Reframing Israel-Palestine: critical Israeli responses to the Palestinian call for Just Peace by Todorova, Teodora
Todorova, Teodora (2014) Reframing Israel-Palestine: 
critical Israeli responses to the Palestinian call for Just 
Peace. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/14049/1/Thesis_Final_Todorova_17_01_14.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
  
 
 
Reframing Israel-Palestine: 
Critical Israeli Responses to the Palestinian Call for Just Peace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teodora Todorova, BA (Hons), MA 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2014  
 
 
                              
 
2 
 
Abstract: 
This thesis examines how Israeli critical activist engagement with the Palestinian call for 
just peace reframes Israel-Palestine. The thesis makes a political-theoretical intervention 
by arguing that Israeli civil society engagement with the principles underlying just peace 
requires, if it is to be successful, the utilisation of non-statist conceptualisations of peace 
politics. The thesis draws upon feminist critical theory and postcolonial critique to 
theorise peace politics as a practice of solidarity. From this perspective the conflict is 
analysed throuJKWKHSULVPRI1DQF\)UDVHU¶VµDOODIIHFWHG¶SULQFLSOH which asserts that all 
those whose lives and wellbeing are affected by an institution of power, whether that be a 
state or a transnational corporation, are subjects of justice in relation to that institution, 
whether they hold the same citizenship as its representatives or not. Thus, by virtue of 
sharing the same, albeit politically diffentiated, geo-political space Israelis and 
Palestinians residing in Israel within its 1948 borders, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as 
well as the refugees outside Israel-Palestine, are subjects of justice and potential 
solidarity. As such, the Palestinians have the right to demand justice not only from the 
state of Israel but also from its citizens. The activist work, narratives and responses of 
three critical Israeli case study groups are examined in relation to the call for just peace: 
Anarchists Against the Wall (AATW), the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions 
(ICAHD), and Zochrot (Remembering). The activist narratives and practices examined 
testify to the way in which critical Israeli engagement with nonviolent ethical 
responsibility towards the Palestinian people can result in unprecedented narrative 
convergence, practical solidarity, and the possibility for non-domination and cohabitation. 
These critical activist practices reveal just peace as an emergent and ongoing project to 
reframe and rearticulate the contemporary relations of oppression and domination in 
Israel-Palestine.       
Key words: Israel-Palestine, just peace, critical activism, feminist critical theory, framing  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis examines how Israeli engagement with the Palestinian call for just peace is 
articulated through activist practice, and how these Israeli critical activist practices 
reframe Israel-Palestine in the process. In particular, the thesis considers the key 
individual, institutional and collective narratives which motivate and/or deter a critical 
engagement with just peace. The thesis makes a critical intervention in the field by 
arguing that Israeli civil society engagement with the principles underlying just peace 
requires, if it is to be successful, the utilisation of non-statist logics or conceptualisations 
of peace politics in Israel-Palestine. The thesis further theorises the potential for an 
emergent peace politics based on a notion of justice situated beyond state-centric 
approaches to conflict resolution.   
Feminist critical theory and postcolonial critique are drawn upon to produce a new 
theoretical framework which enables the theorisation of peace politics as a practice of 
solidarity. Postcolonial theory, and in particular, the work of Edward Said, with its 
notions of overlapping centres and peripheries, intertwined histories, and contrapuntal 
narratives which give rise to new hybrid forms of being and doing, challenging logics of 
separation and irreconcilability, serve as a starting point from which to survey the 
conflicted and contested political and theoretical terrain of Israel-Palestine. At their core, 
postcolonial critique and feminist critical theory, the latter embodied in the work of 
Nancy Fraser (2005), Iris Marion Young (1990, 2002), and Judith Butler (2004, 2009, 
2012), among others, share a commitment to context, history and positionality which 
require us to reconceptualise questions of justice, rights and peace in non-institutional, 
socially embedded ways. In such an instance the failure to observe that peace is a 
question of justice becomes an ethical choice between complicity with oppressive power 
or speaking truth to power.  
                              
 
6 
 
This theoretical approach conceptualises just peace as a process that can only be 
brought about through the emergence of intercultural solidarity beyond the dominant 
logic of ethno-national separation. From this perspective the conflict is analysed through 
WKHSULVPRI1DQF\)UDVHU¶VµDOODIIHFWHG¶SULQFLSOHDQG,ULV0DULRQ<RXQJ¶V
(1990, 2002) work on the politics of difference, justice, and democratic inclusion. Nancy 
)UDVHU¶V µDOO DIIHFWHG¶ SULQFLple asserts that all those whose lives and wellbeing are 
affected by an institution of power, whether that be a state or a transnational corporation, 
are subjects of justice vis-à-vis that institution, whether they hold the same citizenship as 
its representatives or not. As such, the Palestinians have the right to demand justice not 
only from the state of Israel but also from its citizens, as well as international institutions 
complicit in their oppression. Iris Marion Young similarly views solidarity as a relation of 
justice which arises from a shared structural condition. Thus, by virtue of sharing the 
same, albeit politically diffentiated, geo-political space, Israelis and Palestinians residing 
in Israel within its 1948 borders, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as the refugees 
outside Israel-Palestine, are subjects of justice and potential solidarity. Moreover, as Juliet 
Hooker (2009) writes, solidarity is not simply about sympathy or pity:  
The struggle for justice of historically disadvantaged and excluded 
groups (including indigenous people, cultural minorities and the 
descendants of the enslaved) raises important questions for political 
theory about what it means to be the fellow citizen of persons perceived 
DV UDGLFDOO\ ³RWKHU´ DQG DERXW WKH NLQGV of political obligations that 
extend across difference (ibid: 23).  
As such, solidarity is a question of recognition, and the willingness to take action on 
behalf of your fellow subjects of justice. Solidarity is not altruistic, in that it contains 
elements of self-interest: the self-interest to live in peace, with the absence of violence. 
Neither does solidarity depend on mutual identification. Rather, it is contingent on a 
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shared disadvantage that needs to be addressed collectively. However, acts and attempts 
of solidarity are often plagued by tacitly ignored and/or actively obscured intersections of 
unequal power and privilege. The problem with racialised solidarity, referring to 
differential sympathies with racialised others, remains at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian 
FRQIOLFW&KDOOHQJLQJUDFLDOLVHGVROLGDULW\QHFHVVLWDWHV WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRI µWKHHWKLFDO-
historical perspective of dominant racial groups. One way to approach this rather daunting 
task is through changes in the public memory and self-understanding of the political 
FRPPXQLW\DVDZKROH¶+RRNHU 
In the present the prevailing statist logic of separation based on the notion of 
partitioning the land into two pure nation-states, expressed as the concept of ³7ZR6WDWHV
for Two PHRSOHV´, remains the biggest obstacle to reframing the dominant understanding 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From its very inception this logic of separation is a 
statist logic which can only perceive the rights of people in relation to their citizenship, 
even as it refuses to acknowledge that it is dealing with people who are not rights-bearing 
citizens. The logic of separation inherent in the two-state solution implies two equal 
people making concessions in the name of peace and harmony. Simultaneously it fails to 
take into account the vastly unequal playing field from which the two sides begin their 
engagement: one a powerful militarised state, with unspecified and constantly shifting yet 
internationally recognised sovereign borders, the other a stateless people under military 
occupation, or dispersed across the Arab region in refugee camps.  
Despite the dominant rhetoric of irreconcilable ethnic difference which underpins the 
logic of world elites and their proposed ethno-national solution for Israel-Palestine, the 
two collectivities remain entwined in a world characterised by transnational mobility and 
re-settlement, reflected in growing Diasporas and multicultural states and nations. 
Therefore, aside from the more obvious critique of the nation-state as an exclusionary and 
                              
 
8 
 
violence-inducing model of statehood, the two-state solution envisaged and articulated in 
ethno-QDWLRQDOWHUPVSRVHVDQREVWDFOHWRFLWL]HQV¶VRFLDOFXOWXUDODQGSROLWLFDOULJKWV 
Given the history of Israel-Palestine and that the two conflicting populations remain 
enmeshed through political and other designs, a re-partition which reinforces ethno-
national statehood would, it is argued here, still fail to address the lack of equal rights for 
the Palestinian minority within the 1948 borders of Israel, or for that matter the often 
neglected non-Jewish and non-Palestinian minorities residing in this same space. Jewish 
Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories similarly pose an interesting dilemma for the 
notion of ethno-national statehood. However, it is quite clear that the settler colonial 
policies of successive Israeli governments since 1967 in relation to land annexation and 
population transfer are ethno-centric. This is demonstrated by the fact that land settled by 
Jews is considered Jewish and therefore belonging to Israel.      
In order to understand how such an internally incoherent logic continues to dictate 
international policy, while giving justification to continued occupation and the denial of 
basic political and social rights to the Palestinian people in Israel, the refugee camps, as 
well as the Gaza Strip, and West Bank, requires a return to the narratives and histories 
which Edward Said highlights as underpinning any notion of a just peace. It requires the 
reconceptualisation of the conflict as a manifestation of ongoing living history, a history 
that does not begin in 1967, the point of departure for analysis underpinned by the logic 
of separation. Neither does it start in 1948 with the creation of the State of Israel and the 
displacement of the majority of the indigenous Palestinian population. Rather, this history 
takes us back to the late nineteenth century and the colonial designs of both the British 
Empire and Zionist settler colonialism in Palestine. In essence, it requires a confrontation 
with a violent colonial heritage that continues to blight the inhabitants of Israel-Palestine 
as well as those who wish to return to the land.  
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For these reasons the concept of just peace GUDZVRQ(GZDUG6DLG¶V(2006) definition, 
which situates peace politics as a process of acknowledging and engaging with the 
2WKHU¶VQDUUDWLYHDQGWKHPXOWLSOHGLIIHULQJH[SHULHQFHVLQDVKDUHGFRQIOLFWKLVWRU\Just 
peace requires confronting the past in order to look to the future. It requires that if any 
concessions are to be made then they must be assessed in value and magnitude. It is a call 
to equality or at least to the acknowledgement that there is a lack of equality in the 
demand for peace. As such, an engagement with just peace requires the recognition of the 
coexistence and significance of at least two competing narratives in relation to the 
territory which encompasses the land of Historic Palestine (pre-1947), the state of Israel 
(post-1948), and the Occupied Territories of the Gaza Strip and West Bank (post-1967). 
This gives rise to the conceptualisation of the geopolitical and narrative space of Israel-
Palestine. 
A contrapuntal view of these competing narratives does not call for equal treatment 
but rather for examining the ways in which the narratives of the coloniser and colonised1 
are implicated and intertwined in contemporary realities. Moreover, it is an understanding 
of narrative not as a story or a way of seeing and describing the world, but as unevenly 
enjoyed power to shape and construct the world. -XGLWK %XWOHU¶V  FRQFHSW RI
intelligibility is a useful way to articulate this point. According to Butler, the normative 
frameworks produced by power result in the privileging of certain subjects as 
³OHJLWLPDWH´ KHQFH PRUH YDOXDble, trustworthy, and respectable, rendering others 
unintelligible, and hence illegitimate. This notion can be applied contemporarily and 
historically to a number of normative hierarchies related to gendered and racialised 
processes of subjectification and subjugation.  
                                                          
1
 I draw on the work of Gregory (2004), Veracini (2010), and Svirsky (2012) to theorise Israel-Palestine as 
an ongoing situation of settler-colonialism, and hence relations between Palestinians and Israelis as 
relations between the colonised and colonisers respectively. 
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As Butler (2004, 2009) elaborates in her latter work, with particular relevance to 
Israel-Palestine, the state continues to be one of the key sites of violent hierarchical 
subjectification. %XLOGLQJ RQ %XWOHU¶V ZRUN, we might say that theorising peace from a 
state-FHQWULF ORJLF RI VHSDUDWLRQ IDLOV WR DFFRXQW IRU DQGRU DFNQRZOHGJH VWDWH SRZHU¶V
complicity in violence against differentiated subjects. This is of particular relevance to the 
Israeli-Palestinian case in which the power balance is largely skewed in favour of the 
Israeli state. Therefore, the Israeli state can insist that justice be set aside in order for 
peace to be achieved with little cost to its sovereign power.2 However, in a transnationally 
interconnected world such a conceptualisation of state sovereignty which privileges 
institutional power over justice, dignity, and protection for affected subjects and habitats 
needs to be refused.   
The insistence on a non-statist analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its 
desired resolution does not necessarily arise from anti-state politics or for that matter from 
a naive desire to wish the state away. In fact, an emphasis on a non-statist framework 
takes state power as its central unit of analysis; simultaneously insisting on decentering 
the privilege enjoyed by the state to frame political life. The state here is understood as an 
institutional µILFWLRQ¶ SURGXFHG WKURXJK WKH LWHUDWLRQ DQG UHLWHUDWLRQ RI D VHW RI
bureaucratic and repressive practices and mechanisms; i.e. the police, military, border 
control, legislative and judiciary bodies, as well as educational and media institutions. In 
other words, the fiction that is state sovereignty is little more than a set of bureaucratic 
actions carried out by privileged subjects tasked with the reproduction of the state and its 
effects.      
                                                          
2
 ,VUDHO¶VWHQGHQF\WRLQVLVWRQWKH3DOHVWLQLDQUHIXJHHV¶ULJKWRIUHWXUQWREHUHPRYHGIURPQHJRWLDWLRQVDVD
precondition to negotiate is one such example. As is the insistence that Israel must be recognised as a 
³-HZLVK´VWDWH, thus precluding any discussion on the rights of non-Jewish citizens. Similarly, continuing to 
build settlements in the Occupied Territories while refusing to honour the 1967 border as the future 
VRYHUHLJQERUGHURID3DOHVWLQLDQVWDWHLVDQRWKHUH[DPSOHRI,VUDHO¶VGLVSOD\RILQWUDQVLJHQWVRYHUHLJQW\  
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Since the state is understood as the prRGXFW RI LWV FLWL]HQV¶ DFWLRQV LW GRHV QRW
necessarily have to be an ethno-centric and exclusionary body. The modern state, 
divorced from ethno-centrism and other exclusionary ideologies, can equally serve as an 
administrative unit tasked with ensuring the well-being of the environment and population 
under its jurisdiction. Therefore, the thesis argues that when state sovereignty depends on 
destruction, exclusion, and violence for its articulation, it is the duty of citizens/subjects 
to refuse to reiterate this state of affairs, and to insist on a radical democratic reframing of 
the state and related institutions. This framing demands that the state takes responsibility 
and accounts for the needs of all those who are affected by its actions, whether they reside 
within its geopolitical borders or not. Such a framing is equally constructive for 
understanding geopolitical conflict, as it is for addressing larger planetary problems such 
as environmental exploitation and degradation.          
Such processes of framing and their transformative potential, however, require the 
utilisation of narratives which write-in and make intelligible those who have been written-
out and made unintelligible by dominant state-centred frames. The concept of framing in 
this thesis draws on the normative political theories of Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser, 
and to a lesser extent oQ0DULRQ<RXQJ¶VZRUNRQMXVWLFH and inclusion. The thesis avoids 
µIDOVH DQWLWKHVLV¶ )UDVHU  E\ LQWHJUDWLQJ WKH LQVLJKWV RI &ULWLFDO 7KHRU\ DQG
poststructuralist critique by focusing on the points of convergence, rather than divergence, 
embodied in the DERYH WKHRULVWV¶ QRUPDWLYH FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQV Largely, in response to 
)UDVHU¶VZRUNButler (2009) FRQFHLYHVRIµIUDPLQJ¶Ds the prerogative of the war-making 
state which divides subjects into grievable and ungrievable, or those whose life is to be 
preserved and those who are to be destroyed in the name of this preservation. In her most 
recent work on Israel-Palestine (2012) she argues that the only way to break with such 
frames is to refuse to rearticulate dominant formulations, for example by refusing to take 
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part in militarist endeavours. 7KXV %XWOHU¶s understanding of framing emphasises an 
ethical subjectivity which refuses to reproduce violence and exclusion.  
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG )UDVHU¶V (2005) emphasis on framing is concerned with the 
necessary endeavour to expand the µZKR¶ DQG µKRZ¶ FDQ MXVWLFH EH FODLPHG in a 
transnational world. Or in other words, how can the concept of justice be reframed 
beyond state-centric legal boundaries so that it better serves/protects those who are and 
have been affected by unaccountable multinational corporations which often circumvent 
(inter)national law. ,Q WKLV VHQVH )UDVHU¶V emphasis is on the reframing of institutions 
concerned with justice in order to make them better equipped to deal with global 
problems which transcend national boundaries, such as labour and environmental 
exploitation by multinational corporations. However, her conceptualisation of justice is 
not strictly legalistic, as she also considers questions of representation and resource 
redistribution, and their impact on processes of reframing, the former being closely linked 
WR%XWOHU¶VFRQFHSWRILQWHOOLJLELOLW\ 
Setting aside the slightly different emphasis on justice and responsibility embodied in 
%XWOHU DQG )UDVHU¶V FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI IUDPLQJ, this thesis utilises a reconciliation of 
their respective formulations to argue that the necessary articulation of a radical 
democratic order, which is better able to address everyone who is affected by institutional 
power, can only come about through the actions of citizens/subjects who refuse to 
articulate dominant war-making, exploitative and exclusionary frames. And moreover, 
that the task of reframing requires the production and reproduction of new narratives of 
justice and cohabitation. It is here that Iris Marion Young¶VZRUNRQLQFOXVLRQDQGMXVWLFH
reminds us that contemporary political life is enabled and justified by exclusionary 
narratives which can only be countered and/or reframed by acknowledging and 
incorporating excluded narratives. She is particularly interested in how the collective and 
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historical experiences of dispossession and discrimination suffered by African-Americans 
and the indigenous continue to structure contemporary political life in the United States.  
The role of narrative or narrating in this thesis seeks to address precisely this 
quandary in relation to Israel-Palestine: how to acknowledge the past and its role in the 
present without it becoming a defining characteristic of the possible future. However, 
narrative is not utilised here in the same manner as in some versions of Memory and 
Trauma Studies where the function of narrative is often meant to integrate painful 
individual experiences in order to bring about the closure of social conflict and result in 
the production of a cohesive and homogenous cultural, often ethno-national, unit. On the 
contrary, narrating is here understood as a critical future-oriented ethical-political practice 
which acknowledges the past, taking stock of its legacies and effects in the present, in 
order to reconstruct an inclusive and equitable future for all concerned. In this sense, the 
task of narrative is to act as a critical tool which unsettles dominant exclusionary frames 
by piecing together different and sometimes contradictory accounts, and showing the 
limits and exclusions of current perspectives. The structure and selection of the case 
studies examined in this thesis represents one such work of narrative reframing.    
Narrating Israel-Palestine   
Narrating history and memory is undoubtedly at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. How the history of the conflict is told, who has the right to tell this history, 
whose memories enter the history books and whose are dismissed as merely myth, 
impacts not only on how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is narrated but also on how it is 
understood and how it is to be dealt with culturally and politically. Nurit Peled-(OKDQDQ¶V
(2012) monograph Palestine in Israeli School Books highlights the continuing prevalence 
of representations of Palestinian Arabs in Israeli school books DV µWKH RWKHU¶ DQG µWKH
HQHP\¶ with Palestinian versions of history being excluded, delegitimized and silenced. 
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The war over narrative plays an inextricable role in the self-understanding of the two 
collectivities which reside in and lay claim to the land of Israel-Palestine.  
For this reason, Critical Historiography in Israel-Palestine has played an important 
role since the 1990s in challenging the taken for granted narratives of the Israeli state and 
SHRSOH $ FULWLTXH RI ,VUDHO¶V QDUUDWLYHV RI VWDWHKRRG DQG WKH FRQIOLFW FRQWLQXHV WR be 
necessary not because Palestinian narratives are flawless, but because Israel has until very 
recently, and one can argue, continues to be the stronger party which holds the most 
legitimacy over how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to be framed and discussed 
internally as well as internationally.  
Therefore, in order to analyse contemporary civil society attempts to work towards 
just peace in Israel-Palestine, the historical framework utilised by this thesis draws on the 
meticulous, thorough and ethically committed work of Israeli Critical Historiography, in 
particular the work of Ilan Pappé and Gabriel Piterberg. These two outstanding critical 
Israeli historians have not only documented the conflict but have also thoroughly 
contested and undermined the longstanding and previously unchallenged Zionist myth of 
,VUDHO DV D VWDWH HVWDEOLVKHG LQ µD ODQG ZLWKRXW D SHRSOH IRU D SHRSOH ZLWKRXW D ODQG¶
Piterberg has also demonstrated the way in which the Zionist narrative of redemption 
in/through Israel has served to denigrate, invisibilise, and orientalise not only the 
Palestinian Arabs but also the Arab or Mizrahi Jews.  
During discussions on the subject of this thesis, the author has often been accused of 
reinforcing the underlying dichotomy in the conflict, namely Israeli Jews versus 
Palestinian Arabs; and for ignoring or sidelining the complexity of the inter-ethnic 
divisions and hierarchies within, specifically, the Jewish Israeli collective. However, 
these well-meaning critiques fail to grasp the centrality of ethnocratic politics in Israel-
Palestine. As Oren Yiftachel writes: µ7KH DSSURSULDWH SROLWLFDO-geographical framework 
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for the analysis of Israel/Palestine since 1967 is thus: one ethnocracy, two ethno-nations, 
and several Jewish and Palestinian ethno-FODVVHV¶+HGHILQHVDQµHWKQRFUDF\¶
as a state which is neither democratic nor authoritarian:  
yet facilitates non-democratic seizure of the country and polity by one 
ethnic group... Ethnocracies despite exhibiting several democratic 
features, lack a democratic structure. As such they tend to breach key 
democratic tenets, such as equal citizenship, the existence of a territorial 
political community (demos), universal suffrage, and protection against 
the tyranny of the majority (ibid: 270).           
The existence of a hierarchy of ethno-classes both within the Jewish and Palestinian 
ethno-nations is indeed undeniable, and as Piterberg notes, the tragic fate of Palestinian 
Arab and Mizrahi Arab identity in the early years of the formation of the Israeli state is 
rather similar. However, aside from a shared history of symbolic Orientalism the 
similarity in experience vis-à-vis the Israeli state between the Mizrahi Jews and 
Palestinians ends there. Despite continuing ethno-class based discrimination against the 
Mizrahi, as a collective they are considered a full part of the Jewish Israeli nation, and are 
therefore privileged above Palestinian Arabs, including the Palestinian citizens of Israel. 
Moreover, as a number of scholars have noted (Grinberg, 2004; Pappé, 2004) the success 
of rightwing coalition governments in Israel since the early 2000s can, to a large extent, 
be attributed to the votes of the Mizrahi community.  
On the other hand, even if one excludes the disenfranchised population in the 1967 
Occupied Territories from consideration, Palestinian Israelis continue to be excluded from 
the dominant Jewish ethno-nation, as will be shown in the thesis, and are treated as 
second class citizens in relation to the democratic process and allocation of land and 
resources. The institutionalised prevalence of ethno-national discrimination has more 
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recently been likened to apartheid in South Africa, a more detailed discussion of which is 
featured in chapter two. Indeed, Israeli constitutional documents make a clear distinction 
LQ UHODWLRQ WR FLWL]HQV¶ HQWLWOHPHQW WR ULJKWVRQ WKHEDVLVRIQDWLRQDOLW\ OH¶XP) which is 
considered distinct from citizenship (ezrahut). It is for this reason, for example, that the 
Law of Return (1950) makes it possible for every person defined as Jewish, anywhere in 
the world, to make aliyahOLWHUDOO\PHDQLQJµDVFHQW¶WR,VUDHODQGEHJUDQWHGDXWRPDWLF
citizenship upon arrival, while a Palestinian who left their home under conditions of war 
in 1948 continues to be denied the right to return.           
As both Edward Said and Oren Yiftachel have highlighted at different times, the role 
of diasporic communities in the formation and governance of Israel-Palestine is 
unprecedented in historical terms. In fact, Yiftachel (2010) goes as far as to call for the 
immediate cessation of the Law of Return and for a limitation to be imposed on the 
LQIOXHQFHILQDQFLDORUSROLWLFDOWKDWGLDVSRULFJURXSVKDYHRQ,VUDHO¶VSROLF\DQGSROLWLFDO
actions. Said (2006), at the very least, calls for a reappraisal of the role of Diaspora in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For him this reappraisal relates to the Palestinian right of 
return and the possibility for restitution of the civil and political rights which have been 
denied to the Palestinian people since 1948.     
Aside from the entrenched and systematic practice of ethno-national segregation in 
Israel-Palestine, the ethno-class system further serves to stratify the population, 
foreclosing the possibility for certain kinds of solidarity based on class in the traditional 
Marxist sense. For example, many observers have commented on the failure of the 
Mizrahi Jews to forge alliances with Palestinian Arabs on the basis that they share a 
common Arab heritage and are overrepresented in the poor working class. While the 
emergence of such an alliance would be indispensable to justice and peace in Israel-
Palestine, these observations are somewhat naive, for they fail to acknowledge the 
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historical tendency for sections of the working class, particularly, though not exclusively 
in Europe, to be co-opted in nationalist, colonialist, fascist, and anti-immigration 
movements. In Israel, similarly, the Mizrahim¶VORZHUHWKQR-class status means that they 
have at times borne the brunt of the conflict on the Israeli side, making them more not 
less antagonistic towards the Palestinian Other.  
In the aftermath of the Nakba, the expulsion of the majority of Palestinians in 1948, 
most Jewish immigrants from the Arab world who arrived in Israel from the 1950s 
onwards were settled in the poor peripheries of the Israeli border in houses which 
formerly belonged to Palestinians (Pappé, 2004). Many Mizrahi communities continue to 
OLYH LQ WKHVH LPSRYHULVKHG ERUGHU WRZQV ZKLFK KDYH EHHQ DW WLPHV WKURXJKRXW ,VUDHO¶V
history, subject to rocket attacks from Lebanon and Gaza. Likewise, with army service 
being the defining characteristic and pinnacle of inclusion and belonging to the Jewish 
Israeli collective, the Mizrahi community is over-represented among the 10% of Israelis 
who serve in the Occupied Territories and who undertake the physical task of subjecting a 
largely civilian Palestinian population to military rule. Moreover, the Israeli Left has 
traditionally been characterised by middle class Ashkenazi activism. The Ashkenazim 
continue to be over-represented in Israeli peace and conscientious objector movements, 
the latter being quite popular in the 1980s, though both are now in marked decline 
(Grinberg, 2004).  
Having problematised the role of class and its relationship to race and/or ethnicity in 
Israel-Palestine, one might ask: what is the relevance of undertaking this study from a 
perspective largely informed by Critical Theory? In the recent past, Critical Theory as an 
interdisciplinary subject has moved away from the centrality of class as its mode of 
analysis to adopt and refashion a multiplicity of approaches, including poststructuralist, 
psychoanalytic, and postcolonial theories, represented in the centrality of the work of, 
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among others, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and more recently Judith Butler. The 
theoretical framework of this thesis largely draws on the work of Iris Marion Young and 
Judith Butler.  
This theoretical basis formed the springboard for over three years of my own critically 
engaged participatory research in Israel-Palestine in order to theorise the potential for the 
emergence of intercultural solidarity between critical Israeli activists and the Palestinian 
struggle for justice, freedom and equality as embodied in the notion of just peace. As 
Hunter et DO  ZULWH µ0XFK RI WKH ZRUN LQ WKH &7 >&ULWLFDO 7KHRU\@ WUDGLWLRQ LV
preoccupied with uncovering the ways in which social reality is variously negotiated and 
UHVLVWHG µIURP EHORZ¶ RU DW µWKH JUDVVURRWV OHYHO¶ ZLWKLQ HVWDEOLVKHG QHWZRUNV RI SRZHU
and authority. AR [Action Research] helps to build a bridge, to fill the gap, between CT 
DQGSUDFWLFH¶LELG 
Furthermore, as Oliver Richmond (2011) argues International Relations approaches to 
analysing, theorising and otherwise studying processes of conflict resolution, 
peacemaking and/or social transformation tend to privilege and emphasise the role and 
voice of state-centric policy making institutions. Therefore, studying critical activism 
from a Critical Theory informed non-statist perspective can better account for the often 
QHJOHFWHGHPHUJHQWDQGREVFXUHGµSRVWFRORQLDOFLYLOVRFLHW\¶ZKLFKLVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DQ
RQJRLQJ µFRQYHUVDWLRQ DERXW WKH LPSDFW RI KHJHPRQ\ FRORQLDO SUD[LV WKH JOREDO
economy and the reconstruction of rights, needs and identiWLHV¶LELG  
Nevertheless, these civil society networks need to be approached with caution, for 
while characterised by a multiplicity of transnational actors, they are not even, and are 
even less equal. Emphasis on the role and prominence of new media technologies in the 
facilitation of this postcolonial civil society conversation can obscure not only inequality 
in terms of access but also the continued prevalence of the privileging of white, educated 
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voices and perspectives from the Global North; voices which are often empowered by the 
appropriation of the subjugated knowledges and experiences of oppressed and colonised 
peoples. Indeed, this very accusation can be levelled at the choice of case studies in this 
thesis. 
Civil Society in Israel-Palestine    
Why Israeli civil society? In particular, why are such small, and arguably, marginal 
Jewish Israeli groups given such prominence in the struggle for justice, freedom and 
equality in this thesis? No attempt is made in what follows to claim equivalence between 
the efforts of Israeli and Palestinian civil society in the struggle for just peace. On the 
contrary, the thesis departs from the premise that there has been very little evidence for 
any meaningful Israeli civil society engagement with the Palestinian call for justice in the 
aftermath of the failure of the Oslo Accords and the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada. 
Since 2000 and the spread of rightwing politics, the Left in Israel is barely in existence.  
The concept of the Israeli Left has itself changed dramatically over time. During the 
pre-state settlement project and later in the early state years, the left was of a nationalistic 
SHUVXDVLRQSULPDULO\LQWHUHVWHGLQFRQVROLGDWLQJ-HZLVKZRUNHUV¶LQWHUHVWVLQVSLWHRIDQG
against Palestinian Arab workers in Palestine (Pappé, 2004; Shafir, 2005). In the 1990s, 
the Israeli Left reinvented itself by incorporating more culturalist concerns, in line with 
other leftist movements in Europe and North America at the time. More recently, the New 
Left has been associated with the desire to return to the pre-1967 borders and the notion 
of a two-state solution. In a 2001 report written in the midst of the Second Intifada, and 
the immiQHQW HOHFWLRQ RI $ULHO 6KDURQ WR WKH SRVW RI ,VUDHO¶V 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU /LQGVH\
Hilsum wrote: 
In December [2000], after Yasser Arafat raised again the question of 
Palestinian refugees forced into exile when Israel was founded in 1948, 
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a group of left-wing writers and artists, including novelists Amos Oz 
and Meir Shalev, signed a petition declaring their opposition to the right 
of return (Hilsum, 2001: 23).  
The report goes on to explain how many members of the Peace Now movement, 
the largest and oldest peace movement in Israel, are increasingly adopting ultra-rightwing 
rhetoric of a population transfer of the Arab citizens of Israel, rightly leading the report to 
conclude that thLVWXUQWRWKHULJKWVLJQDOOHGµWKHGHDWKRIWKH,VUDHOLOHIW¶. A decade later it 
is arguably no longer possible to speak of a large leftwing peace movement in Israel. The 
widely reported 90% popular support for the military attack on Gaza in December 2008 ± 
January 2009 gives even more credence to such an assertion (Bronner, 2009). Similarly, 
the demands of the self-proclaimed social justice movement, J14, which made an 
appearance in the summer months of 2011, mimicking the Occupy Movement in North 
$PHULFDDQG(XURSHKDUNHGEDFNWRWKHQDWLRQDOLVWHWKRVRI,VUDHO¶V traditional Left. The 
Occupation was off the agenda, and demands for cheaper housing in Israel were met with 
open arms by the leadership of the Settler Movement, who proposed that the answer to 
social justice in Israel lay in more Jewish housing being built on Occupied Palestinian 
land in the 1967 territories.  
What remains of the Israeli Left today can hardly be called either a cultural or 
economic Left. Israeli society is deeply stratified both along ethno-classist lines, and even 
more so with respect to the Palestinians who are seen as radically other. The Left-
associated peace movement was never anti-racist as such; after all, the notion of two 
ethno-states for two peoples relies on a racialist logic. However, the Left seems to have 
become silent and taken a backseat even on the subject of a two-state solution, with the 
rightwing demand for a Greater Israel in Israel-Palestine becoming an increasing reality 
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on the ground in the Occupied Territories, accompanied by continuous rhetoric about 
transferring the Palestinian Arabs out of Israel. 
Further to this, Lahav (2010) argues that the dominant institutionalised patriarchal 
regime in Israel is the product of the consolidation of exclusive ethno-nationalism and 
macho militarism. In this context VRFLDO SULPDF\ LV JLYHQ WR µWKH -HZLVK FRPPXQLW\¶, 
ZLWKHDFKLQGLYLGXDO¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRDQGUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHcommunity placing them 
in a stratified hierarchy of citizenship, which formally excludes the Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories, and further excludes and marginalises Palestinian citizens of the 
Israeli State (ibid: 244). Lemish (2005) makes the case WKDWZRPHQ¶VDQWL-war movements 
are similarly marginalised and excluded from the hegemonic militarised representations 
of the conflict, because they challenge the dominant social order by connecting patriarchy 
and political violence and presenting a nonviolent alternative (ibid: 275).  
For these and other reasons, it LV WKHUHIRUH QRW VXUSULVLQJ WKDW ZRPHQ¶V
organisations are at the forefront of the critical Israeli Left and, moreover, that critical 
organisations in general are adopting feminist modes of thinking and activism. Further, 
the popular turn to the right does not necessarily imply a wholesale annihilation of the 
Israeli Left. In fact, it has contributed to an increasing number of Israeli individuals and 
groups beginning to question some of the dominant Zionist representations of the conflict 
and to be more willing to address the issues that are of vital importance for the Palestinian 
VLGHLQFOXGLQJEXWQRWOLPLWHGWRWKH3DOHVWLQLDQUHIXJHHV¶ULJKWRIUHWXUQ  
In order to differentiate between traditional peace and Left Israeli groups which 
were criticised earlier, the case studies featured in this thesis are characterised by the 
FRQFHSW µFULWLFDO¶ 7KH µFULWLFDO /HIW¶ in Israel is defined as those individuals and 
organisations who (a) acknowledge that the Israeli side is the dominant and stronger side 
in the conflict, leading to (b) a rejection of uncritical militarist and pro-state (in this case 
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pro-Israel) approaches; and (c) a declaration that any discussion about and potential 
solutions to the conflict can only progress by addressing and incorporating the story of the 
OWKHU LQWR RQH¶V RZQ QDUUDWLYH Critical Israeli groups are further differentiated from 
traditional Left peace groups, who prefer negotiation-style interfaith dialogue groups, by 
their emphasis on acknowledging Palestinian narratives, focusing on practical solidarity 
in the joint struggle, and envisaging a radically new and different way of thinking about 
intercultural cohabitation in Israel-Palestine. Under the banner of critical Left Israeli 
organisations, I would include the Coalition of Women for Peace3, an umbrella 
organisation of anti-PLOLWDULVW IHPLQLVW ZRPHQ¶V JURXSV as well as, amongst others, 
(ICAHD), Zochrot (Remembering), and Anarchists Against The Wall (AATW), all of 
which are examined in this thesis. 
On the whole, the critical analysis underpinning this thesis begins with a 
reconceptualisation of the conflict, accompanied by a critical examination of non-state, 
and even anti-state, voices in relation to doing peace politics, based on emergent forms of 
solidarity post-2000 among Israelis and Palestinians. This critique departs from state-
centred International Relations approaches to studying transnational activism by arguing 
that critical theories which focus on justice and its implications for conflict resolution can 
better serve to articulate a more inclusive notion of peace which accounts for the voices of 
the marginalised, excluded, and oppressed.  
The need to reconceptualise an alternative strategy for peace politics in Israel-
Palestine stems precisely from the continued privileging of statist logics of separation 
against the possible non-state and/or alternative solutions emerging from contemporary 
civil society calls for justice, freedom and equality within Israel-Palestine. The 
                                                          
3
 The Coalition of Women for Peace has been particularly active in gathering evidence and publicising the 
activities of business profiting from the Occupation in order to help BDS cases. The result of their work is 
the database WhoProfits.org.   
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importance of civil society contributions to the implementation of peace has been stressed 
in other instances, and this of course presupposes well-developed civil societies, such as 
in South Africa and Northern Ireland: µ,Q GLYLGHG FRPPXQLWLHs civil society plays a 
crucial role in mediating the position of political elites. It provides space for creative 
thinking... It provides an agenda which goes beyond the traditional political divisions, and 
VRHQDEOHVWKRVHWUDGLWLRQVWREHUHFRQFHLYHG¶Bell in Little, 2006: 171).  
+RZHYHUQRWDOOFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVSULRULWLVHDFKDQJHLQWKHVWDWXVTXR'XIILHOG¶V
(2001) extensive research on the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) sector 
demonstrates an established link between the role of financial aid and global governance, 
with many NGOs opting to co-govern afflicted populations and even actively bolstering 
governmental regimes rather than working to challenge discrimination, inequality and 
oppression. This is one of the reasons why in 2002 the Palestinian NGO network (PNGO) 
called for a boycott of USAID by Palestinian civil society organisations. The combination 
of a call for Freedom, Justice and Equality and for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions 
(BDS) of Israel and all institutions complicit in the Occupation, by Palestinian civil 
VRFLHW\LQDFDOOVXSSRUWHGE\FULWLFDO,VUDHOLVIURPµ%R\FRWW)URP:LWKLQ¶DQGDQ
assortment of transnational JURXSVDFURVVWKHZRUOGLQFOXGLQJWUDGHXQLRQVDQGVWXGHQWV¶
unions, testifies to the inseparability of narrative from action. 
The rights-based narrative of BDS encompasses the inhabitants of Israel-Palestine as 
well as those who bear some relation of justice to the land, such as the Palestinian 
refugees who are denied the right to return by Israel. The action aspect of BDS reasserts 
the significance of civil society and public mobilization for justice, reflecting the 
disillusionment and disaffection with state-sanctioned approaches to peace politics. As a 
whole the demands of BDS, perhaps even more so than the tactics, are characterised by an 
active pursuit of nonviolent strategies for conflict resolution. This type of peace politics 
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demands a confrontation with the inherent power disparity in the conflict, as well as 
working towards alternatives which challenge the status quo and seek to achieve a more 
equitable outcome for all concerned.   
For this reason, a further criterion for selecting the chosen critical Israeli groups 
examined in this thesis is WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶UHODWLRQVKLSWRWKHWKUHHSULQFLSOes established 
by the call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS). The principles relate to (i) end 
to Occupation/Colonisation, (ii) Equal Rights for Palestinians in Israel, and (iii) The 
5HIXJHHV¶5LJKWRI5HWXUQ:KHWKHURQHYLHZV%'6DVDPRYHPHQW or as a campaign or 
tactic within the wider movement to end the Israeli occupation and colonisation, the key 
significance of the call for BDS lies in the principles of justice it establishes. Moreover, 
given that these principles are supported by the broadest section of Palestinian civil 
society, including refugees and other Diaspora Palestinians, they constitute the most 
concrete model of a call for just peace as conceptualised by the Palestinian people (BDS 
Call, 2005).   
The identified criteria above resulted in a narrow pool from which the chosen 
Israeli groups were selected. There are many joint Israeli-Palestinian intercultural or 
interfaith dialogue groups in existence which Palestinians in particular tend to dismiss as 
³WDON-VKRSV´+RZHYHUWKHUHDre also numerous respected joint or Israeli groups such as, 
WRQDPHDIHZ%¶7VHOHP%UHDNLQJWKH6LOHQFH Combatants for Peace, Machsom Watch, 
1HZ3URILOH7KH3DUHQWV¶&LUFOHDQG:KR3URILWV+RZHYHUYHU\IHZof these engage 
simultaneously, at least in principle, with the tenets of the Palestinian right of return, 
Palestinian-Israeli rights, and the Occupation. In many ways critical Israeli activist groups 
demonstrate the emergence of unprecedented solidarity between Israeli Jews and 
Palestinians struggling against the Occupation, not in the name of final partition between 
the two peoples, but in the name of justice, freedom and equality.  The emergence of this 
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new found solidarity, which is in no way straightforward and unproblematic, stems from a 
growing awareness that the widely held two-state solution based on the 1967 pre-
Occupation borders is no longer a viable solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
It is important to note that this thesis does not take a particular stance on any state 
solution to the conflict. Nevertheless, the case study chapters feature discussions of the 
growing debate between critical Palestinian and Israeli thinkers and groups on the subject 
of a single and/or binational state in Israel-Palestine, which in turn has resulted in heated 
debates concerning the right to collective self-determination. These debates are 
acknowledged and foregrounded because they represent a newly emergent way to think 
about Israel-3DOHVWLQH EH\RQG WKH FXUUHQW LPSDVVH 1HLWKHU LV WKLV WKHVLV¶V emphasis on 
BDS as a framework for responding to just peace an expectation that leftwing Israelis 
should submit wholesale to the demands made by the BDS campaign in order to be 
considered oppositional to the Israeli establishment.  
Rather, the thesis argues that Israeli engagement with the above principles, 
whether from the Left or Right, is necessary in order to reach a more mutually reciprocal 
agreement than is currently permissible. As will be demonstrated in the chapters which 
follow, the Israeli or Zionist Right has been engaging with all of these issues for many 
more decades than the Israeli Left, albeit this engagement has been characterised by 
denial, omission, and repression. On the other hand, the Israeli Left has largely remained 
on the sidelines of the mainstream Zionist consensus, unwilling to venture beyond a 
consideration of thH2FFXSDWLRQDQG LQWR WKH µXQNQRZQ¶ territory of 1948 and the 
Nakba. 
Indeed, tKH SDVW GHFDGH¶V PRYH ZLWKLQ D VPDOO EXW JURZLQJ VHFWRU RI ,VUDHOL
society, towards dealing with the status of Arab Israelis and the question of the 
Palestinian refugees has been cautious and measured. Engaging with questions of 
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occupation, equal citizenship and the right of return has exposed old, and created new, 
rifts and divisions within Israeli society. Moreover, these questions go to the very heart of 
what it means to be an Israeli in the 21st century. The Colonial Occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories, the presence of a large non-Jewish population which is a remnant 
of the indigenous people that lived in Israel-Palestine prior to 1948, coupled with the 
PLOOLRQV RI 3DOHVWLQLDQ UHIXJHHV DURXQG ,VUDHO¶V ERUGHUV JRHV WR WKH FRUH Rf the self-
defined Jewish state: a Jewish state which views itself as admiQLVWHULQJ µGLVSXWHG
WHUULWRULHV¶, while aiming to maintain a demographic Jewish majority within its 1948 
borders, and rejects outright the Palestinian right of return. Whether explicitly articulated, 
or dwelling between the lines, these issues are central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.             
The Case Studies  
Zochrot (Remembering) is an Israeli organization based in Tel Aviv which was set 
up in 2002 and gained full NGO status in 2005 in order to raise awareness among the 
Jewish Israeli public about the Nakba of 1948 and its legacy within Israeli society. Most 
RI WKH 1*2¶V VWDII H[FHSW IRU WKH 'LUHFWRU ZRUN SDUW-time and the organisation relies 
heavily on voluntary and freelance contributions from activists and researchers. The 
organisation regularly participates in activities co-organised with other critical Israeli 
NGOs. For example, in the past it has run educational workshops with New Profile. 
=RFKURW¶V DFWLYLWLHV UDQJH IURP SXEOLF FRPPHPRUDWLRQ RI WKH 1DNED FROOHFWLQJ DQG
documenting Nakba survivor testimonies, and more recently testimonies by former 
Jewish fighters, to planning the return of the Palestinian refugees. 
ICAHD is a non-violent direct-action organisation comprised of Israeli peace and 
human rights activists who work alongside Palestinian community representatives in the 
2FFXSLHG7HUULWRULHV7KHEXONRI,&$+'¶VZRUNLVEDVHGLQ(DVW-HUXVDOHPDQGWKH:HVW
%DQNDQGDOWKRXJKWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VQDPHVXJJHVWVWKDWLWVPDLQDFWLYLWLHVDUHFRQFHUQHG
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with opposing house demolitions in the Occupied Territories, the organisation is also 
involved in monitoring Israeli settlement activity. Since 2010 ICAHD has expanded its 
SRUWIROLR WR LQFOXGH WKH GHPROLWLRQV RI 3DOHVWLQLDQ KRPHV ZLWKLQ ,VUDHO¶V  ERUGHUV
,&$+'¶V DVVRFLDWHG JURXSV LQ )LQODQG WKH 8. DQG 86$ DUH IXUWKer involved in 
campaigning and lobbying local politicians to encourage their respective governments to 
apply international pressure on Israel to end the Occupation. 
AATW are a group of anti-authoritarian and anarchist direct action activists who 
came together at the start of the construction of the West Bank Separation Wall, or what 
WKH\ WHUP WKH µ$SDUWKHLG :DOO¶ LQ  $$7: DFWLYLVWV DWWHQG WKH ZHHNO\ SURWHVWV
against the Wall coordinated by local Palestinian Popular Organising Committees, and 
attended by Palestinian, international solidarity and Israeli activists. Largely comprised of 
young Israelis, AATW activists are also active in disseminating activist media and in 
providing on-the-ground solidarity and support. Their non-hierarchical participatory 
activism contributes to the workings of a transnational community of solidarity and 
resistance against occupation and colonisation in Israel-Palestine. In many respects, out of 
all three groups they are most explicitly aligned with the aims and tactics of the 
transnational movement for just peace which is discussed in greater detail in chapter one.          
The aims and objectives of the above groups are broadly similar and yet they are very 
different from one another in terms of approach. Although they often share activist power, 
as is the case with most critical Israeli groups, they were not chosen to be compared or 
contrasted with one another in order to create a hierarchy of activism. Rather, each group 
has been included in a broadly theoretical chapter as a practical illustration of critical 
Israeli engagement with a pertinent question within the broader struggle for just peace. 
Moreover, each case study was selected on the basis of being recommended by critical 
Palestinian activists as an example of Israeli groups which are already doing critical and 
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valuable work in Israel-Palestine. It is almost a coincidence that the three case study 
groups happen to represent different types of activist and discursive interventions into the 
critical debates taking place in the past decade on the topic of just peace in Israel-
Palestine 
=RFKURW¶VZRUN LVSULPDULO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKQDUUDWLYHDQGEULQJLQJ WKH WZRKLVWRULHV
together, a task that has already been identified as the basis for any critical and just 
dialogue. AATW take an active solidarity stance in the Occupied Territories which is 
highly valued by Palestinians who have largely given up on the Israeli Left and are 
increasingly seeking to distance themselves from dialogue initiatives through calls for 
anti-normalization. ICAHD bridges the two approaches through practical rebuilding and 
anti-GHPROLWLRQ DFWLYLVP LQ WKH :HVW %DQN FRXSOHG ZLWK LWV IRXQGHU¶V FULWLFDO DQDO\VLV
which seeks to reframe the dominant discourse of the conflict in line with Palestinian 
narratives of just peace.  
Another notable difference between the three groups is that ICAHD and Zochrot can 
be broadly defined as left-liberal, Anarchists Against The Wall (AATW), on the other 
hand, derive their politics from the left-libertarian tradition of thought. However, as one 
$$7:DFWLYLVWSXWLW³:HDUHPRUHDFWLYLVWVDJDLQVW7KH:DOOUDWKHUWKDQDQDUFKLVWVLQ
WKHVWULFWVHQVHRIWKHZRUG´7KLVFRPPHQWLVEHVWXQGHUVWRRGDVDQDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRI
the different counter and/or non-state positions from which AATW activists draw. 
AATW similarly differs from the other two case studies in that it is not an 
institutionalised NGO, but rather a loose organisation of autonomous activists. Zochrot 
(Remembering) and the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), on the 
other hand, are both officially recognised NGOs with registered office premises in Tel 
Aviv and West Jerusalem respectively.  
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Theorising the work of the above critical activist groups has involved a combination 
of an extensive literature review of activist and scholarly work engaged with just peace 
politics in Israel-Palestine, combined with a number of intermittent fieldwork trips to 
Israel-Palestine between 2009 and 2011, which were followed by informal interviews, 
conversations, and online communications with activists. Despite the use of mixed 
participatory methods, the primary focus of the thesis has been to analyse the narratives or 
µVWUXFWXUHV RI NQRZOHGJH DQG VWRULHG ZD\V RI NQRZLQJ¶ &RUWD]]L   ZKLFK
underpin the work done by these critical Israeli organisations. The narrative analysis 
utilised in the study of this groups draws on -XGLWK%XWOHU¶VZRUNRQdiscursive framing, 
as well as on aspects of contemporary organisation studies theory. However, it deviates 
substantially from organisation studies in that it is not so much concerned with describing 
organisational structures and processes but with the narratives produced by these groups 
in relation to the notion of just peace.  
Narrative, both in terms of history and memory but also in relation to contemporary 
processes of sense-making, plays an important part in understanding organising. Langley 
DQG 7VRXNDV  VHH RUJDQLVDWLRQV DV SURFHVVHV RI LQWHUDFWLRQ µSURFHVV WKLQNLQJ¶
GHPDQGVVHQVLWLYLW\WRµFRQWH[WLQWHUDFWLYLW\ experience, and time; and it acknowledges 
non-OLQHDULW\HPHUJHQFHDQGUHFXUVLYLW\¶LELG-'UDZLQJRQ5LFRHXU¶VKHUPHQHXWLF
approach, Gerardo Patriotta (2003) integrates the concepts of temporality and spatiality to 
argue that organisations can be viewed and/or read as texts, and the processes of 
organising as narration: 
Like texts, organizations emerge through processes of distanciation and 
dissociation (both temporal and spatial) whereby human action is 
objectified, historicized, written down in documentary artefacts or 
inscribed into stable structures of significations. Thanks to distanciation 
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KXPDQGHHGVEHFRPH³LQVWLWXWLRQV´ LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW WKHLUPHDQLQJQR
longer coincides with the logical intentions of the actors (2003: 154).    
It is for this reason that this thesis focuses on the codification/signification which 
emerges in the production of organisational texts rather than in the individual actions 
and/or the personal narratives of activists. In many respects, organisation studies, with its 
history of studying corporate and government practices and structures, lends itself more 
clearly to examining the narratives of organised groups such as ICAHD and Zochrot. 
However, when viewing organising as a temporal and spatial process of sense-making 
which results in the production of textual artefacts, then this approach becomes equally 
applicable to the organisational practices and dynamics of less structured groups such as 
AATW.  
There are of course other practical as well as theoretical considerations which played 
a part in the decision to focus on organisational archives as opposed to examining the 
organisations through the individual narratives of their activists. As Hintz and Milan 
DUJXH LQ WKHLUSDSHU µ6RFLDO6FLHQFH LV3ROLFH6FLHQFH5Hsearching Grass-Roots 
$FWLYLVP¶DFWLYLVWVRIWHQYLHZUHVHDUFKHUVZLWKVXVSLFLRQDQGGLVWUXVW2IWHQWKHW\SHRI
probing questions we ask differs little from a police interrogation; and moreover, activists 
can also feel that their largely free and voluntary labour for the cause is being used to 
further the well-paid career of an academic whose work is likely to be of little use to the 
activists or their projects.  
Moreover, in my case, being an outsider, based abroad, and not known from the start 
as an activist on Israel-Palestine, meant that access to individual activists was very 
difficult, long and protracted. When access was finally gained, interviewees were often 
guarded, relying on well-rehearsed institutional legitimating scripts, and repeatedly 
requeVWLQJ WKDW WKHLU QDUUDWLYHV ZHUH QRW WDNHQ DV µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶ RI WKH JURXS RU LWV
activities. The latter made it near impossible to make general observations about 
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collective thought and/or direction. However, this in itself is not a particular problem for 
the present purposes as collective action is the sum of its disparate and independent parts, 
nor was the reluctance to narrate the main reason for focusing on organisational archives.  
Rather, examining the fading, emerging, and enduring narratives of these groups, in 
relation to their activism but also to the concepts of Israel-Palestine and just peace, more 
clearly indicates collective shifts in the process of dialogical sense-making and the 
possibility for the emergence of solidarity with the Palestinian Other. While the analysis 
in the chapters that follow does not therefore rely primarily on interview data with 
activists, the informal interviews conducted nevertheless serve to shape, reflect upon, and 
guide the more theoretical reflections and analysis utilised in the thesis to examine the 
JURXSV¶WH[WXDOQDUUDWLYHV$VVXFKWKHWKHVLVQDUUDWLYHLVLWVHOIRUJDQLVHGDVDSURFHVVRI
dialogical sense-making of the past, present and future in relation to the question of just 
peace in Israel-Palestine as framed in the narratives and work of these critical Israeli 
groups.  
Moreover, this approach to studying critical activist groups foregrounds the 
acknowledgement that working with/on activist groups and networks is not simply about 
studying them and learning about them. It is about being taught and learning from them, 
and recognising that they are active producers of valuable and legitimate knowledge. The 
critical Israeli groups featured in the thesis testify to the inherent tendency of activists to 
theorise ZLWK D VPDOO ³W´ DQG VRPHWLPHV HYHQ ZLWK D FDSLWDO ³7´ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKHLU
struggle, the means and tactics through which the struggle is to be articulated, and 
ultimately the final goal of the struggle, whether that be an end to a certain repressive 
state policy and/or a demand for wider social transformation.  
These activists not only draw on pre-existing modes of critique, whether those be 
liberal human rights discourses, psycho-social theory, and/or anarcho-communist 
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critiques of state power and social domination, they also generate vast amounts of 
context-specific analysis, critique and description of issues and concepts which have local 
as well as transnational implications. Thus, a critical and committed engagement with the 
knowledges and narratives of those engaged in emancipatory struggles can contribute to a 
reappraisal of our critical intellectual heritage and simultaneously provide us with space 
to break down dichotomies between academic engagement and activist practice.  
Simultaneously, a criWLFDO HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK WKHVH DFWLYLVWV¶ WKHRUHWLFDO FRQWULEXWLRQV
necessitates a degree of academic detachment in order to critique and reappraise the 
OLPLWDWLRQVRISURSRVHGUHPHGLHV0RUHRYHUGHVSLWHRQH¶VSROLWLFDODIILQLW\ZLWKWKHJLYHQ
activist perspectives, the activist academic must remain an insider-outsider. Many activist 
DFDGHPLFVRIWHQIHHOµWRUQ¶EHWZHHQWKHFRPSHWLQJFDOOVWREHFRPPLWWHGDQGGHWDFKHGDW
WKH VDPH WLPH \HW LQ UHDOLW\ µREMHFWLYLW\ WXUQV RXW WR EH DERXW SDUWLFXODU DQG VSHFLILF
embodiment and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all 
limits and responsibility. The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective 
vision... )HPLQLVWREMHFWLYLW\LVDERXWOLPLWHGORFDWLRQDQGVLWXDWHGNQRZOHGJH¶ (Haraway, 
1988: 582-583).  
Feminist objectivity has allowed me to theorise in a more concrete and socially 
embedded way. Therefore, in this case, the activist researcher is not so much 
transgressing theory/praxis divides, embodied in the dichotomies of subjective/objective 
and/or committed/detached, but she is rather acting upon a commitment to broaden and 
make the production and sharing of a multiplicity of knowledges more inclusive, 
representative, and accessible. Thus, more than a transgression of personal and 
professional boundaries, the fusion of critical theories and political praxis is ultimately an 
act of resistance against totalizing and/or relativistic ideologies of objectivity, and a 
reappraisal of the importance of speaking and hearing from many different perspectives, 
experiences and ways of making sense of the world.  
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The ultimate aim of this thesis is not only to document the critical practices observed, 
but for the thesis itself to reframe the way Israel-Palestine is understood, and to act as a 
future catalyst for a broader political-theoretical conversation which might contribute to 
further critical action on the ground, as well as in other comparable locations where 
struggles against injustice are taking place. For this reason a combination of narrative and 
intertextual analysis has been utilised to examine WH[WVE\DQGDERXWWKHJURXSV¶ZRUN. As 
David Boje (2001) notes:  
Narrative analysis combined with antenarrative analysis can be a field 
that is about telling stories (ibid: 9) ... And since no narrative is an 
island, but in a dynamic context of plurality of other narratives, the 
centred position self-deconstructs without any pushing, shoving or 
editing on our part (ibid: 23).   
From this perspective, in the process of enquiry, the critical theorist/activist 
researcher self-LGHQWLILHV DV D IHOORZ µWUDYHOOHU¶ RQ D MRXUQH\ RI FULWLFDO SROLWLFDO
exploration (Sherman Heyl, 2007: 371); and thereafter, as a story-teller who re-narrates 
accounts of just peace SROLWLFVµLQDZD\WKDWUHPDLQVIDLWKIXO to the capacity of citizens to 
DFWWRJHWKHU¶0LQRZ,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHWDVNRIWKLVWKHRUHWLFDOSURMHFWLVWR
FRQWLQXH µGRLQJ¶ just peace politics by other means, by narrating, questioning and 
XQVHWWOLQJ H[LVWLQJ DFFRXQWV LQ RUGHU WR µUHRULHQW SHRSOH¶V PLQGV WR FRQIURQW WKH IXWXUH
UDWKHUWKDQWRDFFHSWWKHSDVW¶LELG 
Chapters 
Chapters one and two are conceptual in nature; they outline and examine the key 
concepts which underpin the thesis, and historicise the contemporary set-up in Israel-
Palestine. Chapter One outlines the failings and problems of the official state-centred 
peace process exemplified by the Oslo Accords and similar endeavours, and proposes 
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critical civil society activism as an alternative. Moreover, peace is reframed as a question 
of justice which requires the utilisation of a radical democratic frame in which all affected 
have a right to claim redress from the culpable state, its representatives and citizens. 
Chapter Two looks more closely at the contemporary set-up in Israel-Palestine through 
WKHSULVPRI,ULV0DULRQ<RXQJ¶VµILYHIDFHVRIRSSUHVVLRQ¶LQRUGHUWRPDNHDFDVHIRUD
UHODWLRQRI MXVWLFHRU µDGXW\ WRGR MXVWLFH¶EHWZHHQ ,VUDHOLV DQG3DOHVWLQLDQVDVZHOODV
between the state of Israel and the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the chapter 
foregrounds the necessity for privileged citizens to respond ethically to the call for justice 
by refusing to reproduce state violence and oppression.  
Chapter Three brings the preceding debates together to examine the role of 
violence and the related principle of ethical nonviolent UHVSRQVLELOLW\YLD-XGLWK%XWOHU¶V
reading of Levinas and Benjamin. This theoretical framework is applied as a critical 
discursive reading of a set of documentary film texts dealing with Israeli military service 
in the Occupied Territories which illustrate the limitations and barriers facing the 
possibility for ethical nonviolent engagement in Israel-Palestine. The theoretical 
framework established in chapters one to three proposes acknowledgemeQWRIWKH2WKHU¶V
narrative and taking ethical nonviolent responsibility for the Other as the necessary 
preconditions for establishing a justice-based community of resistance.   
Chapters four to six each take a closer look at some of the key issues surrounding the 
notion of just peace and how my case study groups have responded to them theoretically 
and practically. As chapters one to three establish, just peace remains conditional on 
Israeli acknowledgement and engagement with Palestinian narratives of 1948 and the 
Nakba. Acknowledging the narratives of the oppressed and dispossessed is one small step 
towards overcoming racialised solidarity in favour of the emergence of the ethical 
political solidarity necessary for establishing a just peace.  
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For this reason the work of Zochrot (Remembering) which deals with Nakba 
advocacy and commemoration features as a case study in chapter four. While the group 
does not explicitly define its work as solidarity activism in the same way that AATW or 
ICAHD define their on-the-ground practical resistance and protest activities in the 
Occupied Territories. Nevertheless, the work they do with respect to the Palestinian 
narrative of the Nakba in Israeli society is vitally important in opening up an ethical-
political dialogue about a shared founding moment. The chapter concludes with a critical 
UHIOHFWLRQ RQ =RFKURW¶V DWWHPSWV LQ FROODERUDWLRQ ZLWK WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ 1*2 %DGLO WR
visualise the Palestinian reIXJHHV¶UHWXUQLQDSRVW-Zionist and post-colonial moment. This 
reflection foregrounds some tensions around the subject of the state form Israel-Palestine 
might take, and what that would mean for the self-determination of the two collectivities.   
Chapter Five critically engages with the work of ICAHD and in particular the analysis 
RILWVIRXQGHU-HII+DOSHU7ZRVWUDQGVRI,&$+'¶VZRUNDUHKLJKOLJKWHGDQGH[DPLQHG
namely the contributions made by its on-the-ground resistance and rebuilding activities, 
as well as its international political advocacy which seeks to reframe IsraeO¶VGRPLQDQW
security discourse which serves as a justification for continuing oppression in the 
2FFXSLHG7HUULWRULHV$ORQJVLGHWKLV-HII+DOSHU¶VFULWLFDODQDO\VLVDQG,&$+'¶VUHFHQW
statement announcing its support for a binational state in Israel-Palestine has resulted in 
some spirited debates on the subject of self-determination in a post-decolonisation Israel-
Palestine. These debates are critically examined iQUHODWLRQWRWKHµDOODIIHFWHG¶ principle.      
Chapter Six examines the work and narratives of Anarchists Against The Wall in 
UHODWLRQ WR WKH RIW KLJKOLJKWHG LUUHFRQFLODELOLW\ EHWZHHQ DQDUFKLVP¶V DQWL-state ideology 
and solidarity with the arguably state-centred struggle for Palestinian self-determination in 
the Occupied Territories. The chapter highlights the manner in which the embodied 
activism of AATW articulates an alternative, anti-Zionist and non-dominating Israeli 
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subjectivity in relation to the Palestinian people. The discussion concludes with a 
reflection on the necessity to reconceptualise self-determination as non-dominating and 
non-statist; a conceptualisation which would take into account all affected and avoid 
reproducing minority/majority dichotomisation and hierarchies.    
Given that the oppressive situation in Israel-Palestine is unfolding in the present-
continuous it is practically impossible to conclude the thesis with a definitive conclusion. 
As I write these lines, the United States sponsored peace process is being resurrected for 
DQDOOHJHG³ILQDO WLPH´2YHU WKHQH[WQLQHPRnths, from Wednesday August 14th 2013, 
Israeli and Palestinian negotiators are set to sit down to discuss final status issues: borders, 
refugees, settlements. Yet, in the two days leading up to the start of the new round of 
negotiations the international mHGLD KDV UHSRUWHG ,VUDHO¶V DQQRXQFHPHQW RI WKH
construction of an additional 2000 housing units in East Jerusalem and the Occupied West 
Bank; and the release of 26 Palestinian prisoners as part of the deal leading up to the 
negotiations has been accompanied by Israeli military air strikes in the Gaza Strip. The 
Gaza Strip remains under blockade, and Israel continues to insist that its primary objective 
GXULQJ WKH QHJRWLDWLRQV LV WR EH UHFRJQLVHG DV D ³-HZLVK´ VWDWH E\ WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQV 7KH
outcome of the negotiations, if they are to take off the ground, cannot be predicted. 
However, I would dare to argue, with relative confidence, that the arguments and analysis 
put forward in this thesis will remain relevant in the coming months, if not years, for the 
call for just peace remains unanswered. At the very least, the case put forward in this 
thesis should be read as a critical reflection on the civil society endeavour in the past 
decade to overcome the current impasse. 
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1. Reframing Peace as a Question of Justice 
 
This chapter asserts peace as a question of justice, and just peace as a process of 
DFNQRZOHGJLQJDQGHQJDJLQJZLWKWKH2WKHU¶VQDUUDWLYHDQGRQH¶VUROHLQWKHUHODWLRQRI
oppression which characterises Israel-Palestine. The chapter highlights the shortcomings 
of the official Peace Process in Israel-Palestine since 1993 by providing a critical 
historical-political overview. It argues that the absence of the notion of justice has been at 
the heart of this state-centred approach and its failure to bring about peace. Transnational 
civil society politics and activism are examined as an alternative to obstinate and stagnant 
statist approaches to conflict resolution.  
Reframing Justice and Peace 
7KH YDVW PDMRULW\ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV¶ ,5 DQG UHODWHG GLVFLSOLQHV¶
GHILQLWLRQV RI µSHDFH¶ WHQG WR HPSKDVLVH WKH FHQWUDOLW\ RI WKH VWDWH LQ ZDU DQG SHDFH
(Richmond, 2008). Feminist IR scholarship further draws attention to the manner in 
which conflict and peace are presented in a dichotomous relationship which, similar to 
other philosophical oppositions such as man/woman and culture/nature, corresponds to 
the dichotomy active/passive (Enloe, 1983). As a result, peace is often rendered in terms 
of a lack or absence, i.e. the absence of war or conflict, which leads to the precedence 
and/or privileging of war and conflict over peace.  
While peace is expressed as the desired state of social being, its attainability is 
nevertheless viewed with resignation and pessimism because, rooted in Hobbesian 
thought, war and conflict continue to be perceived as an intricate part of human nature. 
Thus, although peace is the desirable state of social being, the supposed human 
inclination towards conflict and aggression means that wars are more likely to be waged 
and fought. From this perspective, the active pursuit of peace becomes futile since peace 
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LVVHHQDVDPHUHSHULRGRIXQVWDEOHDQGSUHFDULRXVµUHVSLWHEHWZHHQZDUV¶*LUDXGRX[LQ
Hoffman, 2006).    
7KH µQHJDWLYH¶ FRQFHSWLRQ RI SHDFH LH SHDFH DV WKH DEVHQFHUHGXFWLRQ RI
violence, provides us with a large scope of possible definitions, but not necessarily with a 
mechanism for achieving stable and sustainable peace. From a legal and political 
SHUVSHFWLYHDFHDVHILUHEHWZHHQWZRZDUULQJIDFWLRQVFDQEHYLHZHGDVDQµDFWRISHDFH¶
Similarly, a conflict may be brought to an end by a decision to partition a disputed 
territory between two or more states or a peace treaty may be signed between warring 
QDWLRQVZKRDJUHHWRFDUU\RXWµSRSXODWLRQWUDQVIHUV¶+RZHYHUQRZKHUHFDQDJXDrantee 
be found, either in legal texts or political documents that the measures which bring about 
negative peace can guard against renewed hostility or even a new conflict. More often 
than not, ceasefires merely act as lulls in hostility, with violence being on the verge of 
outbreak at any point. 
As Hoffman (2006) points out, durable peace relies on addressing the root causes 
of a conflict, further adding that state actors need to concern themselves with the feelings 
FUHDWHGE\WKHLUGHFLVLRQVEHFDXVHµ3HDFHZKLFKIHHGVUHVHQWPHQWLVDEDGSHDFH¶LELG
16). At this point two further definitions of peace must enter our discussion, namely that 
RI µSRVLWLYH SHDFH¶ DQG µMXVW SHDFH¶. Galtung (1996) deILQHV µSRVLWLYH SHDFH¶ DV D
nonviolent, creative and life-enhancing conflict transformation (ibid: 3 and 9); within this 
definition distributive justice and the promotion of equal opportunity would fall under the 
umbrella of positive peace work.  
'HILQLQJ µMXVW SHDFH¶ on the other hand is a somewhat problematic task. Given 
WKDW WKHUH DUH DW OHDVW WKUHH PDLQ GHILQLWLRQV RI µSHDFH¶ RQH ZRXOG XQGRXEWHGO\ FRPH
DFURVVDQXPEHURIGLIIHUHQWDQGFRQIOLFWLQJGHILQLWLRQVRIµMXVWLFH¶DQGKRZLWUHODWHVWR
peace. A µMXVWSHDFH¶ could be defined negatively and in legal terms as an end to a war 
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and/or a peace which has been agreed in law through the signing of a peace accord and/or 
treaty µ-XVW 3HDFH¶ FRXOG DOVR EH YLHZHG LQ UHODWLRQ WR µ-XVW :DU¶ LH WKH DEVHQFH RI
terrorism and/or state exceptionalism. Thus, one could make the case that had the State of 
Israel and Palestinian representatives complied with the 1993 Declaration of Principles 
during the Oslo peace negotiations, and signed a final status agreement the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict would have concluded with a µMXVWSHDFH¶.   
+RZHYHU'DYLG /LWWOH PDNHV WKHFDVH WKDW µSHDFH¶XQGHUVWRRGPHUHO\ LQ
terms of the absence of violence is antagonistic to the concept of µMXVWSHDFH¶ Rather, he 
defines µMXVW SHDFH¶ as a form of transitional or restorative justice which acts as a 
mechanism to address and prevent past violations from reoccurring in the future. He cites 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an example of µMXVWSHDFH¶ in 
DFWLRQDQGFULWLFLVHVWKH2VOR$FFRUGV¶HPSKDVLVRQVHSDUDWLRQDQG partition for acting as 
a disincentive to incorporate human rights into the peace deal (ibid: 171 ± 173). On the 
other side of the debate, Yossi Beilin (2006), an Israeli negotiator of the Oslo Accords, 
rejects outright the concept of µMXVWSHDFH¶: 
The term Just Peace is redundant, but its problem lies not in its 
redundancy, but in the accompanying concept it introduces onto the 
stage ± ³XQMXVW SHDFH´ 7KH H[LVWHQFH RI D FRQFHSW VXFK DV ³XQMXVW
SHDFH´FUHDWHVDZLGHPDUJLQIRUUHVLVWDQFHWRSHDFHFODLPLQJ that it is 
unjust, thus causing injustice to those who pay the price for lack of 
peace (ibid: 130). 
  %HLOLQJRHVRQ WR DUJXH WKDW D UHVROXWLRQ WRSHDFH DOUHDG\ HQFRPSDVVHV µMXVWLFH¶
DQG WKHUHIRUH WKH RQO\ µXQMXVW SHDFH¶ LV µD SHDFH VLJQHG WRR ODWH¶ LELG: 148). His case 
against µMXVW SHDFH¶ UHODWHV GLUHFWO\ WR WKH ,VUDHOL-Palestinian conflict, and he lists the 
QXPHURXVµRIIHQFHV¶ FRPPLWWHGE\WKH3DOHVWLQLDQV$UDEVDJDLQVWµSHDFH¶LQFOXGLQJWKHLU
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original rejection of the 1947 UN partition of Palestine bHFDXVH RI WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ¶V
PDMRULW\VWDWXVLQWKHWHUULWRU\WKHQXPHURXVUHIXVDOVWRDFFHSW,VUDHO¶VULJKWWRH[LVWDVD
µJewish State¶ DQG ODVW EXW QRW OHDVW WKHRQJRLQJ FHQWUDOLW\RI WKH3DOHVWLQLDQ µULJKWRI
UHWXUQ¶ DVDSRLQWRIFRQWHQWLRQDQGDOOHged obstacle to a peaceful solution (ibid: 141 ± 
146 ).  
7DNLQJ %HLOLQ¶V REMHFWLRQV WR µMXVW SHDFH¶ into consideration, Allan and Keller 
(2006) define µMXVW SHDFH¶ DV µD ODQJXDJH RULHQWHG DSSURDFK¶ WKDW WDNHV XV EH\RQG D
negative definition of peace but is QHYHUWKHOHVVVXSHUVHGHGE\µSRVLWLYHSHDFH¶WKHODWWHU
being concerned with ending social conflict and structural inequality (ibid: 195-6). They 
outline four conditions for the successful fulfilment of µMXVWSHDFH¶ thin recognition, thick 
recognition, renouncement, and rule. The first step involves accepting the other as a valid 
and crucial agent for negotiation. The second requires full acknowledgement of the 
RWKHU¶V LGHQWLW\ DQG D FULWLFDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH VHOI ZKLFK OHDGV WR FRQVHQVXDO
negotiatioQ ERXQGDULHV µ5HQRXQFHPHQW¶ LQYROYHV FRQFHVVLRQV DQG FRPSURPLVHV KHUH
WKH\ FLWH WKH  *HQHYD $FFRUG LQ ZKLFK WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ QHJRWLDWRUV µFRQFHGHG¶ WKH
right of return, while the Israelis renounced their claims to the Old City and East 
Jerusalem, with negotiated right to access. The final component of µMXVWSHDFH¶ which is 
µUXOH¶UHODWHVWRWKHFUHDWLRQDQGXWLOL]DWLRQRIDFRPPRQODQJXDJHIRUQHJRWLDWLRQDQGRU
inter-cultural dialogue based on nonviolent communication and respect for the claims of 
the other (Allen and Keller, 2006:196-208).  
On the other hand, Edward Said (2006) cautions against attempts to produce 
definitions of just peace and warns against reproducing the Oslo Process which for him 
represents an example of thinking about just peace in the same terms as Just War. Instead, 
he makes the case that thinking about just peace must begin with thinking about conflict 
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and/or the reasons behind a conflict. In relation to the Israeli ± Palestinian conflict he 
writes:  
what was at issue between Israelis and Palestinians was never a real or 
Just Peace but the possibility for Palestinians of restitution of property, 
nationhood, identity ... The logic of separation that has been played out 
since 1948 reached its doomed failure with the terminated Oslo Accords 
and the outbreak of the intifada (Said, 2006: 187).  
The alternative model for thinking about just peace SURSRVHGE\6DLGLV µDFRQWUDSXQWDO
PHWKRG¶ZKLFKLVDQDWWHPSWWRµUHQGHUVRPHVHQVHERWKRIDORQJHUDQGZLGHUYLHZ-point 
and also the reality of sLPXOWDQHRXVYRLFHV¶LELG  
a compact or entente whose outlines would have to include regarding 
WKH RWKHU¶V KLVWRU\ DV YDOLG EXW LQFRPSOHWH DV XVXDOO\ SUHVHQWHG DQG
second, admitting that despite the antinomy these histories can only 
continue to flow together, not apart, within a broader framework based 
on the notion of equality for all (ibid: 194).           
Thus, theorising justice in relation to peace requires a nuanced understanding of 
the different experiences in a shared conflict history, with just peace representing not the 
end of the conflict but the beginning of a new dynamic. In the context of Israel-Palestine 
this demands an acknowledgement of Palestinian narratives of 1948 and the Nakba within 
Israeli society, the establishment of secular citizenship based on just solidarities and 
FRKDELWDWLRQZLWKDQHPSKDVLVRQWKHµ2WKHU¶LQGLDORJXHDQGDFULWLFDOH[DPLQDWLRQRI
WKH UROH RI 'LDVSRUD +RZHYHU RQH RI WKH ELJJHVW REVWDFOHV WR 6DLG¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
just peace, as an ongoing process of cooperation and reciprocal exchange between 
affected parties, stems from the tendency to view peace politics within a Westphalian 
frame.  
                              
 
42 
 
The Westphalian frame refers to the establishment of the principle of 
µ:HVWSKDOLDQVRYHUHLJQW\¶in international relations, this relates to the 1648 signing of the 
Peace of Westphalia treaties which signalled the beginning of state-centric peace politics. 
Within this framework all decisions pertaining to war and peace are viewed as the 
prerogative of the sovereign state. This matter becomes even more significant within the 
context of Israel-Palestine given that two sets of competing claims are being made, on the 
one hand, by a sovereign state, and on the other, by a stateless people subject to a 
sovereign power which excludes them from its sphere of responsibility. Therefore, 
employing a state-centred approach in this context gives rise to precisely what Edward 
Said cautions against, which is the application of the logic of Just War to a vision of just 
peace.  
Just War Theory, which relates to the ethical and philosophical justifications for 
states going to war (jus ad bellum), and to their conduct in war (jus in bello), has been 
criticised for emphasising the rights of powerful states over those of non-state or stateless 
actors. For a military action to meet the criteria of Just War it has to be based on self-
defence or the belief that going to war would prevent evil-doing. As Mathew Phillips 
(2011) explains, political violence by non-state actors or less powerful states is often 
GHVLJQDWHGDV µWHUURULVP¶DQGKHQFH LOOHJLWLPDWHDQG has become a justification for US 
and Israeli military conduct in the Middle East. Just War theory often extends to justify 
modern warfare such as targeted killings/assassinations of enemy political leaders, and 
even to minimising responsibility in the disproportionate use of force which results in 
civilian deaths and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. On the other hand, Just War 
theory rarely seems to apply to the right of less powerful states or for that matter stateless 
people to defend themselves from attack. Phillips summarises this in his critique of one of 
the strongest academic and political proponents of Just War theory, and a long-standing 
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defender of Israeli and US military conduct, Michael Walzer, as Just WDU WKHRU\¶V
predisposition to act as: 
an endlessly malleable paradigm which can be readily invoked by the 
most powerful states, though never their enemies or victims... [In the 
21st Century] It is also obvious that just war theory is no reasonable 
alternative to strict adherence to international law. 
Anya Topolski (2010) further argues that in the contemporary transnational world 
Just War theory, with its state-centric insistence on enemies and us/them distinctions, is 
no longer viable for peace-keeping, and I would add, peace-making efforts. Following on 
from the above critique, subsequent analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are based 
on Nancy FrasHU¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHXWLOLVation of a non-statist frame of justice, or the 
µDOODIIHFWHG¶ principle which she defines as:   
all those affected by a given social structure or institution have moral 
standing as subjects of justice in relation to it... what turns a collection 
of people into fellow subjects of justice is not geographical proximity 
but their co-imbrication in a common structural or institutional 
framework, which sets the ground rules that govern their social 
interaction, thereby shaping their respective life possibilities in patterns 
of advantage and disadvantage (2008: 24).         
)UDVHU¶V WKHRU\ RI MXVWLFH KDV GHYHORSHG LQ UHODWLRQ WR KHU UHIOHFWLRQV RQ WKH
contemporary transnational world whereby multinational corporations have just as much 
effect on and power over the lives of people as the territorial governments whose 
sovereignty they are subject to as citizens and residents. Despite this, precisely because of 
the Westphalian stress on the territorial state, many people, and particularly indigenous 
peoples in the developing world, struggle to resist and challenge infringements on their 
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rights and to seek legal or financial redress for corporate misdemeanour. The process of 
UHGUHVVLQJ WKHVHH[FOXVLRQV UHODWHV WR µIUDPH-VHWWLQJ¶RU to the manner in which certain 
subjects are constituted as bearing rights, while others are excluded from the rights 
entitled community (Fraser, 2008: 19).  
The politics of framing takes two forms. The first is WKHµDIILUPDWLYH¶PRGHZKLFK
re-affirms a commitment to state-territoriality as a prerequisite for claims to justice to be 
made. Independence and civil rights movements are included within the affirmative 
mode. The second type of frame-VHWWLQJLVFRQVWLWXWHGE\µWUDQVIRUPDWLYH¶SROLWLFVZKLFK
involve making claims to justice beyond the state. Fraser cites transnational social 
movements such as the World Social Forum within this category. In summary, the first 
type of frame-VHWWLQJ LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH µKRZ¶ RI FODLPLQJ MXVWLFH LH ILJKWLQJ IRU
HTXDOULJKWVZKLOHWKHVHFRQGPRGHIRFXVHVRQWKH³ZKR´KDVWKHULJKWWo claim justice, 
thus seeking to include the excluded within a radical democratic frame of justice (Fraser, 
2005: 80-81, 87).        
In many respects, the transnational movement for a just peace is concerned with 
both of these types of frame-setting politics, in terms of rearticulating the Palestinian 
people as subjects of justice in relation to the state of Israel and to individual Israelis, and 
in terms of articulating justice as a demand for equal rights in Israel-Palestine. Therefore, 
the demand for just peace challenges the Westphalian frame which places the war-making 
VWDWHDWWKHFHQWUHRISHDFHSROLWLFVYLHZHGWKURXJKWKHSULVPRI&ODXVHZLW]¶VRIWUHSHDWHG
GLFWXPµ:DULVWKHFRQWLQXDWLRQRISROLWLFVE\RWKHUPHDQV¶: in essence, declaring war the 
business of politics and reducing peace to a passive afterthought. From this perspective 
the state aQGRUVRYHUHLJQFDQµPDNHSHDFH¶ but one rarely speaks about the state or other 
FRQFHUQHGSDUWLHVµGRLQJSHDFH¶. Moreover, this perspective obscures from view the role 
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of the citizen/subject in enacting just peace politics in relation to other citizens/subjects 
and the state and/or related institutions of political significance. 
Injustice as a Relation of Oppression  
To date there have been a number of contemporary scholarly endeavours to 
highlight the peace efforts of non-state actors. For example, CynthLD &RFNEXUQ¶V
ethnographic work (1998; 2007; 2012) highlights the male-centric militarist system of 
privilege and exclusion which operates at the heart of the war-making state, bringing into 
YLHZWKHUROHRIZRPHQ¶VLQWHU-communal peace activism. Such scholarly work is vitally 
important for its articulation and appraisal of the anti-militarist voices and peace work of 
groups and individuals who rarely feature in international relations literature on conflict 
resolution. Nevertheless, micro approaches to peace politics, which reduce to background 
the macro history and workings of power and privilege in a given society can 
inadvertently obscure the very forces which enable and disable certain groups and 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ability to meaningfully engage in peace politics both in relation to the state 
and other groups and individuals.  
&\QWKLD(QORH¶VDWWHPSWWRKLJKOLJKWWKHPLOLWDULVDWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VOLYHVLQ
the USA and US military is a good example of the effective combination of macro and 
micro approaches to the analysis of the everyday function of a state militarist regime. 
However, once again differential access to power and privilege remain inadequately 
theorised in an account which presents a continuum of female exploitation and 
oppression. For a continuum of oppression is in reverse a continuum of privilege. For 
H[DPSOHD VROGLHU¶VZLIHPD\VHUYHD IXQFWLRQRI IHPDOHVH[XDO VHUYLWXGHYLV-a-vis her 
husband, however her commonality with a Vietnamese woman coerced through 
circumstance or otherwise into prostituting her body to the military personnel occupying 
her war-torn country ends precisely at the point that they both happen to embody 
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gendered and sexualised bodies. It is very difficult to make the case that a military wife, 
or for that matter a female soldier, is not in a position of privilege vis-a-vis a woman 
subject to a highly racialised and sexualised regime of oppression in which she finds 
herself almost completely powerless in relation to the institutions which govern her life.    
7KH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI 1DQF\ )UDVHU¶V  all affected principle to transnational 
war and conflict, taking the above example as an illustration, would mean that 
Vietnamese women would have an equal right to make a justice claim vis-a-vis the 
institutions of the US government and military and/or the transnational companies which 
supply the military with their weapons of mass destruction. Their entitlement to make a 
justice claim would not be based on their formal citizenship and/or belonging to the 
concerned institutions but rather on the basis of the effects of these institutions on the 
people of Vietnam. Hence, the moment the US decides to begin a military campaign in 
Vietnam, and at the precise moment that weapons manufactured by arms company X are 
used to destroy and maim life and property, the US government and military, and 
company X, enter a relation of in/justice with the people of Vietnam. Therefore, such a 
relation of in/justice gives the people of Vietnam the right to claim justice vis-a-vis the 
aforementioned institutions. 
Iris Marion Young (1990) affirms the relationality of justice, adding to the 
definition a consideration of social groups. For her, groups are also entitled to make 
justice claims not only against the state and other institutions of in/justice but also against 
other social groups within a given social order. Young gives the example of black 
$PHULFDQV¶ ULJKW WR DSSHDO WR MXVWLFH DJDLQVW WKH RSSUHVVLRQ WKH\ have historically 
experienced in relation to white privilege in US society. Thus, group justice claims are 
based on social perspective/s which approach political decision-making and public 
GLVFXVVLRQ µZLWK WKH H[SHULHQFH DQG NQRZOHGJH RI WKRVH SRVLWLRQHG Ln a structurally 
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VSHFLILF ZD\¶ <RXQJ   7KLV SHUVSHFWLYH DIILUPV GLIIHUHQFH UDWKHU WKDQ
sameness, placing emphasis on differentiated relationships of power and privilege as 
opposed to relations of identity (ibid: 352-357). Additionally, Young argues that the 
concepts of domination and oppression need to be at the heart of theorising in/justice. 
µ7KHFDOOWR³EHMXVW´LVDOZD\VVLWXDWHGLQFRQFUHWHVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOSUDFWLFHV¶
5). Thus, conceptualising justice requires the critical theorist to contextualise and 
historicise their topic in a socially embedded way: 
Normative reflection must begin from historically specific 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV«:LWKRXWVRFLDOWKHRU\QRUPDWLYHUHIOHFWLRQLVDEVWUDFW
empty and unable to guide criticism with a particular interest in 
HPDQFLSDWLRQLELG«1RUPVDQGLGHDVDULVHIURPD\HDUQLQJWKDWLV
an expression of freedom: it does not have to be this way, it could be 
otherwise (ibid: 6).   
<RXQJIXUWKHUVXEGLYLGHVµRSSUHVVLRQ¶LQWRILYHFDWHJRULHVZKLFKVKHDUJXHs need 
to be redefined depending on the social context being analysed. These are: cultural 
imperialism, exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, and violence. In the next 
FKDSWHU,ULV0DULRQ<RXQJ¶VFRQFHSWXDOFULWHULDIRUDQDO\VLQJRSSUHVVLRQZLOOEH applied 
to the case of Israel-Palestine. This will be done through a contextually historicised 
account of the conflict and its contemporary legacy on the social, political and economic 
relations of dis/advantage pertaining to the two national collectivities in question. Such an 
approach will enable a more robust critical engagement with the possibilities for a 
SUDFWLFDO DUWLFXODWLRQ RI )UDVHU¶V µDOO DIIHFWHG¶ SULQFLSOH ZKLFK LV GHHPHG WR EH D NH\
aspect of just peace politics. Before this can be done it is important to examine, in more 
detail, the shortcomings of official state-centric attempts at peacemaking in Israel-
Palestine DVHPERGLHGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWH¶VVSRQVRUHGµ3HDFH3URFHVV¶.   
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The Peace Process 
The centrality of the state in political life has meant that since 1948 the dominance 
RI,VUDHO¶VVWDWHQDUUDWLYHVKDVGHILQHGWKH,VUDHOL-Palestinian conflict and the parameters 
for its resolution. Despite the international political recognition of the Palestinian people 
in 1988, their collective and individual rights have been continuously reduced to a 
question of pending statehood. The state-centrism characterising Israel-Palestine 
continues to fail to bring about conflict resolution, increasingly leaving embattled and 
polarised communities on both sides of the divide. The tendency to privilege statist 
perspectives particularly relates to the collapse of the Oslo Peace Accords with their 
elusive promise to establish an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. Many observers designate the outbreak of the Second Intifada4, which witnessed a 
spate of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and military targets, as the reason for the 
$FFRUGV¶ WHUPLQDWLRQ +RZHYHU DV 1DQF\ )UDVHU DVVHUWV µWKH PRVW EDVLF GHILQLWLRQ RI
justice is pariW\RISDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶7KXVWKHSULQFLSOHRIµSDULW\RISDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ 
requires us to examine the events that led to the breakdown of the official peace process 
from a non-statist perspective. However, before we do so it is necessary to examine the 
failings of the official peace process in order to provide a springboard for the theoretical-
political discussion which will feature later in the thesis. 
Even before the outbreak of the Intifada most evidence points to the fact that there 
would be no implementation of UN resolutions 242 (1967) or 338 (1973), both of which 
call for an end to the Occupation. Moreover, it is also important to point out that despite 
the fact that many consider The Oslo Accords to be the blueprint for a two state solution, 
there is no mention of the establishment of a Palestinian State either in the Declaration of 
Principles or the subsequent Interim Agreement. On the contrary, the Accords are very 
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explicit that the final status issues of borders, security, settlements, and refugees, all 
relating to statehood and sovereignty, remain outstanding and are yet to be negotiated.  
The 1993 Declaration of Principles, also known as Oslo I, established a 
IUDPHZRUN IRU DQ LQWHULP SHULRG RI ILYH \HDUV ZKLFK ZRXOG OHDG WR ,VUDHO¶V IXOO
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and West Bank (Article V.1). The Accords also called for 
the creation of a Palestinian Council, also known as the Palestinian Authority (PA), which 
ZRXOG WDNH RYHU IURP WKH &LYLO $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ,VUDHO¶V PLOLWDU\ JRYHUQPHQW LQ the 
Occupied Territories (Article VII.5). The Accords specified that Israel had to provide a 
schedule for withdrawal within a year of the Declaration of Principles coming into effect 
in September 1993.  
The second Oslo Accord, known as the Interim Agreement 1995, resulted in the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority, and the transfer under its control of major 
towns and cities, including Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah, and Tulqarem, 
DORQJVLGHD IXUWKHUYLOODJHV7KH3$¶V MXULVGLFWLRQDOVRNQRwn as Area A, together 
with ArHD%ZKHUHWKH3$KDVµMRLQHG¶ responsibility for civilian affairs, but not security, 
constitutes less than 28% of the West Bank. During the Oslo Interim Period, between 
1994 and 1999, Israel doubled the settler population in the West Bank (Foundation for 
Middle East Peace, 2009; Levinson, 2009), while subjecting the Palestinian population in 
Area C, which is under full Israeli military control, to discriminatory policies of house 
demolitions and land expropriation (Abu Zahra, 2007). During the same period the Israeli 
settler population in the Gaza Strip also increased but not at the same rate as in the West 
Bank.  
By 2000 it became clear that Israel had little intention of meeting the minimum 
requirements for withdrawal set out in the 1993 Declaration of Principles resulting in the 
failure of the Camp David negotiations. The ensuing Palestinian uprising provided the 
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Israeli rightwing with a pretext to begin the construction of the 420 miles (675 km) long 
West Bank Barrier, effectively annexing East Jerusalem and large parts of arable West 
Bank land to the Israeli side. In 2005 Israel made the unilateral decision to withdraw its 
ground troops and settlements from the Gaza Strip, transferring the majority of its settler 
population to the West Bank. The withdrawal came 10 years later than the Oslo Accords 
had specified.  
Following the democratic election of Hamas in 2006 Israel imposed an economic 
and military blockade on Gaza, which remains in force at the time of writing. Since 2006 
the relationship between Gaza and Israel has been characterised by Israeli Defence 
)RUFHV¶ ,') WDUJHWHG DVVDVVLQDWLRQV PLOLWDU\ LQYDVLRQV DQG DHULDO DVVDXOWV RQ WKH
WHUULWRU\ DQG +DPDV¶V VSRUDGLF ILULQJ RI URFNHWV RYHU WKH ERUGHU LQWR QHDUE\ 6RXWKHUn 
Israeli civilian centres, punctuated by short-term unilateral ceasefires. The bloodiest of 
these Israeli DWWDFNVZDVµ2SHUDWLRQ&DVW/HDG¶LQ'HFHPEHU± January 2009. 
This military attack left 13 Israelis and over 1,400 residents of Gaza dead, the vast 
majority of the latter being civilian casualties. The attack further resulted in the injury and 
GLVDEOHPHQWRIWHQVRIWKRXVDQGVRI*D]DQVZLWK*D]D¶VKRPHVDQGVRFLDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUH
XWWHUO\ GHYDVWDWHG ,VUDHO¶V RQJRLQJ HFRQRPLF EORFNDGH RI *D]D, coupled with another 
large-scale bombardment of the Strip in November 2012, has meant that four years after 
the military attack the planned reconstruction of Gaza has been very difficult to achieve 
(Amnesty International, 2009). Moreover, the reported March 2010 announcement, 
coinciding with a US state visit, of the planned construction of 1,600 Jewish settler homes 
in Occupied East Jerusalem (Black 2010; Sherwood, 2010); and a number of similar 
announcements since, including a recent statement about government plans for continued 
settlement expansion made by the incoming Israeli Housing Minister (Fisher-Ilan, 2013), 
underscores the tenacity of Israeli state exceptionalism. 
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The publication of the private and confidential Palestinian Authority (PA) records 
of negotiations with Israel between 1999 and 2010, leaked to the news provider al-
Jazeera and published by The Guardian Newspaper in January 2011, which were dubbed 
µ7KH 3DOHVWLQH 3DSHUV¶ JLYHV IXUWKHU LQGLFDWLRQ RI WKH JUHDW SRZHU GLVSDULW\ EHWZHHQ
Israel and the Palestinians. The leaked papers document unprecedented concessions made 
E\WKH3$¶VQHJRWLDWRUVLQFOXGLQJEROGDQGFRQWURYHUVLDOPRYHVVXFKDVUHQRXQFLQJWKH
right of return and relinquishing Palestinian claims on East Jerusalem; the offers being 
repoUWHGO\ UHMHFWHG DV ³LQVXIILFLHQW´ E\ WKH ,VUDHOL QHJRWLDWRUV %ODFN DQG 0LOQH 2011a 
and 2011b). More problematic, perhaps, is the response to the viability and prospect of a 
two-state solution made by United States¶ government representative, Condoleezza Rice: 
µ<RX >WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQV@ ZRQ
W KDYH D VWDWH \RXU FKLOGUHQ
V FKLOGUHQ ZLOO QRW KDYH DQ
DJUHHPHQW¶TXRWHGLQ0LOQH 
7KH 3DOHVWLQLDQ $XWKRULW\¶V DQQRXQFHPHQW LQ HDUO\  WKDW LW would seek 
unilateral recognition of a Palestinian State when the UN Security Council reconvened in 
September 2011 was similarly met with rejection from both Israel and the United States 
administration. The decision to declare a state was also met with opposition from some 
Palestinian and pro-Palestinian critics. A legal opinion published by Guy Goodwin-Gill 
(2011) maintains that a unilateral declaration of statehood by the PA will depose the 
PLO5 RI LWV VWDWXV DV ³WKH VROH OHJLWLPDWH UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ SHRSOH´
effectively depriving the millions of Palestinian refugees living in the Diaspora from 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ DW WKH 81 2WKHUV KDYH IXUWKHU GLVPLVVHG WKH YLDELOLW\ RI WKH 3$¶V
argument that a sovereign Palestinian state will make the Occupation indisputable and 
give Palestinian representatives more international leverage to end Israeli military control. 
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Comments from former Israeli officials appear to affirm the above criticisms. Gidi 
Grinstein, a former Israeli negotiator at Camp David stated that: 
A declaration of a Palestinian state in September includes the possibility 
of a diplomatic breakthrough as well as significant advantages for 
Israel...The establishment of such a state will help anchor the principle 
of two states for two peoples, shape the permanent situation with Israel 
controlling the security assets and the new state's surroundings, and 
diminish the refugee problem by marginalising UNRWA [the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency] and limiting refugee status 
(Grinstein quoted in Hasan, 2011).  
Under combined Israeli and US pressure the 2011 bid for statehood failed. The 
Palestinian Authority returned with a second bid, albeit for non-member state status, in 
November 2012. This vote did not require UN Security Council approval and passed 
successfully in the UN General Assembly. One of the practical opportunities arising from 
this status is the possibility that the PA can take Israel to the ICJ (International Court of 
Justice) and the ICC (International Criminal Court) for crimes committed under the 
Occupation. This hypothetical strategy continues to face a number of obstacles. Firstly, 
each individual UN body can decide at its discretion whether to admit and/or recognise a 
non-PHPEHU VWDWH VHFRQGO\ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV ,VUDHO¶V ELJJHVW DQG VWURQJHVW SROLWLFDO
ally, has used financial threats and incentives to stall the statehood process under the 
guise of trying to restart the peace talks. UNESCO paid the price for admitting Palestine 
in 2011, with the USA withdrawing funding from the organization (Blomfield, 2011). The 
USA has similarly used the threat of terminating aid to the PA to dissuade the Palestinian 
leadership from pursuing a statehood bid at the UN (Swaine, 2011). Most recently, the 
strategy has been to convince Israel to pay, on time, taxes collected on behalf of the PA, 
which are usually withheld for months on end as a form of punishment, in exchange for 
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the PA refraining from making representations at the ICJ and ICC.6 The political 
intractability accompanying the consistent failure of such state-centred approaches to 
bring about a timely resolution to the conflict demands a non-statist re-articulation of 
peace as a question of justice and foregrounds a closer examination of alternative forms 
of peace politics as exemplified in the efforts of Israeli, Palestinian and international civil 
society actors. 
Civil Society: An Answer to War?  
Mary Kaldor (2003) proposes Global Civil Society as an answer to war because 
µWKHFRQFHSWRIFLYLOVRFLHW\KDVDOZD\VEHHQOLQNHGWRWKHQRWLRQRIPLQLPL]LQJYLROHQFH
in social relations, to the public use of reason as a way of managing human affairs in 
SODFHRIVXEPLVVLRQEDVHGRQIHDUDQGLQVHFXULW\RULGHRORJ\DQGVXSHUVWLWLRQ¶LELG
6KHWHUPVFLYLOVRFLHW\µJOREDO¶LQDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRILWVGHYHORSPHQWVLQFHLQWR
increasingly transnational forms related to the process of globalization; globalization 
being perceived as contributing to the erosion of territorial state sovereignty.  
$FFRUGLQJWR.DOGRUFLYLOVRFLHW\LVIXUWKHUGHILQHGE\µERWWRPXS¶RUJUDVVURRWV
struggles for emancipatory JRDOV ZKHWKHU WKHVH DUH ZRPHQ¶V ULJKWV HQYLURQPHQWDO
protection, RU SHDFH RQ WKH EDVLV RI µJRYHUQDQFH EDVHG RQ FRQVHQW ZKHUH FRQVHQW LV
JHQHUDWHG WKURXJK SROLWLFV¶ LELG  )RU .DOGRU WKH QHZ JOREDO PHDQLQJ RI FLYLO
society is characterised by civil society groups putting pressure on economic and political 
institutions of authority through advocacy, campaigning and protest, in an effort to 
institute reform and/or the transformation of policy and practice at a global level. These 
developments have in WXUQIDFLOLWDWHGJOREDOSXEOLFGHEDWHVZKLFKRIIHUµWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI
WKHYRLFHVRI WKHYLFWLPVRIJOREDOLVDWLRQWREHKHDUGLIQRW WKHYRWHV¶LELGThus, 
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Global Civil Society has been increasingly able to contest the primacy of the war-making 
discourse of the geopolitical state.  
However, in the concluding chapter of her book, Kaldor is forced to reconsider her 
somewhat overtly optimistic view of Global Civil Society as an answer to war. 
Examining the political developments in the aftermath of the 11th September  2001 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, Kaldor concludes that we have 
UHWXUQHGWRDQHUDRIµJHRSROLWLFVDQGWKHODQJXDJHRIUHDOLVPDQGQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW¶LELG
148). Nevertheless, this may no longer be the case a decade later which is characterised 
by an apparenWµUHWXUQRIWKHSXEOLF¶, with pro-democracy mass protests across the Arab 
World, and public demonstrations against austerity measures in the USA, UK and Europe. 
The latter protests sought to highlight the role of corporate power and immunity to public 
scrutiny, while joining the global call for more democratic accountability from national 
governments. However, in 2013 the disappearance of Occupy movements in the US and 
Europe in the face of government imposed austerity measures, the outbreak of civil war in 
Syria, and the  PLOLWDU\ FRXS G¶HWDW in Egypt, might suggest that the state is not 
prepared to give up any ground to the people, at least not without a fight.                
These contemporary developments JLYH FUHGHQFH WR 6\OYLD :DOE\¶V 
rejection of the notion of a Global Civil Society. Walby argues instead that there are 
JOREDO FLYLO VRFLHWDO µZDYHV¶ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK FDUU\LQJ RXW GLIIHUHQW SURMHFWV IRU VRFLR-
political change and transformation (ibLG7KHVH µZDYHV¶ LQFOXGH DPRQJVWRWKHUV
First Wave Feminism, Second Wave Feminism, and Environmentalism, but also Fascism, 
Conservatism, and Neo-liberalism. On the basis of this definition, civil society cannot be 
FRQVLGHUHG LQKHUHQWO\ µJRRG¶ DQG µSURJUHVVLYH¶ DV FLYLO VRFLHW\ ZDYHV FDQ DOVR EH
µUHJUHVVLYH¶ DQG µDQWL-PRGHUQ¶ DV LQ WKH FDVH RI (XURSHDQ )DVFLVP LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH
VDQGVSURMHFWRI1D]LVP5DWKHUµFLYLOVRFLHW\LVDNH\LQVWLWXWLRQDOGRPDLQIRU
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the transformation of meanings, the creation and hybridization of projects, the practice of 
LQGLYLGXDODJHQF\DQGWKHFRQWHVWHGSURGXFWLRQRIIUDPHVDQGGLVFRXUVHV¶LELG 
Claire Mercer (2002) similarly criticises much of the literature on Civil Society, in 
particular the Anglophone literature on the role of NGOs in development, for subscribing 
WR µWKH QRUPDWLYH LGHDO WKDW FLYLO VRFLHW\ DQG 1*2V DUH LQKHUHQWO\ µJRRG WKLQJV¶
microcosms of the (liberal) democratic process, comprised of the grassroots, both separate 
and autonomRXVIURPWKHVWDWHZKLOHDFWLQJDVDµEXOZDUN¶DJDLQVW LW¶LELG0HUFHU 
echoes Walby in her definition of civil society as a sphere of contestation and conflict. 
However, she is also highly critical of liberal modernisation theories because of their 
tendencies to render non-Western societies and cultures as pre or anti-modern on the basis 
of their resistance to the (Western) liberal notion of civil/ized society. Here she is 
particularly critical of development discourses which tend to divide NGOs and civil 
VRFLHW\ DVVRFLDWLRQV LQWR µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶ RU µDFFRPPRGDWLQJ¶ YHUVXV µUHVLVWDQW¶ WR
modernisation, i.e. neo-liberal agendas (ibid: 10 ± 12). Duffield (2007) further highlights 
the dubious role of humanitarian NGOs in global governance and their tacit complicity 
ZLWKVWDWHDQGFRUSRUDWHLQWHUHVWVLQWKHQHZZDUVLQHIIHFWFKDOOHQJLQJ.DOGRU¶VDVVHUWLRQ
that Global Civil Society can be an answer to war: 
[Development] seeks to secure the non-insured through the disciplining 
and regulatory effects of self-reliance. Development aims to embed 
security within the world of peoples by making it sustainable (ibid: 
124)... unending war is not primarily a military concern. It is more an 
indefinite and globalized counter insurgency campaign that utilises the 
civilian petty sovereignty of aid agencies to engage with questions of 
poverty and political instability (Duffield, 2007: 127).  
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  In her defence, Kaldor excludes humanitarian NGOs, which are primarily 
concerned with service provision, from her definition of civil society (2003: 146). 
Moreover, she adds that since the 1980s social movements have been transformed into 
1*2VXVLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIµWDPLQJ¶WRUHIHUWRµWKHSURFHVVZKHUHE\WKHDXWKRULWLHVRSHQ
up access to social movements and even take on some of their demands, and movements 
EHFRPH LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG DQG SURIHVVLRQDOL]HG¶   6LPLODUO\ $UXQGKDWL 5R\
 UHIHUV WR WKLV SURFHVV DV µWKH 1*2LVDWLRQ RI UHVLVWDQFH¶ ZKLFK VKH DUJXHV KDV
resulted in the de-politicisation and pacification of social movements. James Petras (1997: 
14) further criticises the process of NGOisation in the context of Latin America for 
XQGHUPLQLQJ WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH µSXEOLF¶ DQG WKXV ZHDNHQLQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V ZHOIDUH
obligations towards its citizens.  
I also draw on the work of Gwamaka Kifukwe (2011) who defines Civil Society 
DVµDQLQVWLWXWLRQDOGRPDLQ¶ZKLFKFRH[LVWVZLWKWKH6WDWHDQG&RUSRUDWHVSKHUHV:KLOH
his work is primarily concerned with Development Expertise in Tanzania, his argument is 
also valuable for defining the role of NGOs and other critical and grassroots organisations 
working in the fields of human rights, justice and peace. From this perspective, Civil 
Society remains a site of contestation over frames and discourses, however it is not 
conceived of as the combination of mass autonomous movements and NGOs. Rather it is 
the domain of private institutions that are separate from, yet imbricated with, the State 
and Corporate spheres. Thus, the domain of Civil Society includes religious institutions, 
political parties, trade unions, and other professional associations, as well as humanitarian 
and advocacy NGOs, any of which can be defined as active, passive, progressive or 
UHJUHVVLYHGHSHQGLQJRQRQH¶VSHUVSHFWLYH 
On the other hand, placing Social MovementVZLWKLQWKHGRPDLQRIµWKH3XEOLF¶RU
µSXEOLFV¶IRUWKH\DUHPDQ\FKDOOHQJHVWKHLQWULQVLFDVVXPSWLRQZLWKLQFHUWDLQGHILQLWLRQV
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of Civil Society which conceive of the Public as passively governed either by consent or 
coercion. Therefore, viewing Social Movements as a manifestation of mass mobilized 
public dissent recognises that the Public is itself a domain within which hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic ideas can be articulated. I concur with Alberto Melucci¶V 
definition of social movements as µKHterogeneous and fragmented phenomena which 
contain a multitude of differentiated meanings, forms of action, and modes of 
organisation, and which often consume a large part of their energies in the effort to bind 
VXFKGLIIHUHQFHVWRJHWKHU¶LELG 
7KH FRQWHPSRUDU\ H[WHQVLRQ RI WKH GLFKRWRP\ EHWZHHQ µJRRG¶ DQG µEDG¶
manifestations of civil society appear in many different guises, and often different 
DXWKRU¶VREMHFWLRQV WRRWKHUV¶GHILQLWLRQVof civil society are at cross-purposes. Thus for 
some, civLO VRFLHW\ LV µJRRG¶ RU µFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQLF¶ ZKHQ LW LV PDQLIHVWHG DV D
7UDQVQDWLRQDO6RFLDO0RYHPHQWZKLOHLWLVµEDG¶RUµKHJHPRQLF¶LILWLV1*2LVHG5R\
2004). For others, in the face of waning mass mobilisation, particularly in the Global 
North prior to the recent re-emergence of public mass protest, NGOs which embody the 
YDOXHV RI µSURJUHVVLYH¶ VRFLDO PRYHPHQWV DUH FRQVLGHUHG µJRRG¶ HYHQ LI LQ D µWDPHG¶
YHUVLRQ ZKLOH µSDVVLYH¶ 1*2V RU 1*2V ZKLFK UHSUHVHQW µUHJUHVVLYH¶ LQWHUHVWV VKRXOG
arguably not be considered part of civil society (Kaldor, 2003), or are alternatively 
GHILQHGDVµEDG¶IRUPVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\:DOE\<HWIRURWKHUVDOOPDQLIHVWDWLRQVRI
autonomous non-state organisations are considered part of a modernising and 
democratising project which is arguably helping to build or strengthen Civil Society (for 
examples see Mercer, 2002).        
As Joseph A. Buttigieg (2005) explains, much of the debate concerned with 
defining civil society as a force for the radical transformation of the status quo (counter-
hegemonic), or as an easily co-opted or already functioning appendage of state and 
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FRUSRUDWH LQWHUHVWV KHJHPRQLF VWHPV IURP D PLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI $QWRQLR *UDPVFL¶V
FRQFHSWRI µKHJHPRQ\¶ DQG WKH VXEVHTXHQW FRQIODWLRQRI FLYLO VRFLHWy with oppositional 
and/or anti-government movements. This misinterpretation lends itself to an 
oversimplified view of the complex relationship between civil society and the state, or 
µWKHSHRSOH¶ DQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW)RU*UDPVFLµWKHVWDWH SROLWLFDOVRFLety + civil society, 
LQ RWKHU ZRUGV KHJHPRQ\ SURWHFWHG E\ WKH DUPRU RI FRHUFLRQ¶ *UDPVFL LQ %XWWLJLHJ
  7KHUHIRUH µFLYLO VRFLHW\ LQ WKH PRGHUQ OLEHUDO 6WDWH LV WKH DUHQD ZKHUHLQ WKH
prevailing hegemony is constantly being reinforced, not just coQWHVWHG¶ LELG 
Moreover, civil society is deeply implicated in and structured by hierarchies of power and 
privilege. Not everyone has equal capacity and access to resources which will allow them 
to take effective action in relation to authoritative regimes. 
'UDZLQJ RQ *UDPVFL¶V WKRXJKW /DFODX DQG 0RXIIH  IXUWKHU WKHRULVH
hegemony as a social relation dominated by articulatory practices. According to them 
these articulatory practices rely on antagonistic forces, i.e. elements which cannot be 
integrated into the dominant logic and require exclusion, an exclusion which is 
maintained through the demarcation of discursive borders. However, this exclusion is not 
necessarily a negation, but rather hegemonic forces have the ability to embrace 
oppositional forces, as long as these forces continue to operate within the same 
parameters as the hegemony, and here they distinguish between democratic and popular 
struggle (ibid: 134-137). In practical terms popular struggle refers to discourses which 
divide a single political space in two opposite camps, for example class struggle, or 
Palestinian self-determination in the form of ethno-national statehood. Democratic 
struggle, on the other hand, LPSOLHV µD SOXUDOLW\ RI SROLWLFDO VSDFH¶ ,Q WKDW VHQVH WKH
rights-based demand for freedom, justice and equality which seeks to transcend existing 
ethno-national divisions in Israel-Palestine would meet the criterion for democratic 
struggle.  
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Having reviewed some of the literature on civil society, the question remains what 
the most appropriate forms are for the articulation of counter-hegemonic discourses and 
practices in Israel-Palestine. I would argue that the question of Social Movements versus 
Civil Society is irrelevant in the contemporary transnational context, for, as Smith et. al. 
(1997) emphasise, the successes of transnational movements depend on a combination of 
mobilising structures, access to decision-making institutions, and local, national and 
international structures of opportunity. Thus, social movements and civil society should 
not be envisaged as standing in opposition or competition to each other, although that 
may indeed be the case if they come from different doctrinal or ideological positions. For 
example, many commentators have expressed reservations DERXWWKHµSURJUHVVLYH¶ nature 
of the real estate protests in Tel Aviv which saw the mobilisation of thousands of Israelis 
in the summer of 2011 in protest against rising rent prices. Much of the scepticism relates 
WRWKHPRYHPHQW¶VUHIXVDOWRDOLJQLWVHOf politically, which some feared could result in co-
option by the Israeli ultra-rightwing who have proposed more cheap settlement housing to 
be built in the Occupied Territories as a solution WRWKH,VUDHOLSURWHVWRUV¶FDOOVIRUVRFLDO
justice (Abu Sarah and Reider, 2011; Halper, 2011).        
Equally, social movements function as umbrellas for ideas which can be 
articulated in different forms within civil society associations, some of which may be in 
conflict with each other over objectives and strategies. For example, the Transnational 
Palestinian Solidarity MovementZKLFKRIWHQFRPHVXQGHUWKHVORJDQVRIµ)UHH3DOHVWLQH¶
DQGRU µ(QG 7KH 2FFXSDWLRQ¶, and more recently under the banner of µBoycott, 
Divestment and SanctionV¶, has different and competing global, national and local 
manifestations. Some factions of this social movement call for a two-state solution, while 
others advocate a single state; some believe their goal can be achieved through nonviolent 
advocacy and campaigning, and others opt for more militant means; some groups 
organise in NGO forums, whilst others opt for grassroots mobilisation and protest. In 
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essence, the Palestinian Solidarity Movement is transnational, heterogeneous, and 
immeasurable as a whole.  A transnational social movement is not legally bound and 
cannot be held accountable by state power. Its associated practices can be criminalised 
but it cannot be outlawed in its entirety.  
Civil Society on the other hand can only exist within legally identifiable and 
permissible national and/or transnational frameworks. In contrast to the relative autonomy 
and anonymity of social movements, civil society can be held legally and politically 
accountable and is subject to regulation and supervision by the State, and other concerned 
institutions, i.e. financial donors (Kifukwe, 2011). The above point is illustrated well by 
the Israeli PDUOLDPHQW¶VSDVVLQJRIDELOOLQ-XO\ZKLFKFULPLQDOLVHV,VUDHOLFDOOVIRU
the boycott of Israel or the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories (Lis, 2011). The 
bill is a political response to the growing transnational campaign for Boycott, Divestment 
and Sanctions or BDS. BDS stands for (i) a consumer Boycott of corporations and 
organisations which support, finance or operate in the Occupied Territories; (ii) 
Divestment from corporations or organisations complicit in the Occupation; and (iii) a 
call for international Sanctions against Israel, including a comprehensive military 
embargo. The call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions originated in a 2005 statement 
issued by the largest coalition of Palestinian civil society organisations.  
The campaign takes its inspiration from the successes of the anti-apartheid 
ER\FRWWV RI 6RXWK $IULFD DV LW GHHPV WKDW ,VUDHO LV HQJDJHG LQ µ$SDUWKHLG SUDFWLFHV¶ DV
defined by the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid, ratified by United Nations General Assembly resolution 3068 
;;9,,, %'6 SURSRQHQWV EDVH WKHLU FODLP RI $SDUWKHLG RQ ,VUDHO¶V GLVFULPLQDWRU\
practices within the Occupied Territories, as well as empirical evidence of discrimination 
against Palestinians in Israel (Pappé, forthcoming; White, 2009). For example, they cite 
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the fact that Israel self-defines as a Jewish State thus symbolically excluding 20% of its 
FLWL]HQVZKRDUHQRW-HZLVK0RUHRYHURI WKH ODQGZLWKLQ ,VUDHO¶VERUGHUV LV
controlled by the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the Land Authority; land which is 
solely reserved for Jewish Israelis.  
Since its initiation in 2005, BDS campaigns and activities have taken place in over 
34 countries and in 95 cities across the world. Many Israelis have also joined the Boycott 
movement, including the signatories to BOYCOTT from Within. In 2010, the Palestinian 
Authority joined with an internal call for boycott of settlement goods. A report published 
by the Reut Institute, a self-SURFODLPHG µnon-SDUWLVDQ =LRQLVW RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶, contended 
that despite its claim to upholding human rights and international law the BDS campaign 
sought to delegitimize Israel (Reut Institute, 2010). The proponents of BDS insist that 
boycott is a legitimate nonviolent tactic and moreover that it is the only viable tactic 
available given that legal and official efforts at conflict resolution have failed 
consistently.  
More moderate criticisms of the campaign have included fears that boycott would 
harm Palestinians, particularly those within Israel, and would hurt the efforts of the Israeli 
peace movement. These criticisms have been addressed through highlighting the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and Israel have 
chosen BDS as their tactic of nonviolent resistance. Further, the reported 90% Israeli 
support for Operation Cast Lead indicates that the Israeli peace movement is no longer in 
existence, or if it is, has little or no influence. Also, many prominent peace movement 
figures have publicly declared their opposition to the Palestinian right of return, one of the 
tenets of BDS; while many from the critical Israeli Left have joined the call for boycott 
from within (Awaad, 2011).  
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The significance of the above argument has become particularly prominent with 
WKH ,VUDHOL 3DUOLDPHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR FULPLQDOLVH ER\FRWW IURP ZLWKLQ 7KH  $QWL-
Boycott Law makes any Israeli individual or organisation who/which support or advocate 
boycott of Israel or the settlements in the Occupied Territories subject to private legal 
prosecution. Israeli proponents of BDS face financial penalties not only if an organisation 
suffers financial loss because of a boycott action, but even if it feels it might suffer 
financial loss. Leading international human rights organisations have criticised the law for 
infringing on freedom of expression (Amnesty International, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 
2011). Internal critics have further pointed out that the law effectively legitimises and 
annexes the settlements to Israel (Lis, 2011). Israeli human rights organisations including 
ADALAH: The Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, and the Israeli 
Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) have declared that they will challenge 
the law in the Supreme Court (Bekker, 2011).  
The law has also been criticised by senior members of the Reut Institute who 
issued a statement arguing that the anti-Boycott law gives more legitimacy to the 
international movement for boycott and further helps to delegitimize Israel as a 
GHPRFUDWLF VWDWH µ7KH %R\FRWW /DZ  GRHV QRW SURSHUO\ DGGUHVV WKH GH-legitimization 
phenomenon, as the law is territorial in its application and yet the de-legitimization 
campaign is globalSULPDULO\RSHUDWLQJEH\RQG ,VUDHO
VERUGHUV¶ .HLGDUDQG6KD\VKRQ
2011, my emphasis). The global versus local distinction highlighted here takes us back to 
the earlier distinction drawn between civil society and social movements. The case of the 
Israeli anti-Boycott law illustrates succinctly the tension between the state or government 
and civil society. In short, civil society does not function as a field separate from and in 
opposition to the state, but rather its activities are constrained, controlled and even subject 
to permission by the government of the state within which it functions. Moreover, civil 
society with its organisational structure is easily identifiable, whereas social movements, 
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particularly those with a transnational character, are much more difficult to classify and 
sanction because their protagonists move in and out of different geopolitical and legal 
contexts and, in the absence of a world government, are therefore freer to mobilise and 
negotiate a multiplicity of frameworks and resources.  
Of course social movements are not unlimited in their scope for action, and are in 
essence constituted by a multitude of actors who in their physical vulnerability as human 
beings are subject to existing governance structures. A good example of this is provided 
E\ WKH µJOREDO¶ DVSHFW RI WKH DERYH TXRWH LQ UHIHUHQFH WR WKH µ:HOFRPH WR 3DOHVWLQH¶ 
campaign. On 8th July 2011, a few days prior to the passing of the anti-boycott law, 
international Palestine solidarity activists from across the world took part in a campaign 
FDOOHG ³:HOFRPH WR 3DOHVWLQH´ 7KHLU VWDWHG LQWHQWLRQ ZDV WR WDNH SDUW LQ D µIO\-LQ¶ E\
arriving en masse at Ben Gurion Airport and declaring at border control that the purpose 
of their trip was to visit Palestinian friends in the Occupied Territories.  
Visiting the Occupied Territories is not officially illegal and, since Israel is in full 
FRQWURORIWKH7HUULWRULHV¶ERUGHUVHQWHULQJWKUough Ben Gurion en route to the Occupied 
Territories is not illegal. Nevertheless, many of these activists claimed that their 
experiences of visiting Palestinian friends were characterised by harassment and threats of 
deportation by the Israeli authorities if they declared the true intentions of their visit 
(Bahour, 2011). Therefore, they felt that in order to gain access to the Occupied 
Territories they were compelled to say that they are visiting Israeli tourist sites. Thus, the 
µ:HOFRPHWR3DOHVWLQH¶IO\-in intended to raise international awareness of the irregularity 
taking place.  
Days before the direct action, the media reported that the Israeli government 
claimed that the activists intended to cause havoc at the airport, and the authorities were 
braced to take decisive action to prevent the fly-in (VOA News, 2011); an allegation 
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GHQLHG E\ µWelcome to PaleVWLQH¶ campaign organisers (Rishmawi, 2011). The Israeli 
authorities requested cooperation from international governments to prevent activists 
from boarding flights to Tel Aviv. The French and British governments, largely using 
anti-terrorist legLVODWLRQ SUHYHQWHG PDQ\ ³NQRZQ´ activists from boarding Ben Gurion 
bound flights, despite the fact that the activists had clearly stated that they would not be 
taking part in protest but plan to declare the true, perfectly legal, purpose of their visit at 
border control (Levidow, 2011). Many of the activists who succeeded in arriving at Ben 
Gurion were arrested, denied entry and deported at a later date (Press Association, 2011).  
In short, social movement actors, despite their transnational nature, are themselves 
entangled in complex webs of geopolitics and are subject to the very international 
governance regimes they seek to challenge and hold to account. Transnational activists 
are not only subject to cross border regulatory regimes but at times their decision to 
engage in zones of conflict can expose them to physical harm and even death. This has, 
on a number of occasions, been the case for ISM (International Solidarity Movement) 
volunteers, who armed with nothing more than their US or EU passports step in to act as 
human shields in defence of Palestinian lives and property in the Occupied Territories. 
The premise underlying their philosophy is that through their nonviolent physical 
presence as internationals from some of the most prominent nations they imbue their 
surroundings and associated persons with the human rights they possess, thus serving to 
avert violations of international law and human rights.  
Nevertheless, the two most prominent cases of the killings of ISM activists, US 
citizen Rachel Corrie in 2003 (Sherwood, 2010), and UK citizen Tom Hurndall in 2004 
(Arrindell, 2004) by the IDF in Gaza, demonstrate that there is a tension between the 
human rights eQWLWOHPHQWVRISHRSOHZKRKROGµ:HVWHUQ¶ citizenship and their inhabiting 
of a space, even temporarily, where human rights do not exist and sovereign power can 
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act with relative impunity. However, the subsequent developments of these cases reveal 
that different geo-political and corporate interests intersect to enable and/or disable 
FLWL]HQV¶FODLPV WR MXVWLFH In the case of Tom Hurndall, his parents eventually received 
justice for his killing, and the Israeli Bedouin soldier responsible for his shooting was 
sentenced to eight years in prison (Butcher, 2005).  
Rachel CorULH¶VIDPLOy have not been able to bring her killers to justice. Her case 
is further complicated by the fact that she died under the blade of a D9 bulldozer, a 
machine supplied by the US Company Caterpillar which provides the Israeli regime with 
the bulldozers used for house demolitions in the Occupied Territories. In 2011 the Corrie 
family began a legal SURFHVVRIVXLQJ&DWHUSLOODUDORQJVLGHWKHVWDWHRI,VUDHOIRUµDLGLQJ
DQG DEHWWLQJ ZDU FULPHV DQG RWKHU VHULRXV KXPDQ ULJKWV YLRODWLRQV¶ &HQWUH for 
Constitutional Rights, 2009).  
Aside from being personal sacrifices and tragedies, cases of activists being 
wounded or killed in the field, such as Rachel Corrie, Tom Hurndall, or the 2010 killing 
by the IDF of nine Turkish humanitarian activists on board the aid ship Mavi Marmara, 
can become catalysts for transnational political mobilisation. Tarrow (2011) refers to this 
DV µFRQWHQWLRXV SROLWLFV¶ which are characterised by one-off events of a tragic and/or 
contested nature which become symbols for transnational political action by civil society 
actors who might have had little or no previous link to the original case. In many respects 
the aftermath of the flotilla murders resulted in greater transnational support for BDS, 
foreshadowing the Israeli anti-boycott law (Barghouti, 2010). 
In recent years there have been a number of attempts to examine the role of 
transnational civil society activism in relation to Israel-Palestine, including the appraisal 
of the international BDS campaign by Omar Barghouti (2011), and the publication of the 
findings of the activist-led Russell Tribunal on Palestine: Corporate Complicity in Israel's 
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Occupation (2011). Anti-occupation or Palestine solidarity activism has also become 
increasingly visible within media discourses, with widespread convergence of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDODWWHPSWVWRµEUHDN¶ the Israeli imposed siege on the Gaza Strip, also known 
as the flotillas. The renewed focus and political promise of these forms of politics 
demands further theorisation in order to explore their potential, as well as to foreground 
the value of these movements in conceptualising alternative forms of peace politics.  
Aside IURP 0DUFHOR 6YLUN\¶V  PRQRJUDSK RQ Arab-Jewish Activism in 
Israel-Palestine there has been little examination of how contemporary Israeli civil 
society activism fits into the wider transnational movement for freedom and justice in 
Israel-Palestine. The Israeli contingent of this movement, which is based on the notions of 
justice, freedom and equality, has to be distinguished from previous civil societal 
formations such as interfaith dialogue groups. Such dialogue groups have been excluded 
from this study for their tendency to reinforce notions of intractable religious or ethnic 
differences, and for their insistence on equating Palestinian and Israeli experiences. In 
When Peace is Not Enough (2013), Atalia Omer further highlights the manner in which 
the refusal of the mainstream liberal Israeli peace camp to engage with the question of 
justice has resulted in the retrenchment of inward-looking ethno-nationalism among 
traditional peace activists.  
While this thesis falls broadly within the same political category as the 
aforementioned literature on Israeli-Palestinian and international activism for justice in 
Israel-Palestine, it also differs in significant ways. Firstly, the emphasis falls less on 
action or transformation through action (Barghouti, 2011; Svirsky, 2012), although the 
transformative potential of action and activism is considered an integral part of the 
process towards just peace politics. Rather, what I am interested in here is how the related 
concepts of justice, freedom and equality are understood, narrated and articulated within 
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critical Israeli activism. And, moreover, what are the necessary narratives and modes of 
articulation which justify and encourage critical activism for just peace? This relates to a 
critical examination of the discursive processes which have resulted in certain sections of 
Israeli society picking up the banner of justice, freedom and equality, and how this 
engagement is being articulated in activist narratives and practices.  
In essence, this thesis examines the narrative structures, or the sense-making 
processes, which have led to an increasing number of Israelis supporting initiatives such 
as BDS, or notions such as the decolonisation of Israel-Palestine, and the Palestinian right 
of return. The thesis also demonstrates that despite active engagement with the above 
notions and initiatives, at thH QDUUDWLYH OHYHO UHPQDQWV RI µROG WKLQNLQJ¶ continue to 
operate. This old thinking is characterised by the desire to maintain two separate ethno-
national identities and a reluctance to decolonise the self by challenging and rearticulating 
predetermined ethno-national categories and identifications.  
These often evident contradictions are the reason why the contributions of 
international activists and activism are increasingly entering debates on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, while the role of the Israeli peace camp has come under growing 
scrutiny.7 Many commentators have gone as far as to dismiss leftwing Israelis as too 
embedded within the Zionist consensus to effectively participate in oppositional politics 
(Freedman and Tilley, 2007; Winstanley 2011). Although I argue that there is no longer a 
viable local Israeli peace movement in existence, this thesis insists that critical Israeli 
activism remains indispensable to the struggle for justice, freedom and equality in Israel-
Palestine. As such, critical Israeli activists must not be seen as the remnants of a bygone 
Israeli peace movement but as the Israeli civil society section of an emergent 
transnational movement for a just peace in Israel-Palestine.    
                                                          
7
 See Svirsky, 2012; and Omer, 2013.   
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Sidney Tarrow (2005) theorises transnational movements as a byproduct of the 
process of Internationalism, which he distinguishes from economic globalisation, and 
GHILQHV DV µD GHQVH WULDQJXODU VWUXFWXUH RI UHODWLRQV DPRQJ VWDWHV QRQVWDWH DFWRUV DQG
international institutions and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in 
collective actLRQ DW GLIIHUHQW OHYHOV RI WKLV V\VWHP¶ LELG  The notion of 
Internationalism highlights the fact that the majority of contemporary transnational 
activism is not necessarily concerned with supporting or opposing global capitalism, as 
embodied in the notion of globalisation, but is rather rooted in domestic political concerns 
in relation to democratic justice.  
7DUURZ IXUWKHU GHILQHV WUDQVQDWLRQDO DFWLYLVWV DV µSHRSOH DQG JURXSV ZKR DUH
rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in contentious political activities that 
involve them in transnational networks of conWDFW DQGFRQIOLFW¶ LELGExamples of 
transnational movements based on Internationalist concerns include diaspora and migrant 
movements, but also peace, anti-war, and human rights movements. The Palestinian 
Solidarity Movement with its current emphasis on BDS would be another example of 
Internationalism; whereby a dense network of transnational actors utilise financial 
dis/incentives in order to redefine the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its resolution. As 
was discussed earlier and will be discussed in more detail in chapter five, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has had a transnational character since its inception, least of all given 
that the legitimacy of the state of Israel is the product of a United Nations resolution.  
A closer examination of the Israeli contingent of the Palestinian Solidarity 
Movement simultaneouVO\ DIILUPV7DUURZ¶VK\SRWKHVLV and underscores the complexity 
of transnational social movements. In the case of the three groups under study in this 
thesis only ICAHD engages fully with the Internationalist system of opportunity outlined 
by Tarrow. Given their anti-state politics, Anarchists Against the Wall explicitly avoid 
engagement with state and international institutions, focusing on practical solidarity at 
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home and transnational public mobilization through boycott advocacy abroad. However, 
as chapter six demonstrates efforts to avoid engagement with the state within the 
predominant statist framework which shapes contemporary life is highly problematic and 
riven with contradictions.  
Ironically, Zochrot which focuses on Israeli public memory and the question of 
WKH3DOHVWLQLDQ UHIXJHHV¶ return has had to engage most intimately with the concerns of 
the transnational Palestinian Diaspora. However, this engagement has not as yet resulted 
in any forms of international institutional advocacy or lobbying being undertaken by the 
organisation. Each of these cases demonstrates the complexity of transnational activism 
which crosses national borders but remains rooted in the desire to reframe local political 
life. For this reason, the context of Israel-Palestine also poses a significant dilemma for 
theorising transnational activism as it blurs the lines between the local, national and 
international.  
For example, does the transnationality of the above groups lie in their being Israeli 
activists who mobilise Internationalist structures to redress injustice in Israel-Palestine by 
lobbying the UN, EU, and/or calling for allies based in Britain, France, and other 
European and/or North American countries to boycott Israel? Or are they already 
transnational activists because they are Israelis in Israel-Palestine in a relation of 
oppression with the dispossessed and disenfranchised Palestinians? In other words, is the 
solidarity activism of AATW and ICAHD in the Occupied Territories local or 
trasnational? It is certainly not international activism, for they are not crossing state 
boundaries, but it is not national and/or domestic activism either considering that the 
physical proximity of Israel within its 1948 borders and the Occupied Territories can be 
starkly contrasted with the vastly different governing regimes operating in each territory. 
Yet, it is precisely these activists¶ relationship to the state of Israel which distinguishes 
Israeli activists from international activists.    
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The above considerations highlight the fact that transnational movements are not 
homogenous and unified collectivities, nor are its constituent parts equally positioned in 
relation to the claims being pursued. Moreover, scholarly literature on transnational social 
movements suggests that transnational movements which focus on the political 
transformation of a given state appear to be more successful at mobilising long-term 
support and resources than those who focus on abstract values. The success of the South 
African anti-apartheid movement, which the BDS campaign is trying to emulate, can be 
contrasted with the failure of the anti-Iraq war movement which dissipated once the 
invasion had taken place because it failed to elaborate on concrete demands for political 
change (Tarrow, 2005).  
The latter case also underscores the fact that the most successful transnational 
movements are those who are led and/or directed by the primary claims makers, or those 
affected by a given institution of power, with other transnational allies taking a position of 
solidarity. This is once again complicated in the case of Israel-Palestine where Israelis are 
also arguably affected by the conflict and the actions of the state of Israel. However, as 
the next chapter will demonstrate unequal positioning in relation to privilege and power 
calls forth for Israeli responsibility for and solidarity with the Palestinians. Thus, the next 
chapters will argue that as privileged citizens Israelis have a responsibility to address the 
claims of the Palestinian people by working to make Israel-Palestine a more inclusive and 
responsible place.  
In essence, transnational activism remains rooted in domestic state politics while 
relying on transnational interconnection and structures of opportunity in order to bring 
about concrete local changes. This does not have to be seen in negative terms, for despite 
living in an internationalist and economically globalised world, life for the majority of 
humanity remains rooted in a single geo-political space. The significance of the state 
continues to lie in the fact that it remains the primary institution which governs day-to-
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day existence; an institution which does not necessarily have to be exclusionary and 
oppressive, despite its history. Being a product of past and present transnational 
interconnections, inter-state wars and alliances, alongside the effects of migration and 
Diaspora, the state as an institution is much more amenable to transnational demands for 
change and transformation. This in itself suggests that state sovereignty is not all-
powerful and unyielding, and that in fact citizens play a powerful role in the articulation 
of the state and its political practices. This foregrounds the role of citizens in the 
rearticulation of governing political structures, an argument which will be examined more 
closely in subsequent chapters.             
Conclusion  
This chapter examined the failings of the state-centric Oslo peace process and its 
emphasis on Israeli state sovereignty at the expense of Palestinian self-determination. It 
has argued that the prevailing Westphalian framework which emphasises state 
sovereignty over and above collective and individual rights is inadequate for dealing with 
questions such as peace in Israel-3DOHVWLQH 0RUHRYHU XWLOLVLQJ 1DQF\ )UDVHU¶V µDOO
DIIHFWHG¶SULQFLSOH DQG Iris Marion <RXQJ¶V DUWLFXODWLRQRI WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI JURXSV LQ
political life, peace is understood as a relation of justice, and hence lack of peace is 
conceptualised as a relation of injustice and oppression. Taking the problem posed by 
state-centric politics, critical transnational activism is proposed and considered as viable 
and desirable alternative for the articulation of just peace politics. Given the relation of 
oppression characterising Israel-Palestine, the onus is placed on Jewish Israeli civil 
society to redress the imbalance of power. The articulation of the existence of a relation 
of oppression in turn requires a reconceptualisation of the historical and contemporary 
narrative of Israel-Palestine.         
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2. Reframing Israel-Palestine 
 
This chapter argues that in order to fully understand the interrelated concepts of 
justice and peace which were examined in the previous chapter, Israel-Palestine needs to 
be understood as one political unit which is characterised by ethnocratic governance 
(Yiftachel, 2010). Such an understanding would then require a reconceptualisation of the 
conflict as a situation of apartheid and oppression. ,ULV0DULRQ<RXQJ¶VILYHFRQFHSWVRI
oppressive relations are utilised to examine more closely the contemporary realities of 
Israel-Palestine. Given the overwhelming presence of symbolic and physical violence in 
Israel-Palestine, the practicalities of enacting a just peace necessitate a rearticulation of 
the ethical-political call for nonviolent resistance to oppression as a relation of 
responsibility for the Other.     
Israel-Palestine 
What is meant by the concept of Israel-Palestine? Israel-Palestine refers to the 
acknowledgement that the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is 
inhabited by two peoples with competing claims to national self-determination. 
Moreover, it is an acknowledgement of the history and ongoing legacy of a long-standing 
territorial dispute with a long record of inter-communal violence. As a concept Israel-
Palestine seeks to incorporate the narratives of a largely immigrant settler society8 versus 
those of the displaced and dispossessed indigenous population. Two national collectivities 
that not only tell different stories about the same land and geo-political history, but who 
speak two different national languages: Arabic and Hebrew. Despite the fact that their 
                                                          
8
 Jewish presence in Palestine predates Zionist immigration post-1882. In 1850 the Jewish population of 
Ottoman Palestine was estimated at 4% (Scholch, 1985:503). British Mandate surveys place the Jewish 
population of Palestine at 11% in 1922, and 31% in 1945, the population increase reflecting immigration 
trends (Institute of Palestine Studies, 1991).     
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lives and histories have been intertwined for over a hundred years, the two sides rarely 
VSHDN RU DWWHPSW WR OHDUQ WKH RWKHU¶V ODQJXDJH +RZHver, we do not simply speak of 
µFRQIOLFWLQJQDUUDWLYHV¶ in an abstract sense; we speak about narratives relating to a real 
geo-political, social and economic conflict. We are speaking, or at least should be, about 
the rights and wrongs of Israeli occupation and Palestinian aspirations for national 
recognition and self-determination. Moreover, we speak of cultural and political power 
and dominance. And we ask two further questions: Who has the permission to narrate the 
conflict in an authoritative way (Said, 1984)? And what are the necessary conditions 
which enable a new narrative to produce a conversation in common: 
Israelis and Palestinians are now so intertwined through history, 
geography and political actuality that it seems to me absolute folly to try 
and plan the future of one without the other. The problem with the 
America-sponsored Oslo process was that it was premised on a notion 
of partition and separation, whereas everywhere one looks in the 
territory of historical Palestine, Jews and Palestinians live together 
(Said, 2000: 191-192).   
As Edward Said suggests, Israel-Palestine increasingly refuses to be disentangled 
and partitioned from its other. Israel-Palestine is a tangible geopolitical space and yet a 
land that is continuously re-imagined in and through politics, poetry, prose and film. 
Israel-Palestine is a land without borders, and the land with the most borders. It is also a 
land in which borders bleed into one another and refuse to be delineated and become 
fixed. Israel-Palestine is a geopolitical description and a cultural metaphor that is both 
internal and external to the border. Israel-Palestine is a myth and a reality. It is a contested 
space which includes that which it wishes to exclude. It is a land where its inhabitants live 
in fear of the border which threatens to banish and cast them out beyond the beloved 
homeland.  
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Israel-Palestine constitutes a conflicted understanding of the Self and Other, 
whereby the pure Self can only exist by excluding the feared Other. Thus, in the minds of 
its 11 million inhabitants, Palestine does not exist in Israel and Israel does not exist in 
Palestine. Yet, while the contested geopolitical and cultural presence of the rival Other is 
RIWHQ RPLWWHG IURP WKH -HZLVK DQG 3DOHVWLQLDQ SURWDJRQLVWV¶ FRQIOLFWLQJ QDUUDWLYHV WKH
2WKHU¶V FRQWHVWHG FR-existence in the cultural and geopolitical imaginary of the Self 
remains indisputable.   
For decades the dominant Zionist position on Palestine was characterized by the 
WZLQ PD[LPV µD ODQG ZLWKRXW SHRSOH IRU D SHRSOH ZLWKRXW D ODQG¶ DQG *ROGD 0HLU¶V
LQIDPRXVVWDWHPHQWWKDWµ7KHUHZDVQRVXFKWKLQJDV 3DOHVWLQLDQV¶7KLVGHQLDO has been 
partially enabled by IsUDHO¶V HPSKDVLV RQ WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQV¶ µ$UDEQHVV¶ RIWHQ SKUDVHG LQ
WHUPV RI µthe Arabs already have many countries (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, etc), 
ZK\GRWKH\ZDQW,VUDHO"¶ Hence, since the Palestinians are Arabs, they do not and need 
not exist as a political entity, and therefore, cannot and should not make political and 
WHUULWRULDO FODLPV RQ WKH 6WDWH RI ,VUDHO ,VUDHO¶V ORQJVWDQGLQJ GHQLDO RI 3DOHVWLQLDQ
existence can also be attributed to their statelessness. The Palestinians did not exist 
because a Palestinian state did not exist; thus in the eyes of the Israeli regime they had no 
legitimate claims for national self-determination.  
As Rashid Khalidi (1997) explains it was not until the outbreak of the First 
Intifada in 1987 that the indisputable presence and significance of the Palestinian people 
became undeniable for the Israeli leadership. The Oslo Accords signalled the first sign of 
Israeli recognition of the Palestinian people. Yet, after forty-four years of military 
occupation and illegal Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip the status of the 
Palestinians in relation to the Israeli regime remains problematic. As Amnon Rubinstein 
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put it in D.QHVVHWPHHWLQJ LQ WKH237V µthere are Israeli citizens with full rights, and 
there are non-Israeli, non-citizens with non-ULJKWV¶ (quoted in Eldar and Zertal, 2007: xx). 
Conversely, for the Palestinians, Jewish presence in Palestine, and Zionist 
aspirations in particular, have been undeniable since the onset of mass Jewish 
immigration in the 1930s and 1940s. On the other hand, recognition of the existence of 
Israel has been the hardest task. The Palestinians, who had consistently rejected partition 
plans for Palestine from the 1930s onwards on the basis of their majority status in 
Palestine, found themselves dispossessed and stateless in the aftermath of the Nakba and 
the creation of Israel in 1948, with the overwhelming majority of Palestinians expelled 
RXWVLGH3DOHVWLQH¶VKLVWRULFERUGHUV 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) established in 1964 by Palestinian 
UHIXJHHVHVSRXVHGµthe elimination RIWKH=LRQLVWHQWLW\>,VUDHO@¶ DQGWKH'LDVSRUD¶VUHWXUQ
to historic Palestine as its primary goal. By 1969 the PLO, reconciled with an established 
and settled Jewish population in Israel/PalestineGHFODUHGLWVREMHFWLYHµWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW
of a secular-GHPRFUDWLF VWDWH LQ KLVWRULF 3DOHVWLQH¶ ZKLFK ZRXOG JXDUDQWHH WKH ULJKWV RI
Muslims, Christians, and Jews alike. From the 1970s onwards the PLO increasingly 
shifted towards a two-state paradigm, earninJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHFRJQLWLRQ DV µthe sole 
legitimate representative of WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ SHRSOH¶ in 1974; culminating in the 1988 
Declaration of Independence which accepted a two-state solution based on the June 1967 
borders of Israel, the Gaza Strip, and West Bank (Khalidi, 2006: 154-5).         
Given the apparent mutual acceptance of the two-state solution, at least in 
rhetoric, why is it necessary to discuss the concept of Israel-Palestine? Since the outbreak 
of the Second Intifada in 2000 it has been widely accepted that the Oslo Accords and US 
VSRQVRUHG µSHDFH SURFHVV¶ had come to a halt or even an end. The ascendancy and 
primacy of the settlement project within Israeli politics and society has normalised the 
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ultra-=LRQLVW DVSLUDWLRQ IRU µ*UHDWHU ,VUDHO¶ (territory encompassing all of historic 
Palestine). Expanding Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories, the denial of the 
rights of non-citizen Palestinians, and increasing threats against Palestinian Israelis that 
WKH\ZLOOEHGHQDWLRQDOL]HGRU³WUDQVIHUUHG´LIWKH\GRQRWGHPRQVWUDWHVXIILFLHQWOR\DOW\
to Israel as a µJewish state¶ (Ravid, 2010), has resulted in the charge of Israeli Apartheid 
(White, 2009), and growing calls for a secular one-state solution (Abunimah, 2006).   
Any attempt to make sense of and illustrate the paradox of Israel-Palestine 
requires the careful examination of complementary and simultaneously conflicting geo-
political maps and narratives. Maps need borders and borders need maps. The nation-state 
relies on its borders being marked on internationally recognised maps. Sovereign 
territories require to be bound by colours which differentiate them from other sovereign 
territories. Few of us consider ourselves defined by colour-coded blocks on maps, yet we 
refer to the geo-political map almost unconsciously as we respond to the routine question: 
µ:KHUHDUH\RXIURP"¶, mostly DQVZHULQJZLWKUHODWLYHHDVHµ,¶PIURPWKHUH¶ and if you 
happen not to come from the USA or WesterQ(XURSH\RXPD\KDYHWRDGGµMy country 
borders on there DQG WKHUH¶. But of course the above notion requires you to be able to 
recognise your place of origin on an internationally recognised geo-political map and 
moreover, the ability to recognise that map as a truthful representation of the spatial and 
cultural origins from which you derive your identity. 
For over 60 years the Palestinian people have been a stateless nation and Palestine 
has been absent from the maps of the world. Since 29th November 1947, when the 
international community voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), proposing 
the partition of Palestine into a Jewish State (52%) and an Arab State (48%), the land of 
Palestine became a golden map worn on a chain around the necks of dispossessed 
3DOHVWLQLDQZRPHQ6D¶GL7KHSROLWLFDOQHgation of the indigenous population of 
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Palestine as a national community was completed in the aftermath of the 1948 War when 
on 14th May 1948 the Jewish State of Israel declared itself sovereign and independent on 
78% of the former land of Palestine, with the remaining 22% of the Palestinian populated 
territories of the Gaza Strip and West Bank coming under Egyptian and Jordanian 
administration respectively until 1967.   
For the Palestinian people, Jewish settlement in Palestine, culminating in their 
displaFHPHQW DQG WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI ,VUDHO DV D µ-HZLVK 6WDWH¶ KDV EHHQ H[SHULHQFHG
and continues to be perceived as a manifestation of European colonial dispossession. In 
Zionist self-representations, on the other hand, the project of Jewish immigration to and 
settlement in Palestine is portrayed as an emancipatory nationalist endeavour for the 
establishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine that would guarantee Jewish 
sovereignty and security. While both of these versions of the role of Zionism conflict, 
they are not necessarily mutually exclusive definitions of the same ideological 
SKHQRPHQRQ ,Q PDQ\ UHVSHFWV =LRQLVP¶V VHOI-representation is indeed correct; the 
writings of Theodore Herzl which inspired the Zionist project and led to the formation of 
The World Zionist Congress in 1882 came on the back of a wave of European anti-
Semitism in the nineteenth century characterised by persecution and pogroms against 
European Jewry.  
For the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe, many of whom had personal 
experiences of migrating from one European state to another in search of a better host-
country and protection from persecution, the idea of migrating to Palestine and fulfilling 
the messianic promise of return would not have been a novel or out-of-the-ordinary 
suggestion. Thus, the wheel of the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict was set in 
motion in the nineteenth century when the first Jewish immigrants began to arrive and 
settle on the land purchased in Ottoman-controlled Palestine by the newly established 
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Jewish Agency. Nevertheless, while the story told about the Zionist pioneers is not 
HQWLUHO\ILFWLRQDOWKHFODLPWKDW3DOHVWLQHZDVµDODQGZLWKRXWSHRSOHIRUDSHRSOHZLWKRXW
DODQG¶ZDVDQGLVDQRXWULJKWIDEULFDWLRQ 
The recent historical challenge to this founding myth has led some Israeli and 
international scholars of the region to agree with the Palestinians about the description of 
Zionism as a form of European colonialism. Yet others have argued that Zionism cannot 
EHGHVFULEHGDVµFRORQLDOLVP¶GXHWRWKHVHWWOHUV¶WUDQVQDWLRQDOFRPSRVLWLRQDQGWKHLUODFN
of a single metropole from which Zionism sprung. For example, the British colonial 
Metropole was the United Kingdom; however, this was not the case for Jewish 
immigrants to Palestine who derived from different European locations and had little 
interest in empire in the traditional sense, their migration being largely the result of 
displacement. 
 Proponents of this view, that is those who do not side with the traditional Zionist 
interpretation nor with the colonial paradigm, tend to compare Zionism to the ideologies 
of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Eastern European ethno-nationalism, i.e. the 
notion that an ethno-UHOLJLRXVFROOHFWLYLW\FRQVWLWXWHVDµQDWLRQ¶DQGDQDWLRQLVHQWLWled to 
a nation-state, and that that state should encompass all the territories in which members of 
the said national collectivity reside. To illustrate this, Jeff Halper (2008) gives the 
example of Serb (Yugoslav) nationalism which sparked the First World War with the 
DVVDVVLQDWLRQRIWKH$XVWULDQ$UFKGXNH)HUGLQDQGDQGWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\LGHDRIµ*UHDWHU
6HUELD¶SUHYDOHQWDPRQJ6HUEQDWLRQDOLVWVLQWKHV 
Gabriel Piterberg disagrees with the above definition of Zionism, arguing instead 
thDW WKH =LRQLVW SURMHFW ZDV IURP LWV LQFHSWLRQ D µVHWWOHU FRORQLDO¶ HQGHDYRXU GULYHQ E\
WKUHH IRXQGDWLRQDO SULQFLSOHV 7KH IRUHPRVW RI WKHVH SULQFLSOHV ZDVLV µWKH QHJDWLRQ RI
H[LOH¶RU µWKHGHQLDORIPHPRU\-HZLVK-µH[LOLF¶ memory on the one hand, and Palestinian 
                              
 
79 
 
PHPRU\RQWKHRWKHU¶7KHVHFRQGWHQHWZDVLVWKHPHVVLDQLFSURPLVHRIµWKH
UHWXUQ¶WRWKHODQGRI,VUDHODQGWKHGHOLYHUDQFHRIWKH-HZLVKSHRSOHZKLFKLVOLQNHGWR
WKHWKLUGDQGPRUHVHFXODUSULQFLSOHRIµWKHUHWXUQWRKLVWRU\¶ZLWK its premise being that 
µWKH QDWXUDO DQG LUUHGXFLEOH IRUP RI KXPDQ FROOHFWLYLW\ LV WKH QDWLRQ¶ 3LWHUEHUJ 
32). Piterberg equates the Zionist ideology and Israeli settlement in Palestine with 
European Protestant settler colonialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In 
defence of the settler-colonial thesis Piterberg adds: 
)URPWKHPRPHQW=LRQLVP¶VJRDOEHFDPHWKHUHVHWWOHPHQWRI(XURSHDQ
Jews in a land controlled by a colonial European power, in order to 
create a sovereign political entity, it could no longer be understood as 
µMXVW¶DFHQWUDORUHDVW(XURSHDQQDWLRQDOLVP LWZDVDOVR LQHYLWDEO\D
white-settler colonialism (2010: 116).  
This view is supported by Ilan Pappé (2008a) who compares and contrasts the 
early stages of Jewish settlement ZLWK µGLOXWHG¶ Protestant German colonial ventures in 
Asia and Africa during the eighteenth century. However, he goes further by wedding the 
two definitions above, arguing that despite its similarity to other religious-inspired settler 
colonial movements; Zionism is also different because it represents a unique blend of 
ethno-nationalism and European settler colonialism. In addition, Pappé asserts that the 
Zionist project is/was based on three driving ambitions: 
to find a safe haven for Jews after centurieVRISHUVHFXWLRQ«>DQG@ WKH
GHVLUHWRUHLQYHQW-XGDLVPDVDQDWLRQDOPRYHPHQW«+RZHYHUDVVRRQ
as these two impulses were territorially realized in Palestine, the 
national and humanist project became a colonialist one. Inside Palestine 
a third impulse was added, the wish to create a pure Jewish space in 
whatever part of Palestine was coveted as the future Jewish State (ibid: 
159).   
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The question of colonialism is particularly pertinent in the case of Palestine given 
that the so called Holy Land has been at the heart of colonial and imperial struggles for 
domination for hundreds of years. Zionist settlement in Palestine began during the reign 
of the fledgling Ottoman Empire, but it was the British Empire which made the dream of 
establishing a Jewish national homeland in Palestine a real possibility. In the aftermath of 
the First World War the League of Nations placed Palestine under British Mandate and in 
1917 Lord Balfour declared: 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their 
best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the 
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other 
country. 
At this juncture it is important to note that many accounts of the origins of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict often neglect the significance of the role of British imperialism 
LQ WKH0LGGOH(DVW-DPHV5HQWRQ¶VLOOXPLQDWLQJDUWLFOHRQµ7KH,QYHQWLRQRI WKH
Middle East, 1917-¶ UHYHDOV KRZ %ULWDLQ SOD\HG D NH\ UROH LQ VHWWLQJ WKH VWDJH IRU
regional conflict by playing a double game in the effort to extend its colonial influence. 
3ULPDULO\ GUDZLQJ RQ GRFXPHQWV IURP WKH %ULWLVK LPSHULDO DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SUH-war 
propaganda campaigns in the Middle East, Renton demonstrates that in a bid to weaken 
the rival Ottoman Empire, Britain sponsored, financially and militarily, Arab nationalist 
DVSLUDWLRQV LQ WKH UHJLRQ ,Q 3DOHVWLQH KRZHYHU %ULWDLQ¶V VWUDWHJ\ RI VXSSRUWLQJ $UDE
nationalism conflicted with its support for Jewish settler-colonisation. The Mandate 
authorities actively supported Zionist aspirations for statehood in Palestine while 
suppressing the equivalent sentiments among the Palestinians. Renton further gives the 
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example of the 1936-1939 Arab Uprising as not simply representing acts of popular 
opposition to growing Jewish immigration to Palestine, but moreover as articulations of a 
nationalist inspired revolt against British colonial double standards, which is one of the 
reasons why the revolts were brutally repressed.   
Of course, British colonialism was not the sole European imperialism to play a 
part in the making of the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The rise to power of 
the Nazi regime in Europe, the outbreak of the Second World War, followed by the 
aftermath of the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps, revealing the extent of the 
devastation that was wrought by the Shoah, all played their part in the events that led to 
today. Post-war Europe was in disarray, with millions dead, displaced and destitute, and 
(XURSH¶V-HZU\DOPRVWHQWLUHO\GHFLPDWHG:KLOHLWLVLQFRUUHFWWR attribute the creation of 
the state of Israel to the European Holocaust, because, as was demonstrated earlier, the 
Zionist project predates the event by nearly 50 years, nevertheless, the immediate legacy 
of World War II did result in garnering international support for the establishment of a 
Jewish homeland. These factors, coupled with large-scale legal and illegal Jewish 
migration to Palestine, a weakened British Empire, and growing Zionist demands for the 
0DQGDWH¶VZLWKGUDZDORQRFFDVLRQDUWLFXODWHGWKURXJKWKHWHUURrist activities of the Irgun, 
FRQWULEXWHGWR WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶GHFLVLRQWRSDUWLWLRQ3DOHVWLQHLQWRDQ$UDEDQG
Jewish State, which in turn resulted in the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war.            
In the aftermath of the 1948 war the Palestinians became stateless. A Palestinian 
state was not established on any part of the territory that constituted pre-1948 Palestine, 
and the 750,000- 3DOHVWLQLDQV ZKR ZHUH H[SHOOHG EH\RQG ,VUDHO¶V ERUGHUV WRRN
what they believed to be, temporary shelter in makeshift camps in the neighbouring Arab 
states of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. These refugees and their descendants remain in these 
camps. The small minority of around 200,000 Palestinians who managed to stay within 
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the newly established State of Israel were given citizenship under the civic identity of 
µ,VUDHOL$UDEV¶ and were subject to martial law until 1966.  
The end of martial law for Palestinians within Israel roughly coincided with the 
June 1967 or Six Day War during which Israel fought a pre-emptive battle and won a 
swift military victory over its neighbouring Arab states, successfully conquering the 
remaining territories that constituted pre-1948 Palestine. One of the first acts of Israeli 
Occupation took part in the midst of war, the centuries old Moroccan Quarter in the Old 
City of East Jerusalem was demolished on 10th June, leaving hundreds of Palestinians 
homeless and resulting in the death of an elderly woman who was buried alive beneath 
the rubble of her home. The first act of Israeli military occupation continues to 
characterize the Israeli policy of demolishing Palestinian homes. An estimated 26,000 
homes or more have been demolished in the West Bank and East Jerusalem alone 
(UNOG, 2011). By 2006 50,000 homes in the Gaza Strip had been fully or partially 
demolished (Ghanim, 2008: 76). During Operation Cast Lead, which lasted only a few 
weeks in December 2008 ± January 2009, 3,000 Palestinian homes were destroyed fully 
and 20,000 partially; countless other buildings, including schools, hospitals and police 
stations suffered a similar fate (Amnesty International, 2009: 55).  
An Exceptional Apartheid   
From the onset of occupation in 1967, Military Order No. 5 declared the West 
Bank a closed military zone resulting in a set-XS ZKHUHE\ µLQVWHad of internal mobility 
being the rule with restrictions being the exception, restrictions are the rule, and mobility 
± through permits ± LV WKH H[FHSWLRQ¶ $EX =DKUD   7KH SHUPLW V\VWHP
alongside colour-coded IDs and vehicle registration plates, hundreds of internal 
checkpoints, and sporadic road closures restrict Palestinian movement on a daily basis 
(ibid: 306 ± 309). Since 2005 family unifications between Palestinians from Israel and the 
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Occupied Territories, or the OPT and East Jerusalem have been prohibited, and reunions 
between residents of Gaza and West Bank are also practically impossible. In practice this 
means that a bride from Nablus cannot join her husband in Nazareth because she is not 
allowed into Israel, and if he moves to live with her he would lose his residency 
entitlements as an Israeli citizen. The situation is even more problematic for Jerusalemites 
who would have their blue ID revoked if they move to reside in the West Bank, and 
would therefore be barred from re-entering Jerusalem (ibid: 317).  
This policy has in effect crippled the Palestinian economy and has also severed the 
geographical continuity of the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem, and is further 
tearing apart Palestinian families and communities. Many Palestinians faced with 
insurmountable violations of their right to family life and daily restrictions on their 
freedom of movement have chosen to leave Palestine altogether. Observers have termed 
the resultVRI,VUDHO¶VFORVXUHSROLFLHVµYROXQWDU\H[SXOVLRQ¶:  
territory can be acquired by depopulating areas and using population 
registries, identity cards, and permit systems to zone population 
movement. In other words, the manipulation of forms of (non) 
citizenship, to displace and dispossess some people, thereby gains 
territory for others (Abu-Zahra, 2008: 303).    
The Palestinian experience of disenfranchisement and dispossession can be 
contrasted with the privileged experience of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories 
whose very presence is in direct contravention of the Fourth Geneva Convention9. While 
Palestinians have no citizenship rights, and are subject to arbitrary and brutal military 
                                                          
9
 $UWLFOHVWLSXODWHV µ,QGLYLGXDORUPDVV IRUFLEOH WUDQVIHUVDVZHOODVGHSRUWDWLRQVRISURWHFWHGSHUVRQV
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or 
QRWDUHSURKLELWHGUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHLUPRWLYH«The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of 
its own civilian population into the territory it occupies¶ 
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regulations, the Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories fall under the direct jurisdiction 
of Israeli civilian law and receive exclusive protection by the Israeli army. The Civil 
Administration, the quasi-governmental body responsible for administering Palestinians 
in the OPT, grants building permits to fewer than 5% of Palestinian applicants. The same 
institution demolishes the homes of Palestinians it has refused to grant permits to, and 
confiscates their privately owned land for Israeli settlement expansion under the guise of 
military necessity (Abu Zahra, 2008: 314; Eldar and Zertal, 2007: 305):  
Given that Jewish colonists ± but not Palestinians ± in the West Bank 
are treated as Israelis, heavily subsidized, and given access to a complex 
system of colonist-RQO\ URDGV DQG ODQGEORFNV WKH WHUP³JHRJUDSKLFDO
VHSDUDWLRQ´ >XVHG XQGHU 6RXWK $IULFDQ $SDUWKHLG@ VHHPV Dlso rather 
euphemistic in this case (Abu Zahra, 2008: 314).  
Why do Jewish Israelis and Palestinians have such a markedly different 
experience although they reside within the same geo-political boundaries? What 
governance regime structures the dichotomy of privilege and oppression? The dominant 
thesis purports that the difference is that the Israeli state within its internationally 
recognized 1948 borders is a democracy, while the territories occupied in 1967 continue 
to be governed in a state of exception, this EHLQJ D UHIHUHQFH WR *LRUJLR $JDPEHQ¶V
(2005) socio-legal concept which refers to a physical space, such as a camp or detention 
centre, created by a sovereign state in which the rule of law does not operate and apply, 
and where the sovereign is free to subject those placed in a state of exception to violence, 
and even to kill them with impunity. The state of exception hypothesis has been applied 
to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank especially since the beginning of the policy of 
µFORVXUH¶LQWKHV (Gregory, 2004, Zreik, 2008).  
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However, what the state of exception thesis fails to account for is why Israeli 
settlHUVLQWKH237DUHJRYHUQHGE\µGHPRFUDWLF¶ Israeli law while this same democratic 
regime is not extended to the occupied Palestinians who hDYHOLYHGXQGHU,VUDHO¶Vmilitary 
rule for the past 45 years. Neither does it explain why the Palestinian citizens of Israel are 
similarly disadvantaged vis-à-vis their fellow Jewish citizens. 3URSRQHQWV RI ,VUDHO¶V
democracy often contrast the experience of Arab Israelis (or Palestinians with Israeli 
citizenship) with occupied, non-citizen Palestinians. The former allegedly enjoy all the 
trappings of modern citizenship including the right to vote in and stand for elections, 
ZKLOH WKH ODWWHU¶V FLWL]HQVKLS Uights will one day be delivered in a yet-to-be established 
state of Palestine somewhere in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.  
However, as the Israeli historian Ilan Pappé (2011) has documented at great 
length, the story of Palestinian Israelis is somewhat more complicated than established 
representations would have it. In many respects, the Palestinian citizens of Israel were the 
first Palestinians to experience Israeli military occupation. The internal military regime, 
which lasted until 1966, closely resembles the tactics and strategies deployed in the 
present day Occupied Territories: from military closure zones, arbitrary arrests, 
roadblocks, random ID spot-checks, curfews, and house demolitions, to permanent 
expulsions right up until 1955, this being the fate of the Palestinian Bedouin community 
of the Naqab/Negev in particular.  
Land confiscation and appropriation by the state authorities in the early days of 
the Israeli regime have also contributed to and continue to shape present day geo-spatial 
arrangemeQWV ZLWKLQ ,VUDHO¶V  ERUGHUV 3ULYDWH 3DOHVWLQLDQ ODQG H[SURSULDWHG E\ WKH
state was transferred to the quasi-governmental institution of the Jewish National Fund 
(JNF), an institution which has since 1953 acted as the legal custodian of land on behalf 
RIWKH-HZLVKSHRSOHµIRUSHUSHWXLW\¶3DSSp-224). Alongside the Israeli Land 
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Authority, the JNF controls 93% of land within Israel which is solely reserved for Jewish 
use. An estimated 3% of land in Israel serves the housing and municipal needs, such as 
schools and playgrounds, of Palestinians in Israel who constitute 20% of the overall 
population (Pappé, 2011):       
The emerging picture is as follows: the borders of the state are almost 
meaningless in that being a Palestinian citizen inside Israel does not 
mean that you are part of the collective [national] project, while being a 
Jew living outside the state does not mean that you are not part of this 
project, since according to the ethos of the state (and the Law of 
Return), every Jew can become a citizen at any point in time. All this 
renders the difference between the actual and potential (Jewish) citizen 
marginal and blurs the concept of borders (Zreik, 2008: 140, original 
emphasis). 
7KH UDFLDOLVHG KLHUDUFK\ ZKLFK FKDUDFWHUL]HV ,VUDHO¶V JRYernance regime in the 
DQGWHUULWRULHVKDVUHVXOWHGLQWKHFKDUJHRIµDSDUWKHLG¶WKHFDVHIRUZKLFKKDV
been clearly articulated and thoroughly substantiated by Uri Davis (1990 [1987], 2003) 
and Ben White (2009), and more recently in the findings and conclusions of the third 
session of The Russell Tribunal on Palestine, held in South Africa in 2011. Affirming the 
Israeli apartheid hypothesis,ODQ3DSSpEDQGUHMHFWVWKHµVWDWHRIH[FHSWLRQ¶
hypothesis, arguing that a state of exception paradigm only functions if one is examining 
,VUDHO¶V µGHPRFUDF\¶ from the privileged perspective of Jewish Israelis. If on the other 
KDQGWKHVLWXDWLRQLVH[DPLQHGLQWHUPVRI,VUDHO¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKLWV3DOHVWLQLDQFLWL]Hns 
and the Palestinians in the Occupied THUULWRULHV WKHQ ZKDW LV UHYHDOHG LV µD VWDWH RI
RSSUHVVLRQ¶ :LWKLQ WKH VWDWH RI RSSUHVVLRQ WZR SDUDOOHO UHJLPHV RI JRYHUQDQFH RSHUDWH
simultaneously: the democratic regime applied to Jewish Israelis is characterized by the 
rule of law and representative parliamentary democracy; the Palestinians, on the other 
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hand, fall under the dominion of the autocratic, unaccountable and covert operations of 
the secret services and military. Pappé (2008b) illustrates the effects of the state of 
oppression with the example that the majority of Jewish Israelis are not concerned by the 
fact that Israel has existed in a constitutional state of emergency since its first day. This is 
because the state of emergency and all that it entails has never been and, they trust, will 
never be applied to them. The emergency only applies to the oppressed Palestinians (ibid: 
150-153).  
 The Five Faces of Oppression   
This section proceeds with an application of ,ULV0DULRQ<RXQJ¶VIUDPHZRUNIRU
justice in relation to group difference to the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
situation of oppression <RXQJ¶V HPSKDVLV RQ JURXS GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ DOORZV XV WR UHWDLQ
some sense of the socio-political significance of the two national collectivities in Israel-
Palestine while simultaneously accounting for differences within and between these 
groups. In that respect, broadly speaking we are discussing Israeli Jews vis-a-vis 
Palestinians. However, the experience of these two national collectivities can be further 
subdivided. For example, the Palestinian people are constituted by Israeli Palestinians, i.e. 
those who hold Israeli citizenship, the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, and the geographically dispersed Palestinian refugee Diaspora. 
Similarly, Israeli Jews can be subdivided into the politically dominant European 
Ashkenazi, the Mizrahi and Sephardic Jews of Arabic and Mediterranean origin, and to 
this mix the more recent wave of migration from the former USSR can also be added, as 
well as any potential citizens from the Jewish Diaspora.  
Given that Israeli society is characterized in the main by transnational Jewish 
migration and settlement these groups should be treated as broad categories which are in 
themselves political and ideological in nature. However, as will transpire in the discussion 
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ZKLFK IROORZV ,VUDHO¶V =LRQLVW QDWLRQDO SURMHFW Kas largely succeeded and continues to 
succeed in integrating and imbuing successive waves of Jewish immigrants to Israel-
Palestine with national loyalty. Thus, while there is socio-political differentiation and 
hierarchy within Jewish Israeli society, on the whole the Jewish collectivity in all its 
diversity is nevertheless in a social, political and economic position of power and 
privilege vis-a-vis the Palestinians.     
As Young asserts, justice cannot be thought of without the related concepts of 
difference and oppression. Thus, identifying group privilege necessitates an analysis of 
oppression and exclusion as experienced by differentially related groups. Young begins 
KHUDFFRXQWRI WKH ILYH IDFHWVRIRSSUHVVLRQYLD WKHFRQFHSWRI µH[SORLWDWLRQ¶ZKLFKVKH
defines as characterized by capitalist labour relations in which a dominant class is 
privileged through the accumulation of wealth derived from WKH GHYDOXDWLRQ RI RWKHUV¶
labour. She adds the layers of patriarchy and racism to explain how labour relations of 
privilege and exploitation can also be driven by gendered and racialized hierarchies. The 
second IDFHWLVµPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQ¶UHIHUULQJWRWKH exclusion of certain groups, in particular 
mentally and physically disabled people, from access to the labour market. She argues 
that this deals a double injustice because although labour relations are exploitative, 
nevertheless the shared experience of exploitation can lead to some degree of individual 
autonomy and group solidarity, whereas the marginalized are relegated to social 
LQYLVLELOLW\ZKLFKFDQKDYHGDPDJLQJHIIHFWVQRWRQO\RQSHRSOH¶V VRFLDODQGHFRQRPLF
opportunities but also on their self-esteem.  
The previous concepts are further related to the third FRQFHSWRIµSRZHUOHVVQHVV¶
ZKLFK GHILQHV SHRSOH¶V DELOLW\ WR H[HUFLVH DXWRQRP\ RU DXWKRULW\ in respect of their 
working life. Young gives the example of the relative autonomy of professionals versus 
those who perform low or unskilled labour. The fourth face of oppression is µcultural 
                              
 
89 
 
imperialism¶ ZKLFKLVDERXWWKHV\VWHPDWLFSULYLOHJLQJRIDGRPLQDQWJURXS¶VFXOWXUHDQG
history, and the silencing and othering RIRWKHUJURXSV¶H[SHULHQFHV7KHILIth aspect of 
RSSUHVVLRQLVµYLROHQFHµZKLFKLQFOXGHVVWUXFWXUDOYLROHQFHE\VWDWHLQVWLWXWLRQVEXWDOVR
individual violence against certain groups and individuals belonging to groups who have 
been rendered as killable, rapeable, and abusable, coupled with relative impunity for the 
perpetrator of racialized, sexist, homophobic or xenophobic violence.          
In the case of Israel-Palestine applying the cultural imperialism phenomenon is 
relatively straightforward. As was demonstrated in the preceding historical section on 
Israel-Palestine, the Zionist version of the conflict and the history of 1948, 1967 and 
subsequently has been the dominant version in the conflict and has been largely accepted 
and enacted by other powerful international institutions which wield great degree of 
authority and power over the fate of Palestinian self-determination. As Edward Said 
ZULWHV µ0HPRU\ DQG LWV UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV WRXFK YHU\ VLJQLILFDQWO\ XSRQ TXHVWLRQV RI
LGHQWLW\ RIQDWLRQDOLVP RISRZHU DQGDXWKRULW\¶ 7KLV colonizing narrative 
has gone as far as to render the Palestinians nonexistent and continues to legitimize 
symbolic and real violence against Palestinian bodies and property. Moreover, the 
imperial tactics of the Israeli state extend beyond its geo-political borders, which it has 
refused to designate beyond vague strategic references to armistice, green, blue, and red 
lines which it claims to be defending but in reality violates on a regular basis. This is 
SDUWLFXODUO\ UHOHYDQW WR ,VUDHO¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWh the Palestinian refugee Diaspora to 
whom it denies the right of return yet reserves the right to police their mobilisation and 
organisation despite the absence of legally recognised jurisdiction, as has been argued is 
WKH FDVH IRU ,VUDHO¶V ORQJVWDQGLQJ Pilitary involvement in Lebanon (Chomsky, 1999; 
Hever, 2010).  
                              
 
90 
 
Gabriel Piterberg (1996) and others also argue that Jewish Israeli society is 
characterized by a double Orientalist discourse. On the one hand, the denial of Arab 
Palestinian identity and the privileging of Zionist Jewish identity; and on the other hand, 
the denigration of the history and memory of Mizrahi and Sephardi Israelis, commonly 
referred to as the Oriental Jews who migrated to Israel from Arab and Muslim countries 
in the 1950s. This has UHVXOWHG LQZKDW3LWHUEHUJFDOOV WKHµ$VKNHQD]LKHJHPRQ\¶RU LQ
RWKHU ZRUGV WKH SULYLOHJLQJ RI ZKLWH (XURSHDQ -HZLVK KHULWDJH ZLWKLQ WKH VWDWH¶s 
narratives. The driving force EHKLQGWKLVµGRPHVWLF2ULHQWDOLVP¶KDV been the prevalence 
of modernisation theories which have constituted the Muslim and/or Oriental other as 
backward, underdeveloped, and in need of civilizing. The socio-political marginalization 
experienced by second and third generation Mizrahi Israelis adds to the complexity of the 
conflict. It is particularly interesting to note that only about 10% of Israeli conscripts, 
with conscription compulsory for both men and women aged 18 and over, actively serve 
in the Occupied Territories during their military service. The majority of IDF soldiers 
who serve in the OPT tend to be Mizrahi or the more recently arrived Russian Jews.10  
$ GLVFXVVLRQ RI µH[SORLWDWLRQ¶ DQG µPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQ¶ FDQQRW EH GLVFXVVHG
separately in the context of Israel-Palestine because they are so closely intertwined in the 
ongoing regime of exclusion and oppression. From the beginning of ,VUDHO¶V2FFXSDWLRQ
of the Gaza Strip and West Bank in 1967 until the signing of the Oslo Accords the Israeli 
economy was heavily reliant on Palestinian labour. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian 
workers from the Occupied Territories travelled every day to work in the low waged 
employment sectors in Israel. The Oslo period created and consolidated Palestinian 
HFRQRPLFGHSHQGHQFHRQ ,VUDHO DQGZLWQHVVHG WKHEHJLQQLQJRI WKHSROLF\ RI µFORVXUH¶
partially, then permanently blocking Palestinian entry from the OPT to Israel, a situation 
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 Presentation by Breaking the Silence, East Jerusalem 2011. 
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exasperated by the fragmentation of the West Bank into administrative zones A, B, and C, 
and the construction of the Separation Wall since 2002 (Hever, 2010):  
Workers coXOGQ¶W ZRUN WUDGHUV FRXOGQ¶W VHOO WKHLU JRRGs, farmers 
FRXOGQ¶W UHDFK WKHLU ILHOGV ,Q  SHU FDSLWD *13 LQ WKH RFFXSLHG
territories plummeted close to 30 percent; by the following year, poverty 
among Palestinians was up 33 percent (Klein, 2007: 433).   
Naomi Klein further argues that the wholesale exclusion of thousands of 
Palestinian labourers was possible due to two major political factors, the first being the 
unprecedented immigration of a million Jews and others from Russia and the former 
Soviet countries from 1993 onwards. The new arrivals served a triple purpose in enabling 
WKHSROLF\RIµFORVXUH¶E\WDNLQJRYHUWKHORZ-paid jobs previously done by Palestinians, 
coupled with the arrival of impressively large numbers of nuclear scientist émigrés who 
MRLQHG ,VUDHO¶V JURZLQJ DUPVDQGKRPHODQG VHFXULW\ VHFWRUV DQG ILQDOO\ WKH FRQWH[WXDO
ignorance of many of these new immigrants who now make up a substantial proportion of 
the Jewish settler population in the West Bank because of the relatively cheap lifestyle on 
offer, in contrast to living in Israel proper (ibid: 430 - 433). The second aspect to closure, 
which in essence sealed the deal, for a want of a better phrase, has been the War-on-
Terror waged by Western states post 11th 6HSWHPEHU,VUDHO¶s experience in fighting 
a long-term conflict and defusing the Second Intifada placed it in a prime position to turn 
its experience to profit, making it a world leader in homeland security and the fourth 
largest arms dealer, bigger than the UK in 2006 (ibid: 428 - 436). Nevertheless, war 
SURILWHHULQJZKLFK1DRPL.OHLQWHUPVµGLVDVWHUFDSLWDOLVP¶KDVQRWEHQHILWHGDOO,VUDHOLV
equally. Since 2000 the gap between the rich and poor has been steadily growing with 
25% of Israelis living below the poverty line, and child poverty standing at 36% in 2007 
(ibid: 436). However, this picture is complicated by the fact that Palestinian Israelis who 
QXPEHU  RI ,VUDHO¶V FLWL]HQV GHVSLWH WKHLU PLQRULW\ VWDWXV LQ WKH SROLW\ DUH
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disproportionately represented in the poverty statistics. Half of those living in poverty in 
Israel are Palestinians, and two-thirds of Israeli children living in poverty are Palestinian 
(Pappé, 2011: 6).  
7KLVKDVOHGWRDJURZLQJH[SHULHQFHRIµSRZHUOHVVQHVV¶ZKLFKFDQEHYLHZHGDVD
continuaWLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSWV RI µH[SORLWDWLRQ¶ DQG µPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQ¶ :KLOH RFFXSLHG
Palestinians are barred from entering Israel, by 2009 the number of illegal Jewish settlers 
in the West Bank and annexed East Jerusalem stood at over 500,000 (Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 2009). The 200 settlements in the West Bank boast 1,400 businesses, 17 large 
industrial zones, and generous tax incentives.11 30,000 Palestinian workers from the 
Occupied Territories are employed in these Industrial Zones. Israeli labour laws which 
include minimum wage requirements and advanced health and safety regulations do not 
apply to Palestinian workers; neither does Palestinian labour law. Palestinian Trade 
Unions have no access to the Industrial Zones, and collective organisation is almost 
impossible because the workers rely on hard to obtain security clearance permits. 
Furthermore, the Israeli army has been used to suppress protests over conditions. Despite 
the illegal and oppressive status of the settlements, and the exploitative conditions faced 
by Palestinian workers in the Industrial Zones, occupied Palestinians have almost no 
FKRLFH ZKHWKHU WR ZRUN WKHUH RU QRW ,VUDHO¶V SROLF\ RI µFORVXUH¶ KDV UHVXOWHG LQ KLJK
unemployment in the West Bank and conditions are markedly worse in blockaded Gaza. 
In contrast, the settlements are highly subsidized by the Israeli state and can afford to pay 
higher wages than can be found within the rest of the West Bank, but still considerably 
lower than the minimum wage in Israel (whoprofits.org). In short, the Palestinian 
workforce in the occupied territories is flexible, cheap, expendable, easily exploited and 
powerless. 
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 Personal notes from the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, International Session on Corporate Complicity in 
,VUDHO¶V2FFXSDWLRQ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Klein (2007) concludes that the process of closure has turned the Palestinian 
SHRSOHLQWRµVXUSOXVKXPDQLW\¶,QFRQWUDVWWKH-HZLVKVHWWlers in the occupied West Bank 
and annexed East Jerusalem, whose presence in the OPT is considered illegal under 
International Law, enjoy a lifestyle of luxury and prosperity not just in relation to the 
oppressed Palestinians but also in comparison to the average Israeli who has become 
poorer over the past decade. The Israeli economist Shir Hever (2010) argues that the 
incentives necessary to sustain the settlements, including lucrative tax breaks, generous 
government subsidies and a flourishing welfare state which has been dismantled in Israel 
proper, coupled with huge security and infrastructural spending, have had a heavy 
financial toll on the Israeli economy, the impoverishment of which is only masked by the 
continuous functioning RI,VUDHO¶VZDUHFRQRP\.    
7KHILQDOVWDWHRIRSSUHVVLRQLGHQWLILHGE\<RXQJQDPHO\µYLROHQFH¶LVWKHPRVW
prominent feature of collective relations in Israel-Palestine. Whether one is speaking of 
the history of the conflict or its contemporary manifestations, violence as war and/or 
terror is continuously evoked in narratives and discussions about Israel-Palestine. In her 
account of violence, Young includes not only state violence against oppressed groups but 
also individual violence against oppressed individuals. Here she gives the example of 
UDFLVWDQGVH[LVWYLROHQFHERWKRIZKLFKDUHRIWHQPHWZLWK µYLFWLPEODPLQJ¶DQGVRFLDO
and legal impunity for the perpetrator. In essence, even when the state itself does not 
undertake the task to persecute oppressed groups, its message is that abusing, raping, and 
killing members of oppressed groups is not as bad as doing so against 
privileged/protected members of society. In short, oppressed lives are not as worthy as the 
lives of others.  
In the case of Israel-Palestine the power disparity between the two national 
collectivities manifests itself in symbolic as well as physical ways which are closely 
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linked to the concept of cultural imperialism. Palestinian violent, as well as nonviolent, 
resistance to the occupation is often caricatureGDVµWHUURULVP¶ZLWKLQGRPLQDQWPHGLDDQG
SROLWLFDO GLVFRXUVHV ZKLOH ,VUDHO¶V VWDWH YLROHQFH LV MXVWLILHG DV µGHIHQVLYH¶ 6DLG 
1988). These discourses tend to disregard the fact that the struggle between the 
Palestinians and the Occupation is a struggle between a stateless and occupied people and 
a militarized occupying state. The disparity is reflected in the rarely reported statistical 
inequality between Palestinian and Israeli fatalities caused by violence in the conflict.12 
 Furthermore, while Palestinian violence against Israelis tends to be perpetrated by 
individuals and small militant groups, Israeli state violence is organised and manifests 
itself in all aspects of daily life including the denial of formal citizenship to occupied 
Palestinians, house demolitions, land expropriations, imprisonment without charge, 
torture in prisons; and individual, albeit state sanctioned, attacks by soldiers and settlers 
against Palestinian personhood and property.13 The disregard and/or misrepresentation of 
Palestinian resistance as always violent will be discussed in Chapter Three which 
examines strategies for nonviolent resistance to the Occupation. Before delving into the 
topic of nonviolence in the next chapter, it is necessary to examine the concept of 
violence in relation to power; this will be done with reference to the state of exception.  
One of the most prominent critiques of the state of exception is that it is based on 
two flawed assumptions. As Pappé (2011) suggests, the state of exception paradigm 
favours the view of the privileged leaving the oppressed devoid of any agency in relation 
to sovereign violence. The second flawed assumption is that sovereign power is always 
bound to produce violence and may itself be constituted by violence. Hannah ArendW¶V
(1970) illuminating writing on violence reveals a rather more nuanced picture of the 
                                                          
12
 VHH%¶7VHOHP)DWDOLWLHV 
13
  %¶7VHOHP6WDWLVWLFV 
                              
 
95 
 
function of sovereign power and violence. She makes the case for conceptual clarity in 
relation to five concepts which she argues tend to be used interchangeably in political and 
philosophical writing on the subject of violence. The five concepts are power, strength, 
force, authority, and finally, violence. $UHQGW GHILQHV µSRZHU¶ DV WKH FROOHFWLYH
empowerment of an individual or group to act in the name of the collectivity. For 
example, in a representative democracy the majority of citizens empower a given party to 
be their elected government and to rule over them for a certain period of time.  
µ6WUHQJWK¶RQWKHRWKHUKDQGUHIHUVWRDQLQGLYLGXDODWWULEXWHRUFKDUDFWHUistic; and 
µIRUFH¶$UHQGWDUJXHVVKRXOGEHUHVHUYHGDVDV\QRQ\PIRUµHQHUJ\¶HYHQZKHQXVHGLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOVHQVHDVLQWKHIRUFHRIDVRFLDOPRYHPHQWµ$XWKRULW\¶LQ$UHQGW¶VGHILQLWLRQ
UHIOHFWV µVWUHQJWK¶ LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW LW LV GHILQHG DV D FKDUDFteristic pertaining to 
µXQTXHVWLRQLQJ UHFRJQLWLRQ E\ WKRVH ZKR DUH DVNHG WR REH\ neither coercion nor 
persuasion DUH QHHGHG¶ LELG  µ9LROHQFH¶ RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG LV LQVWUXPHQWDO $UHQGW
DUJXHV WKDW µSRZHU¶ UHOLHV RQ FRQVHQW UDWKHU WKDQ FRHUFLRQ DQG Yiolence appears in 
moments when consent is withdrawn. For example, while state violence may coerce 
dissenters into submission, it cannot necessarily reinstate its power and/or their consent. 
Here, she gives the example of totalitarian states in which terror becomes the dominant 
PRGHRIJRYHUQPHQWµZKHQYLROHQFHKDYLQJGHVWUR\HGDOOSRZHUGRHVQRWDEGLFDWHEXW
on the contrary, remains in full control. It has often been noticed that the effectiveness of 
terror depends almost entirely on the degree of sociaODWRPL]DWLRQ¶LELG 
$UHQGW¶V UHIHUHQFH WR VWDWH WHUURU LV RI FRXUVH D UHIHUHQFH WR 1D]L *HUPDQ\
However, her discussion on violence relates to other case studies which fall on a 
FRQWLQXXP EHWZHHQ SRZHU DQG YLROHQFH LQFOXGLQJ WKH 86$¶V ZDU LQ 9LHWQam, 
totalitarianism in the USSR, and revolutionary violence. It is interesting to note that while 
Agamben draws heavily on Arendt for his articulation of the state of exception, he does 
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QRWSODFHWKHVDPHHPSKDVLVRQWKHFROOHFWLYH8QOLNH$UHQGW¶VFRQFHSWion of state power 
which relies on collective consent, including Nazi Germany for its anti-Semitic policies, 
$JDPEHQ¶V VRvereign and its victim, the homo sacer, are abstract and atomised. 
$JDPEHQ¶VLQHVFDSDEOHVRYHUHLJQFDQEHSDUWO\DWWULEuted to his reliance on Foucaultian 
thought which traps the subject in an endless cycle of discursive formation and 
reformulation. 7KDWLVQRWWRVD\WKDW$UHQGW¶VDSSURDFKLVQRWSUREOHPDWLF)RUH[DPSOH
she makes little distinction between state and revolutionary violence, and even while she 
acknowledges the latter as a response to oppression, she nevertheless insists on a statist 
framework in a post-revolutionary moment. However, what is important for this 
discussion is that Arendt articulates power and violence in terms of an ongoing struggle 
between the people and the state which leaves room for active resistance to oppression 
rather than capitulating to abstract notions of an all-powerful and inescapable sovereignty.  
Wendy Brown (2010) further critiques the above tendency of politiFDOWKHRULVWV¶to 
conceptualise state sovereignty in theological terms. She demonstrates how, from 
+REEHV¶V/HYLDWKDQWR$JDPEHQ¶VVRYHUHLJQVHFXODUVRYHUHLJQW\KDVQRWRQO\FR-opted, 
but reinstated itself as God Almighty: omnipresent, omnipotent, and supreme (ibid: 58-
61). Moreover, in a world characterised by transnational flows of goods, ideas and people 
which challenge and reshape national state boundaries, the state has become more not less 
aggressively theological in its invocation of divine power. Whether by defining itself as a 
religious state, as in the Islamic Republic of Iran, or by invoking a religious ethos, as in 
the Christian inspired USA, Brown argues that the associated fortressing against real and 
imagined threats to state sovereignty reveals a crisis of sovereign power. Thus, while 
sovereignty wishes to portray itself as unmovable and unshakable it is in fact extremely 
vulnerable to social and economic forces beyond its territorial control (ibid: 61-66).          
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Brown arguHV WKDW WKH FRQWUDGLFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH VWDWH¶V SURMHFWHG LPDJH RI
strength versus its reality of permeability and vulnerability is most evident in the 
contemporary phenomenon of state walling. In the case of Israel-Palestine, the West Bank 
Barrier/Fence/Wall is a structure allegedly designed to guard Israeli citizens against 
Palestinian terrorism. Leaving aside the route of the Wall which snakes into Palestinian 
territory and incorporates large blocks of the illegal settlements into Israel proper, the 
Wall itself serves multiple contradictory purposes. On the one hand, the Israeli state 
claims to seek to keep Palestinian terrorism out of Israel by physically preventing hostile 
µSHQHWUDWLRQ¶ DQG SURMHFWLQJ FRQFUHWH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR SURWHFW LWV FLWL]HQV 2Q WKH other 
hand, the fear of terrorism appears not to prevent continuing Jewish settlement beyond the 
Green Line. This is a most glaring contradiction in places such as Hebron, in which 
Jewish settler presence is physically at the heart of a predominantly conservative Muslim 
Palestinian city, a presence which requires substantial military reinforcement provided by 
the state.  
Here we are presented with an irreconcilable paradox whereby the state insists on 
walling itself against danger and undesirable aspects of coexistence, and simultaneously 
the state insists upon endangering its citizens in the name of aspirations to greater 
sovereignty.          From the perspective of the privileged citizen, i.e. those who confer 
power onto the state and expect protection from danger in return, the desire for walling is 
not just about shoring up the border against external threat. It is a psychological act of 
expelling the perpetration of violence against others. This desire articulates itself as the 
wish to see ourselves as µJRRG¶µLQQRFHQW¶DQGµSXUH¶ZKLOHSURMHFWLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI
danger and violence onto the excluded Other.  
This conceptualisation can be clearly observed in the case of Israel-Palestine in 
relation to the Wall and its claim to protect from wanton Palestinian terrorism. The story 
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of the Wall tends to narrate the conflict from the Second Intifada, characterising 
Palestinian actions as a rejection of peace and the desire to harm innocent Israelis for no 
other reason than that the Palestinians are terrorists. As Edward Said (1984, 1988) has 
pointed out on numerous occasions, the portrayal of Palestinians as violent extremists is 
not new. Nevertheless, what is new about the Second Intifada is that it coincided with 11th 
September 2001 and the ensuing war-on-terror and as such the counter-narrative to 
Palestinian resistance could be repackaged as part of the fight against a global Islamic 
threat (Klein, 2007).  
However, as was discussed in the previous chapter and in the preceding sections, 
the self-projection of Israelis as innocent, and the Israeli state as vulnerable to terrorism, 
LVDJODULQJH[DPSOHRI,VUDHO¶VGHVLUHWRGLVDYRZLWVRZQRQJRLQJUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUDQG
actual perpetration of violence against the Palestinians. The Wall conceals the forty-six 
year old military occupation even as it reinforces it. It seeks to keep Palestinians out of 
Israel while constantly increasing the number of Jewish settlers on the other side of the 
Wall, making them potentially vulnerable to the very violence the state claims it wishes to 
protect its citizens from. In short, even as the Wall claims to protect from the blowback of 
the Occupation, it is itself a tool of the Occupation, the very construction of which 
demands the perpetration of violence, whether through expropriating land and destroying 
the homes of Palestinians who happen to live on the proposed route of the Wall, or by 
YLROHQWO\ VXSSUHVVLQJSRSXODUSURWHVW DV LQ WKHYLOODJHVRI %LO¶LQ%XGUXV1DELK6DOHK
1L¶OLQDQGRWKHUV 
Judith Butler (2004) describes the reaction of the state and privileged citizens to 
terror as µthe desire to ban grief¶*ULHYLQJLVDSURFHVVRIDOORZLQJRQHVHOIWREHundone 
by the loss of the other; it is a moment of introspection and vulnerability which reaffirms 
RQH¶VEHLQJ Ln relation to others, including those who can do us harm, and who we can 
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harm in return. The refusal to grieve, on the other hand, is the desire to deny our psychic 
and bodily vulnerability to injury and death, giving rise to a collective state of heightened 
anxiety, rage and hyper vigilance articulated by an agJUHVVLYHFODLPWRWKHULJKWWRµself-
defence¶. It is a FODLP ZKLFK FRQVWLWXWHV FHUWDLQ OLYHV DV µKLJKO\ SURWHFWHG DQG WKH
abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. 
Other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as 
³JULHYDEOH´¶ LELG  7KLV µKLHUDUFK\ RI JULHI¶ LV SUHFLVHO\ ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV WKH
contemporary set-up in Israel-Palestine where a threat to Israeli life immediately results in 
the disavowal/negation of Palestinian life and livelihood. The most extreme recent 
example was Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09 where the military attack on blockaded 
Gaza, allegedly launched by Israel in response to the firing of rockets into Southern 
Israel, resulted in the death of 1,400 Palestinians, mainly civilians, and thirteen Israelis, 
ten of whom were soldiers in action.  
Disproportionality in modern warfare, i.e. the amount of force which is not only 
possible but also permissible, reveals the unequal valuation of certain lives. The unequal 
valuation of Palestinian life can also be gauged during episodes which are not 
characterised by large scale violence. For example, the release of five hundred Palestinian 
prisoners held in Israeli jails in the autumn of 2011 in exchange for the return of the 
captured IDF soldier, Gilat Shalit, has been interpreted to imply that one Israeli soldier is 
worth 500 Palestinians (Guardian Blog, 2011). From the perspective of the oppressed, 
state violence is experienced as thanatopower, a concept Ghanim (2008) juxtaposes to 
biopower which is concerned with preserving life, µWKH PDQDJHPHQW RI FRORQL]HG
RFFXSLHGVSDFHVDQGVXEMXJDWHGSRSXODWLRQV¶ZKHUHE\WKHOLYHVRIFRORQLVHGVXEMHFWVDUH
µH[SRVHG WR WKe continual threat of death that becomes the permanent shadow 
accompanyiQJ WKHP¶ *KDQLP LELG: 67). Butler (2004) writes that the danger of this 
arrangement is that death and wishing to be dead may become a desirable means to 
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HVFDSHRQH¶VRSSUHVVHGUHDOLWy. Perversely, for many Palestinians, martyrdom, which does 
not relate exclusively to becoming a suicide bomber but more generally to dying in the 
QDPH RI WKH FDXVH EHFRPHV µD ZD\ RI JDLQLQJ SROLWLFDO PHDQLQJ DV D ZD\ RI
compensating for a meaningless life. This is a deadly trap not only because of its fatal 
human results, but also because it turns the political into a state that can be gained only at 
the PRPHQWRILWVHOLPLQDWLRQ¶*KDQLP 
Edward Said (1988: 50) further argues that the violence carried out by non-state 
groups seeks to imitate state sovereignty and its claim to the legitimate use of 
violence/terror for political purposes. As such, organized violence, whether carried out by 
the state or non-state groups, tends to rely on the same statist logic of doing politics. 
Karatzogianni and Robinson (2010:220) highlight that the statist logic is further evident 
LQ WKH VWDWH¶V SUHIHUHQFH IRU GHDOLQJ ZLWK PLOLWDQW RUJDQLVDWLRQV ZKRVH KLHUDUFKLFDO
structures remind it of itself, rather than with more non-hierarchical and pluralistic civil 
society formations. This in turn traps the domain of politics in an endless cycle of 
violence and recrimination.    
In an attempt to think through the best means to break the cycle of violence, Judith 
Butler ( DVNV µ:KDW PDNHV OLIH JULHvabOH"¶ DQG highlights the fact that bodily 
vulnerability is at the core of our shared existence. However, she also argues that 
µYXOQHUDELOLW\ LV DOZD\V DUWLFXODWHG GLIIHUHQWO\ WKDW LW FDQQRW EH SURSHUO\ WKRXJKW RI
outside of a differentiated field of power and, specifically, the differentiated operation of 
norms of recognition¶ (ibid: 44). Thus, the recognition that another being is vulnerable 
does not automatically result in empathy and the desire to protect, it could equally result 
in the desire to harm and kill. This is where grievability is so significant: what are the 
conditions under which we can recognise the loss of life, even the life of those who have 
harmed us, as grievable?  
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This question gives rise to the articulation of a new theory of collective 
responsibility which demands not only that we think about the Other but that we think 
and act with WKH 2WKHU LQ D FRDOLWLRQ WKDW µZLOO KDYH WR DFFHSW WKH DUUD\ RI VRPHWLPHV
incommensurable epistemological and political beliefs and modes and means of agency 
that brings XV LQWR DFWLYLVP¶ LELG  What follows is an attempt to articulate the 
narrative practicalities of building and working in such a coalition. How does one go 
about building such a coalition? Is the recognition of our shared vulnerability a pre-
condition to the establishment of a coalition based on ethical nonviolent responsibility for 
the Other?  
Violence and Responsibility  
As previously discussed, for Hannah Arendt (1970), state power is based on the 
consent of the majority of citizens. Moreover, violence plays an instrumental role in the 
politics of the state, and state violence is not a manifestation of state power but rather a 
sign that the state is losing its power and legitimacy in relation to its citizens. 
Nevertheless, violence, though not necessarily violence against the majority of the citizen 
ERG\ DV LQ WKH FDVH RI D 7RWDOLWDULDQ VWDWH UHPDLQV DQ LQWHJUDO SDUW RI WKH VWDWH¶V
relationship to its polity and those who reside within it. In his renowned lecture µ3ROLWLFV
DV9RFDWLRQ¶ Max Weber GHVFULEHVWKHVWDWHDVµa human community that (successfully) 
FODLPV WKH PRQRSRO\ RI WKH OHJLWLPDWH XVH RI SK\VLFDO IRUFH ZLWKLQ D JLYHQ WHUULWRU\¶ 
(Owen and Strong, 2004 [1919]: 33). This still remains the case, in that the modern state 
is the legitimate bearer of the right to wage war against other states, as well as having the 
right to punish, imprison, and even take the life of citizens and others who are considered 
to have transgressed any given law within the sovereign territory.  
 Glenn Bowman (2001) takes the discussion further in relation to the nation-state 
and ethno-nationalism to argue that violence is constitutive, or foundational, of 
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national/state identity. Although his writing concerns primarily the pre-state emergence of 
ethno-QDWLRQDO FDOOV IRU D VWDWH KLV DUJXPHQW FDQ QHYHUWKHOHVV EH DSSOLHG WR ,VUDHO¶V
relationship with WKH3DOHVWLQLDQVDQGWKHWHQVLRQVXUURXQGLQJWKHVWDWH¶VVHOI-image as a 
µ-HZLVK VWDWH¶ YHUVXs those who antagonise and/or challenge its right to be as such. 
Bowman writes: 
DQHQWLW\¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIZKDW/DFODXDQG0RXIIHFDOOµDQWDJRQLVP¶± a 
presence which is believed radically to threaten the persistence of that 
quiddity [Jewishness] which marks the being of an entity [Israel] ± may 
precisely provide the spur that drives an entity to mark out the 
ERXQGDULHV RI LWV LGHQWLW\ DQG WR µGHIHQG¶ WKHP ZLWK D YLROHQFH ± a 
violence often manifested aggressively (pre-emptively) (ibid: 42).  
 In fact, this is very fitting for the situation in Israel-3DOHVWLQH ZKHUH ,VUDHO¶V
relationship to its own borders continues to be performative rather than territorially 
ERXQG 7KLV UHIHUV WR WKH ODFN RI JHRJUDSKLFDO IL[LW\ LQ ,VUDHO¶V VRYHUHLJQ ERXQGDULHV
boundaries which rely on invoking and enacting metaphysical pre-state formations and 
Biblical claims to ownership of the land (Zertal, 2005, 2007). Similarly, Judith Butler 
(2009) emphasises the simultaneously productive and reproductive nature of constitutive 
violence. Not in the sense that the state is constituted in and through violence, but more in 
the sense that state power produces and reproduces certain subject formations in order to 
sustain and perpetuate its power over those subjects. Thus, in the case of Israel-Palestine, 
the state evokes certain subjects ± Jewish ± as its rightful citizens, and inscribes them with 
WKHGXW\WRGHIHQGDQGSURWHFWWKHSROLW\¶VSXULW\DJDLQVWDQWDJRQLVP6LPXOWDQHRXVO\WKH
state defines and casts out antagonistic others, non-Jews/Palestinians, as enemies of the 
nation-state, the protection of whose lives is not only not necessary, but in fact 
undesirable, for sustaining the Jewish State.        
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  However, subjectification itself does not render subjects powerless to state power 
and its workings. Rather, in an Arendtian fashion, Butler addresses privileged subjects 
with a call to bear responsibility for the oppressed and dispossessed, arguing WKDWµZKHQ
acting reproduces the subject at the expense of another, not to act, is after all... a way of 
registering and demanding equality effectively. It is even a mode of resistance, especially 
when it refuses and breaks the frames by which war is wrought time aQGDJDLQ¶%XWOHU
2009: 184). This is an ethical-political call/demand for the articulation of conscientious 
refusal among Jewish Israelis, a movement, albeit a waning one, which has played an 
important historical-political role in Israel-Palestine, and will be examined more closely 
in the next chapter which theorises the psycho-discursive practicalities of articulating 
nonviolent resistance to oppression among critical Israelis. However, before we can do so 
it is important to think through more concretely the significance and contributions of the 
concept of responsibility at the micro level in enabling more just and peaceful relations in 
Israel-Palestine.  
-XGLWK %XWOHU¶V ZRUN LV RQFH DJDLQ LQGLVSHQVDEOH WR WKLV WDVN SDUWLFXODUO\ JLYHQ
that in recent years she has focused on Jewish ethical and political thought in relation to 
Israel-Palestine. For Butler (2009) nonviolence is not a peaceful task. On the contrary, 
QRQYLROHQFHDQGYLROHQFHFRQVWLWXWHDQRQJRLQJVWUXJJOHZLWKWKHVHOIDQGRQH¶VDELOLW\WR
do violence. Moreover, violence and nonviolence are intricately linked to our relationship 
with the Other and the immovable responsibility for their wellbeing. In Butler¶V (2012) 
critical secular-philosophical reading of Levinas and Benjamin, responsibility emerges as 
the key concept in relation to the biblical FRPPDQGPHQW µ7KRX VKDOO QRW NLOO¶. The 
significance of the commandment lies in the fact that it is an injunction and not a law, that 
is, it is not subject to punishment, and as such it can be refused or ignored by the one who 
KHDUVWKHFDOOµQRWWRNLOO¶In essence, the commandment is based on freedom of choice ± 
the choice to hurt or not to hurt the other ± which stands in contrast to state or legal law 
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which is based on the threat of violence as punishment, or the further demand for violence 
to be performed by subjects, as in military service.  
However, the ability to ignore the injunction is not the same as the right to deny its 
pronouncement, and therefore the subject remains compelled to take responsibility for the 
decision to ignore the commandment. Thus, LQ WKH VSLULW RI µ/HYLQDV contra Levinas¶ 
(Butler, 2012) nonviolence remains a violent but bloodless struggle with oneself over the 
ability to kill or not to kill. Whatever our choices, we are always responsible for our 
actions and for the Other. The refusal to acknowledge that the self is always relational to 
others leaves only the option to destroy or be destroyed. Therefore, violence and 
nonviolence are always relational. Nevertheless, LQVSLWHRIWKLVUHDGLQJ/HYLQDV¶VHWKQR-
centric Judaism poses a quandary for BuWOHU¶V UHFXSHUDWLRQ RI KLV SKLORVRSK\ Rf 
nonviolence, a quandary which she implies a solution for at the end of the text. I hope to 
articulate this solution in more practical terms in the next chapter.  
The quandary refers to the lack of prohibition in Judaism against killing in self-
defence. In fact, killing in self-defence is not only permissible but actually an injunction 
to preserve the self/people. As was touched upon in the discussion on Just War theory, 
Israel often uses the defence of self-defence in its longstanding engagement with the 
Palestinians, essentially absolving its responsibility for the Other who, according to this 
doctrine, has by virtue of being dangerous and threatening made itself irresponsible and 
hence killable and ungrievable. This creates a serious paradox. How does one speak/act 
non-violently on behalf of an other that is allegedly trying to kill you? Butler (2012) 
suggests that the answer is to tell the truth about the other. That is to reconceptualise the 
self as the oppressor and to acknowledge RQH¶V UROH in the othHU¶VDQJHUDQGVHDUFK IRU
revenge. 
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This brings us to %XWOHU¶V reading of Walter Benjamin on divine or revolutionary 
violence as the duty to oppose state violence. Butler GHVFULEHV%HQMDPLQ¶V argument to 
FKRRVHµQRWWRNLOO¶E\QRQYLROHQWO\RSSRVLQJWKHYLolence of the state and its violence-
preserving and violence-inducing laws as a form of anarchism. The non/violent relates to 
refusal which for Benjamin is not always interpreted as µnot violent¶ by the violence it 
opposes; he gives the example of the general strike which involves nothing more than 
refusing to work and yet in so doing damages or does symbolic and, in cases of sabotage, 
UHDO YLROHQFH WR WKH V\VWHP ZKLFK ZRXOG EH UHSURGXFHG E\ RQH¶V ODERXU, and is hence 
viewed as a violent assault on/by the system. As will be argued in the next chapter, the 
refusal to engage in military service has been viewed in similar terms.  
In this sense, Benjamin provides us with a Jewish-anarchist form of refusal ± an 
anarchistic moment that does not necessarily seek to institute a new political order but 
rather strives to free the subject from the violence of the law. Moreover, action in relation 
to the law is what distinguishes ethics from politics. Thus, %XWOHU¶VUHDGLQJRI%HQMDPLQ
results in the conclusion that µ) responsibility has to be understood as a solitary, if 
anarchistic, form of wrestling with an ethical demand, (2) that coerced or forced 
obedience murders the soul and undermines the capacity of the person to come to terms 
with the ethical demand placed upon her, (3) and that the framework of legal 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\ FDQ QHLWKHU DGGUHVV QRU UHFWLI\ WKH IXOO FRQGLWLRQV RI KXPDQ VXIIHULQJ¶
(Butler, 2012: 87). As such, radical ethical-political responsibility implies taking action 
against oppression in order to bring about a more just order.  
+RZHYHU %HQMDPLQ¶V thesis on non/violent resistance to state law has been 
criticised by Arendt for not being clear about whether all or only certain laws should be 
opposed non/violently, the former representing a particular problem for her. For Arendt a 
just order can only be constituted by the federalist legal and political model brought about 
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by a plurality of people working together for its enactment. While the state-centrism of 
this line of thought is somewhat problematic, it nevertheless reaffirms the case which was 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter for making the border the centre of analysis for 
cohabitation and consequently for political action and responsibility. This line of 
argumentation will be expanded in the next chapter which examines the question of 
refusal and the possibilities for the emergence of nonviolent ethical responsibility as 
articulated through existing civil society strategies for peace in Israel-Palestine.  
Conclusion  
 This chapter narrated the historical-political events and actions which demand that 
Israel-Palestine be viewed as a geopolitical space structured by oppressive apartheid 
practices. This manner of reconceptualising Israel-Palestine requires a re-examination of 
responsibility as the ethical-political demand for nonviolent resistance through the refusal 
to enact state-sanctioned violence against the oppressed Other. The question of 
responsibility drew on the work of Judith Butler and her secular-philosophical re-reading 
of Levinas LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH LQMXQFWLRQµ7KRXVKDOOQRWNLOO¶ LQZKLFKVKHUHMHFWVHWKQR-
centrist religious-political thinking. Such thinking which is also prevalent in Just War 
WKHRULHV WHQGV WR UHQGHU WKH 2WKHU µa dangerous and threatening enemy¶ and hence 
absolves the self of the responsibility IRU WKH 2WKHU¶V IHHOLQJV RI UDJH DQG GHVLUH IRU
revenge by claiming self-defence. Instead, in this case, responsibility demands a 
rearticulation of the self as UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKH2WKHU¶VRSSUHVVLRQ, and actively choosing 
to end this relation of oppression. This demand for non-violently ending oppression will 
be examined more closely in the next chapter in relation to critical non-statist Israeli 
activism.  
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3. Reframing Responsibility as Ethical Nonviolence 
 
 Proceeding frRP WKHSUHYLRXV FKDSWHU¶V FRQFOXGLQJGLVFXVVLRQRQ VWDWHYLROHQFH, 
this chapter examines the question of individual refusal to reproduce state militarist 
violence as a form of nonviolent ethical engagement with the Other. In particular, this 
chapter examines the obstacles posed by normative discourses on Israeli primacy and the 
role of the military, and the possibility of refusing conscription in militarist oppression by 
articulating a critical Israeli subject in relation to the oppressed Palestinians. This is done 
with reference to the discourses of a number of Israeli NGOs including Breaking the 
Silence and New Profile, as well as via the analysis of three documentary films featuring 
testimonies of former IDF soldiers including 7R 6HH LI ,¶P 6PLOLQJ, Concrete, and 
%UHDNLQJ WKH 6LOHQFH¶V Guided Tour in Hebron. The question of Palestinian terrorism 
and/or political violence is also addressed in relation to the experience of oppression and 
domination and the question of justice, highlighting the significance of narrative 
acknowledgement in the process of enacting nonviolent ethical engagement. Yulie 
&RKHQ¶VDXWRELRJUDSKLFDOGRFXPHQWDU\My Israel is given as an illustrative example of a 
FULWLFDO HWKLFDO HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK WKH 2WKHU¶V QDUUDWLYH DQG WKH UHVSRQVLELOLWy for redress 
that this calls for. 
0HHQ(UKDEL":KR¶V7KH7HUURULVW" 14 
The case of an oppressive apartheid raised in the previous chapter does not feature 
in the vast majority of political and media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict which is often characterised as a violent inter-religious and not a political 
VWUXJJOH ,Q PDQ\ SHRSOH¶V PLQGV ,VUDHO-Palestine evokes images of defensive Israeli 
military aerial assaults in response to aggressive Palestinian terrorism (Dor, 2005; Hass, 
                                                          
14
 Title of a rap track by DAM, a popular Palestinian Israeli Hip Hop group. 
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2002; Philo and Berry, 2004 and 2011). Moreover, in the past 20 years representations of 
terrorism, dislocated from any mitigating circumstances, has become synonymous with 
the Palestinian struggle, while state-sponsored counter-terrorism strategies have come to 
legitimise state violence (Said, 1988; Hass, 2002). Media and political focus on the 
violent, extra-ordinary and spectacular nature of suicide-bomber terrorism, coupled with 
the conflation of acts of political terror with the religion of Islam and/or ideology of 
Islamism post 11th September 2001, has further led to the disregarding and obscuring of 
everyday popular resistance to the Occupation.  
 The prevalence of Palestinian suicide-bombings since the 1990s has been largely 
DWWULEXWHGWR0XVOLPV¶DGKHUHQce to the Islamic concept of Jihad, commonly translated as 
µKRO\ZDU¶ EXWZKLFKLQIDFWUHIHUVWREHOLHYHUV¶VWUXJJOHDJDLQVWLQMXVWLFHZKLFKGRHVQRW
necessarily imply waging military battle (Abu Nimer, 2003). Aside from the fact that not 
all Palestinians are Muslim, Abu Nimer further emphasises the centrality of peace-
building in Islam, with many of its core values, including the pursuit of justice, emphasis 
on social empowerment, dignity and equality, being fully compatible with secular 
humanist approaches to building just peace. Robert Pape (2005), who has carried out a 
quantitative historical comparison of the backgrounds and political motivations of a 
number of different anti-establishment movements which have utilised political violence 
in the past two centuries, similarly dismisses the religious nature of terrorism. He further 
highlights the fact that the overwhelming majority of suicide attacks have historically 
been carried out by secular Marxists and not Muslims.  
The anthropologist Scot Atran (2010), who has done extensive ethnographic work 
ZLWK \RXQJ 0XVOLP µZRXOG-be-suicide-ERPEHUV¶ DFURVV WKH ZRUOG ZULWHV WKDW UHOLJLRQ
SOD\V D YHU\ QHJOLJLEOH SDUW LQ SHRSOH¶V GHFLVLRQ WR EHFRPH VXLFLGH ERPEHUV %RWK
community and camaraderie trump religion and even national ideology as influencing 
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factors. He further emphasises that Palestinian terrorism, in particular, is political and not 
SV\FKRORJLFDOO\ RU LGHRORJLFDOO\ PRWLYDWHG 7KH PDLQ PRWLYDWLRQ FLWHG E\ µZRXOG-be-
suicide-ERPEHUV¶ LV SHUVRQDO H[SHULHQFH and/or witnessing house demolitions, political 
arrests of family members, and/or other injustices and oppression faced by the immediate 
community. Moreover, following his interviews with key Hamas leaders, the Palestinian 
organisation most commonly associated with Islamism and violent resistance to the Israeli 
Occupation, Atran argues that suicide bombings are considered to be the least desirable 
form of resistance and are only used as a last resort, with more traditional forms of 
combat being preferred by the leadership.  
Moreover, prior to the 1980s, Palestinian Islamists opposed any form of resistance 
to the Occupation and would even target and attack members of the resistance movement 
(Abu Nimer, 2003: 166). Contemporarily, adherents to Islamism represent about 10-20% 
of the Palestinian population and as such a preoccupation with their ideology and 
activities can serve to distort the larger Palestinian struggle. Nevertheless, as Scot Atran 
demonstrates, even so called Islamist hard-OLQHUVVXFKDV+DPDV¶V leadership are willing 
to consider concessions and conciliation if the other side would acknowledge the 
importance of their most sacred values. Notably, political, and not religious, values are 
cited by the Hamas leadership as central to achieving concord, namely the right of return 
and Israeli acknowledgement of the Palestinian Nakba.      
5HWXUQLQJWR$EX1LPHU¶VSRLQWDERXWWKHPLQRULW\VWDWXVRI3DOHVWLQLDQVZKRWDNH
a hard-OLQHPLOLWDULVWVWDQFHWRZDUGVWKHFRQIOLFW¶VUHVROXWLRQLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRFRnsider a 
further number of questions in relation to violence and nonviolence in Israel-Palestine. 
Even if we categorically reject all forms of terrorism, defined as politically motivated 
violence against a civilian population, is it right and realistic to demand that the oppressed 
unconditionally commit to nonviolence? As Roberts and Garton Ash (2009) identify in 
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their edited volume on civil resistance, a closer examination of historical cases in which 
the success of nonviolent strategies has been emphasised, such as Indian decolonisation 
and the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa, among others, still demonstrate high 
levels of interdependence between armed and unarmed modes of struggle in the final 
realisation of the goal of liberation. Judith Brown DGGVWKDWHYHQLQ*KDQGL¶VFDVH
unfaltering mass nonviolent action proved to be possible only in small scale local 
campaigns and much harder to maintain on a national level, especially in a country where 
PLOOLRQVRISHRSOH¶VRSLQLRQVGHVLUHVDQGDspirations for freedom were concerned.  
Further, the demand to renounce all violence and pledge unconditional 
nonviolence, often made by well-meaning outsiders, puts the Palestinian people in an 
untenable quandary whereby a single violent act eclipses all other nonviolent actions in 
the struggle for justice. Given that the right to resist occupation, including by force, is 
enshrined in International Law: 81 5HVROXWLRQ  µUHDIILUPV OHJLWLPDF\ RI SHRSOH¶V
struggle for liberation from colonial subjugation b\DOOPHDQVLQFOXGLQJDUPHGVWUXJJOH¶, 
denying this right to the Palestinian people effectively excludes them from the 
international community. This demand also has the perverse tendency to reinforce support 
for violence because a single suicide-bomb or rockets fired from Gaza into Southern 
Israel, even if they never reach their targets, feature in the international news for days on 
end, while the weekly nonviolent marches at which the residents of entire villages across 
the West Bank turn up to protest against the Separation Wall and the confiscation of their 
land receives no mention. Yet, most Palestinians continue to engage in such protests 
despite the lack of acknowledgement or interest from the global media which prefer 
sensational acts of violence to the daily steadfastness of popular resistance.  
Moreover, emphasis on Palestinian violence obscures the fact that this violence is 
a symptom of occupation and oppression, and that, moreover, the violence of the Second 
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Intifada was largely the consequence of the brutal repression of the First Intifada and the 
failures of the Oslo Process. The story of the First Intifada can be read like a manual of 
nonviolent resistance: mass civil disobedience, non-cooperation with the Occupation 
forces; withholding taxes and services; boycotting Israeli goods and businesses; 
championing Palestinian self-sufficiency; breaking curfews; and holding teach-ins against 
military prohibitions (Qumsiyeh, 2010). Yet, Palestinian nonviolent non-cooperation was 
met with military brutality, repression, mass arrests, and broken bones, illuminating the 
brutality and inhumanity of the occupation. The First Intifada succeeded in putting the 
Palestinian people and the question of Palestine back on the political agenda. However, it 
failed to secure liberation, and the Oslo Process which came in its aftermath merely 
VHUYHGWRTXHOOWKHUDJHDQGVROLGLILHGDQGHQWUHQFKHGWKH2FFXSDWLRQ¶VVWUDQJOHKROG 
Although armed struggle and/or resistance by Palestinians tends to play a major 
role in popular and political imaginations alike, the vast majority of Palestinians tend to 
engage in nonviolent resistance and as such an emphasis on armed resistance can serve to 
detract from more creative and life-affirming forms of protest and insurrection. It is 
therefore important to highlight that not all forms of resistance in which Palestinians 
engaged during the Second Intifada were violent. The Second Intifada witnessed the use 
of many of the same tactics as those used during the First Intifada, albeit ZLWK ,VUDHO¶V
policy of closure, heavily restricted movement between Gaza and the West Bank, and the 
annexation of East Jerusalem, the effectiveness of coordinated mass civil disobedience 
was drastically reduced. The beginning of the construction of the West Bank Separation 
Wall in 2002 gave birth to the popular committees of the Stop The Wall campaign which 
continue to hold weekly non-violent demonstrations against land confiscations and the 
construction of the Separation Wall, and whose work continues to this day (Carter 
Hallward, 2011; Norman, 2010; Qumsiyeh, 2010).  
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The Second Intifada also witnessed the unprecedented involvement of 
international solidarity activists and the formation of the International Solidarity 
Movement (ISM), an organisation set up by Palestinians in 2001 to encourage 
internationals to bear witness to the Palestinian struggle in the face of huge military force, 
and to advocate for Palestinian rights abroad (Clark, 2009; Dudouet; 2009; Schwietzer, 
2009). The two young activists, Rachael Corrie in 2003 and Tom Hurndall in 2004, who 
lost their lives in Gaza while trying to defend Palestinian lives and property, whose cases 
were briefly discussed in chapter one, were both members of ISM.  
Alongside growing transnational nonviolent mobilisation, the Second Intifada has 
resulted in the unification of the Palestinian citizen struggle for equal rights within Israel 
with that of the occupied Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In particular, 
Larkin and Dumper (2012) highlight the increasing role of the Islamic movement in 
Israel, spearheaded by Skeikh Raed Salah, in relation to defending Islamic holy sites in 
the Haram-al-Sharif in East Jerusalem, a task that has become impossible for the occupied 
Palestinians who lack jurisdiction over the annexed city. The campaign to defend the holy 
Islamic sites, with Al-Aqsa mosque acting as the symbol for the movement, has garnered 
widespread international support due to its emphasis not on nationalism but on the 
cultural and religious significanFHRI-HUXVDOHPDQG3DOHVWLQH¶VKHULWDJH 
Palestinian Israelis have also been at the forefront of articulating a secular vision 
for a democratic bi-national state in Israel-3DOHVWLQHRXWOLQHGLQµ7KH)XWXUH9LVLRQRIWKH
3DOHVWLQLDQ $UDEV LQ ,VUDHO¶  DQG WKH µ+DLID 'HFODUDWLRQ¶  7KH DXWKRUV RI
both documents take the unprecedented action of aligning themselves culturally and 
politically with occupied Palestinians, as well as demanding equal rights for Palestinian 
citizens of Israel by challengLQJ,VUDHO¶VVHOI-definition as a Jewish state. The year 2005 
also saw the launch of the transnational campaign for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
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(BDS) of Israel. The BDS campaign, which stops short of calling for a one-state solution 
in Israel-Palestine, nevertheless has three clear objectives which relate to a clear 
Palestinian conception of freedom, justice, and equality as (i) an end to occupation and 
colonisation, (ii) equal rights for the Palestinian citizens of Israel, and (iii) the 
implementation of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.  
In short, despite its violent aspects, the Second Intifada has contributed to the 
formation of new and unprecedented cross-border and transnational alliances, and has 
also encouraged small but significant numbers of critical Jewish Israelis to begin to 
acknowledge and work with Palestinian narratives of the conflict. Critical Israeli voices 
who insist on justice and responsibility are small in number and largely marginalized 
from the Israeli mainstream. Nevertheless, their growing convergence with Palestinian 
conceptualisations of justice, freedom and equality as solutions to the conflict is 
contributing to the emergence of a broader transnational coalition for a just peace. 
Moreover this conceptual convergence between certain Israelis and Palestinians signals a 
break with the mainstream militarist consensus in Israel and represents a move towards 
building a new collectivity of resistance.      
At the core of articulating an egalitarian solution to the predicament of Israel-
Palestine is a commitment to the principles of justice, equality, and freedom from 
oppression. This commitment demands mobilisations across real and perceived borders of 
separation. The solidarity actions of Jewish Israelis, however few in numbers they may 
be, serve to rupture the perceived dichotomy between Israelis and Palestinians, signalling 
a breakdown of previously unquestionable pro-militarism and the unified Zionist 
discourse of past Israeli pHDFH PRYHPHQWV 7KH UHIXVDO WR µVKRRW QRZ DQG FU\ ODWHU¶, 
something the established peace movement Peace Now was often accused of, or to 
separate the obvious continuities between Israeli colonialism and militarism and the 
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Occupation ruptures the internal-Israeli consensus which is based on a logic of ethno-
national unity and separation from the Other.  
Reframing Nonviolence          
In this chapter a case will be made for a positive activist definition of nonviolence 
as a set of strategies and tactics for resistance against oppression, and active solidarity 
with those fighting political domination. Nonviolence, it will be argued, is not simply an 
act of individual refusal to engage in violence, but an active, critical and conscious 
engagement with violence and responsibility for the Other. Therefore, a commitment to 
nonviolence stems from the basic acknowledgement of the current social order which is 
dominated by the privileging of violence and war, and which those who have been called 
upon and have answered the call for justice find themselves in opposition to. Moreover, 
nonviolence relates precisely to the notion, underlying this thesis, that things could be 
otherwise.  
In Nonviolence: The history of a dangerous idea Mark Kurlansky (2006) writes 
that popular understanding of the concept of nonviolence tends to be defined negatively. 
Chapter One demonstrated how negative definitions of peace as the absence of war tend 
to predominate in mainstream discourses on conflict resolution. However, perhaps even 
more problematic is the fact that nonviolence lacks even a basic differentiating term to 
describe its qualities, thus rendering it as merely not violence. The absence of a 
positive/active naming of the concept of nonviolence stems from, but also reproduces a 
conceptual hierarchy of active/passive, and dominant/subordinate, which is further 
reflected in the tendency to view and/or equate nonviolence with the doctrine of pacifism 
and, even more problematically, with passivity.  
 However, a very basic review of the literature dealing with nonviolence 
demonstrates the availability and usage of a number of related and substitutable 
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WHUPVSKUDVHV LQFOXGLQJ EXW QRW OLPLWHG WR µFLYLO UHVLVWDQFH¶ 5REHUWV DQG *DUWRQ $VK
 µQRQYLROHQW UHVLVWDQFH¶ 6KDUS  DQG  µXQDUPHG UHVLVWDQFH¶ &ODUN
2009)DQGµSRSXODUUHVLVWDQFH¶4XPVL\HK7KHDERYHGHILQLWLRQVVKDUHWKHFOHDU
assertion that nonviolence is not passive, neither is it merely a moral appeal to the better 
nature of an oppressive political opponent. Roberts and Garton Ash define nonviolence as 
µFLYLOUHVLVWDQFH¶RU:  
a type of political action that [includes] pressure and coercion ± by 
increasing the costs to the adversary of pursuing particular policies, 
ZHDNHQLQJ WKH DGYHUVDU\¶V FDSDFLW\ WR SXUVXH D SDUWLFXODU SROLF\ RU
even underminLQJFRPSOHWHO\WKHDGYHUVDU\¶VVRXUFHRIOHJLWLPDF\DQG
power, whether domestic or international (2009: 2-3).   
The tactics of the BDS campaign clearly fall within the above definition. Gene 
Sharp (1973) further highlights the methods of (i) non-cooperation and (ii) the withdrawal 
RI FLWL]HQV¶ FRQVHQW IURPSROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQVZKLFKDUHRSSUHVVLYH DQGGLVFULPLQDWRU\
2WKHUV DOVR VWUHVV WKH µXQDUPHG¶ DQG µSRSXODU¶ QDWXUH RI QRQYLROHQW LQVXUUHFWLRQ DQG
protest. While definitions of nonviolence tend to emphasise its strategic and tactical 
nature, the above terms are not only descriptive of nonviolent strategy and action but are 
also constitutive of the realities they seek to describe. While the method of nonviolence is 
promoted for its tendency to build bridges and restore cooperative relations in conflict 
situations, it is important to make the case that nonviolence must not be placed as an 
unconditional demand but must be taken up as a strategic choice by those who are 
fighting for freedom from oppression.  
This is particularly the case in Israel-Palestine where the well-meaning demand 
for nonviolent inter-communal activism often places the onus on the Palestinians 
renouncing violence, with the highly problematic tacit assumption that they are usually 
violent, while Israelis are rarely asked to take responsibility for the violence of the state 
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they belong to and the violence of which they often actively reproduce as citizen-soldiers. 
Thus, in an attempt to reframe the dominant logic around nonviolent cooperation this 
chapter places the onus of nonviolence and responsibility for the Other on the Israeli 
refusal to reproduce violent state narratives and actions against the Palestinians.    
7KHSUHFHGLQJFKDSWHUFRQFOXGHGZLWK-XGLWK%XWOHU¶VFDOOIRUUHIXVDODVDn act of 
breaking with and refusing to rearticulate violent practices of domination and 
subjectivation. The below section on militarism contextualises historically and 
contemporarily the changing nature of the socio-political discourse on selective refusal in 
Israel-Palestine, highlighting the difficulty and/or unwillingness of Israeli subjects to 
refuse to re-enact the violence of the state and its violence-producing and inducing 
relations with the Palestinians. The discussion considers the way in which violence 
against the Other remains not only an integral but a constitutive part of Israeliness itself 
and hence serves as a barrier to the possibility of refusal and ethical responsibility. 
Israeliness here refers to the discursive construction of what is viewed, lived and 
experienced as an Israeli identity, particularly Jewish Israeli subjectivity.   
At this point it is necessary to clarify what is meant by identity and subjectivity as 
used in this thesis. Identity here refers to the active, lived and embodied process and 
experience of identification by the subject with a given community and/or collectivity 
(Brubaker, 2004). Drawing on poststructuralist theory, particularly the work of Judith 
Butler (1997; 2008), subjectivity is used to draw attention to the necessary and impending 
deconstruction of identitarian categories and to call forth the possibilities for more 
egalitarian and less violent subject reformulation. The utility of the concept of identity is 
not rejected for it is understood as a discursive category which has real and sometimes 
violent social and political implications and functions for those whom it names and/or 
excludes.  
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Conversely, a semantic rejection of identity in favour of subjectivity can lead to 
obscuring the very critique an emphasis on subjectivity seeks to make of the functions of 
identity. One of the biggest contributions of poststructuralist theory in the past two to 
three decades has been to unsettle dominant philosophical conceptualisations of a stable 
and essential identity, a challenge which has been largely met within the social sciences 
and humanities with the discursive reformulation and recuperation of identity as a site of 
intersectionality, multiplicity and malleability, a formulation which stands in contrast to 
the notion of subjectivities being formed in violence, exclusion and subjugation. This 
testifies to the deep seated psycho-social investments most individuals, including 
academics, continue to have in the concept of identity.       
During a presentation at a conference dedicated to rethinking minorities and 
majorities in the Middle East and North Africa in early May 2013, I was asked if 
VXEMHFWLYLW\LVQRWLQIDFWDQRWKHUZD\RIVD\LQJµIDOVHFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶0\UHVSRQVHWRWKLV
is affirmatively negative. False consciousness implies ignorance of a grand narrative 
imposed from above. Subjectivity, on the other hand, does not exclude and negate 
awareness of an unjust and oppressive situation in which the subject continues to re-enact 
the very subjectivity which calls for a rearticulation of the dominant order, an articulation 
which fails to fully break with dominant and subjugating discourses. Subjectivity implies 
an (im)possibility or at the very least a struggle with discursive practices which categorise 
us in binary and subjugating subject positions or identities.  
Thus, even subjects with radical egalitarian desires can fall back on binary and 
predetermined differentiated categories of race, ethnicity, and nationality, as will be 
illustrated in the case study section of the thesis. That is not to say that subjectivities 
cannot be rearticulated otherwise in and through action but that constructing an 
alternative or oppositional discourse does not always represent a radical break with the 
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past. As such resistance to subjectivation always remains in conversation with what it 
speaks against or what it seeks to speak otherwise to. At this stage another criticism of 
this conceptual framework must be addressed, namely the alleged lack of agency in 
poststructuralist definitions of subjectivity and resistance.  
-XGLWK %XWOHU¶V  ZRUN RQ WKH SV\FKLF OLIH RI SRZHU LV YHU\ XVHIXO DV D
starting point as she retains the concept of the corporeal individual while rejecting notions 
of the rational subject, thus establishing the concept of subjectivity as a relation of 
subjection and repression. Drawing on Foucaultian discursivity and Freudian 
psychoanalysis, subjectivity is to be understood as a relational concept, (i) as the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VUHODWLRQWRZLWKSRZHUDQGLLDVDUHODWLRn to/with the Other(s) on whom the 
individual is dependent for recognition and hence existence. As such the individual is a 
product of power and reproduces itself in power. Moreover, coupled with the psychic 
need to be recognised as a living being, the subject is vulnerable to exploitation by others 
who also operate in and through the subjection of power. It is this vulnerability to 
(mis)recognition that enables, for example, the state to call upon its citizens as soldiers 
who must be willing to kill on behalf of the social body.   
In short, the interplay between the discursive and psychic is what results in the 
production of categorisations which manifest themselves and are experienced as 
embodied identities in the world, i.e. as Israelis, or soldiers. Simultaneously, this process 
UHVXOWV LQ WKH VXEMHFW¶V SV\FKLF LQYHVWPHQW LQ WKHVH VDPH VHOI-categories, or in 
identification with, even when these categories might be oppressive and exploitative. For 
while discursive formations function on the basis of the creation and maintenance of 
hierarchical and exclusionary subjectivities, nevertheless the corporeal individual can 
experience these sites of subjectivised selfhood as violence and humiliation, but also as 
familiarity and solidarity.  
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Moreover, Butler (1997) outlines a very explicit model of agency within the 
theory of subjectification. She argues that although power is everywhere, and thus 
everything and everyone exists in power, power requires articulation and rearticulation as 
it subjectifies. It is in the process of rearticulation, which is never identical in its 
reproduction, that a possibility to transgress or articulate power otherwise emerges ± this 
is the space of agency. The moment of articulation is the precise point at which the 
discourse can be rearticulated in an alternative way. As such agency remains a relation in 
and with power, and not merely its antithesis or effect.  
7KH FDOO IRU µUHIXVDO¶ WKHUHIRUH LV XQGHUVWRRG ZLWKLQ WKH DERYH theoretical 
framework in which the subject who has the ability to refuse is conceived of as a site of 
UHLWHUDWLRQRIWKHSRZHUZKLFKSURGXFHVLWDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHµWKHVXEMHFWHPHUJHs both 
as the effect of a prior power and as a condition of possibility for a radically conditioned 
IRUPRIDJHQF\¶LELG-15). Thus, while Butler and poststructuralist thought in general 
have been criticised for conceiving of a subject trapped in articulating and rearticulating 
subjugating power, agency remains an integral part of the possibility for ethical action 
because it:  
exceeds the power by which it is enabled... agency is the assumption of 
a purpose unintended by power, one that could not have been derived 
logically or historically, that operates in a relation of contingency and 
reversal to the power that makes it possible, to which it nevertheless 
belongs (ibid: 15).       
With this framework in mind the next section will proceed to examine the 
historical and contemporary civil society debates and discourses on µrefusal¶ in Israel-
Palestine which testify to the difficulty and (im)possibility of rearticulating a non or even 
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anti-militarist Israeli subject who is willing to ethically engage with the subjugated 
narratives of the Palestinians.     
From Militarism to Refusal   
The previous chapter examined relations of oppression and domination between 
Israelis and Palestinians, with relations in the Occupied Territories being revealed as the 
most unequal and oppressive. The discussion on apartheid highlighted the unequal rights 
and privileges of Israeli settlers vis-à-vis occupied Palestinians, however, the role of the 
,VUDHOL 'HIHQFH )RUFHV ,') ,VUDHO¶V DUP\ DQG WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ LQ FKDUJH RI WKH
administration and policing of the Occupied Territories, has so far been discussed only 
VXSHUILFLDOO\&RQWLQXRXVUHIHUHQFHWRµWKH2FFXSDWLRQ¶µWKH6WDWH¶µWKH$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶
and so on, can serve to abstract and obscure the working of power, namely the fact that 
regimes of governance do not operate as unfathomable phantoms but are in fact fully 
reliant on a complex set of relations and actions carried out by human beings.          
In essence, there would be no Occupation without an occupying army. There 
would be no army without soldiers willing to serve in it. And there would be no soldiers if 
there were no people willing to be conscripted. This simple premise stands at the heart of 
the concept of nonviolence: the notion that every action has a consequence and by 
choosing alternative actions or refusing to act in a given way it is possible to prevent 
harmful outcomes, or at the very least to refuse to be complicit in and responsible for 
injustice.  
One of the key agents of injustice in Israel-Palestine is the military and its role in 
WKHFRQIOLFW7KH,')LVRQHRI,VUDHO¶VPRVWSUL]HGLQVWLWXWLRQV7KHFXOWXUDODQGSROLWLFDO
significance and primacy of the IDF has led many commentators to remark that Israel is 
µan army with a state, not a state with an army¶. Military conscription is compulsory for 
both men and women between the ages of 18 and 21, with the exception of Palestinian 
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Israelis and sections of the ultra-Orthodox Jews. Following three years of conscripted 
service most Israelis continue to serve as IDF reservists into their early 50s.  
Political success in Israeli society is directly related to military prestige, with 
senior political roles in the civilian government being primarily occupied by former IDF 
Generals and other high-ranking servicemen. Moreover, with combat roles being 
particularly privileged, the political sphere tends to be middle class, Ashkenazi and male 
dominated (Lahav, 2010; Levy, et al 2010). As Levy et al (2010) point out Ashkenazi 
soldiers have traditionally been the backbone of the IDF and its elite combat units, 
bearing the brunt and the prestige of fighting for Israel. However, they argue that with the 
growing cost of the Occupation and the many wars Israel has had to fight over the years, 
many young Ashkenazis are increasingly unwilling to pay the cost of serving in the army, 
particularly in combat roles which put their life and wellbeing at risk.  
The above, coupled with growing individualisation in the neoliberal era, has 
resulted in many yRXQJ SHRSOH DQG WKHLU IDPLOLHV ³EDUJDLQLQJ´ DQG QHJRWLDWLQJ ZLWK
recruiting officers for the type and nature of the work they would perform during their 
military service. Yet, despite the growing unwillingness among young Israelis to sacrifice 
themselves for the nation, serving in combat units remains a highly privileged role within 
Israeli society, and is increasingly being sold by the army as invaluable occupational 
training guaranteeing civilian career success (Levy et al, 2010).  
Similarly, for many young people from minority and marginalised groups in 
Israel, such as the Mizrahi or Arab Jews, and the Russians, Druze and Bedouin Arabs, 
military service is a means to improve their life chances and gain social influence and 
cultural capital. Moreover, as serving in an occupying army becomes increasingly 
undesirable and growing numbers of young middle class Ashkenazi Israelis seek 
exemption from military service, the IDF finds itself progressively more dependent on 
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Mizrahi Jews, other traditionally marginalised groups, and new migrants to maintain the 
Occupation (Levy, 2010; Mayer, 2008, Breaking the Silence, 2011). This has been the 
FDVH VLQFH ,VUDHO¶V  LQYDVLRQ RI /HEDQRQ ZKLFK VKDWWHUHG WKH P\WK RI ,VUDHO¶V
GHIHQFHOHVVQHVV DQG UHVXOWHG LQ WKH ELUWK RI ,VUDHO¶V ELJJHVW SHDFH PRYHPHQW WR GDWH
Peace Now, and the establishment of Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit), an organisation of 
IDF reserve soldiers advocating selective refusal. 
The relationship between conscientious objection and the State goes to the very 
heart of the debate on power, consent and the ability to act against injustice and 
oppression. It also goes to the heart of the legitimacy of ethical refusal, the right to 
FKDOOHQJH PLOLWDULVHG PDVFXOLQLW\ DQG FLWL]HQV¶ ULJKW WR UHIRUPXODWH WKH IUDPHZRUNV
within which state power operates. The SWDWHKDVQHYHUWDNHQYHU\NLQGO\WRLWVFLWL]HQV¶
DQGFRQVFULSWV¶ UHIXVDO WR IROORZRUGHUV ILJKWDQGNLOOZLWKRXWTXHVWLRQLQg the authority 
which gives these orders. Historically, common responses by the State to conscientious 
objection have included criminalisation, imprisonment and even the death penalty.  
In the small cases where it has been acknowledged, the right to object is often 
limited to a restricted class of people. During the First and Second World Wars 
conscientious objectors in Europe were jailed and forced to perform hard labour, often in 
militaristic conditions, including being made to wear military uniforms. Moreover, refusal 
based on secular ethics rather than religious morality continues to be viewed as 
illegitimate in most places around the world. Although most contemporary societies 
ZRXOGDFFHSW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V ULJKW WR UHIXVHGXULQJFRPSXOVRU\ FRQVFULSWLRQ refusal in 
professional armies continues to be considered universally unthinkable. 
In Public War, Private Conscience, Andrew Fiala (2010), argues for the right to 
refuse to be extended to professional soldiers in countries where compulsory conscription 
is no longer in operation. He argues that soldiers who have chosen to work in the army 
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must not be treated as if they have surrendered their right to citizenship and therefore the 
right to object to morally objectionable policies or state actions. Peretz Kidron (2004) the 
editor of Refusnik! GHILQHV WKLV W\SH RI REMHFWLRQ DV µVHOHFWLYH UHIXVDO¶ ZKLFK µSODFHV
VROGLHUVRQSDUZLWKWKHJHQHUDOVDQGSROLWLFLDQVLQMXGJLQJRYHUDOOSROLF\¶LELG%RWK
of these positions, which differ in that one refers to a professional and the other to a 
conscript army, share an underlying presumption that selective refusal best serves 
µGHPRFUDWLF¶ countries. Both allude to the role of selective refusal in bolstering and 
maintaining the moral and ethical character to which democracies allegedly subscribe but 
on many occasions diverge from, for example, the USA-led occupation of Afghanistan 
and Iraq, or the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Both of these 
approaches, while providing an innovative and intelligent way out for non-pacifist 
conscientious objectors, nevertheless maintain the significance, particularly in the Israeli 
case, of military service and the role of the army in social responsibility. This is 
particularly evident in the following passage relating to selective refusal:  
While those [Israelis] who refuse outright to enlist leave themselves 
open to charges of shirking or evasion RI µQDWLRQDO GHIHQFH¶ WKH
refuseniks were seasoned soldiers; in time their ranks extended to 
include many who had hitherto rendered distinguished service in 
frontline combat units (Kidron, 2004: 56-7, my emphasis).  
As Cynthia Cockburn (2012) asserts, despite the attempt to summarize social 
attitudes to conscientious objection, Kidron nevertheless ends up emphasising the 
cowardice (shirkers who are dodging their duty) of those who refuse to enlist versus the 
bravery and outstanding nature of soldiers (seasoned, distinguished fighters) who opt out 
of selective orders. Andreas Speck (2007), a long-serving member of War Resisters 
International, argues that conceptualisations of the military are closely linked with the 
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everyday heteronormative and patriarchal constructions of masculinity, not only in 
militariseGVRFLHWLHVDWZDUEXWHYHQLQµSHDFHIXO¶ societies.  
The soldier serves as a model on which contemporary masculinity is based: 
testosterone fuelled aggression channelled in destructive skill; NQRZLQJRQH¶VSODFH LQD
KLHUDUFK\RIVWURQJKHURLFPHQZKRVWDQGVXSHULRUWR³FRZDUGV´ DQG³SXVVLHV´JD\VDQG
women); and the willingness to surrender oneself to the orders of superiors in the name of 
masculine camaraderie. The militarist emphasis on heroism and bravado which is carried 
RYHU LQWR FLYLOLDQ OLIH DQG WKLQNLQJ LV VWULNLQJO\ H[HPSOLILHG DERYH E\ .LGURQ¶V
conceptualisation RI VROGLHUV¶ UHIXVDO LQ ZKLFK KH SODFHV KLPVHOI LQ VROLGDULW\ ZLWK
µVHDVRQHGILJKWHUV¶DJDLQVWµVKLUNHUV¶HYHQWKRXJKKLVDFWRIUHIXVDOVKRXOGSODFHKLPLQ
closer ethical proximity to anti-militarist conscientious objectors. Selective refusal, which 
is itself disappearing from view, as opposed to conscientious objection to war-making, 
FRQWLQXHV WR EH RQH RI WKH FRUQHUVWRQHV RI ,VUDHOL RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH PLOLWDU\¶V UROH LQ
Israel-Palestine.  
Moreover, from the perspective of the State, conscientious objectors are always 
presented as unreasonable and even dangerous, and the logic of militarism tends to co-opt 
the language of peace, with invocations of national defence and security, and 
proclamations of the global good serving to justify aggressive war strategies. The ideal 
citizen is constructed as a man ready to fight, kill and die in defence of his nation. 
National historiography and commemorative practices prefer to emphasise heroic 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ µMXVW¶ wars as opposed to wars of aggression. For example, Britain 
chooses to imagine the fight against Nazi Germany as its defining moment of military 
glory, preferring to ignore its role in four centuries of colonialism, slavery, the 
extermination of indigenous peoples, and the brutal suppression of independence 
movements across the globe. The USA continues to style itself as a global liberator, once 
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from the threat of Soviet Communism, and more recently from the threat of Islamic 
extremism, and select Middle Eastern dictatorships. Similarly, the Israeli state has a long 
history of representing its aggressive settler colonial military endeavours as defensive 
wars: tiny David fighting for his survival against giant Goliath.  
,Q VKRUW ZDU DQG WKH VWDWH¶V GHFLVLRQ WR JR WR ZDU KDV VLQFH WKH ODWH WZHQWLHWK
century been narrated in terms of altruistic benevolence as opposed to instrumental 
geostrategic and economic state interests. Such a narrative underpins not only national, 
but specifically patriarchal conceptualisations of the role of the military, and de facto 
soldiers, mostly imagined as male defenders, protectors and liberators. This masculinist 
conceptualisation pervades the popular and political imagination despite the growing 
number of female recruits in armies across the world, and is no less in operation in a 
context such as Israel, where compulsory conscription equally applies to Jewish women.     
Speck (2012) argues that there can be an equally problematic tendency for anti-
PLOLWDULVWDQGZDUREMHFWRUV¶VWUXJJOHVto appropriate militarist discourses of bravado and 
heroism. Rather, he argues, the significance and success of anti-militarist action should be 
measured not by its difficulty but by its ability to empower ordinary people by making 
them aware that refusal is not as difficult as it appears and can be done by anyone. In this 
UHVSHFW.LGURQ¶VMX[WDpositioning of the brave soldiers who refuse selectively versus the 
shirkers who refuse completely is precisely such an example of re-appropriating militarist 
heroism with the consequential re-affirmation of militarist supremacy in social values. 
The above formulation is not unique, and is in fact the rule and not the exception 
in terms of attitudes to refusal in Israeli society where contentious objection is seen as 
illegitimate and refusal is punishable by repeated imprisonment. Moreover, the dominant 
discourse surrounding the legitimacy of refusal is also reproduced within civil society, 
including among relatively critical groups and individuals. The debates surrounding 
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military service and the il/legitimacy of refusal can be illustrated with reference to three 
discursive models of war critique, conscientious objection, and anti-militarism in Israeli 
civil society. These three models are exemplified by the work of three NGOs/movements 
in Israel-Palestine, as well as by the texts produced or used by these groups, and are also 
directly related to questions of justice and responsibility in the conflict.  
The first organisation under consideration is Breaking The Silence, an Israeli 
NGO primarily concerned with bringing to the Jewish public the testimonies of Israeli 
soldiers who have served in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and may have witnessed 
and/or committed acts of brutality against Palestinians under their jurisdiction. Breaking 
The Silence cannot be considered a war objector or anti-militarist organisation as such. It 
is entirely staffed by current or reserve soldiers who have no official collective stance on 
refusal, and from their presentations and actions one can deduce that they do not advocate 
and/or approve of refusal.  
For the mosWSDUWWKH\YLHZWKHPVHOYHVDVµOR\DODQGSDWULRWLFVROGLHUV¶ who have 
been harmed by the oppressive regime of occupation they are forced to enforce on a 
largely civilian Palestinian population. They are also very critical of the role of the army 
in policing the settlements, particularly in Hebron, where Jewish settlement is at the heart 
of the city. In short, they wish to raiVHDZDUHQHVVDQGKLJKOLJKWWKHµPRUDOSULFH¶ paid by 
young Israelis who have to uphold the Occupation, and they wish to remind/ make Israeli 
society aware RIZKDW LV EHLQJGRQH µLQ WKHLUQDPH¶. In many respects the discourse of 
Breaking the Silence can be viewed as a manifestation of the oft-levelled criticism against 
pro-militarist Israelis as tKRVHZKR³VKRRWQRZDQGFU\ODWHU´.LGURQ 
,Q IDFWPXFKRI WKHVROGLHUV¶ WHVWLPRQLHVFROOHFWHGE\ Breaking The Silence are 
characterised by individual soldiers confessing to wrongdoing and in the process 
absolving themselves of guilt and responsibility, often citing that they were merely 
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µcarrying out orders¶ and doing it in the name of the larger Israeli body politic 
(Testimonies 2008, 2009). Discourses concerning moral and/or ethical responsibility for 
the Palestinians as individuals entitled to human rights and dignity are almost entirely 
DEVHQW IURP WKH VROGLHUV¶ DFFRXQWV Moreover, particularly in relation to military 
operations which involve guarding settlements or settlers such as in Hebron, the soldiers 
often portray themselves as the victims of national policy and intransigent and dogmatic 
settlers, while the Palestinians are rendered as hapless subjects to whom things get done 
with impunity and total lack of remorse. For their part, the organisation would argue that 
their non-judgemental approach encourages more Israeli soldiers to speak out and does 
not shut them out of the dominant internal Israeli conversation regarding µThe 
Territories¶.      
Yet, the discourses that are uncritically produced and reproduced in relation to 
individual and collective responsibility in relation to the Palestinians in these Israeli 
accounts have real implications for the ethical address of the call for just peace. In a short 
documentary film entitled Guided Tour in Hebron (2008),  produced by Breaking the 
Silence and featuring testimonies from former soldiers and border police, a number of the 
IHDWXUHG H[SODLQ WKDW ZKDWHYHU KDSSHQV LQ +HEURQ µWKH 3DOHVWLQLDQV DOZD\V SD\¶ ,I WKH
soldiers are bored they terrorise the local Palestinian residents. If the Jewish settlers go on 
a violent rampage attacking the property of Palestinians and beating them up, the army 
arrests the terrorised Palestinians. What is striking about the featured accounts is that the 
Palestinians are rendered like animals in the zoo, voiceless, pitiable, sentient beings that 
are nevertheless devoid of any agency or the right to demand justice and redress from 
their abusers.  
While considering whether to pay a visit to the family whose home he invaded 
and trashed while serving in Hebron, a fRUPHU VROGLHU VWDWHV µ, KDYH QRWKLQJ WR VD\ WR
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WKHP:KDWFDQ,VD\",¶PVRUU\"¶DWWKHVDPHWLPHWKHILOPILQLVKHVZLWKKLVDGGUHVVWR
the Israeli pXEOLFDUJXLQJWKDWLWLVWKHLUµGXW\¶WRKHDUKLPRXWDQGWRµWDNHUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶
IRUZKDWKHGLGµLQ WKHLUQDPH¶, a statement which reasserts the priority and significance 
of the Jewish Israeli collective at the expense of the homini sacri in Hebron, the hapless 
Palestinians who need or deserve no apology from the soldiers who are deeply 
traumatised by the abhorrent actions they have perpetrated against them.  
This is not to downplay the fact that soldiers are very often deeply traumatised by 
their experiences and actions in war and combat, but rather to draw attention to the way in 
which Palestinians remDLQµXQLQWHOOLJLEOH¶ as subjects of justice in the accounts of those 
who have taken or even continue to take active part in the perpetuation of violent 
oppression and domination. This lack of intelligibility constitutes the biggest barrier to an 
ethical enJDJHPHQWZLWKUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKH2WKHU6ROGLHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIVHUYLFHLQWKH
2FFXSLHG7HUULWRULHVXQDQLPRXVO\SRUWUD\WKH:HVW%DQNDQG*D]D6WULSDV$JDPEHQ¶V
camp in which sovereign power acts unchecked againVWGHSROLWLFLVHGKXPDQEHLQJVµLW¶V
diffeUHQW>WKHUH@GLIIHUHQWUXOHVGLIIHUHQWFRXQWU\,W¶VWKHEDFN\DUGRIWKHVWDWHRI,VUDHO¶ 
(Guided Tour in Hebron µWe are in the Wild WHVW :H FDQ GR ZKDWHYHU ZH ZDQW¶ 
(female former Operations Sergeant, 7R6HH,I,¶P6PLOLQJ).  
Yet, the state of exception cannot function without a justifying discourse, and in 
,VUDHO¶V FDVH LW LV DQ HQWUHQFKHG VHFXULW\ GLVFRXUVH ZKLFK XVHV DQ\ SRWHQWLDO WKUHDW WR
Jewish life as a justification for pre-emptive vengeance. If the Palestinians are not entirely 
absent or reQGHUHG DV VLOHQW SLWLDEOH EHLQJV LQ WKHVH VROGLHUV¶ DFFRXQWV WKHQ WKH\ DUH
portrayed as decontextualised and dehistoricised violent and blood-WKLUVW\ µWHUURULVWV¶. 
There appears to be little if any consideration or possibility that Palestinian violence 
might draw on over four decades of violent occupation and dispossession, and that 
violence against soldiers might be based on the understandable perception that that they 
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are agents of occupation and oppression; or that in fact violent opposition to an illegal 
occupation can be viewed as justified and legitimate resistance. Aside from the strong 
emphasis on a security and counter-WHUURULVPGLVFRXUVH WKH VROGLHUV¶ DFFRXQWV analysed 
tend to place emphasis on the moral degeneration and traumatic impact of military service 
LQµ7KH7HUULWRULHV¶ on the occupation soldiers, rather than on the moral illegitimacy and 
injustice perpetrated against the occupied Palestinians.             
Those who subscribe to selective refusal, such as the long-standing organisation 
Yesh Gvul, similarly emphasise the illegality and ensuing moral degeneration from 
,VUDHO¶VRFFXSDWLRQRIWKH*D]D6WULSDQG:HVW%DQN7KH\VXEVFULEHWRWKHQRWLRQWKDWWKH
role of a national army is primarily to defend the nation from external attack, which is the 
reason foU WKHHPHUJHQFHRI WKH,VUDHOLµUHIXVHQLN¶ PRYHPHQW LQIROORZLQJ,VUDHO¶V
invasion of Lebanon. From this perspective Lebanon is viewed as one of the first 
offensive wars fought by Israel, although a clear examination of 1948 and 1967 places 
such an evaluation into question.  
Alongside the older and more established mode of selective refusal, .LGURQ¶V
book, Refusenik!, includes the more recent development of the emergence of a second 
generation of objectors, namely the Schministim, or the senior high school students who 
VLJQHG DQ RSHQ GHFODUDWLRQ LQ  WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG UHIXVH WR HQOLVW LQ WKH µ2FFXSDWLRQ
$UP\¶:KDW LVQHZDQGVWULNLQJDERXW WKLVJHQHUDWLRQRIREMHFWRUV LV WKDW WKH\DUHQRW
.LGURQ¶VVHDVRQHGILJKWHUVRQWKHFRQWUDU\WKHy are young people who have not yet been 
called up to enlist and who have and would refuse when the time comes. Moreover, they 
increasingly draw analogies between 1967 and 1948 as motivating factors for their 
refusal, refusing to differentiate between the two regimes of governance. As 19 year old 
Alon Gurman writes in 2012 µMy refusal to serve in the Israeli military, in addition to 
being a refusal to take part in occupation and apartheid, is an act of solidarity with our 
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Palestinian friends living under Israeli regime, and those who bravely choose to struggle 
DJDLQVWLW¶.15  
Thus, the Schministim draw attention to the complicity of administrative and non-
combatant actions within the 1948 borders of Israel in enabling the Occupation, 
including, but not limited to, the incarceration of Palestinian political prisoners from the 
Occupied Territories in Israeli prisons16; as well as the development and production of 
weapons and military systems in Israeli academic institutions used in the Occupied 
Territories. Furthermore, while in the past refusal has been a primarily male issue, these 
young people represent a growing trend of young women refusing to enlist in the military, 
challenging militarist and patriarchal conceptualisations of soldiering.        
The Schministim more closely resemble the position of New Profile, an anti-
PLOLWDULVW IHPLQLVW1*2ZKLFKZRUNV WR ³FLYLO-L]H´ ,VUDHOL VRFLHW\ UDWKHU WKDQ WKHPRUH
established selective refusal movement. New Profile works towards the legitimating of 
conscientious objection and the establishment of a more nonviolent society, highlighting 
the continuum between violence in the military and gendered violence in civilian society 
(Cockburn, 2012). They also provide support to the growing number of Israeli youth who 
prefer to opt out of military service on medical rather than political grounds. In this 
respect, contemporary trends tend to point towards the decline of refusal, particularly 
selective refusal, and the growing QXPEHUVRIWKRVHUHSRUWLQJDVµXQILWIRUVHUYLFH¶. This 
KDVSDUWO\EHHQDWWULEXWHGWR\RXQJ,VUDHOLV¶JURZLQJXQZLOOLQJQHVVWREHDUWKHEXUGHQRI
serving in the army and to maintain an occupation which they do not feel has anything to 
do with them (Levy, et al, 2010; Mayer, 2008). However, this trend is accompanied by 
the absence of a peace movement, and near to no vocal opposition to the Occupation. This 
                                                          
15
 see http://december18th.org/category/Testimonials/ 
16
 VHH%¶7VHOHP6WDWLVWLFV 
                              
 
131 
 
can in large part be attributed to the aforementioned salience of the security and counter-
WHUURULVPGLVFRXUVHZKLFKVKURXGV,VUDHO¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQWKH2FFXSied Territories.  
Moreover, as Nurit Peled-(OKDQDQ¶VILQGLQJVin Palestine in Israeli School Books 
(2012) demonstrate, the necessary indoctrination which ensures willingness to serve in 
the military is already well underway in school, making refusal almost unthinkable for the 
average 18 year old who is conscripted shortly after high school graduation. Her findings 
in many ways reflect WKH DERYH DQDO\VLV RI VROGLHUV¶ WHVWLPRQLHV 3HOHG-Elhanan found 
WKDW ,VUDHOL VFKRROERRNVDUHFKDUDFWHULVHGE\D µUDFLVWGLVFRXUVH¶DERXW WKH3DOHVWLQLDQV
which emphasises the Jewish state and the importance of a Jewish majority. Visual or 
other representations of the Palestinians are almost nonexistent, and when they are 
featured they are portrayed as primitive farmers or masked terrorists.  
Similarly, PDOHVWLQLDQV DUH UHIHUUHG WR DV µQRQ--HZV¶ for whom there is no 
GHPRJUDSKLFGDWDRUDVµIRUHLJQHUV¶; while massacres committed by Israeli troops against 
Palestinians are justiILHG DQG OHJLWLPDWHGDVKDYLQJ µSRVLWLYH¶ outcomes for the national 
good.  Moreover, according to Peled-(OKDQDQ¶VDQDO\VLVJHRJUDSK\ERRNVUDUHO\VKRZD
PDSRI,VUDHO¶VUHDOERUGHUVUHIHUULQJ WRµ7KH/DQG¶UDWKHUWKDQµWKHVWDWH¶ of Israel, and 
failing to render Palestinian villages and cities within the 1948 borders, while fully 
depicting the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. Books which do not 
subscribe to propagating such messages are not approved by the Ministry of Education 
and are either re-written or destroyed. In essence, the education system reinforces old 
standing Zionist myths about Israel-3DOHVWLQHEHLQJ µa land without people for a people 
ZLWKRXWODQG¶, while reducing the Palestinians to µnon-people¶, µnon-Jews¶, or µviolent and 
dangerous Arabs¶. It is with this educational indoctrination that Israelis are conscripted 
into the army and sent to police and oppress the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.     
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The dual lack of defined borders and lack of intelligible people continues to 
UHVRQDWH LQ VROGLHUV¶ DFFRXQWV DQG FRQWLQXHV to produce and reproduce violence against 
the absented and silenced Palestinians. Moreover, what is striking is the constant silent 
presence of the Nakba and its continuity in Jewish Israeli and Palestinian relations. In 
1XULW .HGDU¶V GRFXPHQWDU\ Concrete (2011) in which she features the testimonies of 
unnamed soldiers who took part in Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in 2008-9 a 
soldier sSHDNVRIEHLQJJLYHQRUGHUV WR µFOHDQVH¶*D]DDQG WXUQ LW LQWRDµVDQGER[¶ and 
another laments that he doubts that there could be so many Hamas operatives present in 
the houses his unit was ordered to demolish; while yet another soldier consistently 
describes the atmospKHUHRIWKHJURXQGLQYDVLRQDVµ,QGHSHQGHQFH'D\¶. Time and again 
the soldiers mention empty streets, never seeing any people, or perhaps not seeing as 
people those they were killing. One of the soldiers shares that every time he thought of 
death he thought of his own funeral, but he never thought of the others (the Palestinians). 
Nevertheless, unlike the two previously mentioned documentaries featuring 
VROGLHUV¶WHVWLPRQLHVConcrete shows that some of the soldiers are able to draw analogies 
between the Palestinians and themselves as people with rights and feelings. One soldier 
asks µIf so many tanks came to a city in Israel how would peoSOH UHDFW" ,W¶V
XQLPDJLQDEOH¶; another feels disgusted by WKHLURQ\WKDWKHDQGDQRWKHUµOHIWLVW¶ reservist 
took a long time to discuss if they could hang a clock on the wall of a house they had 
invaded because they did not want to put a nail through and damage the wood, and then 
an IDF bulldozer came and destroyed a four-story building across the street with all the 
cars, possessions, and possibly people inside it. A third soldier says he fell in love with 
the Palestinian way of life, the way every house has a plot of land and is growing 
µEHDXWLIXO¶ fruit and vegetables and has chickens. 
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It is important not to exaggerate the potential for understanding between Israeli 
Jews and Palestinians alluded to in the above accounts. In fact the above testimonies fit 
QHDWO\LQWRWKHµVKRRWQRZDQGFU\ODWHU¶ genre, and moreover we do not know if any of 
these men will continue to serve as reservists and would be more than willing to re-enlist 
in another attack on Gaza. Despite the VROGLHUV¶GRXEWVDQGUHJUHWVWKHVHFXULW\GLVFRXUVH
ZKLFKVXUURXQGV WKH MXVWLILFDWLRQIRU ,VUDHO¶VPLOLWDU\DFWLRQVFRQWLQXHV WRKDYHDVWURQJ
presence throughout the film, testifying to its intransigence, and continuing to provide a 
buffer against responsibility. Yet, it is also important not to downplay the very real fear 
felt by Israelis in relation to the threat of terrorism and the feelings of self-righteous rage 
and desire for vengeance it induces. With this in mind the next section proceeds to 
critically interrogate the possibilities for building a coalition of ethical resistance and 
responsibility between critical Israelis and Palestinians.                         
Reframing Resistance  
Mobilizing alliances do not necessarily form between established and 
recognizable subjects, and neither do they depend on the brokering of 
identitarian claims. Instead, they may well be instigated by criticisms of 
arbitrary violence, the circumscription of the public sphere, the 
differential of power enacted through preYDOHQWQRWLRQVRI³FXOWXUH´DQG
the instrumentalization of rights claims for resisting coercion and 
enfranchisement. Whether we expand our existing frameworks or allow 
them to be interrupted by new vocabularies will determine, in part, how 
well we consult both the past and the future for our present-day critical 
practices (Butler, 2009: 162, my emphasis).  
 The above quote articulates what has been glimpsed in terms of historical and 
existing Israeli-Palestinian activism and/or selective refusal in Israel-Palestine which has 
stemmed largely from criticisms of arbitrary state or individual violence, and on the 
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Palestinian side the instrumentalisation of rights claims. As Butler asserts, none of these 
DFWLRQV KDYH UHTXLUHG µUHFRJQLVDEOH VXEMHFWV¶ LQ WKH FDVH of selective refusal, or the 
brokering of identitarian claims. In many respects identitarian claims in particular have 
been at the centre of both of the above forms of engagement with nonviolent activism, 
underpinned by an entrenched logic of separation which reasserts separateness and 
irreconcilable difference between Israelis and Palestinians.  
%XWOHU¶V  FULWLTXH RI FRQWHPSRUDU\ ZDU GLVFRXUVHV DQG WKHLU VXEMHFWLI\LQJ
practices in Precarious Life KLJKOLJKWV WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK SRZHUIXO VWDWHV¶ ELRSROLWLcal 
preoccupation with the care for certain types of privileged bodies: White, Western, 
American, Jewish, Israeli, justifies the destruction and disavowal of other bodies which 
have become unintelligible and ungrievable: Brown, Muslim, Arab, Eastern, Palestinian. 
However, an uncritical preoccupation with the ways in which privileged subjects are 
subjected to the subjugating practices of militarised states, as in the case of Israelis, can 
equally serve to obscure the continued privilege and complicity of privileged subjects in 
the violent domination and negation of subjugated subjectivities.  
In that sense, the Israeli refusal movement, particularly in its selective rather than 
conscientious objection modes, can be viewed as an uncritical rearticulation of a 
privileged subject who wishes to be innocent of any violence that is perpetrated against 
the Other. This is evident in continuous invocations of the desire to return to an idealised 
1948 Israel that is not responsible for occupying or oppressing any Palestinians. However, 
this way of articulating the refusal to comply with state-militarist violence fails to engage 
with the repressed narratives of the Palestinians and the way in which both Palestinians 
and Israelis in their current guise have emerged as subjects through a shared founding 
moment of violence.  
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In that sense, the 1948 border is revealed as a violent, subjectifying and 
subjugating border, a withdrawal to which is not a return to innocence but a return to 
ignorance and the refusal to engage with the Palestinian narrative of dispossession and 
their call for justice and recognition. Thus, what this thesis aims to articulate is the 
necessary ethical disidentification that would bring about an ethical subjectivity which 
engages with the call for justice beyond identitarian categorisations. This disidentification 
would entail a necessary deconstruction of the self and existing subjectifying narratives 
thrRXJKWKHFRQVFLRXVUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWWKH2WKHUDQGWKHRWKHU¶VQDUUDWLYHVDUHDQLQWHJUDO
part of this process.  
It is for this reason that this thesis insists on a critical engagement with the 
privilege of Israeli subjectivity not by tracing its emergence in Palestine via a long detour 
through inhospitable Europe, but very specifically through its relation to the absented 
Other, the Palestinians. Contemporary counter-subjectifying discourses are examined 
WKURXJK QDUUDWLYHV ZKLFK GR RU GRQ¶W WU\ UHIXVH RU IDLO WR HQJDJH ZLWK WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ
narrative and the call for justice and responsibility that it accompanies/underscores. The 
three case studies featured in chapters four through to six are examples of the different 
ways in which critical Jewish Israelis are beginning to deal not only with the immorality 
of the 1967 Occupation but also with more founding moments of the conflict, such as the 
Nakba and the rights  of the Palestinian refugees.  
Moreover, this thesis puts forward the argument, particularly in the next few 
chapters, that more than representing remnants of the old pro-militarist, Zionist peace 
movement, the new generation of critical Jewish Israeli activists symbolise the emergence 
of a new post and/or even anti-Zionist, transnational form of doing peace politics in 
Israel-Palestine. More than a peace movement it is an emergent solidarity movement 
which acknowledges the lack of equality between the two sides and emphasises ethical 
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responsibility for the other. Like any emergent movement it is riddled with contradictions 
and faces many obstacles and even wholesale failure. Nevertheless, it is a novel 
opportunity to rearticulate a vision of cohabitation not based on domination and/or 
separation.  
Israeli recognition of the validity of subjugated Palestinian narratives is here 
understood as the point of departure for ethical engagement. However, one might ask 
what is the importance of narrative in relation to already existing modes of critical and 
radical solidarity action and its emphasis on pre-figurative politics? I do not wish to 
substitute action for words as such, although I reject any hierarchies between physical 
protests and narrative challenges to dominant formations which reproduce violence and 
subjugation. Rather, I argue that radical action is difficult if not impossible without the 
existence of certain kinds of narratives which make this action possible/justifiable. Action 
itself requires some form of intelligibility which requires and is further legitimated by a 
justifying narrative. At the same time narratives are not free and unbounded from pre-
existing and dominant discourses. Narratives, including subjugated and oppositional ones, 
operate within and draw from different discursive fields some of which may be competing 
and/or oppositional. Simultaneously, narrative can reveal the limits of discursive 
formulations and allow for a rearticulation or an articulation otherwise of subject 
positions and their relationalities.  
Thus, what the remaining chapters seek to interrogate are the discursive 
boundaries which continue to structure activist thought and action in Israel-Palestine. In 
turn, this critical analysis highlights how previous limits were overcome and demonstrates 
the way in which existing limits continue to constrain other possibilities for a fuller and 
more critical engagement with the Palestinian call for just peace. This task is carried out 
through the application of Butlerian inspired discourse analysis which interrogates the 
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historical and contemporary emergences of counter-hegemonic thought among the case 
study groups featured in chapters four to six. These chapters are also concerned with the 
manner in which certain uninterrogated or taboo psychic attachments to existing 
subjectivities and their privileging continue to pose a barrier to the possibilities to think 
and act otherwise.  
While each case study provides us with different types of activist intervention, at 
their core all three groups are struggling with similar, if not identical, questions of identity 
and the limit of action that they imply. The primary question is this: how is Israeliness to 
be (re)articulated in order to effectively respond to the demand for just peace? I have 
FKRVHQWRH[DPLQHWKHVHJURXSV¶LQVWLWXWLRQDOQDUUDWLYHVSHUWDLQLQJWRWKHDERYHTXHVWLRQV
primarily through documents and texts from and inspired by the organisations, including 
films made about the groups or featuring group members. This choice has been made for 
a number of reasons, which include (i) the nature of documents and texts which makes 
them static and hence easier to analyse in the sense that one can return to them again and 
again, and they can also be studied in relation to the historical moment in which they were 
produced allowing us to capture discursive and narrative changes over time; (ii) texts 
always go through some form of editing testifying to the considered and structured nature 
of the rendered articulations; (iii) while scripted texts allow for a more concrete 
examination they are not set in stone and as such slippages and contradictions continue to 
persist highlighting the unconscious operation of dominant discourses; (iv) narratives 
written on behalf of a group, despite disclaimers to the contrary, are never simply 
H[SUHVVLRQVRIµSHUVRQDORSLQLRQ¶ and as such carry collective responsibility and can point 
towards wider emergent subjectivities and discursivities.     
Yulie CoheQ¶V DXWRELRJUDSKLFDO GRFXPHQWDU\ My Israel (2008), in which she 
explores questions of forgiveness and responsibility is a useful text to illustrate the above 
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mode of analysis in relation to the necessary processes of questioning and reframing 
established narratives in order to ethically engage with the narrative of the Other. The 
ILOPEHJLQVZLWK&RKHQ¶VVHDUFKIRUIRUJLYHQHVVDQGKHUFDPSDLJQIRUWKHUHOHDVHRIWKH
Palestinian man who had committed a terrorist attack against the Israeli airline crew she 
worked for in 1978. Her decision to forgive is partly spearheaded by her brief experiences 
in the West Bank in 2000 while working for an international NGO as a photographer and 
filmmaker. Witnessing and recording five days of poverty, house demolitions and 
harassment by border police, Cohen is convinced to start correspondence with Fahed 
Amir in order to try and understand the reasons behind his actions 23 years earlier.  
Coming from a long-established, well-known and respected Israeli family and 
having served as an officer and captain in the Air Force during her time in the military, as 
well as up to that point being a respected mainstream ILOPPDNHU &RKHQ¶V GHFLVLRQ WR 
forgive and petition for the release of the man who injured her and killed one of her 
collHDJXH¶V\HDUVHDUOLHU LVGLVFXVVHGSXEOLFDOO\RQ ,VUDHOL79ZLWK WKH79SUHVHQWHU
displaying dismay, while another panel member expresses concern for her mental health. 
Following this TV appearance Cohen received hundreds of angry phone calls, accusations 
of treason, and other forms of abuse from fellow citizens, except for one man who lost his 
daughter in a suicide attack who thaQNV KHU IRU UHPLQGLQJ KLP WKDW µZH DUH QRW RQO\
PRQVWHUV¶.  
7KHILUVWSDUWRIWKHILOPIRFXVHVRQ&RKHQ¶VFRQYHUVDWLRQVZLWKD bereaved Israeli 
mother who lost her daughter in a suicide attack and who seems particularly unwilling 
and unable to understand, let alone forgive Palestinian violence. Her pain and loss is so 
extreme that she is stuck in grief and righteous rage, accusinJ &RKHQ RI µHQFRXUDJLQJ
WHUURULVP¶ and proclaiming that hHU GDXJKWHU ZDV NLOOHG EHFDXVH µ6KH ZDV -HZLVK DQG
ORYHGOLIH¶. There is only one moment in which she shows FRQFHUQIRUWKH3DOHVWLQLDQVµI 
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IHHO VRUU\ IRU WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ SHRSOH WKH SRYHUW\¶ EXW then she quickly retracts into 
VWDWLQJµif we wanted we FDQKXUWWKHPPXFKPRUH¶. This is what Butler (2009) refers to 
as the inability to grieve, being constantly stuck in a state of rage and melancholia.  
However, it is important not to create a hierarchy between forgiveness and the 
refusal to forgive when considering questions of personal and collective responsibility. 
Indeed, forgiveness is not itself an engagement with the Other. Forgiving can also be a 
form of closure, while anger can bind the self to the Other in a violent and vengeful 
relation. As such, what is of significance here is not so much the rights and wrongs of 
forgiveness or its refusal, but rather the nature of the relationship one chooses to engage 
in with the Other. In the bereaved mothHU¶V FDVH LW LV D UHODWLRQ RI DQJHU SDLQ
XQIRUJLYDEOH ORVV DQG WKH GHVLUH IRU YHQJHDQFH ZKLOH LQ &RKHQ¶V FDVH WKH SHUVRQDO
choice to forgive is linked to the desire to take responsibility for the Other by trying to 
understand his history and motivations. In that sense it could be argued that responsibility 
and acknowledgement do not necessitate forgiveness, but can nevertheless lead to 
forgiveness.  
1HYHUWKHOHVVWDNLQJUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUDQRWKHU¶VYLROHQFHDQGUDJHGRHVQRWPHDQ
that an individual must forgive an act of violence against themselves. Rather taking 
ethical responsibility for the Other acts as a refusal to reproduce a cycle of recrimination 
and vengeance which leads to more recrimination and vengeance:           
 the kind of narrative required of an account we give of ourselves is one 
that accepts the presumption that the self has a causal relation to the 
suffering of the other... Not all narrative takes this form, clearly, but the 
narrative that responds to allegation must, from the outset, accept the 
possibility that the self has causal agency, even if, in a given instance, 
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the self may not have been the cause of the suffering in question (Butler, 
2008: 23).  
 Here, Butler reiterates the importance of an ethical frame which places and 
understands the self as always relational to an other that is making or stating claims to 
redress of an injustice that has been suffered. In this instance even if one is not personally 
WKH FDXVH RI WKH RWKHU¶V VXIIHULQJ RQH LV QHYHUWKHOHVV FRPSHOOHG WR UHVSRQG and take 
responsibility by virtue of having been addressed by the other. This is particularly 
significant for the above case of personal loss and suffering amidst a conflict where the 
lines between personal and collective responsibility are blurred and can become sites of 
violence. For example, when speaking about responsibility in this case we are not 
VSHDNLQJRIEHLQJµJXLOW\¶ of the pain caused to oneself. Indeed, such a frame is a mirror 
LPDJH RI ,VUDHO¶V ORJLF WRZDUGV WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQV SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ relation to Gaza since 
2006, where a single rocket fired by Hamas or another organisation immediately justifies 
mass violence against any resident of Gaza by virtue of belonging to the same collectivity 
as those firing the rockets. It is precisely such violence producing and reproducing 
frameworks that need to be challenged and broken with in order to end the cycle of 
vengeance and recrimination.  
 At the same time, as was already discussed in relation to refusal, collective 
violence is nothing more than the collection of individual violent actions which serve to 
UHSURGXFHGLVFRXUVHVRIRWKHULVDWLRQDQGUHLQIRUFHGLVUHJDUGIRUWKHRWKHU¶VOLIHDQGULJKW
to live in dignity. As such, the onus to take responsibility is an address to each and 
everyone as an individual, and the accumulation of individual responses is what results in 
the emergence of collective responsibility and the possibility for some form of 
reconciliation and/or ethical cohabitation.  
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&RKHQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRIRUJLYHKHUDWWDFNHULVSHUVRQDOEXWVKe is nevertheless aware 
that this incident is bigger than the personal and testifies to a collective experience of 
suffering, indignity, and struggle against injustice on the one side; and privilege, 
domination, and self-righteous rage on the other, from which personal acts of terror and 
other forms of violence derive their justification and legitimation. She is unable to free 
Fahed from the English prison in which he will spend the rest of his life, but her 
interaction with him spurs her on to re-examine more closely her national mythology and 
to engage more critically with the Palestinian narrative in order to better understand the 
framework which breeds violence:            
The account of oneself is always given to another, whether conjured or 
exiting, and this other establishes the scene of address as a more primary 
ethical relation than the reflexive effort to give an account of oneself. I 
consider as well that the terms by which we give an account are social in 
character. Even the terms by which we make ourselves intelligible, to 
ourselves and others, are not of our making, thus establishing social 
norms as a domain of unfreedom and substitutability on the basis of 
which RXU³VLQJXODU´VWRULHVDUHWROG (Butler, 2008, 29). 
As was already discussed in relation to the ability to refuse, our relationality to 
normative discourses does not determine us or the stories which we tell about ourselves 
and our actions, but rather it structures the parameters of intelligibility. What is meant by 
this is that our actions towards and interactions with others are always structured in the 
first instance by a normative framework which enables us to see ourselves as belonging to 
and in solidarity with a given group or collectivity, while making another collectivity 
unintelligible, unrecognisable and even ungrievable. Thus, like the bereaved mother 
above, even when one can see the poverty and the suffering of the Other, and even feel 
pity for the OWKHU¶VVLWXDWLRQRQHLVQHYHUWKHOHVVQRWTXLWHDEOHWRVHHKRZWKHRWKHUPLJKW
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be angry and vengeful because WKH\KDYHDOUHDG\EHHQKXUWE\µXV¶, and hence how the 
onus to break the cycle of vengeance might in fact fall on us, individually or collectively, 
despite our personal hurt and anger.  
As Nurit Peled-(OKDQDQ¶V DIRUHPHQtioned research on Palestine in Israeli 
school books demonstrates, the stories we tell about the other and the failure to tell, or 
HYHQWKHLQVLVWHQFHWRUHIXVHWRWHOOWKHRWKHU¶VVWRU\FDQOHDGWREOLQGQHVVWRRQH¶VUROHLQ
WKH RWKHU¶V VXIIHULQJ DQG WKH consequent hatred or anger they might feel towards you. 
0RUHRYHUWKHH[FOXVLRQRIWKHRWKHUIURPRQH¶VVWRU\FDQIXUWKHUVHUYHWROHJLWLPDWHDQG
justify any violence one wishes or has to perpetrate against this absented and silenced 
other. Here it is important to note that Peled-Elhanan also lost a daughter in a suicide-
bomb attack, but like Yulie Cohen she has also chosen ethical engagement with the other. 
Cohen similarly makes a personal journey from engaging with her personal attacker to 
learning about the shared painful and violent history of Israel-Palestine.           
At the start of My Israel Cohen describes herself as a µpatriotic citizen¶ who 
aspired to join the army and succeeded in ascending the ranks of the air force. It was only 
in the aftermath of the invasion of Lebanon and upon leaving Israel that she came to 
realise that things were not quite as she KDGEHHQEURXJKWXSWREHOLHYHµI left the army 
and Israel. It was only from far away WKDW,FRXOGVHHFOHDUO\¶ It was in the United States 
where she first saw the images of the 1982 Shabra and Shatilla massacre perpetrated by 
Lebanese Phalangist militias against the Palestinian refugees in the camps, a massacre 
that was enabled and overseen by the IDF; images which were never shown on Israeli 
television.  
6KH GHVFULEHV =LRQLVP DV µRXU VHFXODU UHOLJLRQ¶ which taught her that Jewish 
,VUDHOLV DUH µone peoSOH RQH QDWLRQ RQH ELJ IDPLO\¶ 7KH WZR ELJJHVW GD\V LQ ,VUDHO¶V
calendar are Memorial 'D\WKHµVDGGHVWGD\¶ of the year, which commemorates soldiers 
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fallen in battle, immediately folORZHG E\ ,QGHSHQGHQFH 'D\ WKH µKDSSLHVW GD\¶ of the 
year, celebrating the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. It was only in 2003-4 
that Cohen became aware that on that same day her fellow Palestinian citizens do not 
celebrate but commemorate a day of mourning, the Nakba, or the catastrophe that resulted 
in the dispossession and mass displacement of the Palestinian people from what was to 
become Israel.  
µPerhaps I was in denial. 3HUKDSV,GLGQ¶WZDQWWRNQRZ¶: with these words Cohen 
sets out to find out more about her personal connection to the Nakba. As the children of 
established settler-immigrants, ERWKRI&RKHQ¶VSDUHQWVZere 18 years old when the first 
Arab-Jewish war started, and they both served in the pre-state forces which were to 
EHFRPH WKH ,') DIWHU ,VUDHO¶V HVWDEOLVKPHQW &RKHQ¶V LQWHUYLHZ ZLWK KHU IDWKHU DQG
mother are some of the first recorded testimonies of former soldiers who fought in the 
1948 war and who took part in the Palestinian expulsions. Her father testifies to being 
involved in actions which led to the H[SXOVLRQRI WKH3DOHVWLQLDQV µEntire villages were 
wiped off the face of the Earth. The mission was to empty the villages ± everyone, men, 
ZRPHQFKLOGUHQ¶,QUHVSRQVHWR&RKHQ¶Vquestion about the morality of these actions her 
PRWKHUVD\VµDo not judge oXUDFWLRQVE\WRGD\¶VVWDQGDUGV¶, once again giving the tried 
DQGWHVWHGMXVWLILFDWLRQRI,VUDHOLV¶IHDURIWKH$UDEVDQGWKHQHFHVVLW\ of self-GHIHQFHµ,
ZDQWHGWRGLH¶ are the words with which Cohen concludes her response to this unbearable 
knowledge:   
To call into question a regime of truth where that regime governs 
subjectivation, is to call into question the truth of oneself and, indeed, to 
TXHVWLRQRQH¶VDELOLW\WRWHOOWKH truth about oneself, to give an account 
of oneself (Butler, 2008: 30). 
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 &RKHQ¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHH[LVWHQWLDOFKDOOHQJHIDFHGDVDUHVXOWRIKHUFRQIURQWDWLRQ
with the Nakba is not so much one of denial as the desire to escape. She goes to meditate 
in the mountains in order to centre herself. However, she does not refuse responsibility for 
the unbearable knowledge she has uncovered but returns to engage with her fellow 
Palestinian citizens, attending a Land Day demonstration in 2004 and becoming aware of 
yet another DVSHFWRI,VUDHOLVRFLHW\µOne state with Jews and Arabs where no one learns 
WKHRWKHU¶VODQJXDJH¶. She had been taught English and French in school but never Arabic, 
GHVSLWHPRUH WKDQ RI ,VUDHO¶V FLWL]HQSRSXODWLRQEHLQJ LQGLJHQRXV 3DOHVWLQLans, and 
Israel being in charge of another four million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip for over 46 years. Colonial, and in particular settler colonial, populations rarely learn 
the indigenous language for such an action would to some degree imply an 
acknowledgement of the existence, legitimacy and rights of the indigenous population to 
the land.           
Indeed, lack of shared laQJXDJHQRW VLPSO\ LQ WHUPVRI µWKH VDPH ODQJXDJH¶ but 
also as a lack of a shared narrative frame, coupled with the refusal and denial of a 
common history continue to be two of the biggest obstacles to an ethical engagement 
EHWZHHQWKH,VUDHOLFRORQLVHUVDQGWKHFRORQLVHG3DOHVWLQLDQV$V%XWOHUZULWHVµVRPHWLPHV
calling into question the regime of truth by which my own truth is established is motivated 
SUHFLVHO\E\WKHGHVLUHWRUHFRJQLVHDQRWKHURUEHUHFRJQLVHGE\DQRWKHU¶,QWKH
next chapter we will see the way in which the Israeli NGO Zochrot (Remembering) is 
undertaking precisely such steps to call into question the truth of the Israeli regime in 
relation to the Nakba, and the work the activists do and have done with the Israeli public 
in order to call for recognition, responsibility and redress of the injustice done to the 
Palestinian refugees.       
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µThe non-violent ethical response returns to the other an acknowledgement and a 
SURPLVHRIDZRUOGVKDUHG¶-HQNLQV,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHH[DPSOHVHWE\<XOLH
&RKHQ¶VHWKLFDOHQJDJHPHQWZLWKKHU3DOHVWLQLDQDWWDFNHUDQGWKHZLGHUQDUUDWLYHVRIWKH 
Palestinian collectivity in My Israel represents one way in which critical Israelis can act 
to break with violence reproducing subjectivities and to instead engage in a manner that 
positively reaffirms the formative nature of the relationship between the Israeli Self and 
Palestinian Other.  
However, it is important to note that in the case of an ongoing occupation and 
DSDUWKHLGWHOOLQJDGLIIHUHQWVWRU\HYHQRQHZKLFKLQFRUSRUDWHVWKHRWKHU¶VVWRU\LQRQH¶V
account, is not the final goal of bringing about a just peace. It is merely the necessary first 
step towards acknowledgement and responsibility which calls for the redress of injustice. 
It is for this reason that while this chapter has emphasised the significance of counter 
narratives, the second part of the thesis, starting with the next chapter, focuses on activism 
and the way in which critical Israeli activists ethically reframe not only their individual 
positionalities in relation to the Palestinians, but also how they seek to reframe the Israel-
Palestinian conflict and the possibilities for its just resolution.           
Conclusion  
This chapter examined the role of refusal in breaking with violence inducing and 
reproducing discourses and subjectivities. An ethical engagement with the OWKHU¶V
narrative emerged as a key starting point for recognition, responsibility and the redress of 
RQH¶VUROHLQWKH2WKHU¶VH[SHULHQFHVRILQMXVWLFH$QXPEHURIGRFXPHQWDULHVFRQWDLQLQJ
former ,VUDHOLVROGLHUV¶WHVWLPRQLHVZere analysed as discursive examples of the failure or 
difficulty to critically engage with the OWKHU¶VQDUUDWLYHDQGWDNHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHFDOO
IRUMXVWLFH<XOLH&RKHQ¶VGRFXPHQWDU\My Israel in which she confronts her past trauma 
in order to better understand the motivations of her Palestinian attacker, resulting in a 
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critical confrontation with the Palestinian Nakba and her personal and collective 
relationship to Palestinian dispossession and suffering, is given as an example of the 
necessary ethical engagement with and taking responsibility for the other in order to break 
with the ongoing cycle of vengeance and recrimination.     
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4. Bearing Witness to Al Nakba in a Time of Denial17 
 
 This chapter examines questions of narrative, memory and responsibility in 
relation to the events of the Palestinian Nakba and the creation of the state of Israel in 
1948. In particular, it focuses on the work of the Israeli NGO Zochrot which aims to raise 
awareness about the Nakba in Israeli society in order to bring about public 
acknowledgement and UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU D IRUPDWLYH HYHQW LQERWK FROOHFWLYLWLHV¶ VKDUHG
history. Furthermore, this chapter examines the way in which an engagement with the 
2WKHU¶V QDUUDWLYH UHIUDPHV DFNQRZOHGJHPHQW DV D WDVN RI recognition and calls forth 
justice in the form of redress in order for reconciliation to take place. This reframing of 
responsibility as a question of justice results in the necessity to reframe the Self which is 
called upon to respond to the Other, a reframing which necessitates a break with violence-
reproducing categorisations of selfhood. Moreover, this reframing refers to the necessity 
to rearticulate Jewish Israeli identity as non and/or anti-Zionist in order to respond to the 
justice claims of the Palestinian people.          
Bearing Witness versus Denial 
For decades the Israeli state narrative has dominated the story and history of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This narrative tells the story of Israel and its people as an 
endless chronicle of conflicts, a list of battles won and lost. It is ³thH VWRU\´ of what 
happened to the JewisKSHRSOHDQGZKDWPDNHV,VUDHO³WKHQDWLRQ´ it is. This version of 
KLVWRU\ KDV JHQHUDOO\ QRW EHHQ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH RWKHUV WKH ³QRQ--HZV´ ZKR OLYHG
beside and among the Jewish people, namely the Palestinians. That is not to say that 
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history was oblivious to their presence, it did note them in passing, but without a clear 
reference to who they were. Traditional Israeli history books will inform you that in 1948 
Israel fought and won its War of Independence, and that the Jewish nation established a 
VWDWHLQµa land without pHRSOHIRUDSHRSOHZLWKRXWODQG¶. However, in recent years Israeli 
state narratives have been subject to serious challenges and revisions.  
,VUDHO¶V VR-FDOOHG µQHZ KLVWRULDQV¶ KDYH FKDOOHQJHG  OLQHar and exclusionary 
historical accounts of pre-1948 Palestine as an uninhabited land, settled by the exiled 
Jewish people who established a state despite unrelenting opposition from its neighbours, 
and made the barren desert bloom. Benny Morris (1987; 2004DQG ,ODQ3DSSp¶V
ZRUNLQUHODWLRQWRWKHHYHQWVVXUURXQGLQJWKH6WDWH¶VHVWDEOLVKPHQWKDYHUHVXOWHGLQ
angry debates and social polarization within Jewish Israeli society. In their differing 
ways, Morris and Pappé have helped to dislodge the Zionist myth that Israel prior to 
-HZLVKVHWWOHPHQWZDV³D ODQGZLWKRXWSHRSOH IRUDSHRSOHZLWKRXW ODQG´$FFRUGLQJ WR
their revisionist accounts, the Palestinian people did exist and lived in Palestine prior to 
WKHLUGLVSODFHPHQWLQWKHZDURI,VUDHO¶Vfounding, and that the new Israeli state played an 
active role in the displacement of the indigenous inhabitants and the beginning of the 
Palestinian refugee problem. These new historical accounts are part of growing attempts 
in the present to re-articulate the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the people 
of Israel-Palestine.    
This chapter examines the proliferation in the past decade of Israeli and 
Palestinian collective, individual and historical narratives concerned with the events 
which took place in post-Mandate Palestine and/or the newly established State of Israel 
between 1947-9. It begins with the story of the public resurgence of the suppressed 
narrative of the Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe) after decades of silence marked by a 
pronounced lack of officially-sanctioned narratives. The chapter continues with the story 
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of how the Palestinian people have individually and collectively held onto memories of 
their dispossession and how these memories have more recently been utilized politically 
LQRUGHUWRDUWLFXODWHWKH3DOHVWLQLDQUHIXJHHV¶ULJKWRIUHWXUQ7KLVDFFRXQWLVIXVHGZLWKD
theoretical analysis of the work of the Israeli NGO Zochrot (Remembering) which seeks 
to reintegrate the narrative of the Nakba in the Jewish Israeli collective consciousness by 
making pre-1948 Palestine and its people visible in the Israeli socio-cultural and political 
landscape. The chapter notes that the work of critical historians such as Ilan Pappé, 
alongside progressive civil society institutions such as Zochrot, are creating a much-
QHHGHG ³VDIH VSDFH´ ZLWKLQ ,VUDHOL VRFLHW\ ZKHUH DFNQRZOHGJHPHQW DQG ZLWQHVVLQJ FDQ
begin to take place without fear of persecution or retribution.  
In Remnants of Auschwitz (1999) Agamben defines the witness as, on the one 
hand, a third party observer who is called upon to testify in a court of law, and on the 
RWKHUWKHZLWQHVVYLFWLPµZKRKDVH[SHULHQFHGDQHYHQWIURPEHJLQQLQJWRHQGDQGFDQ
WKHUHIRUHEHDUZLWQHVVWRLW¶LELG,QUHODWLRQWRWKHODWWHU$JDPEHQDUgues that an 
ethics of witnessing is incompatible with a legal conceptualisation of the witness because 
a separation of ethics and law becomes impossible given that, according to him, the 
necessary related concept of responsibility is already contaminated by law (ibid: 20). 
%HDULQJZLWQHVV WKXVEHFRPHV µDFRQIURQWDWLRQZLWK WKH LQILQLW\RI UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ LELG
21), thereby constituting witnessing as an impossibility (ibid: 34). 
+RZHYHU&DWKHULQH0LOOV  ULJKWO\ FULWLFL]HV$JDPEHQ¶V OHJDOLVWLF DFFRXQt 
of witnessing for leaving out the role of the one to whom the testimony is being 
addressed, thereby ignoring the question of historical responsibility and its relationship to 
remembering and/or bearing witness (ibid: par. 21). She argues that by privileging the 
Latin origin of µUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ LQ WKH URRW ZRUG µVSRQGHR¶ (to sponsor or guarantee), 
Agamben wilfully nHJOHFWV LWV RULJLQ LQ WKH YHUE µUHVSRQVR¶ (to reply or respond to 
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another). Paul Ricoeur identifies this problePDVWKHµGXW\WRUHPHPEHU¶ which relates to 
our deep concern for the past and to our future orientation (Ricoeur, 1999: 9). The ethical 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\µWRUHVSRQG¶ to the testimony (account) of another is embodied in the duty 
WRNHHSDOLYHµWKHPHPRU\RIVXIIHULQJRYHUDQGDJDLQVWWKHJeneral tendency of history to 
FHOHEUDWH WKH YLFWRUV¶ LELG  +HUH 3DXO 5LFRHXU HPSKDVL]HV WKH UROH RI WKH FULWLFDO
histoULDQ ZKLFK LV WR UHLQIRUFH WKH µWUXWK-FODLP¶ of memory against falsifiability and to 
revise or refute dominant history: 
In admitting what was originally excluded from the archive the historian 
initiates a critique of power. He gives expression to the voices of those 
who have been abused, the victims of intentional exclusion. The 
historian opposes the manipulation of narratives by telling the story 
differently and by providing a space for the confrontation between 
opposing testimonies (ibid: 16, my emphasis). 
In short, the responsibility to bear witness requires the conscious utilization of 
narratives which tell the dominant version of hLVWRULFDO HYHQWV µRWKHUZLVH¶, or in other 
ZRUGVµWKHGXW\WRGRMXVWLFHWKURXJKPHPRULHVWRDQRWKHUWKDQWKHVHOI¶5LFRHXU
89). Conversely, the alternative response to the memories of the abused and/or oppressed 
is µdenial¶ RU WKH µQHHG WR EH LQQRFHQW RI D WURXEOLQJ UHFRJQLWLRQ¶ &RKHQ  
µ'HQLDO LV DOZD\V SDUWLDO VRPH LQIRUPDWLRQ LV DOZD\V UHJLVWHUHG >WKH SDUDGR[ RI@
NQRZLQJDQGQRWNQRZLQJ¶LELG 
From Silence to Bearing Witness  
In Remembering Al-Nakba in a Time of Amnesia (2008), to which the title of this 
FKDSWHU DOOXGHV $KPDG 6D¶GL DWWULEXWHV WKH SURORQJHG 3DOHVWLQLDQ µVLOHQFH¶ about the 
Nakba, which KHVWUHVVHVLVQRWWKHVDPHDVµDPQHVLD¶ or wilful forgetting (see Ricoeur, 
1999), to the Palestinian collective experience of post-traumatic shock as a result of the 
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unprecedented scale of dispossession and displacement of between 750,000 and 900,00018 
civilian Palestinians in 1947-49. This collective silence has been characterised by the 
absence of publicly received testimony regarding the forced mass exodus and was further 
H[DVSHUDWHG E\ WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ UHIXJHHV¶ H[SHFWDWLRQ WKDW WKH GLVDVWURXV HYHQWV ZKLFK
assailed them would be a temporary arrangement. The passage of time, the international 
failure to implement the refugeHV¶ULJKWVDQGWKHDUULYDORIWKHVHFRQGPDMRUGLVSODFHPHQW
DQGGLVSRVVHVVLRQRIWKH3DOHVWLQLDQSHRSOHIROORZLQJ,VUDHO¶VYLFWRU\LQWKH6L[-Day 
Arab-Israeli War and the ensuing military occupation of the Palestinian territories of the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank, suggest the prospect of return is futile.  
The Palestinian silence in relation to the Nakba relates in part to the political and 
ideological dominance of the Israeli state narrative that has perpetuated the longstanding 
and, until very recently, formally unchallenged FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRIDVD³WULXPSKDQW´ 
war of LQGHSHQGHQFH GXULQJ ZKLFK WKH ³$UDE´ SRSXODWLRQ RI 3DOHVWLQH WRRN ³YROXQWDU\
IOLJKW´ VHH3HOHG-Elhanan, 2010; Pappé, 2006). These two conflicting narratives of the 
same event, one triumphant and one catastrophic, have been vastly unequal in terms of 
global public legitimacy, the former being the accepted and dominant version of 1948, 
while the latter has been historically absent from international debates on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the plight of the Palestinian refugees. The subject of the Nakba 
remains a contentious issue within institutional discourses on the conflict because those 
who lay claim to having been its victims are a powerless and stateless people, while the 
RYHUZKHOPLQJUHVSRQVLELOLW\OLHVZLWKRQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VPRVWLQIOXHQWLDOQDWLRQ-states. 
Since the UN decision to partition Palestine in 194719 and the resulting Nakba the 
vast majority of Palestinians have been relegated to statelessness and exile. One and a half 
                                                          
18
 UNRWA Statistics (1950-µ1XPEHURI5HJLVWHUHG5HIXJHHV¶
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/rr_countryandarea.pdf/,  accessed on 3/4/2010 
19
 UN GAR 181 
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million Palestinians continue to reside in refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank20. The 3.5 million residents of the Occupied Territories have 
EHHQ VXEMHFW WR ,VUDHO¶V PLOLWDU\ UXOH VLQFH WKH  RFFXSDWLRQ DQG WKH remaining 1.5 
million21 Palestinians are second class citizens in a Jewish State which refers to them as 
WKH³$UDEPLQRULW\´DQGFRQVLGHUVWKHPD³GHPRJUDSKLFWKUHDW´$ORQDQG%HQQ03). 
The Palestinians, in their millions, have for many decades spoken about the tragedy which 
assailed them in 1948, albeit their stories and testimonies have until recently been largely 
ignored within dominant institutional discourses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The hegemonic narrative of the State of Israel has not only acted to omit Israeli 
perpetration of the Nakba but has been coupled with the active denial of the very 
existence of the Palestinian people as a national collectivity. This political strategy dates 
back to early Zionist representations of pre-Jewish VHWWOHPHQW3DOHVWLQHDVµa land without 
pHRSOHIRUDSHRSOHZLWKRXWODQG¶, a claim most explicitly articulated by the Israeli Prime 
0LQLVWHU*ROGD0HLUZKRLQIDPRXVO\GHFODUHGLQDQHZVSDSHULQWHUYLHZµ7KHUHZHUHQR
VXFKWKLQJDV3DOHVWLQLDQV¶SURFHHGLng to publicly deny the catastrophic events of 1947-
E\DGGLQJµ,WZDVQRWDVWKRXJKWKHUHZDVD3DOHVWLQLDQSHRSOHLQ3DOHVWLQHDQGZH
FDPH DQG WKUHZ WKHP RXW DQG WRRN WKHLU FRXQWU\ 7KH\ GLGQ¶W H[LVW¶22. Such acts of 
public denial of the existence of the Palestinian people have been possible because, as 
Edward Said (1984) writes: 
Facts do not at all speak for themselves, but require a socially 
acceptable narrative to absorb, sustain and circulate them. Such a 
narrative has to have a beginning and an end: in the Palestinian case, a 
homeland for the resolution of its exile since 1948. But as Hayden 
                                                          
20
 UNRWA Statistics (2010), http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=253 
21
 &HQWUDO%XUHDXRI6WDWLVWLFVµ3RSXODWLRQE\3RSXODWLRQ*URXS>LQ,VUDHO@¶
http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/yarhon/b1_e.htm 
22
 The Washington Post, Herald Times 16.6.1969 (ProQuest Historical Newspapers) 
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:KLWHKDVQRWHGLQDVHPLQDODUWLFOH³QDUUDWLYHLQJHQHUDOIURPWKHIRON
WDOH WR WKHQRYHO IURPDQQDOV WR WKH IXOO\ UHDOL]HG µKLVWRU\¶KDV WRGR
with the topics of law, legality, legitimacy, or, more generally authority 
(ibid: 34).      
The combination of the silence of an expelled, grief-stricken and distressed 
population, on the one hand, and the void in the memory and landscape of the 
perpetrating collectivity, on the other, is somewhat understandable in the context of what 
took place in Palestine in 1947-+RZHYHUDV6D¶GLODPHQWVDQG3DSSp
condemns, it is far harder to understand the response of the international community at 
the time and even more recently. The passage of time appears to have entrenched not only 
the denial of the perpetrators, but also the amnesia of the international bystanders. Despite 
the existence of numerous UN resolutions, among them UN Resolution 194 (1949) which 
FDOOV IRU WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ UHIXJHHV¶ ULJKW RI UHWXUQ WR WKHLU IRUPHU
homes, and the later UN Resolution 242 (1967) which calls for the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, there has been a 
mesmerizing absence in academic literature on the subject of the story of the Palestinian 
dispossession.  
The international academic neglect of what happened to the Palestinian people in 
1948 is particularly prominent in the fields of collective memory and post-conflict 
studies. Perhaps understandably, scholars in the field of collective memory who deal with 
issues of victimhood and perpetration are reluctant to apply theory, which has been 
largely developed in the wake of the Jewish Shoah23, to an event perpetrated by a section 
of the Jewish collectivity against another Semitic people in the period immediately 
succeeding the European Holocaust. Another perfectly plausible explanation is presented 
                                                          
23
 µ&DWDVWURSKH¶LQ+HEUHZWKHFRQFHSWUHODWHVWRWKHV\VWHPDWLFPXUGHURIPLOOLRQ(XURSHDQ-HZVE\WKH
Nazi regime during the 1940s. 
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by the argument that the Shoah is a unique and unprecedented event of mass devastation 
in the history of human existence and is therefore not comparable to other smaller (and 
arguably less significant) events of collective suffering IRU WKH FODLP RI WKH 6KRDK¶V
µXQLTXHQHVV¶ see Wiesel, 1985: v. iii., 162, 1; also, to a lesser extent, Kearney, 2002: 69).  
However, a case could be made that the above argument is almost irrelevant given 
that no comparison between the Shoah and Nakba is required considering that while each 
historic event is unique in its specificity, there are enough other cases of national 
dispossession and inter-communal violence with which moral analogies, if not strict 
comparisons, can be drawn. To name a few analogous cases, South African Apartheid, 
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the troubles in Northern Ireland are to a greater or lesser 
extent comparable cases given that they constitute contemporary points of departure for 
theorising ethical responsibility for the suffering of others. Furthermore, in 
Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonisation 
 0LFKDHO 5RWKEHUJ PDNHV D FRPSHOOLQJ FDVH DJDLQVW µWKH IUDPHZRUN WKDW
understands collective memory as competitive memory ± a zero-sum struggle over scarce 
UHVRXUFHV¶5RWKEHUJSURSRVHVWKDWPHPRU\LV: 
multidirectional: as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross referencing, 
and borrowing; as productive and not privative (ibid: 3)... Not strictly 
separable from either history or representation, memory captures 
simultaneously the individual, embodied, and lived side and the 
collective, social and constructed side of our relation to the past (ibid: 
4)... A model of multidirectional memory allows for the perception of 
the power differentials that tend to cluster around memory competition 
within a larger spiral of memory discourse in which even hostile 
invocations of memory can provide vehicles for further, countervailing 
commemorative acts (2009:11-12).       
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Yet, despite the pre-existence of credible Palestinian scholarship documenting the 
history and geography of pre-1948 Palestine, such as the influential works of Walid 
Khalidi (1959, 1992), the narrative of the Nakba began to gain widespread legitimacy 
within Western and Israeli academic and political discourse only with the arrival of 
,VUDHO¶V UHYLVLRQLVW KLVWRULDQV 7KH QHZO\ GHFODVVLILHG ,VUDHOL 'HIHQFH )RUFHV¶ DUFKLYHV
IURP WKH  ZDU IHDWXUHG LQ 0RUULV¶V ERRN The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee 
Problem (1987), and the revised edition in 2004, revealed that the over 800,000 
PalestiniaQVZKRµOHIW¶ Palestine during the period were in fact subjected to an organised 
campaign of ethnic cleansing, including forced expulsions, a number of recorded 
massacres, and numerous cases of rape carried out by the pre-state Jewish forces against 
the civilian Palestinian population.  
6WDJJHULQJO\0RUULV¶Vsubsequent reflections on the very revelations he helped to 
bring to public knowledge have been strikingly amoral. According to Morris, his opinion 
reflecting the contemporary Israeli consensus: µ,QFHUWDLQ FRQGLWLRQV H[SXOVion is not a 
ZDUFULPH,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWWKHH[SXOVLRQVRIZHUHZDUFULPHV<RXFDQ¶WPDNHDQ
omelette without breaking eggs... There are circumstances in history that justify ethnic 
FOHDQVLQJ¶ LQWHUYLHZZLWK6KDYLW+D¶DUHW], 9.1.2004). For Ilan Pappé, on the contrary, 
the dispossession of the Palestinians in 1948 by Israel represents a crime against humanity 
ZKLFKKDVµEHHQHUDVHGDOPRVWWRWDOO\IURPWKHJOREDOSXEOLFPHPRU\¶: 
This, the most formative event in the modern history of the land of 
Palestine, has since been systematically denied, and is still today not 
recognised as an historical fact, let alone acknowledged as a crime that 
needs to be confronted politically as well as morally (Pappé, 2006: xiii). 
The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (2006) represented one of the first scholarly 
attempts to bear witness to the Nakba outside of the Palestinian collectivity. To bear 
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witness is to act as a bridge between remembrance and forgetting, between memory and 
oblivion, between the living and those whose lives have been rendered meaningless. 
Bearing witness is about speaking truth to power, making manifest buried lies and 
concealed crimes and making an ethical and political demand for justice. Moreover, as 
Paul Ricoeur (2004) asserts, the role of a critical historian is not only to revise and update 
the history of a given community, in this case the Israeli collectivity, but to correct, 
criticise and even refute taken-for-granted historical narratives (ibid: 500). Since Pappé is 
a Jewish Israeli his ethical stance represented an almost unprecedented and exemplary 
undertaking. For his moral courage and outspoken demand for justice on behalf of the 
Palestinian victims he paid a high price in the aftermath of the publication of his book 
which resulted in his being subjected to slander, death threats and, ultimately, his self-
imposed exile.  
Pappé (2006) defined the event of 1947-49 as an organised campaign of ethnic 
cleansing by the pre-state Jewish armed forces against the indigenous civilian population 
of Palestine. Further, he documented the ways in which the concealment of the Nakba 
was achieved and continues to be maintained by the careful ideological and political 
orchestration and machinations of the Zionist leadership and institutions of the State of 
Israel. Among the acts of what Pappé terms Nakba memoricide (ibid: 225), which began 
in the immediacy of the ensuing state-building and power consolidating project in the 
aftermath of 1948, he lists the wholesale destruction, dynamiting, bulldozing, and erasing 
of 500 depopulated Palestinian villages in order to prevent the return of their expelled 
inhabitants. Other acts of memoricide include the declaration of depopulated and 
confiscated Palestinian lands as Israeli State property, giving newly expropriated 
ORFDOLWLHV µDQFLHQW¶ Hebrew names, and handing the land over to the Israeli Land 
Authority for the establishment of Jewish settlements. Palestinian land was also turned 
                              
 
157 
 
over to The -HZLVK 1DWLRQDO )XQG -1) IRU µDUFKDHRORJLFDO¶ anG µreforeVWDWLRQ¶ 
programmes (ibid: 232):  
7KHDUFKDHRORJLFDO]HDOWRUHSURGXFHWKHPDSRIµ$QFLHQW¶,VUDHOZDVLQ
essence none other than a systematic, scholarly, political and military 
attempt to de-Arabise the terrain ± its names and geography, but above 
all its history (p. 22«WKHHUDVXUHRIWKHKLVWRU\RIRQHSHRSOHLQRUGHU
to write the history of another peoplH¶VRYHULW3DSSp.            
Bearing Witness in a time of Denial  
7KH VXFFHVV RI ,VUDHO¶V FRQFHUWHG HIIRUW WR HUDVH WKH PHPRU\ RI 3DOHVWLQLDQ OLIH
before 1948 is precisely what the narrative of the Nakba seeks to combat. The 
politicization and public mobilization of the narrative of the Nakba began in earnest 
during the 1990s, as an increasing number of Palestinian scholars noted the pronounced 
absence of officially chronicled Nakba survivor testimonies. Similar to scholars in Europe 
and North America during the 1990s who were driven to make records of and preserve 
Holocaust survivor testimonies for dissemination to future generations, Palestinian 
academics feared that with the passage of time the generation which lived through the 
Nakba would be lost forever before the possibility of documenting and making public 
WKHLU PHPRULHV 7KH PRVW UHFHQW RI WKHVH NH\ FRQWULEXWLRQV LV 'LQD 0DWDU¶V What It 
Means to Be Palestinian (2011), a monograph which recounts the Palestinian struggle for 
peoplehood through the voices and stories of Palestinians living in exile and under 
Occupation.  
In many respects, contemporary narration of the Nakba represent a political 
strategy which seeks to counter the hegemonic Zionist narrative of 1948 and to combat 
perpetrator-induced amnesia vis-à-vis Palestinian claims for justice and recognition. In 
the wake of the failure of the Oslo Peace Accords, the Nakba re-emerged in the 
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Palestinian national consciousness as a reminder of the failure of Palestinian national 
aspirations, resXOWLQJLQDUHFNRQLQJZLWKWKHµXQSDVWQHVV¶ of the past, which continues to 
GLFWDWH 3DOHVWLQLDQ GDLO\ H[LVWHQFH LQ WKH IRUP RI ,VUDHO¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG RFFXSDWion 
YHUVXV3DOHVWLQLDQVWDWHOHVVQHVVDQGDEVHQWHHLVP6D¶GL7KHHQVXLQJSUROLIHUDWLRQ
of testimonies, memorial books and commemorative events in relation to the Nakba has 
been a collective effort to create a socially recognised narrative of the past which serves 
to inform the politics of the present. In many respects, the re-emergence of the narrative 
RIWKH1DNEDDVµDSRLQWRIKLVWRULFDODQGSROLWLFDORULHQWDWLRQWRZDUGVWKHIXWXUH¶$OODQ
2007: 253) represents an attempt to narrate the past in order to articulate the injustice, 
powerlessness and social exclusion experienced in the present.  
The lack of officially sanctioned narratives and icons of commemoration due to 
the stateless status of the Palestinian collectivity  has constituted the NakbDDVDµSRUWDEOH¶ 
VLWHRIPHPRU\DQGDWHPSRUDOSRLQWRIGHSDUWXUHIRUWKH3DOHVWLQLDQSHRSOHµ3DOHVWLQHDV
a birthplace, homeland, source of identity, a geographical location, a history, a place of 
emotional attachment and fascination, a field of imagination, and place wherein 
Palestinians want to end their days has dominated the lives of Palestinians on an 
LQGLYLGXDODQGFROOHFWLYHOHYHO¶6D¶GL7KLVORQJLQJIRUURRWHGQHVVDQGUHWXUQ
is deftly narrated by Lila Abu-Lughod in her chapter in Nakba: Palestine, 1948 and the 
Claims of Memory (Abu-/XJKRG DQG 6D¶GL  LQ ZKLFK VKH FKURQLFOHV KHU ODWH
IDWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQWRUHWXUQWR3DOHVWLQHLQWKHZDNHRIWKH2VOR$FFRUGV6KHUHODWHVKRZ
from his residence in Ramallah in the Occupied West Bank he conducted regular 
KLVWRULFDOµWRXUV¶ to his childhood home in Jaffa, from where his family was forced to flee 
in 1948 (ibid: 77-104).  
Abu-/XJKRGZULWHVWKDWXSRQKHUIDWKHU¶VILUVWUHWXUQYLVLWWR-DIIDDIWHURYHUIRUW\
years of exile, he reported feelings of profound disorientation and unfamiliarity in the 
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alien environment of the now Israeli Tel Aviv suburb of Jaffa. He was nevertheless able 
to find his bearings and relocate himself in the city of his youth by asking local 
Palestinian children about the location of King Faysal Street, and to his relief they took 
him there immediately, even though there was no longer a sign bearing the name of that 
VWUHHW LELG  7KH FKLOGUHQ¶V LQWLPDWH NQRZOHGJH RI D ORQJ H[SXQJHG KLVWRU\ DQG
supplanted geography and Ibrahim Abu-/XJKRG¶VDELOLW\ WR UH-locate physical remnants 
of pre-Nakba sites, such as Hasan Bek Mosque, his now re-named and Israeli-occupied 
school, and the now-QHJOHFWHGFHPHWHU\ZKHUHKLVIDWKHU¶VDQGJUDQGIDWKHU¶VUHPDLQVUHVW
(ibid: 83-91), testify to the living memory of the pre-Nakba years passed on from 
generation to generation through family stories.        
For the Palestinian generations born after the Nakba, who derive their identities 
from the experience of Palestinian dispossession and statelessness, the stories and maps of 
the lost Palestinian villages and cities are not lived but inherited memories. These second 
and third generation Palestinian refugees were not born and raised in villages their parents 
and grandparents had to leave, nor have they had the opportunity to visit them, and even 
if they were permitted to return they would discover that their ancestral homes no longer 
exist, as they have either been reduced to ruins, or are now covered by Israeli cities and 
settlements. Marianne Hirsch defines the above mode of formative recollection as 
postmemory: 
distinguished from memory by generational distance and from history 
by deep personal connection... Postmemory characterises the 
experiences of those who grew up dominated by narratives that precede 
their birth, whose own belated stories are evacuated by the stories of the 
previous generation shaped by traumatic events... Postmemory ± often 
obsessive and relentless ± need not be absent or evacuated: it is as full 
and as empty, certainly as constructed, as memory itself (1997: 22).   
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Mapping the erased and suppressed geography of former Palestinian inhabited 
localities is an integral part of the Palestinian endeavour to retrieve and retain the material 
significance of their loss: their homHV PRVTXHV YLOODJHV DQG ODQGV 5RFKHOOH 'DYLHV¶V
(2007) account of the memorial books compiled by Palestinian refugees in the camps of 
Lebanon, Syria, The West Bank and Gaza illustrates precisely the integral role played by 
WKHUHIXJHHV¶SUHRFFXSDWLRQZLth preserving the memories of the physical localities from 
which these communities were expelled or forced to flee in 1948 and have since been 
prevented from returning to. The compulsion and intricate detail with which these maps 
are drawn and communally preserved, detailing not only significant landmarks and 
geological habitat but also the ownership of homes and lands, is intimately tied to the 
Palestinian longing for and desire to return to the familiarity and ownership of their 
former homes. The village, with its connotation of intimate connection to the land, 
remains a key site of identification and a source of belonging for the refugees who 
continue to organise camp life and dwelling on the basis of their localities of origin in 
pre-1948 Palestine.   
Nevertheless, the Nakba is not simply an act of recall, as the experience of being 
XSURRWHGIURPRQH¶VKDELWDWLVDWUDJLFUHDOLW\HYHQIRUWKHVXEVHTXHQWJHQHUDWLRQVRIWKRVH
Palestinians who remained within the borders of the state of Israel and for whom 
dispossession continues in the present. These Palestinians who Israel refers to as the 
µ$UDEPLQRULW\¶, who managed to remain and received Israeli citizenship in the aftermath 
of 1948, although they are no longer subject to the military rule imposed on them until 
1966, they continue to reside in a legal and existential limbo. They are citizens of a 
country which treats WKHP DV µpresent absentees¶24: second-rate citizens whose lands 
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 µLand & Housing Rights: The Absentee Property Law declares that anyone who left the country in 1948 
is an absentee, and that his/her property comes under the control of the State. This Law was used only 
against Arabs [Palestinians], and even in reference to people who remained in the country but who were 
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continue to be confiscated by the state, and who are denied the right of return to their 
IRUPHUKRPHVDQGORFDOLWLHVZKLFKXQOLNHWKHUHIXJHHVEH\RQG,VUDHO¶VERUGHUVWKH\
can visit, touch and smell, but they cannot reclaim (Abu-/XJKRGDQG6D¶GL3DSSp
2006). Yet, like the children who took Ibrahim Abu-Lughod to King Faysal Street, 
GHVSLWH QHDUO\  \HDUV RI DEVHQFH IURP -DIID¶V ODQGVFDSH WKHVH 3DOHVWLQLDQV NHHS WKH
memory of pre-Nakba Palestine alive. Palestinian Israelis organise annual processions to 
the localities of former Palestinian villages to commemorate the Nakba; these Marches of 
5HWXUQRIWHQFRLQFLGHZLWK,VUDHO¶V,QGHSHQGHQFH'D\25 celebrations and constitute an act 
of resistance in the face of denial, and more recently, attempts at outright legalised 
repression.  
The latter development has been characterised by the actions of the ultranationalist 
ULJKWZLQJ SDUW\ RI WKH ,VUDHOL )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU $YLJGRU /LHEHUPDQ¶V Yisrael Beiteinu 
(Israel is Our Home), which has proSRVHG H[WHQVLYH OHJLVODWLRQ WR µEDQ¶ the Nakba 
(+D¶DUHW], 14.5.2009). The first legal proposal submitted in May 2009 was only narrowly 
defeated in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) amidst international outrage and 
condemnation from Palestinian Israeli minority rights groups and their progressive Jewish 
supporters who opposed the divisive and discriminatory nature of the law (+D¶DUHW], 
31.5.2009). The proposal involved DEDQRQDQ\SXEOLFGLVSOD\RIµPRXUQLQJ¶ RQ,VUDHO¶V
                                                                                                                                                                             
compelled to leave their land. These individuals are called "present absentees." The Defence (Emergency) 
Regulation 125 authorizes the military commander to declare land to be a "closed area." Once he so 
declares, no person is allowed to enter or to leave the area. By this regulation, the population of tens of Arab 
villages became uprooted. There is no uprooted Jewish population in the State. The National Planning & 
Building Law prohibits the provision of basic services such as water and electricity to tens of unrecognized 
Arab villages in the State. Although these villages existed before the State's establishment, the main purpose 
of the law is to force the people to leave their villages and move to government-planned areas. There are no 
XQUHFRJQL]HG-HZLVKYLOODJHVLQ,VUDHO¶(Adalah, Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Report to 
UN CERD 1998: 2, http://www.adalah.org/eng/intladvocacy/cerd-major-finding-march98.pdf)    
25
 Al Nakba is annually commemorated on 14th 0D\DFFRUGLQJWRWKH*UHJRULDQFDOHQGDUZKLOH,VUDHO¶V
Independence Day celebrations are annually held on 5th Lyar according to the Hebrew calendar. The two 
dates do not always coincide, as was the case in 2010 when 5th Lyar corresponded to 19th April.    
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Day of Independence and the imprisonment for up to 3 years of anyone who would refuse 
to obey the law (+D¶DUHW], 1.1.2009). A revised proposal which banned references to the 
Nakba from Israeli school textbooks and ordered the removal of existing references 
succeeded in becoming law in July 2009 (+D¶DUHW], 22.7.2009). The most recent 
onslaught on Nakba commemoration became law on 23rd March WKHµ1DNED/DZ¶
makes it LOOHJDO IRU LQVWLWXWLRQV ZKLFK µundermine the foundations of the state and 
FRQWUDGLFWLWVYDOXHV¶to receive any public funding (Khoury and Lis, 2011).  
Peled-Elhanan (2010) illustrates the textbook anti-Nakba law in action. She writes 
LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH ,VUDHOL JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHDFWLRQ WR D VFKRRO WH[WERRN E\ 'RPND HW DO
(2009) which was recalled immediately after publication because it rendered: 
the Palestinian version regarding the ethnic cleansing in 1948 alongside 
the ,VUDHOLRQHDVD³YHUVLRQ´DQGQRW³SURSDJDQGD´XVLQJERWK,VUDHOL
DQG 3DOHVWLQLDQ VRXUFHV VXFK DV :DOLG .KDOLGL¶V ERRNV 7KH FKDQJH
requested by the ministry of education was first of all to remove the 
Palestinian sources from the Palestinian version and to substitute it with 
3DOHVWLQLDQ WH[WV WKDW DUH ³PRUH IDLWKIXO WR UHDOLW\´ RU ZLWK ,VUDHOL
sources... In order to have the book republished, the publishers replaced 
the Palestinian sources with Israeli ones in the part called The 
Palestinian Version and gave it a lesser weight, without changing the 
structure (Peled-Elhanan, ibid: 398).   
Despite the fierce attempts by the rightwing Israeli establishment to silence the 
voices of the Palestinian people, the unrelenting force of the narrative of the Nakba is 
increasingly penetrating the consciousness of growing numbers of progressive Jewish 
Israelis who are confronting the Zionist myths26 of their upbringing. Among these 
                                                          
26
 Similar WR6PLWK,XVHWKHFRQFHSWµP\WK¶QRWWRFRQQRWHDµIDOVH¶RUµIDEULFDWHG¶DFFRXQWRIKLVWRU\EXW
UDWKHUµDZLGHO\KHOGYLHZRIWKHSDVWZKLFKKDVKHOSHGWRVKDSHDQGH[SODLQWKHSUHVHQW¶6PLWK 
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individuals are the founders and members of the Israeli NGO Zochrot (Remembering) 
who work to raise awareness about the Nakba within Israeli society:  
The Nakba is an unspoken taboo in Israeli discourse, its memory 
expunged from the official history of the country and from its physical 
landscape. Yet the Nakba is also the central trauma of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and its legacy continues to unfold today ± in the 
institutionalization of inequality and violence, in the erasure of the past, 
and in the deteriorating plight of the Palestinian refugees. We hope that 
by talking about the Nakba in Hebrew, the language spoken by the 
Jewish majority in Israel, we can engage the public in learning about 
and taking responsibility for the Nakba and its enduring consequences 
(Zochrot Annual Report 2008). 
Zochrot¶V commemorative and educational work in relation to the Nakba 
exemplify what Karen E. Till (2008) theorizes as a socially engaged and ethically 
UHVSRQVLEOHµSODFH-EDVHGSUDFWLFH¶DPRGHRIRSHration based on the conceptualisation of 
VRFLDOPHPRU\DVHPERGLHGH[SHULHQFHµSODFHVDUHHPERGLed contexts of experience, but 
DOVRSRURXVDQGPRELOHFRQQHFWHG WRRWKHUSODFHV WLPHVDQGSHRSOHV¶ LELG7KLV
notion is embodied in =RFKURW¶V commemorative activities which include public tours to 
the locations of the Palestinian villages destroyed during 1947-49. These tours are 
accompanied by the publication of booklets dedicated to these erased localities. The 
booklets contain history about and maps of the village, as well as testimonies from the 
YLOODJH¶V UHIXJHHV DQG RQ RFFDVLRQ LQFOXGH ZULWWen reflections by the Israeli Jews who 
live or have lived in the towns and settlements erected on the lands of the former 
Palestinian villages.  
=RFKURW¶VFommemorative activities echo the village memorial books compiled by 
Palestinian refugees in the camps as the organisation routinely engages in the re-mapping 
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RI3DOHVWLQHRQWRWKHDPQHVLDF,VUDHOL ODQGVFDSH7KH1*2¶VWRXUVRIWHQFXOPLQDWHZLWK
the erection of street signs bearing the pre-1948 names of the destroyed Palestinian 
villages in Arabic and HebUHZµ7KHVHVLJQVDUHXVXDOO\UHPRYHGVKRUWO\DIWHU5HPRYDO
of the signs testifies to their importance; the act of their removal relates both to the Nakba 
DQGWRLWVVLJQLILFDQFHLQVSDFHDQGKLVWRU\¶Zochrot Annual Report 2008).  
The organization also engages in advocacy activities which seek to democratise 
the public landscape of Israel. These activities include actively opposing building plans 
which will erase the remains, without marking the existence, of depopulated Palestinian 
villages, such as ZoFKURW¶Vsuccessful Supreme Court lawsuit against the JNF which calls 
for the erection of public signs identifying the Palestinian villages on which JNF sites are 
now located27. At the time of the original request =RFKURW¶V demand was widely 
publicized in the liberal media with numerous articles appearing in the Israeli daily 
+D¶DUHW] (12.6.2005; 26.7.2005; 13.6.2007, 3.2.2008)28. 
Attempts to preserve the physical traces of the former Palestinian presence are 
often met with evasion and vandalism, a case in poiQWEHLQJ-1)¶VUHIXVDODQGGHOD\ LQ
repairing and replacing the damaged signs in Canada Park which testify to the destroyed 
Palestinian villages (Zochrot Annual Report 2009). Nevertheless, the battle for and 
against Nakba remembrance continues to be waged publicly, legally and politically, 
making it increasingly difficult for the opponents of the narrative to refute its potency and 
moral entitlement. ThH VHQWLPHQW RI UHVLJQDWLRQ DQG µGDPDJH OLPLWDWLRQ¶ in relation to 
Nakba commemoration is illuminated in a comment made by a JNF administrator in a 
newspaper interview following =RFKURW¶V successful High Court petition concerning 
Canada Park:  
                                                          
27
 Zochrot µ+LJK&RXUW3HWLWLRQ>&DQDGD3DUN@0LOLWDU\&RPPDQGHU¶V5HVSRQVHWR&DQDGD3DUN
3HWLWLRQ¶DQGµ-1)¶V5HVSRQVHWR&DQDGD3DUN3HWLWLRQ¶ 
28
 translations from the Hebrew are available on =RFKURW¶V website: see bibliography. 
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7KHVLJQVGRQ¶WVD\ WKDWZHH[SHOOHG WKHPQRU WKDW WKH\¶UH LQ UHIXJHH
FDPSV«,VXJJHVWQRWUDLVLQJWKLVLVVXHLQWKHPHGLDEHFDXVHLW¶VYHU\
sensitive. And it would be better not to raise the issue at all. So far there 
LVRQO\RQHSDUNZKHUH LW¶VPHQWLRQHG ,QIDFWPDQ\RI WKH-1)SDUNV
are on land where Arab villages were once located, and the forests were 
planted as cDPRXIODJH %XW ZH¶UH DIUDLG LW ZLOO VSUHDG WKURXJKRXW WKH
FRXQWU\ LW¶V DSSDUHQWO\ VRPHWKLQJ WKDW FDQ¶W EH VWRSSHG (Michal 
Kortoza interview in Eretz Israel Shelanu; translated quote in Zochrot 
Annual Report 2008).            
Commemorative practices such as the public display of signs bearing witness to 
the former presence and current absence of the Palestinian people, two unspeakable facts, 
are deeply unsettling to the Jewish Israeli collectivity which refuses to acknowledge the 
past so as to avoid confronting responsibility in the present. Such commemorative acts are 
GHHSO\ GLVWXUELQJ EHFDXVH WKH\ µSURPSW XV WR WKLQN DERXW IRUPV RI GHVFHQGDQF\
genealogies of proprietorship and histories of citizenship, and remind us that we need to 
reconceptualise receiveGLGHDVRILGHQWLW\EHORQJLQJDQGWKHFLYLF¶-RQNHULQ7LOO
109). Thus, in spite of the hostile and unreceptive environment and the concerted efforts 
to silence the remembrance, and even utterance, of the Nakba, =RFKURW¶V work is opening 
up a valuable space for Jewish Israelis to be able to begin to confront the founding myths 
of Zionism, and perhaps be able to begin, at a later stage, to take ethical responsibility 
without the unbearable and potentially disabling burden of guilt and the fear of 
persecution.  
Nakba remembrance carves out a space which enables the painful past of 
Palestine-Israel to be confronted with a view to acknowledging and assimilating the 
Nakba as a shared historical experience, an act which has the potential to enable the 
possibility of the two collectivities to begin to envisage a future based on coexistence and 
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reconciliation. The public commemorative events in which Zochrot engage act as a bridge 
between the two conflicting narratives and are opportunities for active inter-cultural 
dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. These acts serve to democratize and 
reconstitute social memory not only through education and commemoration but also by 
posing important and challenging political questions in the form of =RFKURW¶V 2008 public 
FRQIHUHQFH RQ WKH ,VUDHOL UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ UHIXJHHV¶ ULJKW RI UHWXUQ 7KH
conference was ironically held at the Zionists of America House in Tel Aviv, and the 
location of this historically unprecedented event can be read as a sign of the Nakba 
QDUUDWLYH¶VSRZHURIVXEYHUVLRQDQGGLVUXSWLRQRIWKH=LRQLVWDFFRXQWDQGVLPXOWDQHRXVO\
as a testament to the flexibility and strength of the Zionist hegemony.  
Such inherent contradictions in the geo-political space within which Zochrot 
functions serve to illustrate the validity of some of the criticisms levelled at the 
organisation by Lentin (2008) who argues that much of =RFKURW¶V work remains at the 
level of the symbolic, and further, activities such as mapping the land as it existed before 
1948 epitomise a re-colonisation of Palestine (ibid: 217). For her this constitutes an 
appropriation of Palestinian memory which perpetuates Palestinian victimhood and Israeli 
authority (ibid: 215). While there is validity in her criticisms, Lentin leaves little room for 
self-reflexivity and improvement among Zochrot activists. Two of her challenges to the 
organization have been met or attempted at the time of writing. One of the challenges 
represented by her is the need for Jewish Israelis to develop political strategies for 
advocating the Palestinian return ± a question which was first SXW DW WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
2008 conference mentioned above and which forms part of a larger ongoing project on 
the practicalities of return in conjunction with the Resource Center for Palestinian 
Residency & Refugee Rights: BADIL.  
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The second challenge, which Lentin admits is much more difficult, is to document 
the testimonies of Jewish perpetrators of the Nakba. Given the current climate of denial, 
this task is much more problematic and any progress is likely to be painstakingly slow. 
Nevertheless, since 2010 there are a number of testimonies on =RFKURW¶V website from 
former Jewish Israeli combatants who fought in 1948 who have reluctantly come forward 
to speak about carrying out and/or witnessing expulsions of the Palestinians. These 
include the testimony of Amnon Noiman (Zochrot, 17.6.2010) which is featured in a 
documentary about contemporary Israeli responses to 1948 (Lia Tarachansky, By the 
Roadside, 2013). This testimon\DOVRIHDWXUHGLQWKHµ7RZDUGVD&RPPRQ$UFKLYH¶ 
exhibition hosted by Zochrot and curated by the critical Israeli film maker Eyal Sivan and 
the historian Professor Ilan Pappé. The exhibition featured the testimonies of over 150 
Zionist fighters who had participated in the 1948 war.           
Therefore, despite their limitations, Israeli proponents of Nakba acknowledgement 
are carving out a vital space for dialogue within Israeli society which is increasingly 
enfolding in denial. This denial is most explicitly evident in the concerted political efforts 
to silence the Nakba narrative and intimidate its advocates. To commemorate the Nakba 
LQDQHYHQWFRUUHVSRQGLQJZLWK,VUDHO¶V,QGHSHQGHQFH'D\FHOHEUDWLRQVZDVKHOGE\
Zochrot activists. On the day they put up protest posters across Tel Aviv which read: 
³7KH1DNED VLQFH0DGH LQ ,VUDHO´ and at the bottom: ³7KH1DNED ODZDLPV WR
VFDUH WKRVH ZKR FRPPHPRUDWH WKH 1DNED RQ ,VUDHO¶V ,QGHSHQGHQFH 'D\ ,VUDHO¶V
Independence Day is The Nakba day too. You try to shut my mouth but ,ZRQ¶WIRUJHWWKDW
WRGD\LVDOVR1DNEDGD\´.29 
Such activities constitute not only commemorative acts, but further articulate a 
political solidarity against those who wish to silence those who have chosen to bear 
                                                          
29
 Translations from the Hebrew supplied in personal correspondence by Eitan Bronstein, May 2010. 
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witness to the Nakba. Such acts are politically as well as symbolically significant given 
that Nakba commemorative activities in Israel have been criminalised by the 2011 anti-
Nakba law. The significance of the activities of organisations such as Zochrot 
(Remembering) lies precisely in the act of bearing witness and the refusal to forget about 
the Nakba in a time of perpetrator-induced denial. Zochrot¶V Independence/Nakba Day 
activities are a reminder that denial and repression are not the same as forgetting, and 
moreover, there is positive potential in the stand-off between those who seek to reconcile 
with the tragedy of the past and embrace a future of coexistence and those who choose 
denial and conflict. As a result a conversation is beginning to take place in Israeli society 
and this conversation is being held in a common language, and even those who refuse to 
listen cannot deny that they are hearing. 
Since the 1990s, the history of 1948 has been simultaneously read and re-read as a 
historical account from the events of the past to the present, and in reverse, illuminating a 
silenced history and memory from the perspective of the now. Despite its catastrophic 
nature, the Nakba is also a narrative of hope, its narration having been made possible by 
the long awaited recognition in the Oslo Accords of 1993 that the Palestinian people are a 
national collectivity with rights to self-determination. The explosion of Nakba testimonies 
and commemorations since the 1990s has been the direct result of the space to re-narrate 
the Palestinian nation opened up by the Oslo Accords with their promise of statehood. 
Narrating the Nakba became even more urgent when this promise, coupled with the 
UHIXVDOWRDGGUHVVWKHUHIXJHH¶VULJKWRIUHWXUQEHJDQWRDSSHDUDVDGLVWDQWDQGXQWHQDEOH
prospect.          
In response to these failures, the Palestinian collectivity and Diaspora 
intellectuals, alongside a number of critical Israeli academics and civil society groups 
such as Zochrot, amongst others, have undertaken a project which seeks to challenge and 
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re-articulate the polarising positions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Differential access 
to power has meant that who gets to tell the story of the Nakba with the biggest impact 
has not always been related to direct experience and its lived consequences, but the 
privilege of being able to speak and be received with authority, which at present tends to 
lie with Israelis. Nevertheless, the conversation that is taking place between progressive 
Israeli Jews and Palestinians is vitally important as it is producing new narratives for 
FRH[LVWHQFHZKLFKDUHYLWDO IRU µFRQVWUXFWLQJDVHQVHRI WKHVHOI LQ WKHIDFHRI WUDGLWLRQV
WKDWKDYHFUXPEOHGDQGKXPDQKRSHVWKDWULVNEHLQJIRUJRWWHQ«RQO\WKURXJKWKHYDULHW\
of relationships constructed by many people seeing from different perspectives can truth 
EHNQRZQDQGFRPPXQLW\EHFUHDWHG¶0LQRZ 
From Recognition to Redress 
3URMHFWVVXFKDVWKHµ7RZDUGVD&RPPRQ$UFKLYH¶ exhibition (2013) and the Cape 
Town vision document (2012) on the Palestinian refugee return co-authored by BADIL 
and Zochrot activists are prime examples of critical attempts to bridge the two histories of 
1948 and to work towards the redress of the survivors of the Nakba. When I first became 
DZDUH RI =RFKURW¶V ZRUN LQ -10 the only testimonies from 1948 available on 
=RFKURW¶V ZHEVLWH Zere two short documentary films recorded and edited by Raneen 
Jeries, a Palestinian Israeli activist. One of the films features testimonies of five 
Palestinian women who lived through and survived the Nakba, and the second features 
two Palestinian survivors of the ethnic cleansing of the neighbourhood of Manshiyyah in 
1947, both of whom are internally displaced Palestinian citizens of Israel. While Lentin 
FULWLFLVHV=RFKURW¶VSRVVHVVLRQRIthese testimonies as a form of recolonisation of 
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Palestinian memory by the Jewish Israeli colonisers, Raneen saw her work somewhat 
differently.30 
As a Palestinian woman living in Israel the opportunity to record the testimonies 
of Palestinian survivors is both an opportunity to re-write, or rather to write in, a part of 
her history that had been written out by the Zionist state she grew up in, and also as she 
H[SODLQHG WR PH µ7R VSHDN DERXW WKH 1DNED LQ +HEUHZ \RX QHHG 3DOHVWLQLDQ VWRULHV
[the] Nakba is a Jewish [IsUDHOL@VWRU\DVZHOO¶6LPLODU to Peled-Elhanan (2012), Raneen 
also stressed that for an Israeli organisation aimed at the Jewish public in Israel, to 
archive the stories of Palestinian survivors is also vitally important in order to counteract 
the silencing and absence of the Palestinian narrative from the Israeli curriculum, an 
absence which serves to continually justify hatred and violence against the Palestinian 
people, whether under the Occupation or elsewhere. 
The recording of Israeli perpetrator testimonies relating to 1948 had begun at the 
time of the interview. However, the process of recording these testimonies was rather 
slow in gathering momentum as most Israelis who fought in 1948 were reluctant to come 
forward and speak about what they saw or did. Moreover, while there are now 150 
recorded testimonies of Jewish fighters who took part in the expulsions of Palestinians in 
1948, FROOHFWHGDVSDUWRIWKHµ&RPPRQ$UFKLYH¶ exhibition, these testimonies are 
overwhelmingly characterised by evasion and partial recollection; for example, 
sometimes it is not clear whether the former fighters are recollecting atrocities they 
witnessed or perpetrated (see Zochrot website for examples); similarly, there is little 
indication of remorse or regret for the actions, and even less desire to redress the 
3DOHVWLQLDQUHIXJHHV¶GHPDQGIRUUHWXUQ,QIDFWPDQ\RIWKHWHVWLPRQLHVDUHUHPLQLVcent 
RI%HQQ\0RUULV¶VLQIDPRXVµ<RXFDQ¶WPDNHDQRPHOHWWHZLWKRXWEUHDNLQJHJJV¶ remark.  
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 Interview conducted over Skype, 17.12.2010.  
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Nevertheless, the collection of perpetrator testimonies from 1948 is absolutely 
vital in order to combat the officially sanctioned amnesia and denial in relation to the 
Nakba which characterises Israeli society at present. Moreover, in the absence of 
Palestinian narratives about 1948 from the Israeli curriculum, which we saw in the 
previous chapter serves to justify and sanction continued militarist violence against 
Palestinian lives and property in the Occupied Territories, and to a lesser degree within 
Israel =RFKURW¶V RQOLQH Drchive can serve as an alternative source of historical 
information containing survivor testimonies31 which challenge the Zionist narrative of 
1948 as a triumphant war of independence against the threat of annihilation. 
Simultaneously, the corroboration of Palestinian survivor testimonies through the 
juxtapositioning of Jewish Israeli perpetrator testimonies serves to reinforce the present 
necessity to recognise, take responsibility for and redress the rights of the Palestinian 
survivors and descendants of the Nakba. The necessity for recognition, responsibility and 
justice is even more pertinent in light of the issues examined in the previous chapter 
which highlighted the re-living, re-enacting, and re-articulation of the trauma and 
violence of the Nakba in each and every subsequent violent militarist encounter under 
occupation.  
At the same time, in light of the ongoing relation of violence and oppression 
characterising Israel-Palestine, acknowledgement in the form of recognising and 
accepting the truth claims of the Palestinian narrative of the Nakba does not in itself 
represent an adequate response to the PalestLQLDQ FDOO IRU MXVWLFH $V WKH µ&RPPRQ
$UFKLYH¶ curator Eyal Sivan explains in an Al Jazeera interview, acknowledgment 
without recognition of the moral, ethical and political implications of the injustice/s 
perpetrated against the Palestinians during the Nakba, and subsequently, fits neatly in to 
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 ,Q=RFKURW¶VZHEVLWHKDGRYHUYLVLWs, primarily from Israel (Morocutti, 2013).  
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WKH µVKRRW DQG FU\¶ narrative (Silver, 2011). What is at stake in relation to having 
information about formative past events is not so much the accumulation and possession 
of knowledge but rather what to do with the knowing:                 
the mutually performative effects that narratives and subjects have in the 
presence of each other sometimes produce effects that resemble what we 
used to call authorial intention. In this context, the interest of assuming 
the performativity of narrative as subject-forming moments or places 
DQG DOVR DV HIIHFWV RI WKH VXEMHFW¶V DWWHPSW WR JLYH DQ DFFRXQW RI
themselves is to reframe the debate about the use, abuse or abusive 
(re)construction of national pasts (Rosello, 2010: 25).          
In other words, the task at hand is not so much about acknowledgment but rather it 
is about the responsibility entailed by the recognition of WKH2WKHU¶VULJKWWRUHGUHVV7KH
responsibility entailed calls forth not only a reframing and/or a retelling of an expunged 
history as a shared history, but also a reframing of the subject positions of the key actors 
in Israel-Palestine. Responsibility calls for a reframing of victims and perpetrators, or the 
colonised and colonisers, in a manner that helps to break with the violent and violence-
reproducing past, while at the same time honouring the role of the past in the present 
relation of misrecognition and irresponsibility. In essence, the task at hand is to articulate 
a future-oriented vision of Israel-Palestine and of the Jews/Israelis and Palestinians living 
in Israel-Palestine, as well as of those who wish to return. 
7KXVWKHµ&RPPRQ$UFKLYH¶ can be viewed as a future-oriented project that not 
only serves as a testament and acknowledgement of what was done in 1948 in the present, 
but can also act as a catalyst to a truth and reconciliation process in the future. Indeed, 
PXFK RI =RFKURW¶V UHFHQW ZRUk has been inspired by the work of the TRC (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission) in South Africa, with a joint study visit by BADIL and 
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=RFKURWDFWLYLVWVLQZKLFKOHGWRWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIWKHµ7KH&DSH7RZQ'RFXPHQW¶
which lays out a joint vision for WKH3DOHVWLQLDQUHIXJHHV¶UHWXUQDnd has since been the 
subject of presentation and discussion at the Right of Return Conference, held at Boston 
University, USA in April 2013.  
What is interesting however is the manner in which Zochrot and BADIL have 
focused their joint efforts on redress rather than truth, clearly bearing in mind the 
criticisms of the TRC process. One of the biggest criticisms levelled at the TRC has been 
its individuation of the crimes committed during the Apartheid regime which allegedly 
detracted from the need for collective reparation (Mamdani, 2002). The misplaced focus 
on truth for amnesty at the expense of atonement and the redress of the collective 
experience of injustice has in turn been criticised for leaving the socio-economic 
framework of apartheid in place in post-Apartheid South Africa, with continuing white 
minority control of land and resources, and the growing deprivation and dispossession of 
the black majority (Valji, 2003).  
It is for this reason that the Cape Town return vision document focuses not only 
on Israeli acknowledgement and corroboration of the Nakba, but more significantly on the 
recognition of the right of return, taking responsibility for its implementation or lack 
thereof, and consequently the question of redress, or in other words the practicality of 
implementing the return. Significantly, the authors of the vision paper assume a post-
Zionist future in which the return will take place. There is no indication or discussion of 
how this post-Zionist future is to be arrived at, or what the role of the activists might be in 
bringing about this post-Zionist moment. While the paper is unique and unprecedented in 
scope and nature, it is the first time Israeli Jews and Palestinians have got together to 
actively think and plan the Palestinian refugee return, the document nevertheless remains 
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contradictory in many places, partly due to disagreement on key issues but perhaps also to 
do with lack of expertise in certain areas such as economics and public administration.  
For example, the authors admit that there are major unresolved disagreements 
over a two or one state solution, an issue which is likely to have a major impact on the 
return and its nature and scope. Similarly, there is great disagreement over the question of 
property restitution and rights. For example, are the current Jewish occupiers of properties 
that belonged to Palestinians who were expelled or left in 1948 to be evicted from these 
properties, or are the original Palestinian owners to be compensated instead; and in either 
case do the Jewish residents have any rights to property and/or compensation if they had 
purchased in good faith and/or lived there for a prolonged period of time?                       
The doFXPHQW DOVR SURYLGHV QXPHURXV µWUDFN¶ options for individual and 
collective return, and attempts to resolve some underlying inequalities in Palestinian 
society. For example, it argues that financial and practical provisions for return should 
also be made for those refugees and their descendants who left behind land and property 
and for those who did not have land and/or property but are nevertheless entitled to 
compensation and financial redress. These proposals however leave a rather confusing 
and not entirely compatible mixture of individual, collective and state responses to 
housing and public administration and responsibility in the eventuality of the return. 
/LNHZLVH ZKLOH WKH FRQYHUVLRQ RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ PLOLWDU\ DLG EXGJHW WR ,VUDHO LV
envisaged as a probable financial source for the implementation of the return, the 
significance and role, with the exception of UNRWA, of the International Community 
and the governments hosting the refugee Diaspora, is ignored.  
6LGHOLQLQJ WKH UROH RI WKH UHIXJHHV¶ KRVW VWDWHV LV SDUWLFXODUO\ SUREOHPDWLF IRU a 
number of reasons, not least of all because the right of return to Israel-Palestine could be 
responded to with the denial of the residency and citizenship rights, and in extreme 
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circumstances the expulsion, of Palestinian individuals and/or communities who might 
wish to reclaim the right of return symbolically while remaining and settling in the 
country in which they were born or in a third state of their choice. Also, excluding the 
wider region from the frame of return is equally problematic in light of ongoing 
secondary and tertiary displacement of the Palestinian refugees from Syria, and the 
possibility of the conflict there spreading to Lebanon. It is also surprising that the authors 
of the document fail to acknowledge that the return as envisioned represents the biggest 
case of social engineering on an unprecedented scale, with the exception of the creation of 
the Zionist state of Israel and colonial Algeria, and for this reason the return might 
involve and require regional and international cooperation.  
Nevertheless, despite the above criticisms, the aforementioned discrepancies and 
contradictions in the return vision document testify to the inclusion and inclusivity of a 
variety of voices and points of view in the process of thinking about the return. Likewise, 
the document represents a collaborative work-in-progress rather than a manifesto, and 
calls forth further consideration and debate. The vision document also represents a radical 
reframing of the return as the co-responsibility between the Israeli coloniser and 
colonised Palestinians, and further demonstrates how Zochrot as an organisation has 
grown and developed since its inception. This can be gauged in particular by contrasting 
the 2012 Cape Town Document co-authored by BADIL and Zochrot with the 2010 paper 
on the practicalities of return, published in the second tri-lingual issue of the Sedek 
Journal.  
7KHSDSHUHQWLWOHGµ7KLQNLQJSUDFWLFDOO\DERXW WKHUHWXUQRI WKH3DOHVWLQLDQ
UHIXJHHV¶ LV FR-DXWKRUHG E\ WZR RI =RFKURW¶V IRXQGHUV 1RUPD Musih and Eitan 
Bronstein. In this paper the framework underlying the thinking about the practicalities of 
the return is decidedly Jewish Israeli centric, if not Zionist. The underlying assumption is 
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that the decision-making process lies in the hands of Israelis: the Israeli public has to 
accept the return, it has to be assured of its safety and right to self-determination, and it 
will accommodate the absorption of the refugees into the existing body politic via a 
gradual process of return. While the 2010 paper similarly assumes a post-Zionist moment 
in which the return will take place, once again the arrival at the post-Zionist moment is 
unclear, and moreover, it appears that while the state will be de-Zionised, there is 
reluctance on the part of the Jewish Israeli authors to see the Jewish Israeli collectivity 
rearticulated otherwise. What I mean by this is that there is an absence of an attempt to 
think beyond the dominant and prevailing logic of separation and segregation between 
Israelis and Palestinians. For example, the post-return state is envisaged by the authors as 
a state comprised of numerous nation states, each responsible for its own governance and 
cultural management.  
In contrast the 2012 document encourages bilingualism, and calls for Arabic and 
Hebrew to be instituted as the official languages of the state which would have to be 
learnt by both collectivities, with emphasis on Jewish Israelis learning Arabic as part of 
the decolonisation process. The notion of Israelis as colonisers is also decidedly absent 
from the 2010 paper on the return, with a focus on righting the wrongs of 1948 without 
the acknowledgement that the Zionist project is an ongoing settler-colonial project both in 
the 1948 and 1967 territories. The Occupation is also curiously absent from the frame 
employed to examine the return. For example, the refugees in Lebanon are mentioned as 
deserving to be prioritised because their conditions are the worst. This is rather curious 
given that the authors are writing four years after the blockade of Gaza and in the 
aftermath of the 2008-2009 attack, which is briefly mentioned in the paper in relation to 
future truth and reconciliation processes, circumstances which arguably make eighty 
SHUFHQW RI *D]D¶V UHVLGHQWV ZKR DUH UHIXJHHV IURP 48, the refugees with the worst 
circumstances. This is not an attempt to create a hierarchy of refugees, which is highly 
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problematic to begin with, but rather to highlight the manner in which the leaving out of 
the Occupation from a framework which alludes to the possibility of a shared state by 
Israelis and Palestinians can still reinforce the logic of separation which frames the 
ongoing apartheid and occupation.  
Moreover, avoiding the subject of the Occupation is a means of avoiding 
responsibility in the present, or at least avoiding talking about the necessary actions for 
bringing about the post-Zionist state envisaged in the return documents: µ:KHQ , >ZH@
remember, rewrite, retell the past, the new past turns my present into a narrative 
environment that becomes a type of norm, a constraining and enabling frame that defines 
ZKDW , >ZH@ ZLOO QHHG WR RSSRVH FHOHEUDWH GHI\¶ 5RVHOOR   7KXV DV ZDV
already discussed, responsibility entails more than simple acknowledgement; it entails 
actions that would bring about some form of justice. Therefore one could ask: is it enough 
to speak about the Nakba in Hebrew and to envisage the Palestinian return while 
continuing to serve in the IDF, remaining silent about, and maintaining the ongoing 
colonial Occupation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank?32 In many respects Zochrot 
remains trapped within the Zionist consensus it is trying to break free from. This however 
does not have to be disabling, even if it is constraining at present. However, it does 
require an urgent and serious working through: µ:RUNLQJ WKURXJK WKH SDVW LV ERWK D
practice and something between a politics and an ethics, something that could be called an 
DJHQGD¶ 5RVHOOR 33 A renewed agenda which calls for practical solidarity in 
                                                          
32
 In 2005 a group of Zochrot activists resigned over RQHRI=RFKURW¶Vfounder¶s refusal to continue serving 
as an IDF air force reservist; the question of serving in the military continues to be a hotly contested issue 
within the organisation. (Amit Perelson, Skype Interview, 2012)  
33
 Currently the organisation is considering its responsibility to begin advocacy work in relation to the right 
of return alongside its educational activities on the Nakba, although the direction Zochrot will take on the 
subject is not clear at present (conference presentation by Zochrot Director Liat Rosenberg, 2013).     
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the present would be better placed to create the necessary steps to redress the injustices of 
the past with view to creating a fairer and more egalitarian future.   
There are many possibilities for what this agenda might look like. One possibility 
is a renewed focus not only on the acknowledgement of the Nakba, but more importantly, 
the recognition of the right of return within Israeli society. For while Zochrot activists 
accept the right of return as a given in both the 2010 paper and the 2012 vision document, 
nevertheless, it is not clear what the best means are to convince the Jewish Israeli public 
to move away from denial and the refusal to recognise the Palestinian right to redress. 
Indeed, one possible answer is that as the colonisers ³Israeli Jews do not matter as far as 
making decisions about the Palestinian right, or the return, and that they will simply have 
to live with the consequences of implementing the justice of the Palestinian return´. 
Nevertheless, in light of a region in conflict, an otherwise engaged International 
Community, and an intransigent Israeli body politic, the Israeli public is emerging ever 
more as a group which needs to be addressed as a key player, the role of which needs to 
be examined in relation to but separate from the current Zionist governance regime, and 
organisations such as Zochrot can help to articulate an alternative vision of cohabitation.   
Reframing Israeli Jewishness    
 2QH RI WKH PRVW LQWHUHVWLQJ DQG VLJQLILFDQW TXHVWLRQV UDLVHG E\ =RFKURW¶V
reframing is what to do with the colonisers in the event of decolonisation. This in 
particular is embodied in the tension between the role to be played by Jewish and Israeli 
in the identity of the post-Zionist settler collectivity. Most Palestinians and many critical 
Jewish Israelis prefer to place emphasis on the Jewish as a redeemable ethno-religious 
category, while the Israeli is considered to be imbued with the characteristics of Zionism 
and colonialism, and moreover might imply acceptance of the Zionist settler colonial 
project of the state of Israel. However, I would like to argue that both of these 
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DVVXPSWLRQVDUHGHHSO\ IODZHGDQGPRUHRYHUVHUYH WR UHLQIRUFH=LRQLVP¶VRZQORJLFRI
settler colonial supremacy. Above all, Israel is not an Israeli state, it is a Jewish state 
which happens to be called Israel. In fact, the project of Zionism is a project which 
desires Jewish self-determination and supremacy within Israel-Palestine. Thus, treating 
WKHµ-HZLVK¶SDUWRI-HZLVK,VUDHOLDVWKHQHXWUDOWHUPPHUHO\REVFXUHVWKHUROHSOD\HGby 
WKH=LRQLVWFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIµ-HZLVKQHVV¶LQLWVVHWWOHUFRORQLDOHQGHDYRXU 
One could argue, as Judith Butler (2012) does, and is discussed at length in the 
next chapter, that for this very reason Jewishness needs to be reclaimed from its Zionist 
conceptualisation. However, anyone interested in unpacking and challenging the Zionist 
policy of dispossession needs to examine the role of Jewishness in this colonial project in 
a critical and conscious manner, acknowledging the function of the concept in the Zionist 
project, without dismissing or denying the fact that Jewishness means many different 
things around the world and is experienced in many different ways by different people 
who have defined themselves as Jewish historically or contemporarily. 
Furthermore, an emphasis on Jewishness, which also then results in debates 
around Jewish rights to self-determination in Israel-Palestine, implies that Jews 
everywhere in the world have the right to settle and claim collective rights in Israel-
Palestine by virtue of being Jewish. The above notion of collective Jewish self-
determination in Israel-Palestine is the premise of Zionism and the practice of the state of 
Israel as it stands under the Law of Return. However, what needs to be considered is 
whether in a decolonised and post-Zionist Israel-Palestine, in the twenty-first century, 
after decades of post-colonial debates, a notion of transnational collective Jewish rights in 
Israel-Palestine can still be justified. Furthermore, conceptualising rights in terms of 
ethno-religious and sectarian groupings is itself highly problematic and threatens to 
recreate a new version of segregation, perhaps akin to the set-up characterising 
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contemporary Lebanon, a set-up which contains the constant threat of inter-communal 
violence, something that a future decolonised Israel-Palestine would need to avoid. This 
WKHQ EULQJV PH WR PDNH D FDVH WKDW D UHDUWLFXODWLRQ RI µ,VUDHOL¶ DV D +HEUHZ VSHDNLQJ
national collective can potentially enable a more just and egalitarian mode of 
configuration post-Zionist apartheid. Rosello explains that:  
The goal is to invent or perhaps to recognize and celebrate, where it 
H[LVWVDQHZW\SHRIµEUHDNLQJIUHH¶,WGRHVQRWKDYHWREHDEUHDNLQJ
IUHH µIURP¶ WKHSDVWEXW D UHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW OLYLQJZLWh the ever-present 
past is unavoidable, that, therefore, the present is this so-called past of 
violence and guilt, but also that a welcoming of that heritage does not 
mean that we must reproduce it. And this is not a three stage dialectic 
process but a constant articulation between these positions (Rosello, 
2010: 19).  
What the above quote articulates is a warning of the danger of rearticulating 
embattled identities and therefore the need to accept and recognise the role of the past in 
the present and the future without reproducing the violence that has brought us together. 
In the case of Israel-Palestine this begins with an acceptance that Jewish Israelis are 
indeed colonisers, that their presence in Israel-Palestine has only been possible because of 
the violent colonisation and dispossession of the Palestinian people; but it is also an 
acceptance that they are there, that as people they have the right to choose to remain and 
live there in equality, without imposing a settler colonial order on the land and its people. 
Thus, despite its violent history, and its continuing violence, the concept of Israeliness is 
also the concept that best encapsulates the Jewish, Hebrew speaking people who have 
lived in Palestine for the past sixty five to a hundred years. Moreover, Israelis are not 
simply Jews. Although they are a part of the transnational Jewish community, they have 
their very own specific and unique history. The Zionist project of Israel is unprecedented 
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in Jewish history, certainly in recent Jewish history, and one needs to be sceptical of 
accepting theological texts written thousands of years ago as historical facts. Thus, Jewish 
Israeli history is unique in relation to Jewish diasporic experience, and that needs to be 
acknowledged as part of thinking about the future of the role of Jewish Israelis in Israel-
Palestine post-Zionist colonisation. 
In that sense, the category µJewish Israeli¶ would function in much the same way 
as Afrikaner identity functions in post-$SDUWKHLG 6RXWK $IULFD =RFKURW¶V  SDSHU
bearing in mind the aforementioned criticisms, alludes to the significance of retaining a 
Jewish Israeli identity post-Zionism, an identity that would be characterised by the 
FRQWLQXLW\RIWKH+HEUHZODQJXDJHDQGFXOWXUH7KXVDOWKRXJKDWSUHVHQWµ,VUDHOL¶FDUULHV
the connotation of violence and dispossession by association of belonging to the Israeli 
settler colonial state: in a post-apartheid situation it has the potential to become a cultural 
and not a political signifier. Thus, over time Israeli Jewishness has the potential to be 
rearticulated as a civic identity. Therefore, allowing for Jewishness to be reclaimed as an 
ethno-religious and/or cultural self-identification rather than the racialised category it 
signifies in the current settler colonial state of Israel. It also helps to avert the rather 
problematic attempt by some to reduce Jewishness to religion and religious practice, an 
attempt which denies the significance of the multiple ways in which Jewish self-
identification has developed in the past two centuries.     
The above comments are not meant as a prescription for a future identitarian 
category, rather it is an attempt to problematise some of the debates circulating in relation 
to what form Israeli Jewishness might take in a post-Zionist Israel-Palestine. Moreover, 
the above debate has direct bearing on differing visions of an alternative solution to the 
conflict in the form of a shared state, and what the role and place of Jewish Israelis in it 
might be. Furthermore, such debates are gaining momentum among critical Israeli groups 
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such as Zochrot, and ICAHD which is examined in the next chapter. Zochrot has not 
come out explicitly for a one or two state solution, and as highlighted earlier, its 
collaboration with BADIL is also characterised by disagreements among participants in 
relation to the nature of Israel-Palestine in the eventuality of decolonisation. Nevertheless, 
there is an emerging consensus among critical Israeli and Palestinian activists that the one 
state solution is the inevitable, if not necessarily the desirable, outcome of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
Therefore, for organisations such as Zochrot, the question of what the de-
Zionization and decolonisation of Israel-Palestine might mean for Jewish Israelis, who 
face becoming an ethno-national minority in the eventuality of the Palestinian return, is 
increasingly gaining significance, as exemplified by its prominence in the 2010 paper on 
the return, and to a lesser extent, the 2012 Cape Town documents. The 2010 paper in 
particular testifies to the tensions and difficulties underpinning the process of psychic 
decolonisation among critical Jewish Israelis. This process remains an ongoing, fraught, 
and simultaneously, growing attempt among critical Israelis to rearticulate Israeli 
Jewishness as non-Zionist and non-dominating. The next chapter examines the work of 
the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) and will explore further the 
above debates on decolonisation and self-determination by examining ICAHD¶V
statement in support of a binational state in Israel-Palestine and the accompanying 
responses by Palestinian counterparts.            
Conclusion  
This chapter examined critical Israeli responses to the Palestinian narrative of the 
1DNED DQG WKH UHIXJHHV¶ ULJKW RI Ueturn with reference to the work of the Israeli NGO 
Zochrot. The chapter highlighted the difficulty of working towards acknowledgement and 
recognition of the Palestinian right to return in a climate of denial and suppression of the 
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memory and history of the Nakba within Israeli society. However, it also highlighted the 
productive tensions which have emerged in the process of critical Israelis and Palestinians 
working through the past in order to imagine a more just future. These tensions relate to 
visions of redress, cohabitation and the possibility to articulate alternative subjectivities 
which break with the current dichotomy of coloniser/colonised.     
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5. Decolonising Israel-Palestine 
 
 This chapter examines the work and thought of the Israeli Committee Against 
House Demolitions (ICAHD), particularly as it relates to the political analysis provided 
by its founder, Jeff Halper. The chapter begins by briefly situating Israel-Palestine as a 
situation of ongoing settler colonisation. It then proceeds to examine the significance and 
FRQWULEXWLRQV RI ,&$+'¶V WUDQVQDWLRQDO DGYRFDF\ and its practical resistance and 
rebuilding activities which focus on reframing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
situation of oppression and dispossession; an analysis which demands international 
redress for the plight of the Palestinian people. The second part of this chapter focuses on 
IC$+'¶VUHFHQWHQGRUVHPHQWRIDELQDWLRQDOone-state solution and the ensuing debate on 
binationalism, decolonisation, and the right to collective self-determination in Israel-
Palestine.    
Israel-Palestine as Settler Colonialism 
7KH WLWOH RI WKLV FKDSWHU LV SDUWO\ LQVSLUHG E\ WKH VXEWLWOH RI +DOSHU¶V VHPL-
autobiographical political monograph An Israeli in Palestine: Resisting Dispossession, 
Redeeming Israel (2008, 2010), and his self-SURIHVVHGUHJUHWGXULQJ,&$+'8.¶V
DQQXDOFRQIHUHQFHLQ/RQGRQWKDWKHKDGQRWVXEWLWOHGWKHERRNµ'HFRORQLVLQJ,VUDHO¶DV
RSSRVHGWRµUHGHHPLQJ¶LW7KLVOLQJXLVWLFRPLVVLRQRUVXEVWLWXWLRQSRLQWVWRZDrds broader 
GHEDWHV DQGFKDQJHV LQ FRQVFLRXVQHVV LQ ,&$+'¶V WKRXJKW LQSDUWLFXODU DQG WR FULWLFDO
Israeli narratives more generally, in relation to Israel-3DOHVWLQH¶VVHWWOHUFRORQLDOSDVWDQG
SUHVHQW0RUHRYHU WKHLQYRFDWLRQRIµUHGHPSWLRQ¶LQ WKHWLWOH RI+DOSHU¶VDXWRELRJUDSK\
inadvertently draws on a key tenet in the Zionist settlement discourse: redemption which 
refers to the Jewish return to Palestine and the transcendence of the diasporic exile 
(Piterberg, 2010). Thus, invoking redemption unwittingly re-affirms the settler colonial 
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project in Israel-Palestine. For this reason it is important to engage with the tension 
inherent in the redemption/decolonisation logic common among critical Israeli groups in 
order to consider a way out of the impasse.   
$V /RUHQ]R 9HUDFLQL   ZULWHV µVHWWOHU FRORQLDOLVP UHPDLQV FXUUHQWO\
most invisible where a settler colonial order is most unreconstructed (e.g. Israel and the 
8QLWHG6WDWHV¶(ONLQVDQG3HGHUVHQVLPLODUO\UHDIILUPWKHH[FHSWLRQDOVXccess 
of settler colonialism in Israel-Palestine as the only transnational pan-European settlement 
project to achieve relatively secure nation building in the twentieth century. As mentioned 
previously, the diasporic character of the Jewish settler population34 sets Jewish 
settlement in Palestine apart from other instances of settler colonialism. This has allowed 
VRPH VFKRODUV WR UHMHFW WKH VHWWOHU FRORQLDO ODEHO DOWRJHWKHU LQFOXGLQJ ,&$+'¶V -HII
Halper (2008 and 2012) who has argued that the diasporic character of Jewish Israelis 
makes Israel an example of an ethno-nationalist state which more closely resembles 
Serbian nationalism, with the added characteristic of the settler population being largely 
made up of displaced and persecuted migrants from Europe who cannot be constituted as 
colonialists. However, Veracini would also characterise Serb ethno-nationalism, 
particularly in relation to the practices of ethnic cleansing and population settlement in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, as another instance of twentieth century settler 
                                                          
34
 Proponents of this argument often cite the lack of a single Metropolis from which Jewish Israelis 
originate, emphasising the transnationality of the settler population. For example, the Ashkenazi Jews 
originate from all over Europe and North America, with the country of departure not necessarily being the 
country which they were born in or which their family comes from (this is particularly the case for 
displacement in the aftermath of the Holocaust). The Mizrahi or Arab Jews were expelled from a number of 
Middle Eastern and North African countries in the 1950s. The Sephardi community finds its origins in the 
expulsions which took place from Spain and Portugal in the 15th Century; and in the twentieth century the 
community has also suffered expulsions and persecution in the European and Middle Eastern countries in 
which their forefathers had resettled.          
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colonialism, albeit not as successful; though reports of Republika Srbska demanding 
secession indicate that a similar trajectory is desired.       
In contrast to the rich and complex theorisation available on the phenomena of 
colonialism and imperialism, scholarship on settler colonialism is an emerging field, often 
characterised by anthologies which examine the anthropological practices of specific 
settler colonial societies (Elkins and Pedersen, 2005; Goldstein and Lubin, 2008; Stasiulis 
and Yuval-Davis, 1995). With the exception of the work of Patrick Wolfe (1999; 2006), 
perhaps one of the most comprehensive contemporary theoretical accounts of settler 
colonialism is provided by Veracini (2010). Veracini stresses that settler colonialism must 
be treated as a phenomenon separate and distinct from both colonialism and immigration: 
in the case of the former, colonisation is defined as a conquered polity dominated by an 
µH[RJHQRXV DJHQF\¶ LELG  ZKHUHDV PLJUDWLRQ ZKLOH LW VKDUHV the aspect of 
displacement with settlement, is different from it in that migrants arrive and are expected 
to assimilate into a pre-existing and constituted political order. Settlement on the other 
KDQG LV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ FRQTXHVW µUHWXUQ¶ DQG DQ LQJDWKHring in a place in which the 
settler collectivity institutes a new sovereign order where they come to be in control of 
both the usurped/displaced indigenous  population, and exogenous others, for example 
African slaves in the United States or contemporary immigrants (ibid: 3-12).  
Previous chapters have emphasised the role of narrative in consolidating early 
Jewish settlement in Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel, which continues 
to play a strategic role in maintaining the current oppressive regime in Israel and the 
Occupied Territories in relation to the Palestinians, as well as the denial of the Nakba and 
WKH UHIXJHHV¶ ULJKW RI UHWXUQ 1DUUDWLYH DOVR SOD\V D YHU\ VLJQLILFDQW UROH LQ VHWWOHU
psychology, with disavowal being one of its key characteristics (ibid: 14): the disavowal 
of any responsibility or complicity in colonialism ± LQ ,VUDHO¶V FDVH FRORQLDOLVP LV
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something associated with the British Empire, not Jewish settlers; denial of any founding 
violence against the indigenous population ± µWKH\ MXVW OHIW¶ DQG HPSKDVLV RQ VHWWOHU
innocence and suffering ± µVHHNLQJ UHIXJH IURP SHUVHFXWLRQ¶ 'LVDYRZDO LV IXUWKHU
coupled with an emphasis on settler struggle, and outstanding contribution to the land, 
together with an appropriation of authentic indigeneity ± µUHWXUQ WR WKHSURPLVHG ODQG¶
µPDNLQJWKHGHVHUWEORRP¶DQGRUµDODQGZLWKRXWDSHRSOHIRUDSHRSOHZLWKRXWDODQG¶ 
The elimination and/or physical or narrative replacement of the indigenous 
population by the settler collectivity is a common trope in settler colonialism (Wolfe, 
1999; Veracini, 2007 and 2010). In fact, one distinguishing aspect between pure 
colonialism and settler colonialism is precisely the issue of labour versus land. In pure 
colonialism, the exogenous rulers rely on and expect servitude by indigenous labourers, 
often having colonised precisely for the purpose of extracting resources and labour for the 
benefit of the Metropole and its representatives. On the other hand, while not always 
achievable in reality, settler colonies aspire to independence and self-sufficiency, and 
seek to become the natives of the land.  
As Shafir (2005) highlights, early Jewish settlement in Palestine was initially 
modelled on other colonial entities such as French Algeria; however during the 
subsequent settler migration waves a strong emphasis on self-reliance and Jewish-only 
labour became the dominant demand. The difficulty of maintaining a Jewish-only labour 
force during pre-state settlement, partly because of the small number of Jewish workers at 
this stage, but also due to lack of agricultural and other skills among the Yihuv 
population, in contrast to the plentiful and cheaper labour provided by Palestinian 
agricultural workers, resulted in mass discontent and union strikes by the settler 
population (ibid: 44 - 55). In the years after the state was established, and as a result of 
the large scale ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Arab Palestinian population, the above 
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settler-only model became the dominant mode of organisation particularly in the early 
years of state formation, but was more prominently re-established in the 1990s with the 
policy of closure vis-à-vis the Occupied Territories.       
As Naomi Klein (2007) has pointed out, closure has only been possible with the 
arrival of large numbers of cheap migrant labour from Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe 
to replace the cheap labour previously supplied by the Palestinians. Nevertheless, the 
settler colonial sovereign ability to control the population economy comprised of settler 
colonists, indigenous and exogenous others (Veracini, 2010), means that the presence of 
exogenous others does not challenge the settler colonial paradigm but can rather be co-
opted to bolster settler supremacy in relation to the indigenous population. A similar 
example, though one with far worse consequences for the indigenous population, is the 
case of the United States where the indigenous First Nations were eliminated almost in 
their entirety, to be replaced by claims to settler indigeneity.  
Thus, with the elimination of most of the indigenous population of North America 
the white settler colonists have been able to institute themselves as the original and 
authentic inhabitants and hence to maintain their right to govern in relation to later 
arrivals. Moreover, the virtual elimination of the indigenous population has also meant 
that the settler polity has had, over time, to rely on importing racialised exogenous labour 
in order to develop the colonial enterprise: in the pre-state period these needs were met 
with the labour of forcibly imported African slaves, and later impoverished free African 
Americans, and contemporarily other racialised exogenous workers such as migrant 
labourers from South America.    
                              
 
189 
 
One of the biggest obstacles to decolonising settler colonialism continues to be the 
dominance of the elimination or zero-sum paradigm35, in which any future remodelling of 
a settler colonial society, often as a result of struggles for recognition by exogenous 
others, takes place within the established settler colonial order: for example civil rights 
for African Americans in the United States. Conversely, even in cases where there has not 
been a physical elimination of the indigenous population, decolonisation has often been 
characterised by the flight of the pan-European settlers, for example in Algeria, or 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (Veracini, 2007). Nevertheless, there are also other less bleak 
examples in which settler colonial decolonisation is an ongoing process rather than a 
clean and brutal break with the past, for example post-Apartheid South Africa, but also 
the often neglected case of many South American countries where the European settler 
colonial population has by and large assimilated into the indigenous population, further 
mixing with exogenous others, and creating a majority mestizo (mixed) population. Thus, 
while settler colonial decolonisation or discontinuity remains a problematic task, it is 
nevertheless, not an impossible one. Indeed, the Palestinian call for Boycott, Divestment 
and Sanctions (BDS) is partially modelled on the South African anti-Apartheid struggle 
which despite its limitations continues to be one of the most successful decolonisation 
struggles related to a recent settler colonial society.   
Currently, for many, particularly Israelis and uncritical observers, Israel within its 
 ERUGHUV LV D GRQH GHDO DV IDU DV VHWWOHU FRORQLVDWLRQ LV FRQFHUQHG )URP ,VUDHO¶V
perspective and by its prerogative it is an internationally recognised Jewish state, albeit 
with flexible and disputed borders. These borders have not been disputed by most 
Palestinians who have for the past 20 years been working towards a two-state solution 
EDVHGRQWKHZLGHO\DFFHSWHGERUGHUVGHILQHGE\WKHDUPLVWLFHµ*UHHQ/LQH¶2QO\D
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 Veracini (2010) defines this as the settler colonial tendency to eliminate or exterminate the indigenous 
population in the process of establishing its claim to the land and to govern unchallenged.  
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minority of Palestinians, or as the state prefers to refer to them, Arabs or non-Jews, 
whether one is willing to admit the events of the Nakba or not, are resident in Israel as 
second class citizens, hence affirming the primacy of the Jewish Israeli national majority. 
The state of Israel, as it stands, is a fait accompli: the Zionist settler colonial project has 
successfully produced a Jewish Israeli nationality and a Jewish state. Its greatest 
DFFRPSOLVKPHQW LV WKDW ,VUDHO¶V GH IDFWR H[LVWHQFH VHUYHV WR HUDVH DQGRU REVFXUH LWV
colonial origins, sealing its image as a realised national self-determination project. That 
the above discourse often fails to acknowledge the unfinished settler colonial project 
ZLWKLQ ,VUDHO LWVHOI LV RIWHQ QHJOHFWHG HYHQ E\ ZHOO PHDQLQJ FULWLFV 7KH µ-XGDL]DWLRQ¶
planning and resettlement policies in force in the Galilee since the 1980s, and the ongoing 
expulsions of the Bedouin Palestinians in the Negev/Naqab, the latter closely mirroring 
land expropriation in the West Bank, are usually wilfully ignored and sidelined facts.  
Nevertheless, the ongoing colonisation of the West Bank is hard to ignore. The 
settler colonial settlements in annexed and occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank 
are illegal under International Law. Judea and Samaria, as the Israeli government 
officially refers to the territory of the West Bank in its internal communication and 
PLOLWDU\RUGHUVLVµGLVSXWHG¶WHUULWRU\LHWKH3DOHVWLQLDQVFODLPLWLVODQGIRUWKHLUIXWXUH
state, but Israel also claims as her sovereign territory. The half a million Israeli settlers 
who reside in the East Jerusalem and West Bank settler colonies are linked to Israel 
proper through a complex and exclusive grid of roads to which Palestinians are denied 
DFFHVV ,W LVSRVVLEOH WRGULYH IURP0D¶DOH$GXPLP WR7HO Aviv and back without ever 
being given any indication that you have left Israel or entered the occupied West Bank at 
any point. A Palestinian on the other hand might live in a West Bank village, half of 
which is on the other side of the Separation Wall where he/she has no legal permission to 
enter or visit (Weizman, 2007). This obfuscated and perplexing settler colonial apartheid 
was largely made possible by the geo-political arrangement put into place as a result of 
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the Oslo Accords, and the emergence of Areas A, B, and C; an arrangement which 
absolved Israel from responsibility as an Occupying Power towards the Palestinian 
civilians under its control, and gave the military-run Civil Administration unprecedented 
internationally sanctioned control of most of the physical land in the West Bank. It is this 
situation that ,&$+'¶V-HII+DOSHUDSWO\GHVFULEHVDVµ7KH0DWUL[RI&RQWURO¶ 
+DOSHU¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI WKHVLWXDWLRQLQ ,VUDHO-Palestine, particularly in the OPTs, 
DVDµ0DWUL[RI&RQWURO¶LVZRUWKTXRWLQJDW length. He defines the Matrix of Control as:  
a maze of laws, military orders, planning procedures, limitations on 
movement, kafkaesque bureaucracy, settlements and infrastructure ± 
augmented by prolonged and ceaseless low-intensity warfare ± that 
serves to perpetuate the Occupation, to administer it with a minimum of 
military presence and, ultimately, to conceal it behind massive Israeli 
³IDFWV RQ WKH JURXQG´ DQG D EODQG IDoDGH RI ³SURSHU DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ´
7KH 0DWUL[ UHVHPEOHV WKH (DVW $VLDQ JDPH RI ³*R´ Unlike chess, 
where two opponents try to defeat each other by eliminating one 
DQRWKHU¶V SLHFHV WKH DLP RI *R LV WR ZLQ E\ LPPRELOL]LQJ \RXU
opponent, by controlling key points on the matrix. This strategy was 
used effectively in Vietnam, where small forces of Viet Cong were able 
to pin down and virtually paralyze a half-million American troops 
possessing overwhelming superior fire-power. Israel's Matrix of Control 
accomplishes the same with the Palestinians. Maintaining the image of a 
democratic country only trying to defend its citizens from Arab terror, 
Israel uses seemingly innocuous and even benevolent policies and 
procedures to create a matrix of control and repression intended to lower 
WKH2FFXSDWLRQ¶VPLOLWDU\SURILOH,&$+'ZHEVLWH 
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The abovH DUWLFXODWLRQRI ,VUDHO¶V 2FFXSDWLRQDV D µ0DWUL[RI&RQWURO¶ZRUNV WR
highlight the ongoing process of colonisation and dispossession which characterises the 
situation in the OPTs, in particular the West Bank. The Gaza Strip, since the territorial 
disengagement and the departure of the Israeli settler population, has largely been reduced 
to an open air prison: one of the many µBantustans¶ intended by Israel for the 
µZDUHKRXVLQJ¶ RI WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ SRSXODWLRQ µ:DUHKRXVLQJ ZKHQ DSSOLHG WR D SHRSOH
such as the Palestinians, refers to a static situation of civil and political virtual 
LPSULVRQPHQWHPSWLHGRIDOOSROLWLFDOFRQWHQWDQGZLWKRXWUHGUHVVRUUHVROXWLRQ¶,&$+'
Demolishing Homes, Demolishing Peace, 2012: 6). By emphasising the structural policies 
of dispossession and ethnic cleansing by the Israeli state against the Palestinian people, 
,&$+'¶V DQDO\VLV UHIUDPHV WKH ,VUDHOL-3DOHVWLQLDQ FRQIOLFW DZD\ IURP ,VUDHO¶V VHFXULW\
discourse which portrays Israel as a tiny island of democracy amidst a sea of violent Arab 
terrorists. 
5HIUDPLQJ,VUDHO¶V0DWUL[RI&RQWURO 
,&$+'¶V 0LVVLRQ 6WDWHPHQW GHILQHV WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ DV D µKXPDQ ULJKWV DQG
SHDFHRUJDQL]DWLRQHVWDEOLVKHG LQ WRHQG ,VUDHO¶V2FFXSDWLRQRYHU WKH3DOHVWLQLDQV
ICAHD takes as its main focus, aV LWV YHKLFOH IRU UHVLVWDQFH ,VUDHO¶V SROLF\ RI
demolishing Palestinian homes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and within Israel 
SURSHU¶6LQFH,&$+'KROGV6SHFLDO&RQVXOWDWLYH6WDWXVDW WKH81(FRQRPLFDQG
Social Council. The organisation has previously received the Olive Branch Award from 
Jewish Voice for Peace, USA; and Jeff Halper, ICAHD's co-founder and Director, was 
nominated for the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize (ICAHD, Mission Statement 2012). ,&$+'¶V
activities can be roughly summarised under four categories: (i) political analysis 
(reframing the conflict), (ii) practical solidarity (resisting demolitions, and rebuilding), 
(iii) transnational advocacy (lobbying international governments and inter-governmental 
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institutions); and (iv) alternative education tours (providing transnational activists with 
expert knowledge and information).  
,&$+'¶VVWURQJDQGYRFDOFRPPLWPHQWWRRSSRVLQJWKH2FFXSDWLRQDQGVWDQGLQJ
side-by-side with Palestinians resisting house demolitions is respected and valued by 
PaOHVWLQLDQFRXQWHUSDUWV'HVSLWHLWVQDPHWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVDUHZLGH-ranging: 
from activists physically resisting house demolitions by getting in front of bulldozers, to 
providing legal advice and moral support to Palestinians seeking to apply for building 
SHUPLWV WR FKDOOHQJLQJ WKH &LYLO $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V36 negative rulings against Palestinian 
claimants, to taking the case against house demolitions to international legal institutions. 
Since 2011 the organisation has expanded its activities to carry out legal research on the 
state of demolition practices within Israel as well as in the Occupied Territories, 
SDUWLFXODUO\IRFXVLQJRQGHPROLWLRQVRI%HGRXLQYLOODJHVLQ WKH1HJHY1DTDE ,&$+'¶V
findings are regularly presented to international human rights committees in the European 
Union and United Nations. Moreover, ICAHD has sister organisations in the USA, UK, 
and Finland, and since 2013 also in Germany, with most members being seasoned 
Palestine solidarity campaigners, experienced at lobbying political representatives at the 
local, national and regional levels.  
 8QOLNH =RFKURW ZKLFK H[SOLFLWO\ VHHNV WR DGGUHVV ,VUDHOL VRFLHW\ ,&$+'¶V UROH
tends to be more focussed on grassroots solidarity with the Palestinian people, with an 
emphasis on internatiRQDO DGYRFDF\ :LWKLQ ,VUDHOL VRFLHW\ ,&$+'¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ WKH
Occupied Territories and abroad are largely viewed as marginal, traitorous, or obstructive 
1*2 0RQLWRU  ,&$+'¶V SHDFH FHQWUH %HLW $UDEL\D KDV EHHQ GHPROLVKHG VL[
times by the Israeli army, often with explicit warnings. Nevertheless, even where 
,&$+'¶V ZRUN LV VHHQ DV QHFHVVDU\ DQG ZHOFRPH DV LQ WKH :HVW %DQN ,&$+' OLNH
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many other solidarity organisations, often has to walk the tightrope between solidarity and 
patronage, humanitarian resistance and depoliticised charity.  
Similar WR=RFKURW,&$+'¶VZRUNDQGSHUVSHFWLYHKDVHYROYHGDORQJVLGHDQGDVD
result of constructive criticism levelled at them. This evolution in organisational narrative 
is most evident in the writing of Jeff Halper which oscillates between analysis and a call 
for action. When translated into action the obstacles posed by the situation on the ground 
make the biggest difference to enacting justice in practice. Thus, despite recently coming 
out for a binational one-state solution in Israel-Palestine, the blockade of Gaza from 2006 
has made it practically impossible for ICAHD to resist house demolitions or to rebuild 
demolished homes there. Solidarity with Gaza has become largely symbolic or 
humanitarian in nature. For example, Halper took part in the international flotillas which 
attempted to break the siege by entering Gaza from the Mediterranean Sea and bringing 
solidarity in the form of books, food, medicines, and toys for children. Similarly, since 
2011 ICAHD has started to make explicit links between house demolitions in the West 
%DQN DQG KRXVH GHPROLWLRQV DJDLQVW 3DOHVWLQLDQ FLWL]HQV RI ,VUDHO ZLWKLQ ,VUDHO¶V 
borders, bringing their thinking and work closer to a discourse of decolonisation. 
However, lack of funds and the considerable higher cost of operating a construction site 
in Israel have prevented the organisation from hosting an international rebuilding camp in 
the same way that they do on an annual basis in the West Bank. 
Out of the three case study organisations examined in this thesis, ,&$+'¶VZRUN
most closely resembles the characteristics of a Transnational Social Movement (TSM) as 
GHILQHG E\ -DFNLH 6PLWK HW DO  7KLV GHILQLWLRQ GHILQHV 760V DV VKDSLQJ µJOREDO
politics by mobilizing transnational resources in national conflicts, generating 
FRQVWLWXHQFLHV IRU PXOWLODWHUDO SROLF\ DQG WDUJHWLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ $OJHU
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1997: 270). Jackie Smith (2008) further argues that multilateral transnational activism 
serves to democratise national spaces:  
By mobilizing in International arenas, activists working at local and 
national level can bring respectability and urgency to their claims, 
altering the distribution of moral resources in the conflict. Mobilizing 
international legal arguments and institutions therefore helps alter the 
balance of power between neoliberal and democratic globalization 
networks (ibid: 174).             
 For this reason, alongside its practical resistance activities in Israel-Palestine 
ICAHD has increasingly focussed on international advocacy, regularly briefing 
international politicians, decision makers and lawyers on the situation in the Occupied 
Territories. 2012 saw the launch of a new information pack including statistics on 
displacement trends, a legal briefing bookOHWRQ,VUDHO¶VYLRODWLRQRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDV
pertaining to house demolitions and displacement37 specifically designed for international 
lawyers; as well as a detailed booklet containing political and normative analysis of 
,VUDHO¶VGLVSODFHPHQWSROLFLHV LQWKH237Vµ'HPROLVKLQJ+RPHV'HPROLVKLQJ3HDFH¶ 
Alongside the aforementioned post-Oslo overlapping but separate territories 
inhabited by Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank, the Israeli military uses a 
combination of British Mandate and Ottoman laws to administer the Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories. An 1858 Ottoman land law, adopted by the British in 1943 is used 
WRH[SURSULDWHODQGIURPSXEOLFRZQHUVKLSGHFODULQJLWµ6WDWH/DQG¶IRUSXEOLFXVHZKLFK
in reality is mainly used to build private housing for Israeli settler colonists. Alongside 
WKLV WKHPLOLWDU\XVHVGHULYDWLYHVRI0DQGDWHµ(PHUJHQF\5HJXODWLRQV¶DPHQGHGXQGHU
the Jordanian Administration, but not updated since 1967, to declare civilian Palestinian 
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inhabited areas as µFORVHGPLOLWDU\]RQHV¶DSUHWH[WIRUHYLFWLRQVDQGKRXVHGHPROLWLRQV
(Weizman, 2007). It is worth noting that the adoption or inheritance of former emergency 
colonial regulations and laws is a common feature and trope characterising the governing 
state of exception under colonial or imperial rule (Lloyd, 2012). Conversely, Israeli settler 
colonists in the West Bank are subject to Israeli civil law with the army lacking any 
jurisdiction over them; while within Israel proper a separate 1965 building law is used to 
expropriate Palestinian land for public/state purposes (Amnesty International, 1999).    
Alongside military administration, corporate capital plays an equally significant 
role in many of the injustices suffered in Israel-Palestine. Corporate complicity is heavily 
LQWHUWZLQHGDQGHQPHVKHG LQ ,VUDHO¶V UDFLDOLVHGUHJLPHRIRSSUHVVLRQDQGGRPLQDWLRQ LQ
the Occupied Territories, and to a lesser extent in Israel within the 1948 borders. As such, 
individual corporations are viewed as vehicles for and enabOHUVRI,VUDHO¶VVWDWHLQWHUHVWV
and policies, and as institutions which benefit directly and indirectly from the abuse and 
exploitation of the Palestinian people (Barat and Winstanley, 2011; Barghouti, 2011; 
Wiles, 2013). Despite differentiated emphasis on the role of state or corporate institutions 
as purveyors of injustice, the relationship between state and corporate institutions 
continues to shape the reality of Israel-Palestine.  
The policy of closure in the Occupied Territories which has barred and excluded 
most Palestinians from the Israeli employment market since the 1990s has resulted in an 
unemployment epidemic and growing impoverishment. At the same time many 
international and Israeli businesses particularly in the settlement blocks have benefitted 
DQGSURILWHGIURP3DOHVWLQLDQZRUNHUV¶GHVSHUDWLRQDQGWKHDEVHQFHRIDPLQLPXPZDJH
and legal employment protection. In essence, profit accumulation has been shaped by 
racialised practices and, simultaneously, racialised policies have been enabled by a drive 
for profit accumulation which routinely disregards human rights.  
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 &RUSRUDWHFRPSOLFLW\ LQ ,VUDHO¶V2FFXSDWLRQRI WKH:HVW%DQNDQG*D]D6WULS LV
particularly prominent in the physical infrastructure of the Occupation, from the over 500 
International and Israeli companies involved in the construction, maintenance and 
VXUYHLOODQFH RI WKH 6HSDUDWLRQ :DOO WR *URXS6HFXULFRU¶V *6 SURYLVLRQ RI SULVRQHU
transport and private personnel involved in the incarceration of Palestinian political 
prisoners, to &DWHUSLOODU¶V EHVSRNH ' DUPRXUHG EXOOGR]HUV XVHG E\ WKH ,VUDHOL DUP\ LQ
house demolitions and other destructive operations in the Occupied Territories (Who 
Profits, 2012). On the whole, private companies play an essential role in the maintenance 
and perpetuation of the Occupation with many security services, including check-point 
management, increasingly subcontracted to private security firms such as G4S. A 
Caterpillar bulldozer was also infamously involved in the death of US solidarity activist, 
Rachael Corrie, in 2003, with the company having to face a private lawsuit in the USA 
(Corrie et al, 2005).   
)RU WKHVH UHDVRQV FRUSRUDWH FRPSOLFLW\ LQ ,VUDHO¶V KXPDQ ULJKWV DEXVHV DQG
violations has increasingly become the subject of calls for boycott and divestment. 
ICAHD was one of the first Israeli groups to call for a boycott of the Israeli occupation, 
predating the 2005 Palestinian Civil Society call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
E\ ILYH PRQWKV ,&$+'¶V RULJLQDO ER\FRWW VWDWHPHQW LQFOXGHG  DQ DUPV embargo on 
weapons sold to Israel for use in the Occupied Territories; (2) boycott of settlement goods 
and businesses; (3) trade sanctions against Israel for violating its EU agreement by 
labelliQJJRRGVIURPWKH:HVW%DQNDVµ0DGHLQ,VUDHO¶; (4) divestment from corporations 
profiting from the Occupation, such as Caterpillar; and (5) holding to account individuals, 
such as politicians and senior military personnel, responsible for human rights violations 
by trying them in International courts (ICAHD, 20057KHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VUHYLVHGFDOOIRU
boycott in 2010 bought ICAHD under the framework of the Palestinian BDS call and 
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expanded to include boycott of Israeli academic, cultural and sports institutions until they 
condemn the Occupation and disassociate themselves from it. 
,&$+' 8. DOVR KDV DQ DQQXDO µ/REE\ 3DUOLDPHQW 'D\¶ LQ 2FWREHU1RYHPEHU
when activists descend upon the United Kingdom Parliament to meet with Members of 
Parliament (MPs) and Ministers and to advocate for their political representatives to put 
pressure on Israel to stop its demolition practices. ICAHD members were also 
encouraged, as part of a transnational Palestine Solidarity Movement campaign, to write 
to their local Members of European Parliament (MEPs) to lobby against the upgrade of 
trade relations between European member states and Israel under the Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (CAA) framework. The effort was 
largely unsuccessful as the vote on the trade agreement upgrade passed successfully on 
18th September 2012.  
However, to some degree, the recently announced European Union Directive, 
which came into force on 30th July 2013, advising member states that they should not 
finance, cooperate or give scholarships to institutions and individuals residing beyond the 
1967 borders, can be attributed to the above civil society efforts. Political commentators 
have argued that this directive has been put in place by the EU to counteract growing calls 
for a boycott against Israel; an action which can be partially attributed to the efforts of 
critical activist groups such as ICAHD. Thus, despite the directive not extending to cover 
trade, and as a directive is merely advisory and not legally binding, nevertheless, it 
alludes to an acknowledgement of the illegitimacy of the settler-colonial enterprise under 
way in the Occupied Territories, and signals the growing recognition of the significance 
of the BDS campaign and its transnational successes.        
Building Resistance and Solidarity  
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Alongside its international advocDF\ DFWLYLWLHV ,&$+'¶V PRVW VLJQLILFDQW ZRUN
remains their resistance, rebuilding, and alternative education activities in Israel-
Palestine. ICAHD runs annual summer rebuilding camps ± it  has rebuilt 187 homes to 
date ± and LW UXQV µ([WHQGHG 6WXG\ 7RXUV¶ in the autumn, specifically designed for 
activists, journalists and politicians, as well as one-off alternative tours for groups and 
individuals, providing political analysis for what is taking place in East Jerusalem, the 
Old City, and Jordan Valley. The rebuilding camp and tours are both hosted in Beit 
Arabiya,&$+'¶VSHDFHFHQWUHDQGWKH\ are accompanied by an extensive education and 
advocacy programme, featuring talks and presentations from Palestinian and Israeli civil 
society activists, as well as tours to the Jordan Valley and to Palestinian communities in 
Israel who are under threat of demolition. A closer analysis of participatory observations 
made during the 2011 ICAHD summer rebuilding camp can help to highlight some of the 
intricacies and tensLRQVHPERGLHGLQ,&$+'¶VZRUN0\HWKQRJUDSKLFDFFRXQWUHOLHVRQ
µWKLFNGHVFULSWLRQ¶RUWKHLQWHUSUHWLYHIUDPHZRUNGHYHORSHGE\&OLIIRUG*HHUW] 
In July 2011 over thirty international and Israeli activists took part in the annual 
rebuilding camp held in the West Bank village of Anata. The camp was hosted in the 
KRPH RI WKH µIODJVKLS¶ IRUPHU KRPH RI WKH 6KDZDUPHK IDPLO\ ,&$+'¶V SHDFH FHQWUH
The largest contingents of participating activists were from Britain, Finland and the USA, 
with the majority EHLQJIHPDOH7KHFDPS¶VWDVNZDVWRUHEXLOGWKHKRPHRIWKH$EX
Omar family, also in the village of Anata. Over the course of the rebuilding camp 
participants developed close relationships with both families; however I have chosen to 
concentrate on tKH UROH RI %HLW $UDEL\D ODUJHO\ GXH WR LWV V\PEROLF VWDWXV DV ,&$+'¶V
peace centre.  
Beit Arabiya, which is named after Arabiya Shawarmeh, the wife of Salim 
6KDZDUPHK ,&$+'¶VILHOGFRRUGLQDWRUDQG WKHRZQHURI WKHKRXVH LVGHGLFDWHG WR WKH
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memory of Nuha Sweidan and Rachael Corrie, two women who were killed while 
resisting house demolitions. Beit Arabiya stands in the village of Anata in Area C which 
like the majority of the West Bank falls under sole Israeli control as part of the Oslo 
arrangement. In some ways, Area C can be interpreted as the quintessential space of 
exception. The Palestinian Authority does not even have nominal jurisdiction over the 
welfare of the Palestinians living in Area C, unlike in Areas A and B. The Israeli military 
which is in sole control, represented by the Civil Administration in civilian affairs, is 
primarily tasked with expropriating land from the Palestinian residents for the building 
and expansion of illegal Jewish-only colonial settlements (Weizman, 2007).  
Although most of Area C has been ]RQHGDVµDJULFXOWXUDOODQG¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHRI
refusing building permits to Palestinians, DUHD &¶V ODQG LV QHLWKHU DUDEOH being largely 
rocky and mountainous, nor does it prevent Israel from expropriating Palestinian land in 
order to construct illegal Jewish settler colonies.38 Anata is surrounded on three sides by 
four Israeli settlements established on land previously belonging to the village: Almon, 
Anon, Kfar Adumim, Nofei Prat, and the military base, Ananot (Palestinian Monitoring 
Group, 2006). Beit Arabiya, the home of Salim and Arabiya Shawarmeh was demolished 
and rebuilt IRXUWLPHVEHIRUHEHLQJGHGLFDWHGDV,&$+'¶VSHDFHFHQWUHLQ&KLVWLVRQ
and Christison, 2003), after the family decided it could no longer cope with living under 
constant threat of demolition and moved to live elsewhere.39 After each demolition Beit 
Arabiya was rebuilt by ICAHD activists. In January 2012 Beit Arabiya and the Abu Omar 
home I participated in rebuilding were both demolished, alongside the Bedouin 
encampment overlooking Beit Arabiya. Beit Arabiya was rebuilt for a fifth time during 
the 2012 summer rebuilding camp and demolished a sixth time a few months later. It was 
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 On average only 5% of applications for building permits are granted by the Civil Administration 
(Weizman, 2007)  
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 Personal conversation with Jeff Halper.   
                              
 
201 
 
rebuilt in early 2013 jointly by ICADH and Sabeel, a Palestinian Christian Liberation 
Theology organisation.  
In his semi-autobiography, Jeff Halper (2008) describes the first time he witnessed 
D KRXVH GHPROLWLRQ WKH ILUVW GHPROLWLRQ RI 6DOLP DQG $UDEL\D 6KDZDUPHK¶V KRPH LQ
DV WKHGD\KHUHDOLVHGKHZDVµDQ ,VUDHOL LQ3DOHVWLQH¶ Since then the Shawarmeh 
IDPLO\DQGWKHLUVHYHQFKLOGUHQKDYHEHHQWKHµIODJVKLS¶VWRU\RI,&$+'ZLWKWKHFRXSOH
travelling on speaking tours to the UK and elsewhere to share their experiences of trauma 
DQG UHVLVWDQFH $V +DOSHU ZULWHV µ,W LV WKH ILQH OLne between protest and resistance that 
creates the divide, the chasm, between mainstream Zionist and what I call critical Israeli 
SHDFHJURXSV¶LELG,WLVSUHFLVHO\LQSDUWLFLSDWLQJDQGOHDGLQJUHVLVWDQFHDFWLYLWLHVLQ
relation to house demolitions and, perhaps even more significantly, the political act of 
rebuilding demolished homes that sets ICAHD apart from other Israeli peace groups and 
has forged significant links between the organisation and Palestinian civil and political 
partners.  
Due to the nature of rebuilding, essentially putting a roof over a homeless family, 
many, including some of the participants who had elected to join the rebuilding camp, 
KDYH LQWHUSUHWHG ,&$+'¶VZRUNDV µKXPDQLWDULDQ¶+RZHYHU WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQKDVEHHQ
keen to stress that rebuilding is a political and not a humanitarian act.40 It is primarily 
political in that the rebuilt houses rarely survive an impending demolition for more than 
six months. However, despite the likelihood of having to relive another demolition, just as 
traumatic as the first or subsequent ones, most Palestinian families choose to rebuild. This 
is often because they have no choice; with an average of seven children most families find 
it hard to continue living in the overcrowded homes of friends and relatives. Rebuilding 
also constitutes a simple act of resistance in the face of ongoing Israeli attempts at ethnic 
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cleansing. Every day, dozens of Palestinians proclaim their presence and determination to 
remain in Palestine by doing something as simple as building a home to live in, despite 
the constant looming threat of demolitions. It is one of myriad examples of everyday 
resistance undertaken by ordinary people. 
By annually rebuilding a family house, selected by the local Popular Organising 
Committee41, ICAHD provides solidarity to the everyday resistance already taking place, 
simultaneously giving it an international platform. One of the interesting things I noted 
during my participation in the 2011 camp was how the humanitarian/political tension 
served WR VWUHQJWKHQ ,&$+'¶V SROLWLFDO WDVN $W WKH VWDUW RI WKH  FDPS DW OHDVW D
quarter of the participants, largely represented by US citizens, thought of the work they 
ZHUHDERXWWRHPEDUNRQDVµKXPDQLWDULDQ¶0DQ\SURIHVVHGWRKDYHOLWWOHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the politics behind house demolitions, having come to 
try to learn more through participating in the local environment. In his participant 
observation of an ICAHD study tour, David Landy (2008) has similarly observed the lack 
of prior knowledge and awareness, particularly of Palestinian culture and society, among 
international participants. In particular, he criticises the structure of the tour for 
reinforcing the ignorance and ethno-supremacy of white, middle class, Westerners 
through the appropriation of Palestinian experience and suffering. 
I agree with his observations to some degree, although what I observed during the 
camp was the radical transformation of many relatively unknowledgeable, well-meaning 
humanitarians into critical and astute activists who were ready to return to their home 
countries and advocate for justice in Palestine.42 By the end of the camp many of the 
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 Popular Organising Committees are comprised of leading activists from the different parties and factions 
in Palestine, and they are most commonly associated with protests against the Segregation Wall.  
42
 Two of the American Quaker activists have since set up Palestine solidarity groups in their respective 
home towns (personal correspondence).   
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participants had concrete plans for setting up solidarity groups or giving talks to their 
existing communities and organizations. However, the problem of appropriating 
LQGLJHQRXV NQRZOHGJH WR VHFXUH RQH¶V VWDWXV DV DQ HQOLJKWHQHG :HVWHUQ KXPDQ ULJKWV
DFWLYLVW PXVW QRW EH RYHUORRNHG 7KH HPSKDVLV SODFHG RQ ZLWQHVVLQJ DQG VKDULQJ µRXU¶
experience of the rebuilding camp upon our return, with the experience of the Palestinian 
IDPLOLHV ZKR KRVWHG XV EHLQJ UHOHJDWHG WR µLOOXVWUDWLYH H[DPSOHV¶ LQ µRXU¶ IDFWXDO DQG
reliable story, made me reflect on the privilege of our positioning as international 
µZLWQHVVHV¶ 
Our passports provided us with relative freedom of movement around Israel-
Palestine. For example, our Palestinian counterparts who lacked Jerusalem IDs were not 
able to join us in Jerusalem or Israel within the 1948 borders. Being a primarily 
Caucasian group meant that we were rarely stopped and searched at check points. And 
our very presence acted as a deterrent to the Civil Administration from carrying out 
demolitions in front of us. To some degree, the very regime of International Law which 
did not seem to matter in Palestine, but nevertheless applied to us, allowed us to do the 
rebuilding work we were doing. For, when told that rebuilding Palestinian homes was 
illegal under Israeli law we could respond that Israeli actions constituted a war crime 
under International Law43, and as such we were merely upholding International Law in 
Palestine.     
Although, internationality is not bullet proof, perhaps there was a degree of safety 
in numbers as we were a large group from a number of Western countries, but being 
American did not stop the bulldozer from crushing Rachael Corrie to death, or the sniper 
from shooting dead Tom Hurndall. International solidarity activists have also been shot 
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 $UWLFOHRI7KH)RXUWK*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVWDWHVµ$Q\GHVWUXFWLRQE\WKH2FFXS\LQJ3RZHURIUHDORU
personal property belonging individually or collectively to private personVLVSURKLELWHG¶   
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and wounded in the past at demonstrations against the Wall, including US citizen Tristan 
$QGHUVRQLQ0DUFKLQ1L¶OLQYLOODJH44 However, more than simply experiencing and 
witnessing the situation in Palestine, the aim of the rebuilding camp was/is to equip the 
international participants with the necessary embedded knowledge and skills to 
participate in advocacy activities upon their return to their home countries.  
Over time, the experience of rebuilding, visiting other sites of house demolitions, 
including in Israel within its 1948 borders, being visited by the IDF, and hearing 
testimonies from Palestinian and Israeli activists resisting demolitions across Israel-
Palestine, all the participants, including those who had come with little prior knowledge, 
left with a much greater understanding of the political situation in Israel-Palestine. In 
PDQ\ UHVSHFWV ,&$+'¶V DOWHUQDWLYH HGXFDWLRQDO WRXUV DQG WKH UHEXLOGLQJ FDPS¶V
programme of talks and civil society panels are designed to mirror the tours provided by 
,VUDHO¶V0LQLVWULHV of Education and Tourism to the Jewish Diaspora45 and international 
journalists and politicians. Both types of tours are similar in nature in that the primary aim 
is to provide participants with intimate knowledge of the lay-of-the-land in order to build 
a relationship with the place and its residents, and ultimately to encourage participants to 
advocate the respective perspective upon return. The biggest difference between these 
tours, aside from the political framework and perspective, is related to resources. The 
Israeli state usually finances and/or subsidises its tours; while an organisation such as 
ICAHD relies on participants financing themselves by fundraising through civil society 
connections such as churches, trade unions and independent supporters. Many Palestinian 
civil society organisations and transnational solidarity groups are also increasingly 
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 0DQ\RIWKHFDPS¶VSDUWLFLSDQWVZDQWHGWRMRLQWKH1DEL6DOHKGHPRQVWUDWLRQDJDLQVWWKH:DOORQRXU
second Friday, but the organisers prevented us due to safety concerns. On that day twelve international 
activists were arrested and GHSRUWHGEHIRUHWKHGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶VVWDUW5HOD\HGE\,&$+'RUJDQLVHU0D\D
Rotem).  
45
 I participated in one such tour, organised by the Union of Jewish Students (UJS), in the summer of 2006.  
                              
 
205 
 
working to provide similar alternative tours to combat the much better resourced 
propaganda of the Israeli state.46              
Nevertheless, similar to Landy (2008) I also noted that Palestinian perspectives 
and experiences were likely to be received far better when corroborated by a 
corresponding Israeli organisation or activist perspective. However, some of the more 
experienced activists who participated were very critical of the security discourse 
employed by Breaking the Silence (BtS) during their presentation following the screening 
of 7R6HH LI ,¶P6PLOLQJ. For example, activists complained that the BtS representative 
refused to acknowledge that Palestinian armed resistance is legitimate under International 
Law, and it is in fact the occupation forces who are illegally present in the Occupied 
Territories. 6KH ZDV VLPLODUO\ FULWLFLVHG IRU XVLQJ ,VUDHO¶V GLVFRXUVH WR GHVFULEH WKH
2FFXSLHG7HUULWRULHVDVµGLVSXWHG¶  
Furthermore, despite the growing rhetoric of and support for a one-state 
alternative among Palestinian civil society actors, particularly those active in coordinating 
WKH %'6 FDPSDLJQ ,VUDHO¶V PRYHPHQW UHVWULFWLRQV EHWZHHQ WKH :HVW %DQN DQG (DVW
Jerusalem and hence Israel within the 1948 borders, means that it is often left to Jewish 
Israeli activists to conduct tours and presentations within the 1948 territory, thus 
inadvertently reaffirming Jewish sovereignty and hegemony within that space. Moreover, 
while ICAHD is increasingly working to link its resistance activities against demolitions 
LQWKH:HVW%DQNZLWKWKHUHVLVWDQFHDFWLYLWLHVRI3DOHVWLQLDQFRPPXQLWLHVZLWKLQ,VUDHO¶V
1948 borders, according to Jeff Halper there has been a great deal of reluctance among 
Palestinian Israelis to cooperate with ICAHD as they do not wish to be associated with 
the Occupation but rather see their struggle as a struggle for equal Israeli citizenship. 
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Such tensions testify to the continuity of the discourse of separation which only works to 
create a chasm between Israelis and Palestinians, but also between Palestinians 
themselves.  
Jeff Halper (2012) further identifies Palestinian calls for anti-normalization as an 
increasing obstacle to co-resistance. The call for anti-normalization arrived in 2007 
during the first Palestinian BDS conference held in Ramallah. It defines normalization as 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ µDQ\ SURMHFW RU LQLWLDWLYH RU DFWLYLW\ ORFDO RU LQWHUQDWLRQDO VSHFLILFDOO\
designed for gathering (either directly or indirectly) Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and 
Israelis, whether individuals or institutions; that does not explicitly aim to expose and 
resist the occupation and all forms of discrimination against the PalestinLDQ SHRSOH¶
(Kassis, 201, Kindle Edition). While an organisation such as ICAHD clearly falls outside 
the defined criteria of normalisation, Halper has argued that it is increasingly used by 
some Palestinians to refuse to work with all Israeli groups and individuals including 
critical ones such as ICAHD and Zochrot.47 
The inconsistent application of normalization was further highlighted during an 
LQFLGHQWZKLFKOHGWR-HII+DOSHU¶VGHFLVLRQWRSXOO,&$+'RXWRIWKH-HUXVDOHP0DUFKLQ
GXHWRWKHRUJDQLVHUV¶LQVLVWHQFHWKDW,&$+'could only participate on the condition 
WKDW WKH µ,VUDHOL¶ SDUW RI ,&$+' EH GURSSHG DV D µQR EUDLQHU H[SUHVVLRQ RI VROLGDULW\¶
Susan Abulhawa (2012) defends this UHTXHVW E\ DUJXLQJ WKDW WKH UHPRYDO RI µ,VUDHOL¶
ZKLFK VKH XQZLWWLQJO\ FRQIODWHV ZLWK µ,VUDHO¶ LV D QHFHVVDU\ DFW RI DSRORJ\ IRU WKH
violence perpetrated against the Palestinian people by Israel. Yet, Israel and Israeli are not 
symbiotic. Israeli is a national and cultural identity, which although the product of the 
establishment of the settler colonial state of Israel, does not necessitate its continuation as 
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 Zochrot was forced to cancel a counter-mapping workshop in Ramallah in early 2012 due to protests that 
working with the organisation constitutes normalisation (Miller, 2012).  
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a settler colony to exist as a form of identification. In many respects, envisaging the 
possibility of the continuation of Israeli identity beyond Israel is not very different from 
the fact that Palestinian identity has not relied on the existence of Palestine as a nation-
state. Moreover, as a longstanding solidarity activist, Halper has explicitly referred to 
KLPVHOI DV µDQ ,VUDHOL LQ 3DOHVWLQH¶ DQG IXUWKHUPRUH LW LV SUHFLVHO\ WKH V\PEROLVP RI
µ,VUDHOL¶ UHVLVWDQFH WR WKH RFFXSDWLRQ WKDW LV Post significant in relation to enacting 
practical solidarity with the Palestinians in a joint struggle for just peace.  
Halper has argued that much RIWKLVWHQVLRQLVGXHWRJURZLQJµGHOLJLWLPL]DWLRQRI
the Israeli narrative, of everything Israeli: everything Israeli is colonial, is not legitimate 
DQG VR RQ¶ LQ .DXIPDQ-Lacusta, 2011: 460). However, the prominent Israeli activist 
Michael Warschawski (Mikado) sees the decline in joint struggle differently. For him 
Palestinian interest in cooperating with critical Israeli groups and individuals is 
proportionate to the size and influence of critical Israeli activism within Israeli society. 
Thus, he argues that if and when the Israeli peace movement re-emerges as a serious 
partner for just peace, then Palestinians will have more reason to engage. At the moment, 
he argues, the Palestinians are conserving their energies and concentrating on 
transnational activism and advocacy instead (ibid: 460 - 461). Conversations with 
Palestinian activists confirm this analysis. In particular, many Palestinian activists, while 
acknowledging the contributions of critical Israeli groups, are nevertheless frustrated by 
the fact that these groups have disproportionate influence on setting the agenda, given 
their marginality within Israeli society.        
ICAHD itself is a prime example of the small number of critical Israeli groups and 
individuals currently in existence. For despite its broad and diverse transnational base of 
supporters, ICAHD Israel is comprised of a very small core group of activists who are 
strongly dependent on +DOSHU¶V OHDGHUVKLS DQG GLUHFWLRQ ,Q IDFW PDQ\ ORQJ-term 
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VXSSRUWHUVKDYHH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQVWKDWZLWKRXW+DOSHU¶VFKDULVPDWLFOHDGHUVKLS,&$+'
could cease to exist. Also, during my engagement with the organisation in the past few 
years I have seen little evidence of any attempt to increase the Jewish Israeli membership 
of ICAHD, with the organisation becoming increasingly over-reliant on transnational 
activists for its practical activities. Much of this is WR GR ZLWK +DOSHU¶V SDWULDUFKDO DQG
institutionally-centralised style of running the organisation which leaves little room for 
the advancement of other activists, and is also in strong contrast with the preferred model 
of non-hierarchical organising among contemporary activists.  
1HYHUWKHOHVV DW SUHVHQW DQG IRU WKH IRUHVHHDEOH IXWXUH +DOSHU¶V DVWXWH SROLWLFDO
analysis continues to have a significant international reach, certainly a greater reach than 
,&$+'¶VSK\VLFDO FDSDFLW\DVDQ1*2DQG, as such, statements issued by ICAHD are 
seriously debated and discussed by Palestinian counterparts. Moreover, given the growing 
tendency for Palestinian supporters and proponents of BDS to argue for a single state in 
Israel-Palestine, refusals to engage in joint struggle with critical Israelis, and/or to 
recognise their right to identify as Israelis, have significant implications for the type of 
one-state being envisioned. Least of all such refusal implies the lack of desire among 
some Palestinian counterparts to envisage a more egalitarian state which will not simply 
reproduce an inverse situation of minority/majority dichotomisation and domination.   
From Decolonisation to Binationalism?   
In the past decade, largely due to disillusionment with the Oslo Peace Process, 
debates and discussions surrounding a one-state alternative have been gaining momentum 
particularly among Palestinian activists and thinkers, but also increasingly among critical 
Israelis (Farsakh, 2011; Loewenstein and Moor, 2012). This debate is also increasingly 
focused on the question of collective self-determination both in relation to the Palestinian 
people, but more so in relation to the Jewish Israeli settler colonial population. Much of 
                              
 
209 
 
the tension surrounding the question of a one-state solution revolves around the twin 
questions of binationalism and the right to collective self-determination in Israel-
Palestine. This tension largely stems from the logic of separation inherent in the two-state 
discourse which continues to structure contemporary activist and normative thought.  
)URP WKH=LRQLVW ,VUDHOLSHUVSHFWLYH WKHUHKDVQHYHUEHHQD µGHVLUH¶ WR OLYHZLWK
the Palestinians, certainly not as equals. The Zionist narrative has always conceptualised 
the land inhabited by the Jewish Israeli community as an exclusively Jewish space, 
ideally devoid of any others, but at the very least those others, as in the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel, should accept their place in the Jewish polity as a minority with 
minoritarian rights. This discourse is characterised by hyper-vigilance regarding the 
perceived threat to the Jewish character of the state. This fear is often articulated in terms 
RIDQ LPSHQGLQJGHPRJUDSKLFµWLPH-ERPE¶ZKLFKZRXOGFKDOOHQJH WKH-HZLVKPDMRULW\
either as a result of the natural growth of the Palestinian minority population within the 
1948 boundaries, or from the growing possibility of admitting to the existence of an 
apartheid-like situation vis-à-vis the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, leading to 
their demand for equal rights under one government in Israel-Palestine.   
Nevertheless, in the immediate present and the foreseeable future, and despite the 
likelihood of the emergence of an anti-apartheid rights-based struggle for a single state, 
the Jewish character of the 1948 territory is indisputable and well established. Moreover, 
with the closure of the OPTs and consistent emphasis on the physically violent aspects of 
the conflict, in particular the threat of rocket attacks from Gaza, it is relatively easy for 
the Israeli state to present the Palestinians as a security question rather than as a question 
of political domination. The coexistence of these two possibilities, impending coexistence 
on the one hand and the desire for separation on the other, presents a significant dilemma 
for the majority of Jewish Israelis. This dichotomy is riddled with internal contradictions, 
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for despite emphasis on separation, coexistence, albeit unequal and repressive, is already 
WDNLQJ SODFH E\ QRQH RWKHU WKDQ ,VUDHO¶V SROLWLFDO GHVLJQ 7KLV UHIHUV to the embedded 
presence of 520,000 Jewish Israeli settler-colonists living and working in the Occupied 
Territories, a presence that is set to increase with continuous settlement expansion.    
While Israel is preoccupied with containing the oppressed, Palestinians are doing 
a lot more work to resolve the current situation, albeit their strategies and tactics point 
towards the simultaneous coexistence and workings of multiple, overlapping and 
contradictory discourses about Israel-Palestine. There are at least three irreconcilable 
scenarios being articulated, sometimes at the same time. These can be seen as the two-
state versus one state version, with the latter splitting into an Algerian option48 versus a 
binational and/or one-person-one-vote option. The two-state option equally emphasises 
separation, but with the end of the Oslo process and the failure of the 2011 UN bid for 
statehood, and the subsequent failure of the 2012 non-member state status granted at the 
UN to bring about an end to the Occupation, it is relatively easy to put this version to rest.  
However, we cannot dispense with a discussion on the significance of the logic of 
separation even if we discount the viability of a two-state solution. On the contrary, 
proclamations of a one-state discourse themselves embody the logic of separation. 
Apartheid or, the Hebrew version, hafrada (separation), is one manifestation of a one-
state solution based on ethno-national separation. Binationalism is another; however, 
given the vast structural inequality with which the two collectivities may enter a 
binational union, it could possibly end as just another version of apartheid. For some 
Palestinians, particularly those with an Islamist persuasion, but also many from non-
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 This refers to the notion that Palestine will be liberated through a long and protracted military struggle, in 
a similar way to the Algerian national liberation struggle against the French, resulting in the inevitable 
departure of the Jewish Israeli population and the establishment of a single Palestinian ethno-national, and 
possibly Islamic, state in all of historic Palestine.  
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religious and secular backgrounds, an Algerian type decolonisation struggle during which 
the settler-colonial population would either decide to repatriate to their country of origin 
or remain as a small minority in a new Palestine represents a theoretically viable 
alternative in the case of the failure of calls for a one-person-one-vote solution within 
Israel-3DOHVWLQH 7KH H[DPSOH RI $EXOKDZD¶V FULWLFLVP RI WKH µ,VUDHOL¶ LQ ,&$+' LV DQ
illustration of this underlying discourse. Despite the militant rhetorical devices employed 
in articulating an Algerian type process, the reality and practicalities of the situation in 
Israel-Palestine point more towards the unfolding of a long and laborious anti-apartheid 
struggle which is only beginning to be articulated among Palestinians, not just in the 
Occupied Territories and Israel but more so internationally, and is attracting a very small 
number of critical Jewish Israelis at present (Farsakh, 2011).                
ICAHD, under the auspices of Jeff Halper, is in many respects one of the leading 
Israeli organisations that has spoken out on the subject of a one-state solution for Israel-
Palestine; albeit at present there are as many visions of a one state as there are visionaries. 
In September 2012 ICAHD which had previously withheld its position on a given state 
solution, issued a statement officially in support of a one-state solutionµ,QWKH1DPHRf 
Justice: Key Issues around a Single SWDWH¶  ZDV ZHOFRPHG E\ 3DOHVWLQLDQ
counterparts for accepting Israeli-Palestinian cohabitation in a single state as a desirable 
resolution, but was nevertheless criticised on key aspects. Ali Abunimah, a prominent 
Palestinian Diaspora activist, founder of The Electronic Intifada: an online publication for 
critical debate and discussion, and author of One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the 
Israeli-Palestinian Impasse (2006), criticised ICAHD for the underlying binationalism in 
their statement which granted equal right to self-determination to the Jewish Israeli settler 
collectivity and the displaced and colonised indigenous Palestinians (Abunimah, 2012).   
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Up until the publication of µ,Q WKH Name of Justice: Key Issues around a Single 
SWDWH¶ Halper (2012) had EHHQ D VWURQJ SURSRQHQW RI ZKDW KH UHIHUV WR DV D µ5HJLRQDO
&RQIHGHUDWLRQ¶7KH FRQFHSWRI WKH UHJLRQDO FRQIHGHUDWion is inspired by the belief that 
Israel-Palestine is too small a unit to solve all of the key issues concerning the right of 
return, water, trade, security, borders, and population settlement. Instead he argues for a 
regional set-up in which the Occupation of the 1967 territories would be dismantled, a 
viable and contiguous Palestinian state would be established on all of the 1967 territories, 
and a regional confederation, similar to the European Union would emerge between 
Palestine, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and possibly Egypt, where there would be free 
and unrestricted movement between the territories for the purpose of trade, settlement, 
and visiting friends and relatives, and the member states would collectively coordinate 
their security and environmental policy to ensure peace and the fair regional distribution 
of resources such as water.       
Despite a number of problematic assumptions underlying this proposal, it 
contributes two important points to the discussion on the nature of the possible solution to 
Israel-3DOHVWLQH¶VSUHGLFDPHQW)LUVWO\WKHUHLVWKHLGHDWKDWLWLVSRVVLEOHDQGGHVLUDEOHIRU
Jewish Israelis to cooperate and integrate into the region as equal and valuable partners, 
WKXV GHEXQNLQJ WKH VHFXULW\ SUHWH[W IRU ,VUDHO¶V H[FHSWLRnalist militarism. Secondly, it 
responds practically to the problem I envisaged in chapter four regarding the danger that 
an implementation of the right of return without regional cooperation can lead to the 
expulsion of Palestinian refugees who might in fact wish to remain and settle in their host 
country rather than physically return to Israel-Palestine. In this respect, a regional 
confederation could ensure the security and human rights of both individuals and national 
collectivities in the region. However, underlying the federal proposal is reluctance 
towards the possibility of a full implementation of the right of return which may 
inevitably lead to the minoritarian status of Jewish Israelis within Israel-Palestine and all 
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this can imply, including the possibility of facing discrimination, oppression and 
H[SXOVLRQ 7KLV LV SHUKDSV RQH RI WKH NH\ UHDVRQV ZK\ ,&$+'¶V  VWDWHPHQW RQ D
single state places great emphasis on a µbinational¶ government in Israel-Palestine based 
on the principle of self-determLQDWLRQ IRU -HZLVK ,VUDHOLV DQG 3DOHVWLQLDQV ,&$+'¶V
statement on the subject of a single state in Israel-Palestine states: 
There seems to be only one useful starting point for a joint effort to 
construct a single state for all: the principle of self-determination 
mitigated by the necessity of creating a single political entity. Beginning 
with the idea that two peoples share the country and, given their own 
national identities and needs, must also create a common political space 
(ICAHD, 2012).        
 This proposal was welcomed by key Palestinian proponents of the one state 
solution, including Ali Abunimah, for its emphasis on the creation of a single political 
unit in Israel-Palestine. Nevertheless, RQH RI WKH NH\ FRQWHQWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ ,&$+'¶V
formulation has revolved around the right to self-determination. Both Ali Abunimah 
(2010, 2012) and Omar Barghouti (2012), two prominent Palestinian proponents of the 
one-state solution, have vocally rejected the application of the principle of self-
determination to the Jewish collectivity in Israel-Palestine. Abunimah (2012) argues that 
as a settler colonial nation Jewish Israelis are not entitled to collective self-determination 
in the manner that Palestinians are. He does not argue that Jewish Israelis do not 
constitute a nation as such. Rather, he argues that the historical-political situation in 
which Jewish Israeli nationalism emerged in Israel-Palestine was only possible because of 
the dispossession of the Palestinian people. Therefore, Jewish Israeli nationhood, which is 
settler-colonial and exogenous to Palestine, cannot claim self-determination in the manner 
that the Palestinian people are entitled to by virtue of their indigeneity and their shared 
collective experience of political discrimination and dispossession.  
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There are a number of problems with this configuration, including the issue of 
exogeneity, for while most Israelis immigrant or settler origins, the exilic nature of Jewish 
nationalism which predates modern state-FHQWULF =LRQLVP PHDQV WKDW µUHWXUQ to the 
PRWKHUODQG¶LVQRWDYLDEOHRSWLRQ+HUH$EXQLPDKLVQRWEHLQJDFFXVHGRIDVNLQJ-HZLVK
Israelis to leave, rather what is being highlighted is that Jewish settlement in Palestine is 
different from, let us say, French settler colonialism in Algeria. For while the French 
settlers saw Algeria as their true home, they were nevertheless fully aware of their French 
ethno-national origins. The notion of Jewish nationhood49 on the other hand, including 
that which is shared by those who reject Zionism outright and even the idea of return to 
the promised land, at least not until the Messiah returns, as in some ultra-orthodox 
accounts, has always been based on the idea that Palestine/Israel is the point of Jewish 
origin, exile, and return, and this has been the case for centuries. Other possible issues 
with a denial of the right to self-determination to Jewish Israelis in a future one state 
scenario stems from the fact that self-determination under international legal conventions 
has often been reserved for ethnic-minority groups. In the eventuality of a full or even 
large-scale return by Palestinians, Jewish Israelis will become an ethnic minority in 
Israel-Palestine. Honouring the entitlement to self-determination for those who are settled 
and resident in Israel-Palestine may be necessary in order to avoid real or imagined fears 
of persecution or reprisal in the context of a long history of Jewish persecution in other 
ethnic majority polities in which Jews have constituted a minority.   
Nevertheless, Abunimah raises a pertinent point not so much in relation to the 
principle of self-determination as to the question of return. Should Jewish return be 
suspended temporarily while the Palestinian refugee return is implemented? Or should the 
Law of Return be suspended permanently? In fact, would the Jewish Diaspora have a 
                                                          
49
 For a discussion on whether the Jewish people are an  invented nation or the true blood descendants of the 
biblical Hebrews see Sand, 2010   
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ULJKWWRµUHWXUQ¶DIWHUGHFRORQLVDWLRQ"7KHVHDUHIXQGDPHQWDOTXHVWLRQVWKDWKDYHQRHDV\
DQVZHUV7KHZULWLQJRI-XGLWK%XWOHUDQG-HII+DOSHU,&$+'¶VIRXQGHUZKRLVKLPVHOI
a diasporic oleh (returnee) originally from the United States, suggest that there is an 
unseverable link between Jewishness and the desire to choose, or not, to emigrate to 
Israel-Palestine, or rather that even if one is to choose exile, return must still be an 
unquestioned option. Abunimah¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW Israelis are not entitled to a right to 
national self-determination on the basis that they are not indigenous, or at least not in the 
recent millennium, and moreover, that their constitution as a nation is based on violent 
and dispossessive settler colonialism, raises a question in relation to Jewish right to 
ongoing settlement in Israel-Palestine in the case of decolonisation. Moreover, this 
conceptualisation further raises the subject of whether giving up the diasporic Jewish 
right of return might be a necessary prerequisite to the process of decolonisation.  
Omar Barghouti (2012) rejects outright both the idea of Jewish self-determination 
in Israel-Palestine and the notion that Jewish Israelis constitute a nation. He argues that 
µ%L-nationalism, initially espoused by liberal Zionist intellectuals, is premised on a Jewish 
national right in Palestine, on par and to be reconciled with the national right of the 
indigenous, predominantly Arab population. Bi-nationalism today, despite its many 
variations, still upholds this ahistorical national right of colonial-VHWWOHUV¶LELG+H
goes on to dismiss the existence of an Israeli nationality on the basis of the fact that the 
contemporary Israeli state does not recognise Israeli or even Jewish Israeli as a 
nationality, only Jewish is recognised as a nationality under current Israeli law.  
Barghouti cites two different international legal definitions pertaining to what 
FRQVWLWXWHV D QDWLRQDO FROOHFWLYLW\ RQH RI ZKLFK LV WKH µ.LUE\ GHILQLWLRQ¶ DGRSWHG E\
81(6&2 ZKLFK VWLSXODWHV WKDW D SHRSOH DUH µD JURXS RI LQGLYLGXDO KXPDQ EHLQJV ZKR
enjoy some or all of the following common features: history, ethnic identity, culture, 
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ODQJXDJH WHUULWRULDO FRQQHFWLRQ HWF¶ LELG  7KLV GHILQLWLRQ Ls further extended to 
LQFOXGHWKDWµthe group as a people must have the will to be identified as a people or the 
FRQVFLRXVQHVV RI EHLQJ D SHRSOH¶ LELG  %DUJKRXWL GLVPLVVHV ERWK RI WKHVH
definitions as inapplicable to Jewish Israelis. This is highly problematic on a number of 
levels. 
 First of all, for at least the past 60 years Jewish Israelis residing in Israel-Palestine 
have had a common language and culture, namely Hebrew, which is distinct from other 
Jewish collectivities around the world; and they share a common territorial identity 
corresponding to the 1948 borders, with the exception of post-1967 government settler-
colonial designs which have for the most part been disputed by the majority of Israelis. 
To imply that Jewish Israelis lack a consciousness as a people makes it very difficult to 
understand why the vast majority of Israelis are willing to be conscripted into the Israeli 
army in order to defend the state of Israel and their fellow citizens. Even if one is to 
invoke the fact that many Israelis might speak another language or have family in another 
country, it would be similar to stating that US nationals, in spite of their multicultural and 
transnational origins, do not constitute a people with a perceived common identity as 
Americans. In short, the fact that the Israeli state refuses to inaugurate an Israeli 
nationality, which is perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to its democratisation, merely 
testifies to the extra-territorial schemes of the state rather than to a lack of identification 
among the Jewish Israeli population as a people.        
Moreover, as I have already argued in chapter four, it is important to view Jewish 
peoplehood as distinct from Jewish Israeli nationhood. In other words, I am making a 
case for the Israeli nation to be viewed as a constituent part of the Jewish people, thus 
acknowledging a transnational ethno-religious connection, at the same time as 
acknowledging and treating it in practice as a distinct national collective; a national 
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collective which has by virtue of its long-term residence in Israel-Palestine acquired 
certain rights, including the right to return/remain and self-determine. Conversely, other 
non-Israeli Jewish individuals and communities who might wish to migrate to Israel-
Palestine would then be subject to open and fair migration procedures in the same way as 
all other exogenous individuals and collectivities wishing to reside in Israel-Palestine. For 
this reason I would advocate a Jewish Israeli right to self-determination, but I oppose the 
notion of an unlimited and unrestricted Jewish right of return, especially one based on the 
EDVLVRIGHQ\LQJWKH3DOHVWLQLDQSHRSOH¶VULJKWWRVHOI-determination in Israel-Palestine.  
Thus, the question of rearticulating Jewish Israeli identity in order to bring about a 
more just situation in Israel-Palestine remains pertinent. However, an emphasis on 
disavowal and self-negation is neither just nor practical for building a joint struggle for an 
egalitarian and just resolution to the ongoing settler-colonial apartheid. As Laila Farsakh 
ZULWHVSUHVHQWO\ µ0RVWRI WKH3DOHVWLQLDQGHEDWHRQ WKHRQH-state solution, while 
inclusive of Jews, avoids engaging with the complexity of Jewish identity and history. It 
clearly repudiates Zionism, but seeks to incorporate the Jewish person as a neutral 
UHSHQWDQWHQWLW\¶LELG6KHFDOOVIRU3DOHVWLQLDQDGYRFDWHVRIWKHRQH-state solution to 
build alliances with critical anti-Zionist Israelis and to create and have:  
an open discussion on identity and a free open space to understand 
Israeli culture in its Western dimensions as much as in its Arab roots 
which it often negates...The second debate that needs to take place is 
about multiculturalism in Israel as well as in the Arab world and within 
Palestinian society, and how to reinvigorate the present Arab identity 
with the cosmopolitan character it once had (ibid: 70).        
 Chapter six will focus more closely on the implications of multiculturalism in 
Israel-Palestine. The section below examines more the ongoing debates concerned with 
                              
 
218 
 
,VUDHO¶VGHILQLWLRQDVDVHWWOHU-colonial enterprise and the question of self-determination in 
relation to decolonisation and indigenous rights. Moreover, claims and counter claims to 
indigeneity and exogeneity, justice in, and rights to the land of Israel-Palestine need to be 
carefully unpacked and considered in relation to actual and lived realities as well as 
aspirations for a just future. This discussion demands a critical engagement with settler 
colonialism and the practical potential for decolonisation. 
Reframing Belonging  
To begin with, it is paramount that some of the more unique aspects and 
particularities of the Israel-Palestine situation be acknowledged in order to examine 
possibilities for decolonisation in a way that is constructive and involves the least amount 
of symbolic and/or real violence in the long term. The diasporic character of Israel-
Palestine cannot be ignored or downplayed. Israel-Palestine is not only a state created and 
settled by a population of diasporic origin, but moreover, the creation of the Jewish settler 
colonial state, in the process of expelling the majority of the indigenous Palestinian 
population in 1948, has in turn resulted in the birth of one of the largest Diasporas in the 
world. Half of all Palestinians currently live in the Diaspora. This makes the geo-political 
dimensions of the conflict and any rights-based claims transnational and extraterritorial in 
a way that is not comparable to any other settler colonial state.  
Furthermore, from its very inception as a settlement and state project, Israel-
Palestine has been enmeshed in a complex matrix of inter and transnational 
configurations, current and former manifestations of imperialism, colonialism, and 
population resettlement, and it continues to figure prominently in the debates and 
decisions of international governance and legal institutions and frameworks. As such it is 
distinctive as an ongoing transnational project. For this reason, Israel-Palestine stands out 
as a geo-political project that has been at the heart of much international legal and 
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political debate. Yet, these debates, which have largely centred on the right to self-
determination for both parties, have been largely state-centric, and moreover ethno-
centric. However, given the diasporic nature and origins of the two collectivities, 
cosmopolitan approaches to framing and understanding the situation in Israel-Palestine 
have been largely absent from the discussion. 
Indeed, the diasporic aspect of the relationship between the settler and indigenous 
population further complicates questions of rights within Israel-Palestine, not least 
because both populations can claim belonging even if not indigeneity. Thus, while Ali 
Abunimah (2010; 2012) is correct in arguing that the principle of self-determination only 
applies to indigenous and/or minority ethnic groups, nevertheless some form of 
acknowledgement of Jewish Israeli identity has to take place given the long history of 
intransigence and the undeniable presence of two national groups which are very strongly 
defined and established along ethno-national lines. In the long term, entrenched 
binationalism can lead to national separatism and as such an ultimately successful 
democratic one-state would require that divisive identities yield to the emergence of a 
µUDLQERZ¶QDWLRQZKLFK DOORZVDQGHQFRXUDJHV LWV FLWL]HQV WR LGHQWLI\ LQ QRQ-nationalist 
terms.  
Thus, what is being proposed here is a multi-dimensional approach to rights-based 
justice claims in Israel-Palestine; an approach that does not necessarily negate the role of 
the state but rather calls it to account for its actions in relation to µall affected¶. Moreover, 
given the diasporic nature of the affected population, and here the emphasis is on the 
displaced indigenous Palestinian Diaspora, the state of Israel does not stand alone in 
relation to refusing to engage with the principle of justice as conceptualised and proposed 
in this thesis. In fact settler colonialism in Israel-Palestine has only been possible because 
of the myriad of intertwined international institutions involved in the enabling of Jewish 
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migration to Palestine and the establishment of a settler colonial state. The concept of 
self-determination in international law does not refer to the right to set up an independent 
nation state, but the right to claim group rights in a situation in which the majority 
population and/or government is oppressing and discriminating against a minority or the 
indigenous population (Pedersen, 2005). As such, self-determination is a principle which 
seeks to further democratise states rather than lead to their break up into smaller units.  
Therefore, not only has the principle of self-determination been routinely applied 
to the Israel-Palestine situation in an erroneous state and ethno-centric manner, but 
moreover, since the beginning of Jewish settlement in Palestine it has been routinely 
applied in a racially hierarchical way; hence, the privileging of Jewish nationalism in the 
Balfour Declaration during the British Mandate. Susan Pedersen (2005) also highlights 
the role of the League of Nations in encouraging settler colonialism in Palestine, a policy 
ZKLFK ZDV JHQHUDOO\ DW RGGV ZLWK WKH /HDJXH¶V YLHZ RQ SDQ-European settlement in 
mandated lands in Africa and elsewhere. This is partly explained with respect to 
sensitivity around anti-Semitism, but one must also wonder whether it was not in fact 
underlying anti-Semitism which drove WKH /HDJXH¶V HQFRXUDJHPHQW RI µVHOI-WUDQVIHU¶ 
among European Jews, in a way that contrasts with their strong opposition to white South 
African settler colonialism in Namibia and British settlement in Kenya.         
   In the aftermath of the Second World War, the League of Nations and the 
%ULWLVK 0DQGDWH¶V SULYLOHJLQJ RI -HZLVK QDWLRQDOLVP DQG VLPXOWDQHRXV VXSSUHVVLRQ DQG
exclusion of Palestinian aspirations for national independence were inherited by the 
United Nations. The legacy of European anti-Semitism once again played a role in 
consolidating Jewish settler colonialism in Palestine, resulting in the almost unanimous 
UN decision to partition Palestine into two states for two people in the aftermath of the 
European Holocaust. This is yet another example of the exceptional transnational 
                              
 
221 
 
character of Israel-Palestine; no other settler colonial enterprise has ever declared a state 
as a result of an international resolution, a resolution justified on the basis of a European 
inter-state crisis which led to the displacement and resettlement of millions of people.  
While acknowledging the role of the Holocaust in contributing to large Jewish 
migration to Palestine in the 1940s and 1950s, it is important not to read the history of 
Israel-Palestine in a Eurocentric fashion. To echo Walter Mignolo (2000), unpacking the 
dichotomous identity of Israel-Palestine requires a critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism 
devised and enacted from the perspective of colonial difference. He envisages critical 
FRVPRSROLWDQLVP DV µERUGHU WKLQNLQJ¶ FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ DQ HPSKDVLV RQ µD SOXULFHQWULF
world built on the ruins of ancient non-Western cultures and civilizations with the debris 
of Western civilization. A cosmopolitanism which only connects from the centre of the 
large circle outward, and leaves the outer places disconnected from each other, would be 
DFRVPRSROLWDQLVPIURPDERYH¶LELG 
A reading of Israel-Palestine from the perspective of colonial difference would be 
firmly based on the premise that Zionist Israel is a settler colonial state in its origin, and a 
settler colonial apartheid in its contemporary guise and as such the focus must be on the 
displaced indigenous population and their call for justice which has been addressed to the 
colonising collectivity. At the same time, the history of anti-Semitism and what the 
Diasporic nature of Jewishness has to say about belonging and displacement cannot be 
neglected by any critical attempts to understand the making and make-up of Israel-
Palestine. Moreover, it is also important to emphasise that Jewishness and Zionism are 
not the same things and must not be used interchangeably. Neither does the historical 
experience of anti-Semitism negate or justify the brutality and racism of Zionist settler 
colonialism and the violence it has done and continues to do to the Palestinian people.  
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As far back as the 1930s, Jewish intellectuals such as Hannah Arendt and Martin 
Buber, who considered themselves cultural Zionists, strongly opposed the formation of a 
Jewish ethno-national state in Palestine and argued for binational coexistence. Arendt 
(2007) in fact argued, in a rather prophetic manner, that a Jewish state formed against the 
wishes of its Arab neighbours would lock itself in perpetual conflict. As someone who 
spent the majority of her life theorising the violence produced by statelessness as a result 
of nation-states purging themselves of their undesirable cohabitants, Arendt was also 
highly critical of the expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948.  
Judith Butler (2012) builds on the binational Jewish intellectual tradition 
represented by Arendt and Benjamin among others, to argue for the emergence of Jewish 
nationhood which is divorced from the concept of state sovereignty. Instead, she 
envisages a polity comprised of a federation of nations or pluralities, affirming collective 
identity and difference, with its main role being to guarantee individual and collective 
rights through decision-making in common. Addressing contemporary Zionist Jewish 
nationalism, she calls for a reappraisal of the Jewish exilic tradition which teaches us that 
the basis for cohabitation is unchosenness µZHQRWRQO\OLYHZLWKWKRse we never chose 
and to whom we may feel no social sense of belonging, but we are also obliged to 
SUHVHUYHWKHLUOLYHVDQGWKHSOXUDOLW\RIZKLFKWKH\IRUPDSDUW¶LELG 
Furthermore, Butler emphasises International Law as the framework which would 
JXDUG FLWL]HQV DJDLQVW SRWHQWLDO VWDWH DEXVHV 'UDZLQJ RQ %HQKDELE¶V ZRUN RQ
cosmopolitanism and the origins of International Human Rights Law in the aftermath of 
)DVFLVW 7RWDOLWDULDQLVP %XWOHU UHIHUV WR DGKHUHQFH WR ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ DV µ-HZLVK
politics¶ZKLFK WKH ,VUDHOL VWDWHKDV DSURYHQ WUDFN UHFRUG IRU IORXWLQJDQGGLVUHJDUGLQJ
6KH LV LQ SDUWLFXODU LQYRNLQJ ,VUDHO¶V IDLOXUH WR DGKHUH WR KXQGUHGV RI 81 5HVROXWLRQV
especially UN Resolution 194 which calls for the return of the Palestinian refugees, 
                              
 
223 
 
instead upholding the discriminatory Law of Return which only applies to Diaspora Jews. 
In reference to the Nazi dispossession of the European Jews, often cited as a reason for 
WKHQHFHVVLW\RI WKH-HZLVKVWDWH VKH UHVSRQGV WKDW µQR ULJKWV WR UHIXJHHVDUH legitimate 
WKDWE\ WKHLUYHU\ H[HUFLVHSURGXFHDQHZSRSXODWLRQRI VWDWHOHVV¶ LELG7KXV IRU
her binationalism in Israel-3DOHVWLQH ZRXOG FRQVWLWXWH µD FRKDELWDWLRQ JXLGHG E\ WKH
memory and the call to justice that emerges from dispossession, exile, and forced 
FRQWDLQPHQWQRWMXVWIRUWZRSHRSOHVEXWIRUDOOSHRSOHV¶LELG 
Thus, at the core of articulating an egalitarian solution to the predicament of 
Israel-Palestine is a commitment to the principles of justice, equality and freedom from 
oppression. This commitment demands mobilisations across real and perceived borders of 
separation. Moreover, I would add that this commitment should not be purely based on a 
binational or indigenous principle of self-determination but RQ WKH SULQFLSOH RI µDll 
DIIHFWHG¶ which was established at the beginning of the thesis as the most encompassing 
SULQFLSOH RI MXVWLFH 7KH µDOO DIIHFWHG¶ principle and the co-responsibility it entails is a 
commitment to diversity and plurality which seeks to ensure individual and collective 
rights without sacrificing one at the expense of the other. This would, in turn, entail 
examining the reality of Israel-Palestine not simply through a binational or majoritarian 
perspective which reaffirms the conflicting dichotomy of Jewish Israeli versus 
Palestinian, but also acknowledges the need to address the rights and needs of other 
individuals and collectivities such as African refugees and other African, Asian and 
Eastern European migrants who reside in Israel-Palestine in the present and are often 
ignored and neglected by all visions of a future resolution, whether that be one or two 
state versions.  
The above theoretical/political reflection was inspired by the debate which ensued 
IROORZLQJ,&$+'¶VVWDWHPHQWLQVXSSRUWRIDELQDWLRQDl state solution in Israel-Palestine. 
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As a critical Israeli organisation, ICAHD has perhaps been most explicit in articulating a 
demand for the recognition of Jewish Israeli collective self-determination in the 
eventuality of decolonisation. ,&$+'¶VIRXQGHr, Jeff Halper (2012), has been very open 
and vocal about his fears that in their struggle for decolonisation radical Palestinian 
counterparts are increasingly moving away from cohabitation. As I have already 
articulated in the above theoretical-political GLVFXVVLRQ ERWK ,&$+'¶V YLVLRQ RI D
binational state and Palestinian counterparts version of a single liberal-democratic state 
fail to articulate a vision of Israel-Palestine that would avoid reproducing self-
determination as non-statist and non-dominating.  
,Q $EXQLPDK DQG %DUJKRXWL¶V FDVH VHOI-determination only applies to the 
indigenous majority, thus a future state would be based on the political rule of the 
Palestinian ethno-QDWLRQDOPDMRULW\,Q,&$+'¶VFDVHPLQRULWDULDQVWDWXVLVSHUFHLYHGDV
what it is, namely reduced and secondary rights, but the solution is seen as creating a 
binational state between the current and future ruling ethno-nations, namely Israeli Jews 
and Palestinians. However, Halper fails to adequately theorise the problematic 
relationship between the Jewish and Israeli in his concept of Jewish Israeli self-
determination. This is perhaps what makes Palestinian counterparts uncomfortable: the 
possibility that Jewish self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ PLJKW QRW RQO\ EH D µUHZDUG¶ IRU SDVW DQG
ongoing colonisation of Israel-Palestine, but that it might serve as a future justification for 
claims for transnational Jewish rights in a single bi-national state, thereby constituting the 
continuation of Jewish settler colonialism by other means. Thus, both of these approaches 
fail to articulate self-determination in non-statist and non ethno-nationalist terms, and 
therefore as not based on domination and majority/minority dichotomisation. 
This FKDSWHU¶V IRFXV RQ VHOI-determination in relation to settler-colonialism 
nevertheless reflects the growing debate among critical Israeli and Palestinian 
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counterparts on the subject of the future of Israel-Palestine. Critical Israeli groups, and in 
particular, ICAHD which is highly respected for its on-the-ground solidarity and 
UHVLVWDQFH DFWLYLWLHV LWV HIIHFWLYH LQWHUQDWLRQDO DGYRFDF\ DQG LWV IRXQGHU¶V DELOLW\ WR
reframe the dominant discourse on Israel-Palestine, have a significant role to play in 
rearticulating Israel-Palestine as a more democratic and open place. ICAHD¶VVWDWHPHQW
in support of a binational state, despite its stated limitations, is an example of critical and 
ongoing attempts to do precisely that. Chapter six will examine the way the work of 
Anarchists Against The Wall (AATW) in Israel and the Occupied Territories goes some 
way to address the issues raised by the challenge of binational and/or majority/minority 
formulations of rights in Israel-Palestine.   
Conclusion  
This chapter examined the transnational advocacy, political framing, and practical 
rebuilding work of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions. The analysis 
focused in particular on the normative framing of the Occupation and joint struggle in 
Israel-Palestine SURYLGHG E\ ,&$+'¶V IRXQGHU Jeff Halper, particularly his stance on 
binationalism as a precondition for cohabitation. Critical Palestinian responses to 
,&$+'¶V RQH VWDWH VROXWLRQ VWDWHPHQW DQG HQVXLQJ FULWLFLVPV RI -HZLVK ,VUDHOL ULJKW WR
self-determination in Israel-Palestine were also examined in relation to contemporary 
debates on the possibility for and future of decolonisation. The chapter concluded with a 
caution that binationalist and/or minority/majority configurations of rights can serve to 
reproduce similar formulations to the current dichotomy at play in Israel-Palestine. The 
SULQFLSOHRIµall affected¶ was invoked to remind of the need to consciously include and 
address the rights and needs of non-Palestinian and non-Jewish Israeli individuals and 
collectivities residing in Israel-Palestine in any solution which intends to be truly 
democratic and inclusive.       
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6. Armed with Nonviolence and Solidarity 
 
 This chapter examines the embodied solidarity activism and reflexive thought of 
Anarchists Against The Wall (AATW), a non-hierarchical collective of radical left Israeli 
activists who are active in the joint struggle against the Separation Wall in the West Bank. 
The chapter begins with an introduction to the key issues and background of AATW, 
providing a critical analysis of the dynamics at play in critical solidarity activism in 
Israel-Palestine. The main discussion focuses on the challenges facing attempts to 
articulate the intersections between different forms of oppression in an attempt to build a 
prefigurative community which will avoid the pitfalls of minority/majority 
dichotomisation and other forms of domination. This question is further related to the 
issue of self-determination and its possible redefinition outside of dominant statist 
frameworks.              
Activists Against the Wall 
 Examining the work and thought of the critical Israeli direct action group 
Anarchists Against The Wall (AATW) can help to illuminate some of the outstanding 
issues in relation to the questions of solidarity and self-determination in Israel-Palestine 
which were raised in chapters four and five. Moreover, such an examination can also 
serve to highlight further questions for consideration in relation to the nature and direction 
of joint struggle in Israel-Palestine. In many respects, due to its pluralistic and non-
hierarchical nature and the lack of a singular grand-narrative about its role and agenda, 
AATW most clearly embodies the inherent contradictions and tensions that characterise 
contemporary critical Israeli activism. While most critical Israeli groups and activists shy 
away from the lDEHOµUDGLFDO¶ and prefer to emphasise the left-liberal democratic agenda 
underpinning their efforts, AATW has embraced radicalism as its defining attribute. This 
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openness and accepWDQFHRIWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIµUDGLFDO¶, in turn implying an acceptance 
of marginalisation within Israeli society, but also more broadly signifying a separation 
from mainstream methods of political engagement, has nevertheless placed AATW in a 
relatively privileged and significant position within the joint struggle.  
Thus, unlike the two previous case study organisations, AATW has faced fewer 
accusations of normalisation by Palestinian allies and, in spite of its anarchist name 
$$7:¶V DFWLYLVP KDV DWWUDFWHG considerable media and academic interest, featuring in 
the writings of Uri Gordon (2008), and Judith Butler (2013), alongside a recently 
published volume edited by Uri Gordon and Ohal Grietzer (2013) which is dedicated to 
and features former AATW announcements and reflective essays by some of WKHJURXS¶V 
leading activists. It is important to note that while the question of solidarity has been at 
the heart of many of these debates, the question of self-determination, either in its 
collective or individual guise, has not been discussed explicitly by AATW activists and/or 
those writing about them and their work, with the exception of Judith Butler (2013). 
Further, given that the question of self-determination remains tied to the notion of 
statehood, it should not be surprising that a group which identifies with anarchist 
principles has not engaged and/or is not engaging with the question of self-determination 
in Israel-Palestine. As such, the consideration of the question of self-determination in 
relation to AATW is a question posed by the author of this thesis and is not to be taken as 
a reflection of the group¶V SRVLWLRQ RQ WKH VXEMHFW. Before proceeding to discuss the 
question of self-determination, it is important to provide context and introduce the work 
of AATW in more detail.            
Anarchists Against The Wall emerged as a direct action group in 2003 during a 
SURWHVW FDPS KHOG LQ WKH 3DOHVWLQLDQ YLOODJH RI 0DV¶KD ZKLFK ZDV MRLQWO\ VHW XS E\
Palestinian, Israeli and International activists on the proposed route of the West Bank 
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Separation Wall. The name AATW was not in fact given by the activists themselves but 
by the media in the aftermath of a highly publicised event following a solidarity action 
during which an Israeli soldier shot and wounded one of the Israeli activists. Up to this 
point different names had circulated in relation to the affinity groups comprising what 
ZDV WR EHFRPH $$7: LQFOXGLQJ µ$QDUFKLVWV $JDLQVW WKH )HQFH¶ DQG µ-HZV $JDLQVW
*KHWWRV¶ *RUGRQ DQG *ULHW]HU  GHILQH WKH 0DV¶KD FDPS DV D PRPHQW ZKLFK
provided Israeli activists with an opportunity to differentiate themselves from the 
International Solidarity Movement (ISM) and to make the presence of radical Israeli 
activists more visible and prominent within the protest.           
While the name Anarchists Against the Wall has stuck with the group, 
nevertheless many activists have said thDW WKH\VHHWKHPVHOYHVPRUHDVµDFWLYLVWV¶ rather 
than as µanarchists¶50 against the Wall, and as such the group is comprised of a wide 
variety and plurality of opinions and political positions. Nevertheless, the group does 
organise on the basis of anarchist principles which include non-hierarchy, direct action, 
and consensus decision-making. In relation to the Palestinian popular nonviolent struggle 
against the SHSDUDWLRQ :DOO ZKLFK $$7: UHIHUV WR DV µ7KH $SDUWKHLG :DOO¶ $\DORQ
2004), the anarchists see their position as providing on-the-ground solidarity to a struggle 
that is led first and foremost by those who it affects, namely the Palestinian residents of 
WKH YLOODJHV DORQJ WKH :DOO¶V URXWH 6HFRQGO\ DW OHDst during the early years of the 
struggle, AATW activists felt that their presence as privileged Israeli citizens provides 
some form of protection against unchecked Israeli military violence and the likelihood of 
the army using live ammunition on the protesters. As one anarchist activist explains: 
We believe that a non-violent struggle puts more pressure on the 
Israelis. When the army has to deal with civilians, it has to bring in a far 
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ODUJHUQXPEHURIVROGLHUV7KH\FDQ¶WRSHQ ILUHDW WKHPIUHHO\DW OHDVt 
we hope not. In spite of the best efforts of organizers, almost every 
week of demonstrations ends with at least a few wounded. 262 people 
have been injured and 5 killed in the village of Bidu, near Jerusalem. 
One of these killed was a boy of 11 (Ayalon, 2004: 11).    
In the early years of the anti-Wall protests, with the Israeli army fearing the 
outbreak of a third intifada, Israeli and international presence bolstered the nonviolent 
Palestinian struggle. However, over time, proportional to the lack of public interest in 
,VUDHOWKHDUP\¶VYLROHQFHKDVcontinually escalated. While the weekly Friday protests in 
%XGUXV DQG %LO¶LQ WZR IODJVKLS YLOODJHV ZRQ VRPH OHJDO JDLQV IRUFLQJ FKDQJHV LQ WKH
planned route of the Wall, and increasing international awareness of the popular struggle, 
latHUSURWHVWV LQRWKHU3DOHVWLQLDQYLOODJHV VXFK DV1L¶OLQ51, and particularly Nabi Saleh, 
have been violently suppressed, with tear gas and live ammunition being used by the IDF 
to disperse protesters, sometimes before the start of the actual demonstration. In relation 
to attending a protest in Nabi Saleh, widely considered to be one of the villages which has 
faced the most violence from the Israeli army, AATW activist Chen Misgav writes about 
one Friday afternoon in the past IHZ \HDUV ZKHQ JDV FDQLVWHUV µUDLQHG¶ on gathering 
protesters before the planned start of the demonstration, leading to him and other activists 
having to run for cover, bursting through the door of an unknown Palestinian woman who 
immediately gave them raw onions to help with the effects of the gas:             
,W ZDVQ¶W P\ ILUVW YLVLW WR D 3DOHVWLQLDQ KRPH EXW LW ZDV FHUWDLQO\ WKH
ILUVWWLPHLQZKLFK,EXUVWLQWRDKRXVHZKRVHRZQHU,GLGQ¶WNQRZ7KH
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 I attended a demonstration in July 2009 during which two ³Mistaravim´ secret service soldiers dressed to 
look like Palestinians encouraged the children from the village to throw stones and then pulled out guns 
loaded with live ammunition. In the ensuing panic the army swooped in and arrested two young men from 
the village. The event was recorded by AATW activists; the video has since been removed from the web. 
The young men were released from administrative detention some weeks later following widespread 
international protest.     
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physical experience and the fear of what was going on outside were 
shared by all of us, Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, and to a large 
extent, eased the differences between us. The borders placed between us 
were crossed within a few minutes of the start of the demonstration. But 
other borders were also crossed ± borders between public and private 
spaces, between home and outside, and between safe and dangerous 
places. For the first time in my life I felt safer in a Palestinian home than 
outside with soldiers from the very army I had served in (Chen Misgav, 
2013: 133).      
0DQ\RIWKHUHIOHFWLYHHVVD\VIHDWXUHGLQ*RUGRQDQG*ULHW]HU¶VHGLWHGYROXPHDV
well as personal conversations with activists reflect the sentiment in the above quote, 
namely the emerging and sustained moments of identification between Israelis and 
Palestinians during solidarity actions. The physical embodiment of sharing similar 
H[SHULHQFHVRIYLROHQWDVVDXOWRQRQH¶VSK\VLFDOVDIHW\DQGLQWHJULW\IDFLQJYLROHQWDUUHVW
injury, or even the possibility of death, helps to create bonds and understanding that go 
beyond mere rhetoric. As well as crossing real and metaphorical borders of enmity, the 
embodied activism of AATW also helps to create relations between Palestinians and 
Israelis that are based on friendship as well as solidarity; rearticulating an Israeli 
Jewishness as non-dominating and anti-Zionist.  This in turn serves not only to 
rearticulate Israeli identity otherwise but also to construct a different relationship with the 
Palestinian people; as 15 year old Iltezam reflects in relation to the joint struggle in 
Budrus: µ,KDYHQHYHUGHDOWZLWK,VUDHOLVDVIULHQGVEHIRUH,VUDHOLVZHUHDOZD\VRFFXSLHUV
DQGVROGLHUV¶0RUUDU 
This approach to embodied activism is moreover highly critical of joint 
Palestinian-Israeli cooperation based on inter-faith or dialogue groups which avoid 
physical activism in the Occupied Territories. According to AATW activists, this type of 
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cooperation, apart from being normalising, also panders to the racism of Israelis and their 
fear of the Palestinian people. For many of the activists, making the effort to experience 
the reality of the Occupied Territories is the first step to overcoming the fear of the Other, 
OHDGLQJWRDUDGLFDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIRQH¶VSHUFHSWLRQDVDQ,VUDHOLDQGZKDWLWPHDQV to 
be Israeli in relation to the Palestinian people (Snitz, 2004).  
Nevertheless, despite acknowledging and appreciating the important role played 
by Israeli solidarity activism, many Palestinian activists are increasingly placing the onus 
on critical Israelis to raise awareness within Israeli society (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010). For 
most AATW activists the expectation to raise awareness among the average Israeli is seen 
as a particularly daunting and difficult task due to the aforementioned fear and racial 
attitudes which prevail in relation to the Palestinian people. Together with increasing 
identification with the Palestinian people and their struggle against the Occupation, many 
AATW activists describe their relation with mainstream Israeli society, including friends 
and relatives, as one of alienation and disconnection.  
For most Israelis the West Bank is a world apart despite being a forty-five minute 
drive from Tel Aviv, and as such the concept of Israelis going to protests alongside 
Palestinians who are thought of as a terrorist threat, against a Wall that is supposed to 
NHHS,VUDHOLVVDIHIURPWKLVWKUHDWLVSHUFHLYHGDVµLPPDWXUH¶DWEHVWDQGDVµLUUDWLRQDO¶
µFUD]\¶DQGHYHQµGDQJHURXV¶6QLW]:KLOHVRPHRIWKH activists, the majority of 
whom are in their twenties and early thirties, find themselves lucky to have liberal and/or 
understanding friends and family, who are at least curious and willing to debate the 
issues, others choose to remain silent about their activities in the West Bank due to fear of 
rejection, or the possibility that they might lose financial support provided by their 
families and become ostracised and homeless in the process (Edmonds, 2013).        
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Another typical obstacle to drawing more Israeli support for Palestinian 
popular resistance is the particular opinion received by those more 
sophisticated than us. It is that political activism is generally futile. This 
LGHDLVFRPPXQLFDWHGZLWKHPSDWK\LQWKHIRUPRI³YHU\JRRGRI\RX
but do you think any of it makes a differencH"´7KH DOPRVW XQLYHUVDO
prevalence of this idea generally reflects the anti-democratic tendencies 
in societies where people are governed by other people and is not unique 
to Israel. It is both personally convenient and convenient for 
governments when people believe their role is essentially as spectator. 
The fact that the belief in political impotence is the product of 
indoctrination and personal psychology is reflected in the fact that it is 
typical exactly for those who do have the most political power and as 
such are subjects to the most indoctrination (Snitz, 2004: 26). 
 The J1452 protests in the summer of 2011 which to a great degree dispelled the 
notion of Israeli apathy are an apt example of the above unwillingness to engage 
politically with the oppression of the Palestinian people. J14 protesters were more 
concerned with Jewish Israeli solidarity and wellbeing, consistently refusing to engage 
with the question of the Occupation. Indeed, the argument for excluding the subject of the 
Palestinians from the biggest public discussion of justice in Israeli society was largely 
based on the premise that issues of a µSROLWLFDO¶ nature should be avoided in order to 
maintain unity. It would almost be a FOLFKpWRSRLQWRXWWKDW,VUDHO¶VULVLQJOLYLQJFRVWVDUH
directly linked to the ever-expanding settler colonial project in the West Bank which is 
maintained by none other than an advanced system of state welfare subsidy that has been 
DOPRVWFRPSOHWHO\DEVHQWIURP,VUDHO¶VERUGHUVVLQFHWKHV, and therefore, that 
an economy reliant on a military Occupation is nothing but political. Notably, the 
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 7KHQDPHRIWKH,VUDHOLµVRFLDOMXVWLFH¶SURWHVWVZKLFKVSUXQJXSLQWKHVXPPHURISURWHVWLQJWKH
rising cost of living in Israel.  
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suggestion by the settler leadership that Israelis struggling to pay their rent in Tel Aviv 
VKRXOGPRYHWRWKHµQHLJKERXUKRRGV¶ of the Occupied Territories, where housing is state 
subsidised, was not perceived DVµSROLWLFDO¶. While the J14 protests ended by raising more 
questions than answers, they represented a spectacular failure by the largest Israeli civil 
society movement calling for justice to address the PalestiQLDQ SHRSOH¶V FDOO IRU a just 
peace. The 2013 Israeli parliamentary elections which led to a former settler leader 
becoming the Housing Minister might be yet another indication of the normalisation of 
the Occupation within Israeli society.  
As chapters three and four demonstrated, the education system and the media play 
a major role in propagating an anti-Palestinian message, circulating narratives and images 
which bolster Jewish Israeli supremacy and righteousness, and portray Palestinians as 
violent and threatening, and at best as faceless others (Dor, 2005; Hass, 2002; Peled-
Elhanan, 2012). This in turn provides normative justification for the oppression and 
violence carried out against the Palestinian people. In many respects the militarisation of 
Israeli society which begins from birth with family military connections, and is 
strengthened through the education system, normalises relations vis-à-vis the occupied 
Palestinians, making the actions of activists such as AATW which are deemed to be 
against IsraHO¶VPLOLWDU\UHJLPHDppear irrational and traitorous:  
wherever you go you are surrounded by soldiers. Soldiers in uniforms 
carrying guns. Reserve soldiers, living their civilian lives, except for one 
month a year, when they go back to being proper soldiers. Former 
soldiers, who think you too should be a soldier. Mothers, fathers, wives 
of soldiers. People who think soldiers are always right, and that they 
deserve a 10 percent discount in shawarma stands, and that they keep us 
safe. Border police soldiers RQ FLYLO SROLFH GXW\ 2K DQG WKHUH¶V WKDW
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depressed, alienated, self-loathing soldier that used to be me (Wagner, 
2013: 60).  
 The above quote by an AATW activist not only affirms my analysis in relation to 
the foundational normativity of militarism in Israeli society but moreover highlights the 
tensions embodied in critical and/or radical Israeli activism. For while most AATW 
activists on the whole reject military service in the Occupied Territories and in the Israeli 
army in general, many of the activists are in fact former soldiers who have since come to 
a different perspective about Israeli-Palestinian relations. However, while Judith Butler 
and I have argued that objection to military service remains the primary means through 
which to refuse to reproduFH ,VUDHO¶V UHJLPH RI YLROHQFH DQG RSSUHVVLRQ QHYHUWKHOHVV
these young activists exemplify the possibility for Israeli civil society as a whole to be 
awakened to a different type of solidarity, one not based on ethno-centric communalism, 
but rather one based on shared humanity and a desire for justice.   
Radicalised Through Struggle  
A closer examination of the profiles of AATW activists demonstrates the diversity 
of routes of engagement which have led them to solidarity activism in the struggle against 
the separation Wall.  Similar to most leftwing Israeli activists, AATW are primarily, 
though not exclusively, middle class Ashkenazi Jews, largely in their twenties and early 
thirties. Many of the activists were radicalised through other forms of activism, while 
some found themselves visiting the Occupied Territories by invitation from more active 
friends and then became active in AATW as a result of the repression and brutality they 
witnessed (Gordon and Grietzer, 2013). The majority of AATW activists have been and 
FRQWLQXH WR EH DFWLYH LQ RWKHU UDGLFDO OHIW DQG OLEHUWDULDQ VWUXJJOHV ZLWKLQ ,VUDHO¶V 
ERUGHUVFRQFHUQHGZLWKZRPHQ¶VZRUNHUV¶TXHHUDQG/*%7ULJKWV DVZHOODV migrant 
and refugee rights. Add to to this solidarity activism, particularly with Bedouin citizens 
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ILJKWLQJ,VUDHO¶VGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGGLVSRVVHVVLRQSROLFLHVLQWKH1HJHY1DTDEDVZHOODV
the Judaization policies affecting Palestinian Israeli citizens in the Galilee (Ayalon, 2004; 
Gordon, 2008; Gordon and Grietzer, 2013; Svirsky, 2012).53 
$$7: PHPEHUV¶ DFWLYLVP LQ WKH :HVW %DQN EHJDQ GXULQJ WKH RXWEUHDN RI WKH
Second Intifada, with many members having been involved in the joint Palestinian and 
Jewish Israeli grassroRWV VROLGDULW\ JURXS 7D¶D\XVK µSDUWQHUVKLS¶ in Arabic) which 
worked alongside the ISM to bring food to besieged cities in the West Bank, as well as 
helping farmers to work their land during military-imposed curfews. The associated queer 
LGBT rights group Black Laundry (Kvisa Schora) was the first Israeli group to politicise 
LGBT opposition to the Occupation and to display solidarity with the Palestinian struggle 
during the 2001 Tel Aviv Gay Pride Parade when activists marched with placards 
SURFODLPLQJµTheUH¶VQRSULGHLQWKH2FFXSDWLRQ¶. Black Laundry largely ceased to act as 
an independent group by 2003 with many of its members migrating to AATW and 
solidarity activism in the Occupied Territories (Ziv, 2010). While solidarity with 
3DOHVWLQLDQVKDVRIWHQPHDQW µJRLQJEDFN WR WKHFORVHW¶ GXULQJ MRLQWDFWLRQV WKHJURXS¶V
politics remain highly relevant in relation to questions of minority rights in a post-
apartheid scenario, and contemporaril\ LQ UHODWLRQ WR UHVSRQGLQJ WR µpinkwashing¶54 
endeavours by the Israeli state.    
:RPHQ¶V DQG JD\ ULJKWV KDYH LQ SDUWLFXODU EHHQ WKH IRFXs of contestation and 
tension, often being used as a differentiating marker and as a means to create a hierarchy 
between the alleged liberalism of the Israeli state and the patriarchy of the Arab 
Palestinian culture. This in turn has served to justify and/or distract from the racial 
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 Many of these struggles, particularly the latter three, have been documented by the activist photography 
collective ActiveStills.org. 
54
 $WHUPXVHGE\3DOHVWLQLDQ6ROLGDULW\DFWLYLVWVWRUHIHUWR,VUDHO¶VDWWHPSWWREUDQGLWVHOIDVDSURJUHVVLYH
and gay friendly state surrounded by backwards and homophobic Arabs in order to create LGBT solidarity 
with Israel (Elia, 2012; Krebs and Olwan; 2012; Morgensen, 2012).   
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DSDUWKHLGSROLFLHVXQGHU2FFXSDWLRQDQGZLWKLQ,VUDHO¶VERUGHUV:KLOHPRVWRWKHU
peace groups tend to avoid the subject of gender and sexuality, with the exception of 
IHPLQLVWDQGZRPHQ¶VJURXSV$$7:DFWLYLVWVDWWHPSWWRlink the struggles for freedom, 
equality and justice and to create solidarity among those affected. In the Occupied 
Territories priority is given to ending the Occupation given the fact that it affects men, 
women, LGBT, and heterosexual Palestinians in equal measures. Nevertheless, within the 
1948 borders an emphasis on intersecting interests and solidarity among sexual and ethnic 
minorities and other oppressed people plays an important democratising role, serving to 
disrupt the heteronormative racialised order.  
+RZHYHU$$7:¶VDFWLYLVPLQWKH2FFXSLHG7HUULWRULHVKDVRIWHQEHHQFULWLFLVHG
for being inconsistent with their radical anarchist, sexual and feminist politics, and their 
activism within the 1948 territories. AATW has also been criticised for what is seen by 
some as a contradiction, namely anarchists supporting a national independence struggle. 
In his book Anarchy Alive, Uri Gordon (2008) addresses some of these criticisms by 
responding that (i) the nature of solidarity is inconsistent, and moreover, those giving 
VROLGDULW\ FDQQRW EH WKH RQHV¶ ZKR GLFWDWH WKH QDWXUH RI WKH VWUXJJOH WKH\ DUH VKRZLQJ
support to; (ii) the Palestinian people already live under an oppressive state, and a 
Palestinian state might in fact be a little less violent and oppressive towards them; (iii) 
solidarity now is a strategic choice which will result in creating space for more radical 
prefigurative politics55 in the future; (iv) no one cares what anarchists think about states 
anyway (ibid: 149-157).  
While these points are inGHHG UHOHYDQW WR WKH GLVFXVVLRQ -XGLWK %XWOHU¶V 
critique of Gordon highlights some of the inconsistency in his response, and I would add 
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 Prefigurative politics refers to the desire or attempt to live and/or enact politics in a way one wishes to see 
society structured in the future. For example, being a vegan or refusing to participate in unethical 
consumption practices.   
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it also highlights the continuity of the logic of separation which remains active in the 
discourses and narratives of AATW activism. However, it is also important to emphasise 
WKDW 8UL *RUGRQ¶V QDUUDWLYH LV RQO\ one among many which coexist among AATW 
DFWLYLVWV DQG WKHUHIRUH WR D GHJUHH %XWOHU PLVWDNHQO\ WDNHV *RUGRQ¶V QDUUDWLYH DV
representative of AATW as a collHFWLYH+RZHYHU%XWOHU¶VFULWLTXHUHPDLQVUHOHYDQWRQ
the whole. She criticises Gordon for his uncritical assumption that the anti-Wall struggle 
is a statist struggle, thus ignoring or sidestepping ongoing debates on a single and/or 
binational state in Israeli-Palestine. However, this criticism in turn ignores the fact that 
Palestinians are split on the question of national independence or cohabitation, and in fact 
a small majority in the West Bank continues to support a two state solution.  
Butler further FULWLFLVHV $$7:¶V IDLOXUH WR HQJDJH ZLWK YRFDO TXHHU 3DOHVWLQLDQ
organisations for BDS such as Al Qawas and Aswat, the existence of which challenges 
some of the problematic assumptions that minority rights and voices are absent and/or 
silenced from Palestinian society. This is indeed a very important criticism given that 
joint struggle is often represented as radical queer and feminist Israelis showing solidarity 
with conservative and patriarchal Palestinians, and making links with queer and feminist 
Palestinian groups can work to strengthen a prefigurative political agenda. However, as 
Rima (2013) from Aswat points out, emphasis on the politicisation of queer Palestinian 
VXEMHFWV FDQ SODFH D VLJQLILFDQW EXUGHQ RQ TXHHU 3DOHVWLQLDQV GHWUDFWLQJ IURP RWKHUV¶, 
particularly international and even more significantly Israeli, responsibility to oppose the 
Occupation in solidarity with the Palestinian people whether queer or not. Thus, as 
Israelis the onus on AATW activists continues to be anti-Occupation activism which does 
not place identitarian conditions on those whose struggle it supports.      
0RUHSUREOHPDWLFSHUKDSVLV*RUGRQ¶VQDUUDWLRQRI,VUDHOLDQDUFKLVPDVHPHUJLQJ
IURP D SURJUHVVLYH DQG XQSUREOHPDWLF YHUVLRQ RI ,VUDHO¶V HDUO\ VHWWOHPHQW SURMHFW LQ
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Palestine, which fails to account for the founding racialism of the Zionist settler colonial 
project. Moreover, such an account shows a failure to engage with contemporary critical 
anti-colonialist politics among Palestinian thinkers and activists. Thus, GordoQ¶VDFFRXQW
inadvertently reaffirms the dominanW OHIW GLVFRXUVH RI WKH µJRRG OLWWOH ,VUDHO¶ within its 
ERUGHUVYHUVXVWKHµbad expansionLVW,VUDHO¶ which is refusing to leave the Occupied 
7HUULWRULHV 0RUHRYHU *RUGRQ¶V QDUUDWLRQ RI ,VUDHOL DQDUFKLVP also conflicts with more 
critical readings among AATW activists.  
In an interview with Aaron Lakoff (2005), one of the founding AATW activists, 
Yossi Bartal, argues that most of the anarchists who went to Palestine in the early years of 
Jewish settlement left Israel shortly after its creation as it failed to meet their expectations 
and clashed with their anti-statist principles. Rather, the emergence of contemporary 
Israeli anarchism is inspired by and can be traced to the 1980s and 1990s transnational 
anti-globalization movements which saw the convergence of a number of different 
struggles for social and economic justice against exploitative and oppressive corporate 
and state interests. The following statement by the Anarchist-Communist Initiative, an 
AATW associated affinity group, better reflects the complex social, economic and 
SROLWLFDO DQDO\VLV ZKLFK XQGHUSLQV $$7:¶V opposition to Israeli apartheid, and 
distinguishes it from the mainstream Israeli Left:  
7KHOHIWWKHVRFDOOHG³SHDFH´FDPS´ZLOOQHYHU be able to establish a 
real lasting peace, as long as it denies the responsibility of Zionism in 
the displacement of the Palestinian people from their land, and as long 
as it refuses to understand that a country in which more than a fifth of 
the populatioQLVQRW-HZLVKFDQQRWEHERWK=LRQLVW D³-HZLVK6WDWH´
and truly democratic. The best that the Zionist left can afford itself is a 
³PLOLWDU\GHPRFUDF\´ZLWKVHFRQG-class citizens (Palestinian, Bedouin, 
'UX]H DQG IRUHLJQ ZRUNHUV DQG ³JHQHURXV RIIHULQJV´ a la Barak of a 
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³UHFRJQLWLRQRID3DOHVWLQLDQ6WDWH´D OD6KDURQZKLFKPHDQVQRWKLQJ
but the establishment of poor Palestinian ghettos, separated and devoid 
of hope, to become easy dumping grounds for products, sweatshop 
infrastructure and a source for cheap labour for Israeli industries ± 
6KLPRQ 3HUHV¶ ³1HZ 0LGGOH (DVW´ (Anarchist-Communist Initiative, 
2004: 54-55).   
The above analysis demonstrates the intersection of political and economic 
interests, highlighting the importance of historical narrative and responsibility in 
addressing the oppression of the Palestinian people. Moreover, it emphasises an 
DZDUHQHVV RI ,VUDHO¶V 2FFXSDWLRQ DV D FRQWLQXDWLRQ RI DQ RQJRLQJ DQG ORQJ-standing 
settler colonial project in Palestine. Such an analysis further challenges at home and 
abroad WKH GRPLQDQFH RI ,VUDHO¶V VHFXULW\ DQG VHSDUDWLRQ GLVFRXUVH DUWLFXODWLQJ DQ
alternative anti-apartheid discourse which calls for solidarity and equality and suggests 
that there are and could be more just and fair alternatives to living under a militarised 
apartheid. 1HYHUWKHOHVV *RUGRQ¶V QDUUDWLYH RI ,VUDHOL DQDUFKLVP LV QRW HQWLUHO\
inconsistent ZLWK VRPH DFWLYLVWV¶ YLHZ RI WKH 2FFXSDWLRQ DV DQ DEHUUDWLRQ RI ,VUDHOL
democracy, or even as a process of de-democratisation of Israeli society as this statement 
GHPRQVWUDWHV µ'LUHFW DFWLRQ LV the democratic act when democracy stops functioning... 
The ethnic cleansing is occurring before our eyes and we have only one option: to use the 
few rights we still have from the remnants of Israeli democracy and break the racist, 
LPPRUDOODZ¶$$7:P\HPSKDVLV 
Although the above statement demonstrates an awareness of privilege, the 
privilege of Israeli citizenship, it shows a lack of awareness and/or reflexivity in relation 
WRWKHµZH¶ who have access to or can view Israel as a democracy. For whom is Israel a 
democracy? It is certainly not a democracy for the 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza, or the 
WZRPLOOLRQ LQ WKH:HVW%DQNZKRDUH VXEMHFW WR ,VUDHO¶VPLOLWDU\RFFXSDWLRQZLWKRXWD
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right to citizenship or redress. Nor is it a democracy for its one and a half million 
Palestinian and Bedouin citizens whose non-Jewish nationality excludes them from 
HTXDOLW\$VVXFKWKHQRWLRQRIXVLQJWKHIHZULJKWVµZHVWLOOKDYHIURPWKHUHPQDQWVRI
IsUDHOLGHPRFUDF\¶LPSOLHVDQXQFULWLFDODFFHSWDQFHRIWKHSULYLOHJHRI-HZLVKFLWL]HQVKLS
which in fact challenges the very notion of Israel as a democracy. 
Similarly, a number of the leaflets issued following the wounding of AATW 
DFWLYLVW *LO 1D¶DPDWL LQ 003 emphasise his recent military service, playing on the 
outrage of a former Israeli soldier being wounded by the army he once belonged to and 
which should be protecting him as a Jewish citizen. The same leaflets, which call for 
Israelis to join an upcoming protest following the shooting, refer to the Palestinian village 
RI'HLU%DOXWZKHUHWKHSURWHVWLVWRWDNHSODFHDVEHLQJORFDWHGLQµ6DPDULD¶WKHELEOLFDO
name for parts of the West Bank which is used in official Israeli state discourse as a 
justification for illegal Jewish Israeli settlement and colonisation (AATW, 2004: 46-47).  
%RWKWKHVHVWDWHPHQWVXQZLWWLQJO\UHDIILUP$$7:¶VEHORQJLQJDQGUHODWLRQWRWKH
Jewish Israeli mainstream, even if they remain highly critical of it. Moreover, the shock 
aQG VXUSULVH DW *LO 1D¶DPDWL¶V VKRRWLQJ KLJKOLJKWV WKH XQHTXDO YDOXDWLRQ RI 3DOHVWLQLDQ
and Jewish Israeli life, with the wounding or killing of the former being perceived as 
µQRUPDO¶DQGRUµLQHYLWDEOH¶ZKLOHWKHZRXQGLQJRIWKHODWWHUUHSUHVHQWVWKHµXQWKLQNDEOH¶. 
,W LV IRU WKLV UHDVRQ WKDW ,VUDHO¶V OLEHUDO PHGLD LQWHUHVW LQ WKH SURWHVWV DJDLQVW WKH :DOO
DUULYHG ZLWK 1D¶DPDWL¶V VKRRWLQJ DQG KDV VLPLODUO\ GZLQGOHG DV D UHVXOW RI WKH ODFN RI
Israeli casualties in the past few years. On the other hand, the killing of dozens of 
Palestinian protesters since 2002 has been met with complete lack of media interest.  
At the same time the incrHDVLQJ µZRXQGDELOLW\¶ DQG HYHQ µNLOODELOLW\¶ of radical 
Israeli activists suggests a growing convergence between the Palestinian struggle for 
justice and those Israelis who are deemed by the regime as posing a threat by challenging 
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its domination and hegemony; this in turn creates and strengthens previously unthinkable 
affinities and solidarities. Moreover, AATW activists have continuously critically 
engaged with the question of privilege in an attempt to redress some of the imbalance 
between themselves and the Palestinian people. They try to use this privilege, particularly 
their Israeli citizenship which affords them greater international mobility, in order to 
spread the message of the struggle. However, the use of this privilege itself has negative 
repercussions with the danger of Israelis being SHUFHLYHGDVWKHVWUXJJOH¶VVSRNHVSHRSOH
Given that members of the Popular Committees are often denied the right to leave by 
Israel or the right to enter by Western states, this can lead to Israeli involvement 
overshadowing the role of Palestinian organisers who are primarily affected by the Wall. 
Similarly, the presence of radical Israelis can equally serve to appease the conscience of 
mainstream Israeli society: 
The over-attention on Israeli demonstrators is motivated in part by the 
,VUDHOL SUHVV¶ IDPLOLDULW\ ZLWK WKH ,VUDHOL SURSDJDQGD GHYLFH NQRZQ DV
³VKRRWLQJ DQG FU\LQJ´ ,QGHHG D receptive Haaretz readership always 
feels flattered by depoliticised depictions RI WKHEHDXWLIXO ,VUDHOL OHIWLH¶ 
(Snitz, 2004: 25). 
On the whole, despite or perhaps because of their anti-hierarchical and non-
institutionalised form of organising AATW has not only inspired significant interest from 
the liberal Israeli media, but has also been featured in two internationally acclaimed and 
award-winning documentary films about the popular struggle against the Wall, Budrus 
(dir. Julia Bacha, 2009) and 5 Broken Cameras (dir. Emad Burnat and Guy Davidi, 2011). 
These two films perhaps best exemplify the potentially problematic manner in which the 
struggle can be mis/represented. Budrus which documents the early years of the struggle 
against the Wall in the Palestinian village of the same name has been described by a 
numbeU RI DFWLYLVWV DV µDSROLWLFDO¶ for featuring the testimonies and narratives of 
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Palestinian residents of the village, Israeli activists, and Israeli soldiers in equal measure, 
and therefore detracting from the fact that these constituents play a very different role in 
respectively leading, supporting, and oppressing, a struggle for freedom and justice.  
Equally, the individuation of participants, while it can serve to create greater 
understanding of the motivations driving the individuals involved in the protest, in this 
case works to equalise power dynamics, failing to adequately convey the unequal power 
relations which underpin the Occupation, the Wall, and the Palestinian struggle against 
these injustices. Much of these omissions can be attributed to the fact that the film has a 
primarily Israeli audience in mind, and as such is structured and saturated by the 
parameters of acceptable discourse. In this case acceptable discourse relates to the 
necessity to represent Israeli apartheid as a situation of conflict between two relatively 
equal sides, with the added bonus of the presence of radical Israelis testifying to the 
µJRRGQHVV¶ of Israelis in general.  
On the other hand, 5 Broken Cameras which is based on the personal experiences 
RI(PDG%XUQDWDUHVLGHQWRI%LO¶LQZKRKDVGRFXPHQWHGWKHVWUXJJOHRIKLVYLOODJHRYHU
a period of four years, reclaims the centrality of the Palestinian experience and leading 
role in the struggle against the Wall. The tone of the film is considerably darker, showing 
the escalating military violence and brutality which faces protests against the Wall. While 
the documentary features a number of Israeli activists, they are primarily seen in a 
supporting role, with the focus EHLQJRQWKHYLOODJH¶VUHVLGHQWVZKRdaily live and bear the 
brunt of the Occupation.          
It is precisely because of the danger of overshadowing the Palestinian struggle that 
in reality AATW activists insist on the centrality of pragmatic direct action, avoiding 
political dogma, focusing on getting Israelis out on demonstrations, and avoiding being 
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seen as spokespeople. Moreover, Kobi Snitz56 identifies five principles of working as an 
µRXWVLGHU¶, principles he applies to both Israelis and internationals: (i) First and foremost 
the struggle is a Palestinian struggle; (ii) outsiders should never speak to soldiers in a 
situation of conflict, or show overt familiarity, unless Palestinians trust you and have 
asked you to do so; (iii) there needs to be awareness of and respect towards cultural roles; 
(iv) outsiders need to familiarise themselves with existing social relations, e.g. gender; (v) 
observing and raising awareness about BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) is the 
primary task after leaving a demonstration.  
For most activists the above principles are relatively straightforward and 
unproblematic with the exception of gender relations, including the question of what 
FRQVWLWXWHV µPRGHVW¶ clothing for women and the issue of sexual harassment of female 
solidarity activists during protests, which is a point of particular contention. One of the 
ways in which feminist activists have dealt with the issue of patriarchy in Palestinian 
VRFLHW\KDVEHHQE\LQVLVWLQJRQZRPHQ¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQGHPRQVWUDWLRQVZith diversity 
in terms of women, men, different generations, and factions being involved often being 
cited as the catalyst for success, with the village of Budrus being a flagship example.  
Conversely the failure to engage with other forms of oppression and 
discrimination which coexist in the struggle, whether because of prioritising the protests 
over building a supportive community or wishing to appear tough, is resulting in 
unresolved trauma and burnout, with many activists increasingly leaving the struggle and 
some even the country (Arieli, 2013; Shapiro, 2013). Yossi Bartal (2013) argues that 
burnout and the growing sentiment of cynicism and pessimism among radical activists 
stems from the refusal to engage in and/or envisage an alternative to the current situation 
of oppression; the need to find a future to fight for not only to be fighting against.   
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 3UHVHQWDWLRQJLYHQGXULQJ,&$+'¶VUHEXLOGLQJFDPS 
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Reframing Community 
 Much of the tension surrounding the question of community also relates to the 
question of self-determination. The anarchist refusal to engage in a conversation about the 
nature of Israel-Palestine, particularly if the conversation is centred on the topic of a state 
or two, is a principled objection. Nevertheless, the refusal of relatively privileged citizens, 
in this case Jewish Israelis, to engage with the possible direction of Israel-Palestine leaves 
the power to decide in the hands of those who have no intention to choose an egalitarian 
option. Perhaps two obstacles to envisaging an alternative community in Israel-Palestine 
can be identified in the thinking of AATW. The first relates to the continuing logic of 
separation which operates in most Israeli and Palestinian narratives and discourses. This 
is to do with the idea that although the two-state solution is seen as an impossibility or as 
a window of opportunity that has closed in the past decade, and although the current 
situation is understood as an apartheid, the simpler solution is still seen as a solution 
involving ethno-national separation.  
 This manner of thinking is not entirely representative of AATW, for as mentioned 
before, even in a two state scenario based on the 1967 borders, AATW activists believe 
that Israel has to become a state of all its citizens and that the Palestinian right of return 
should be implemented. However, where the logic of separation still operates or remains 
in place is in relation to envisaging cohabitation with the Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories. Similarly, even if one is to assume that most Palestinians want an independent 
state in the West Bank and Gaza, the question of binationalism and/or multiculturalism, 
and self-determination for cultural collectivities remains relevant in light of the right of 
UHWXUQDQGWKHSRVVLELOLW\IRUHTXDOFLWL]HQVKLSZLWKLQ,VUDHO¶VERUGHUV 
 Moreover, a case can be made that activists such as AATW, who have engaged 
and are engaged with a full diversity of socio-cultural and economic struggles in Israel-
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Palestine, and who are in fact most familiar with the realities of multiculturalism and the 
attempt to eliminate and/or suppress it under Zionism, are perhaps best placed to 
encourage a conversation about self-determination in a manner that avoids reproducing 
majority/minority dichotomies and dominations. Furthermore, a conceptualisation of self-
determination as mutual respect, non-domination and reciprocity between autonomous 
socio-cultural units (Young, 2007: 65) is fully compatible with anarchist principles and 
does not have to be based on a statist model, or certainly not a statist model based on 
ethno-centrism and centralised institutionalised power. Thus, a conversation which 
examines the question of cultural self-determination does not have to be focused on the 
state as a unit of organisation. At the same time, such a model of self-determination can 
better account for the manner in which multiple interests and effects intersect and are 
mutually-determined and/or determining, seeking to ensure reciprocal relations based on 
the µall effected¶ principle which takes justice as its premise.       
 A criticisPRI WKHDERYHDSSURDFKPLJKWEH*RUGRQ¶V  UHWRUW WKDW µno one 
cares what anarcKLVWV WKLQN DERXW VWDWHV DQ\ZD\¶. However, such an attitude is deeply 
problematic in a context in which the state is not, if it ever has been, an institution 
separately identifiable and separate from social relations in a given locality. In other 
ZRUGVµWKHVWDWHLVQRWDKRPRJHQHRXVPHGLXPVHSDUDWHGIURPFLYLOVRFLHW\E\DGLWFK
but an uneven set of branches and functions, only relatively integrated by the hegemonic 
pracWLFHVZKLFKWDNHSODFHZLWKLQ¶/DFODXDQG0RXIIH7KH very idea that the 
state is a framework which functions separately from social practices must be understood 
as the product of the effects of this very frame (Mitchell, 2006):  
By establishing a territorial boundary to enclose a population and 
exercising absolute control over movement across it, governmental 
powers define and help to constitute a national entity. Setting up and 
policing a frontier involves a variety of fairly modern social practices ± 
                              
 
246 
 
continuous barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration laws, 
inspections, currency control and so on. These mundane arrangements, 
most of them unknown one hundred years ago, help manufacture an 
almost transcendental entity, the nation-state (ibid: 180).        
  In other words, and perhaps nowhere better exemplified than in Israel-Palestine, 
social life is fully structured and reproduced within a statist framework, and the 
experiences and opportunities of anarchists are not exempt. For the notion of Jewish 
Israeli privilege, and the opportunities of freedom of movement and/or relative protection 
from state abuse and violence it affords, hinges on none other than the privilege afforded 
to it by the Israeli state which defines itself as a Jewish nation-state, and in the process 
excludes most of its other residents and subjects from full citizenship rights. Therefore, 
principled anti-statism does not afford privileged subjects the right to selectively elect 
which aspects of state practices to accept or reject, i.e. enjoying the transnational freedom 
of movement, settlement and employment an Israeli passport affords, while refusing to 
engage with the question of what might and/or should a more egalitarian state formation 
in Israel-Palestine look like. Such practices can in fact inadvertently reaffirm and 
normalise privilege.    
 7KH VHFRQG REVWDFOH WR $$7:¶V DUWLFXODWLRQ RI DQ DOWHUQDWLYH FRPPXQLW\ LQ
Israel-Palestine that might serve to better sustain waning Israeli activism is directly 
related to activiVWV¶ UHOXFWDQFH WR HQJDJH ZLWK WKH TXHVWLRQ RI VHOI-determination and 
largely stems from the structure of anarchist activist practice itself. A number of the 
activist essays in Anarchists Againts the Wall (2013) focus on the subject of alienation 
and burnout. Of particular relevance to this discussion are the writings of Tali Shapiro, 
Roy Wagner, Sarah Assouline, and Ruth Edmonds which feature in the above edited 
volume and critically reflect on the questions of alienation, belonging, inter-group 
dynamics, and confronting Israeli society about its racist and oppressive nature. Some of 
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the key issues which emerge across the critical accounts point towards a common 
problem in anarchist organising, namely the tendency to withdraw in marginal socio-
political activist subcultures as a means to create a buffer against the political alienation 
and marginalisation felt in mainstream society. This in turn has a negative repercussion in 
the context of Israel-Palestine by making it difficult for Israeli activists to challenge 
fellow citizens and attempt to have a more critical conversation about the oppression of 
the Palestinian people.    
 In many of the cases the alienation experienced does not lead to activists being 
physically RVWUDFLVHGE\WKHLUIDPLO\DQGµnon-aligned¶ friends but rather to them leading 
a double-life where they do radical activism in relative secret and spend the rest of their 
WLPH EHLQJ DQ µRUGLQDU\¶ Israeli who drinks coffee in Tel Aviv bars (Edmonds, 2013). 
This is not necessarily a negative thing in itself as activists have a right to family life and 
the right to maintain relations with family members who do not share their political views 
and affiliations. However, perhaps more problematic is the radical activist tendency to 
refuse to collaborate and engage with other Israelis who are left-leaning but perhaps 
might not be as radical as themselves. This has particularly been the case around the 
Solidarity Sheikh Jerrah57 movement which diminished in the aftermath of anarchist 
activists pulling out of the protest because they felt that their leftwing counterparts were 
not radical enough because they subscribe to the two-state solution as an alleged means to 
block the right of return (Svirsky, 2012; Wagner, 2013). 
                                                          
57
 The movement emerged in protest at WKH,VUDHOLFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQin 2009 to evict four Palestinian families 
from their homes in East Jerusalem on the basis that these homes belonged to Jews prior to 1949. Since then 
the homes have been settled by Jewish settlers who in fact have no original claims to the properties. The 
Sheikh Jerrah protests have been one of the few events which brought together left-liberal and radical 
DFWLYLVWV LQ WKH SDVW GHFDGH 0DQ\ OLEHUDOV MRLQHG RQ WKH EDVLV WKDW WKLV GHFLVLRQ FRQWUDGLFWHG WKH VWDWH¶V
refusal to recognise the claims of Palestinians who were expelled in 1948, fearing that this decision could 
set a future precedent for evicting Jews from the former properties of Palestinians.    
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Although this analysis of mainstream leftwing Israelis is to a large extent correct, 
nevertheless, given the overwhelming rightwing attitude prevailing in Israeli society there 
is a great need for critical activists to engage their less radical or critical leftwing 
counterparts who are at the very least sympathetic to the message of ending the 
Occupation. A blanket refusal to engage with less radical counterparts can have the 
adverse effect of pushing the few remaining leftwing Israelis further into the mainstream 
right, foreclosing all possibilities to encourage their engagement with the very serious and 
necessary questions of the right of return, self-determination, and creating a more 
egalitarian society in Israel-Palestine.  
Furthermore, radical activists can at times act in a dogmatic fashion, forgetting 
and/or choosing to ignore that they themselves were not always radical and aware of their 
own privileges and bigotry. And moreover, that radicalisation is nothing more than an 
ongoing process of unlearning and challenging ingrained socio-cultural practices and 
ways of seeing the world, with many of these tensions being clearly embodied in the 
writings of AATW activists. Furthermore, and this is something the aforementioned 
activists show awareness of in their reflective essays, applying excessively high standards 
for people of a similar background, i.e. Israeli Jews, while downplaying the bigotry and/or 
intolerance of Palestinian allies, can itself be a form of racism and classism.  
In particular, this refers to the failure of the predominantly middle class Ashkenazi 
activist milieu to be able to articulate and forge links between the Palestinian struggle for 
justice and freedom with the cultural and economic concerns of the majority of Israeli 
Jews who are working class and of Arab descent, and those Israelis who arguably have 
the most to win from a more egalitarian set-up in Israel-Palestine. This failure can be 
attributed to the historical and continuing dominance of the Ashkenazi ethnicity in Zionist 
Israeli discourses. However, the continuity of this racialised and class dominance among 
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radical activists is also partly to do with the reluctance among many of them to challenge 
their relative privilege not only in relation to the oppressed Palestinians, but also in 
relation to the majority of non-European Israelis who have been the second biggest 
YLFWLPV RI =LRQLVP¶V VHWWOHU FRORQLDOLVP ZKLFK KDV VRXJKW WR HUDGLFDWH QRW RQO\ ,VUDHO-
3DOHVWLQH¶V$UDE3DOHVWLQLDQKHULWDJHEXWDOVRWKH$UDEKHULWDge of Mizrahi and Sephardi 
Jews:           
 There are not, for example, necessary links between anti-sexism and 
anti-capitalism, and a unity between the two can only be the result of a 
hegemonic articulation (p. 178)... The strengthening of specific 
democratic struggles requires, therefore, the expansion of chains of 
equivalence which extend to other struggles. The equivalential 
articulation between anti-racism, anti-sexism and anti-capitalism, for 
example, requires a hegemonic construction which, in certain 
circumstances, may be the condition for the consolidation of each one of 
these struggles. The logic of equivalence, then, taken to its ultimate 
consequences, would imply the dissolution of the autonomy of the 
spaces in which each one of these struggles is constituted; not 
necessarily because any of them become subordinated to others, but 
because they have all become, strictly speaking, equivalent symbols of a 
unique and indivisible struggle (Laclau and Mauffe, 1985: 182). 
In order words, Laclau and Mauffe highlight the manner in which forging links 
between different forms of oppression and their necessary unity in a struggle against 
injustice requires active articulation or in the case of Israel-Palestine a rearticulation of 
exisWLQJVRFLDO UHODWLRQV7KXV WKHQHFHVVLW\ WR ILJKW IRUZRPHQ¶VDQG/*%7OLEHration, 
justice for the Palestinian people, and freedom from ethnic discrimination among Israeli 
Jews in Israel-Palestine might not be immediately obvious to those affected by the 
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different forms of oppression they face. However, just as Zionism has made it possible to 
speak about a coherent and unified Jewish nation in Israel-Palestine despite ethno-
national and class differences, so can an active anti-Zionist discourse based on the 
principle of justice attempt to articulate the manner in which the shared, though different, 
forms of oppression facing women, Palestinians, Mizrahi Jews and other non-Ashkenazi 
Israelis, can be overcome by working together for justice, freedom and equality.  
This is not to say that a case is being made here for seeing different experiences of 
oppression as the same, or for that matter that some of those suffering class and/or ethnic 
oppression are not themselves complicit and responsible for reproducing the oppression 
of others. For example, as has already been mentioned, the majority of Israeli soldiers 
serving in the Occupied Territories are working class Mizrahi and/or Russian speakers. 
On the contrary, I am arguing that it is not only possible but in fact it is necessary for 
radical activists to actively work to articulate and forge alliances between different 
oppressed groups in order to demonstrate that justice and freedom in Israel-Palestine are 
beneficial for all, or at the very least for the vast majority of those who reside in Israel-
Palestine.  
Feminist activists, when QRWIDFHGZLWKDFFXVDWLRQVRIµWURXEOHPDNLQJ¶ and trying 
to take away DWWHQWLRQ IURP µPRUH SUHVVLQJ¶ LVVXHV KDYH EHHQ particularly adept at 
drawing analogies between racialised military occupation, and its accompanying violation 
of personal and private sSDFHDQGWKHYLRODWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VERGLHVDVDPHDQVRIFRQWURO
and repression (see Shapiro, 2013). However, socialist politics in Israel have historically 
been heavily influenced by the racialist dynamics of Zionism, and as such this continues 
to pose a barrier to attempts to articulate equivalence between the experiences of Mizrahi 
Jews and Palestinians. Moreover, the emphasis on Jewish unity at the expense of possible 
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class solidarity precludes a more nuanced understanding of intersecting interests and the 
experiences of race and class in Israel-Palestine.      
The J14 µVRFLDO MXVWLFH¶ protests, with their emphasis on mythical Jewish unity, 
represent another missed opportunity to articulate the manner in which the continued 
military occupation of the Palestinian people, and the economic subsidy of the ongoing 
settler-colonial project in the Occupied Territories, is placing a social and economic 
burden on the differentially racialised working class Mizrahi population who bear the 
brunt of having to live in substandard housing and impoverished and dilapidated 
neighbourhoods inside Israel. Instead, the vacuum left by the leftwing Israeli failure in the 
past three decades to attempt to articulate a convergence between different class and 
racial interests in Israel-Palestine has been filled by growing rightwing radicalisation, 
characterised by rampant racism and national chauvinism, exemplified by the violent 
racist riots against African refugees which took place in Tel Aviv in May 2012.  
The growing social shift to the right has in turn meant that many young people 
who are becoming active in contemporary Israeli society face an increasingly harder task 
as far as raising awareness and confronting fellow citizens in Israel is concerned. This is 
one of the reasons why a growing number of young radical activists and the signatories of 
BOYCOTT! From Within increasingly feel that change from within Israeli society is a 
very distant possibility, thus placing the onus on transnational Boycott, Divestment and 
Sanctions (BDS). Many critical Israelis are also increasingly opting to leave the country 
to focus on transnational campaigning for BDS58, as they feel they can make more 
difference putting political pressure from outside (Assouline, 2013).     
The growing sentiment among Israeli dissidents that pressure from outside is the 
most effective strategy in the immediate future could potentially open up new 
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transnational spaces for critical voices from the Palestinian and Israeli Diasporas to meet 
and articulate alternative versions of cohabitation in Israel-Palestine. These versions of 
cohabitation will hopefully take into account not only those who are resident, hold 
FLWL]HQVKLS DQGRU ZLVK WR UHWXUQ EXW DOVR WKH IXWXUH VRFLHW\¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR RWKHU
refugees seeking protection and wishing to live in peace and security in Israel-Palestine. 
Moreover, given the continuing primacy of Jewishness in Zionist discourse, and de facto 
Jewish diasporic support for Israel as a Zionist settler-colonial project, the role and 
responsibility of the critical Jewish Israeli Diaspora to address transnational Jewish 
communities with the question of justice in Israel-Palestine becomes pertinent. In other 
words, do critical Jewish Israelis living abroad have a responsibility to use their Jewish 
DQG ,VUDHOL SULYLOHJH WR DGGUHVV WKH =LRQLVW DVSLUDWLRQV DQG VXSSRUW IRU ,VUDHO¶V VHWWOHU
colonial project among the transnational Jewish Diaspora? And if so, what form would 
this responsibility take? The scope of this thesis does not permit an affirmative answer or 
an opportunity to delve deeper into this question. However, it raises the need for further 
investigation on the subject. 
Despite the above criticisms, the work of AATW activists alludes to the fact that 
there is a growing, even if very slow and reluctant, articulation and convergence between 
different struggles for justice. Even if at present this is taking place among a minority of 
critical individuals. As mentioned previously, AATW is largely comprised of many 
activists who are active and have been active and in solidarity with different groups which 
seek to challenge the many forms of injustice and oppression which coexist in Israel-
3DOHVWLQH 7KXV LQ PDQ\ UHVSHFWV $$7:¶V embodied activist practices are themselves 
articulations of equivalence and many of the activists personally embody this equivalence 
by being predominantly female, queer, and/or from marginalised ethnic and class groups. 
Moreover, the writings of AATW activists demonstrate a remarkable amount of analysis, 
reflexivity and theorisation on key issues pertaining to privilege and solidarity, something 
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that is often absent from other critical Israeli accounts. The challenge remains for this sort 
of reflexivity and deep understanding of the intersections of power and oppression to be 
articulated among the majority of residents in Israel-Palestine.      
Conclusion  
 This chapter examined the embodied solidarity activism and reflexive analysis of 
Anarchists Against the Wall (AATW). In particular, the radical anti-Zionist politics of 
AATW activists were highlighted as a means to rearticulate Jewish Israeli subjectivity as 
non-GRPLQDWLQJLQUHODWLRQWRWKH3DOHVWLQLDQSHRSOH$$7:¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRVXSSRUWLQJ
WKHMRLQWVWUXJJOHDJDLQVWWKHµDSDUWKHLG¶:DOOLQWKH:HVW%DQNWHVWLILHVWRWKHSossibility 
to articulate new alliances between Palestinians and critical Israelis which can lead to the 
expansion of the field of democratic struggle in Israel-3DOHVWLQH 0RUHRYHU $$7:¶V
commitment to other radical social struggles pertaining to gender, sexuality, and worker 
and migrant rights serves to articulate equivalence between different democratic 
struggles. The discussion demonstrated, however, that this articulation is faced by 
considerable resistance and challenges on multiple levels. In the final analysis, some 
criticisms were levelled at AATW for refusing to actively engage with the question of 
self-determination, which is understood as not having to be defined by statist parameters, 
and is moreover a discussion which can benefit by taking into account the multiplicity of 
power and oppression that operates in Israel-Palestine. 
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Conclusion 
 
The thesis drew upon feminist critical theories and postcolonial critique to theorise the 
emergence of a non-statist and non-dominating peace politics in Israel-Palestine. This 
theoretical-political approach was applied to the critical analysis of the activist thought 
and practices of three critical Israeli civil society groups, examining the way they reframe 
the geopolitical and narrative space of Israel-Palestine in response to the Palestinian call 
for just peace. Thus, this thesis is simultaneously a critical reflection on activist practice, 
and a critical activist-academic intervention on the topic of just peace in Israel-Palestine. 
The activist narratives and practices examined testify to the continuation of the logic 
of separation inherent in the dominant call for ethno-national partition. At the same time, 
they also testify to the way in which critical Israelis assuming ethical nonviolent 
responsibility towards the Palestinian people can result in unprecedented narrative 
convergence, practical solidarity, and the possibility for non-domination and cohabitation. 
In the final instance, critical activist practices reveal just peace in Israel-Palestine as an 
emergent and ongoing project to reframe and rearticulate the contemporary relations of 
oppression and domination.       
Moreover, the theoretical-political framework and critical analysis of non/anti-Zionist 
Israeli activism in Israel-Palestine drew attention to the need to move away from the logic 
of separation which underpins traditional state-centred approaches to peace. In particular, 
the analysis departed from the position that the post-Oslo Accords framework which 
structures life in contemporary Israel-Palestine is largely responsible for the present 
impasse. Further to this, the thesis made the case that statist approaches to peace have 
been based on an inherent power disparity between the state of Israel and the Palestinian 
people, who are on the whole a geographically dispersed and stateless collectivity. As 
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such, a solution based on statist principles fails to respond to the calls for justice made by 
the Palestinian people. Therefore, it was proposed that only a framework based on Nancy 
)UDVHU¶VSULnciple of the µall affected¶, which takes into account the right to redress by all 
those who are enmeshed in power relations with a given institution and its representatives, 
can serve to adequately address the question of justice in Israel-Palestine.     
The tenets underpinning the 2005 Palestinian civil society call for Boycott, Divestment 
and Sanctions (BDS) of Israel, namely (i) an end to colonisation of Arab Palestinian 
Lands, (ii) equal right for Palestinian citizens of Israel, and (iii) implementation of the 
3DOHVWLQLDQ UHIXJHHV¶ ULJKW RI UHWXUQ DUH LGHQWLILHG DV WKH framework underpinning the 
Palestinian call for just peace. Moreover, the principles of the BDS campaign most closely 
resemble the conceptualisation of the all affected principle. Further, the evolution of the 
widespread civil society support for the BDS campaign between 2009 and early 2013, the 
time period this study covers, testifies to the growing importance of transnational civil 
society and its role in reconceptualising and reframing Israel-Palestine and the 
accompanying understanding of justice and peace.  
Support for the principles of BDS has further emerged over the past few years as the 
differentiating marker between the declining significance of the traditional Israeli leftwing 
peace movement, characterised by its support for the ethno-nationalist two-state solution 
DQG,VUDHO¶VZLWKGUDZDO WRWKHSUH-1967 borders, and the emerging critical and/or radical 
Israeli voices studied in this thesis. The latter are characterised by their non/anti-Zionist 
critique of the Israeli state and its Judeo-supremacist polices within the 1967 Occupied 
Territories and in the 1948 borders. The emergence of these critical Israeli voices has in 
recent years converged with critical Palestinian calls for decolonisation, characterisations 
RI,VUDHODVDQµDSDUWKHLG¶VWDWHDQGFDOOVIRU,VUDHOWREHFRPHµDVWDWHIRUDOOLWVFLWL]HQV¶. 
More recently these discussions have also been accompanied by greater emphasis and 
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debate on the possibility of cohabitation in a single and/or binational state in Israel-
Palestine. This in turn has placed emphasis on solidarity and µMRLQW-VWUXJJOH¶ IRU
decolonisation and democratisation, in contrast to the dominant state-centred tendency to 
view Jewish Israelis and Palestinians as two national collectivities with diametrically 
opposed interests. 
Overall, this study should be viewed as a modest theoretical-political contribution to 
the growing academic interest in transnational civil society efforts for justice, peace and 
reconciliation. In relation to Israel-Palestine, this thesis can also be seen as a critical 
accompaniment to emergent literature on the joint-struggle, the BDS campaign, and 
transnational solidarity activism. On the whole, the thesis engaged with, built upon, and 
problematised emergent academic and activist literature and practices which have dealt 
with the themes of joint struggle, activist reframing of Israel-Palestine, and the possibility 
for binational cohabitation. Works dealing with these topics include, among others, 
Maxine Kaufman-/DFXVWD¶V  Refusing to be Enemies, 0DUFHOR 6YLUVN\¶V 
Arab-Jewish Activism in Israel-Palestine; and /RHZHQVWHLQ DQG 0RRU¶V  edited 
volume, After Zionism: One State for Israel and Palestine; DQG $WDOLD 2PHU¶V (2013) 
When Peace is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp thinks about Religion, 
Nationalism and Justice.  
This thesis differs from these works in that it not only examined and analysed existing 
activist thought and practice, but it also utilised the emergent analysis in order to theorise 
the ongoing process of political reframing, and in turn to highlight discrepancies and/or 
omissions in current activist thought and practice, concluding with some tentative 
suggestions for future direction. Moreover, the thesis focused on the role of 
intersectionality and intertextuality in the transnational movement for just peace in Israel-
Palestine, thus demonstrating the manner in which solidarity activism, critical academic 
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research, and artistic practices converge and intersect in articulating an alternative vision 
of/for Israel-Palestine. The multiplicity of actors involved in the transnational solidarity 
movement for just peace in Israel-Palestine, including critical historians, political 
scientists, and other academics, as well as critical filmmakers, professional and grassroots 
civil society activists, alongside others, with many of these actors slipping in and out of 
multiple roles, testifies to the futility of compartmentalising different fields of activity. 
This is even more the case in Israel-Palestine where the society is more divided along the 
OLQHV RI ZKHWKHU RQH LV FULWLFDO RI RU UHODWLYHO\ FRPSODFHQW WRZDUGV ,VUDHO¶V JRYHUQDQFH
regime towards the Palestinians and non-Jewish citizens.                
This division is particularly evident in chapters three and four. Chapter three examined 
the declining movement for conscientious objection in Israel alongside contemporary 
critical documentaries on the subject of military service. The relevance of these texts is 
not so much to do with who produced them, whether civil society groups or critical 
filmmakers. Rather, what matters is that these documentaries circulate and are 
appropriated by different actors to do similar discursive work on the subject of military 
service and its effects, and moreover, despite their critical stance, they nevertheless testify 
to the prevalence of the GRPLQDQW,VUDHOLGLVFRXUVHRIµVKRRWLQJDQGFU\LQJ¶. An important 
question arose as a result of this critical reflection, namely, that if the WHQGHQF\WRµVKRRW
DQG FU\¶ remains dominant within Israeli society, and if as the evidence suggests 
conscientious objection is in fact declining, then what are the necessary steps to break 
with the violence-reproducing frame which enables the continuing oppression of the 
Palestinian people? How can Jewish Israeliness be rearticulated as non-violent and non-
dominating?  
Throughout the thesis, narrative continuously emerges as a key site of articulating, 
transmitting, and reproducing existing oppressive subjectivities and relations. It is for this 
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reason in particular that at the end of Chapter Three and in Chapter Four the necessary 
Israeli confrontation with the Palestinian narrative of the Nakba is highlighted as the first 
step in ethically and non-violently engaging with the Palestinian Other in order to 
articulate Israeli-Palestinian relations otherwise. The significance of historical narrative in 
relation to 1948, but also in relation to the ongoing Zionist settler colonial project in 
Israel-Palestine, is also highlighted in Chapter Five through my critical reflection on the 
debates on the right to collective self-determination and binationalism which have taken 
place EHWZHHQ ,&$+'¶V -HII +DOSHU DQG WKH FULWLFDO 3DOHVWLQLDQ DFWLYLVWV $OL $EXQLPDK
and Omar Barghouti.  
Indeed, as a result of taking the necessary steps to engage with Palestinian narratives, 
critical Israelis are increasingly moving towards a one state or binational perspective, as 
exemplified in the positions of Zochrot and ICAHD. However, the growing move towards 
advocating for egalitarian cohabitation in a shared geo-political space is not free of 
contradictions and tensions. Accepting the label of colonisers has been difficult for critical 
Israelis. Similarly, accepting the possibility of decolonisation, resulting not only in an end 
to Jewish privilege in Israel-Palestine, but more so the possibility of impending 
minoritarian status in a future Arab Palestinian majority state, is similarly experienced as 
problematic and undesirable. It is for this reason for example, that Halper argues in favour 
of a binational state as a precondition of cohabitation, whiOH=RFKURW¶VHDUOLHUUHIOHFWLRQRQ 
the Palestinian refugee return envisages a loose federation of autonomous cultural 
collectivities coexisting in a decolonised Israel-Palestine.  
My contribution to these debates has been to suggest a rethinking of the relationship 
between the Jewish and the Israeli in Jewish Israeli identity by foregrounding the manner 
in ZKLFK WKH XVH RI µ-HZLVK¶ in the Zionist settler colonial project continues to justify 
diasporic settler colonialism, while denying the rights of the Palestinian refugee Diaspora 
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to return. Thus, a rearticulation of Jewish Israeliness as a civic, cultural and linguistic 
community might better serve to break with settler colonial privilege, while 
acknowledging and affirming the specificity and history of Hebrew cultural life in Israel-
Palestine. In that respect, the practical solidarity activism of Anarchists Against the Wall 
(AATW), who explicitly act as Israelis in support of the Palestinian popular struggle 
against the Separation Wall, serves as one example of the articulation of Jewish Israeliness 
as non-dominating and non-Zionist. The act of taking direction from the Palestinian 
organisers of the popular struggle, and physically standing as a barrier against Israeli 
military violence, while refusing to reproduce it, breaks with the dominant notion of 
Israeli unity in the processes of oppressing the Palestinians, and is perhaps the ultimate 
symbol of rupturing the logic of separation.  
Nevertheless, as I have expressed in my critique of AATW in Chapter Six, the 
DFWLYLVWV¶ DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW WKH Palestinian popular struggle is an ethno-national statist 
struggle, coupled with their discomfort or reluctance to confront Israeli society, 
reproduces the logic of separation and irreconcilability between Israelis and Palestinians, 
and is resulting in activist burnout, with many activists leaving Israel-Palestine altogether. 
However, as the thesis has emphasised, critical Israeli civil society groups should not be 
simply seen as a small SDUW RI ,VUDHO¶V declining Left but rather as the Jewish Israeli 
component of the transnational movement for just peace in Israel-Palestine. As such, the 
thesis¶V findings suggest, both in relation to ICAHD and AATW, but also more recently in 
relation to Zochrot, that critical Israeli groups are increasingly moving towards 
transnational DGYRFDF\DQGFDPSDLJQLQJLQOLJKWRI,VUDHOLVRFLHW\¶VLQWUDQVLJHQFH 
Zochrot, is perhaps one of the few critical groups in Israel-Palestine which accepts the 
tenets of just peace while continuing to place emphasis on working within Jewish Israeli 
VRFLHW\DQGSODFLQJWKHRQXVRQWKH-HZLVK,VUDHOLSXEOLF¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIWKH3DOHVWLQLDQ
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right of return as a precondition for cohabitation. This approach is highly valued by 
Palestinian counterparts, with many increasingly emphasising the need for critical Israelis 
to address Israeli society rather than simply showing solidarity with the Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories. However, at present the majority of critical Israelis find this request 
difficult to fulfil. Nevertheless, the move towards transnational activism is resulting in 
interesting and productive convergence and collaboration between critical Israeli and 
Palestinian Diaspora activists, particularly in Europe and North America. These emerging 
alliances, which were alluded to in the thesis, point towards future directions for research.                                   
Future research could engage with a number of interrelated questions which have 
emerged in the process of theorising just peace politics in Israel-Palestine. These 
questions concern the transnational role of critical Jewish Israeli and Palestinian Diaspora 
activism, as well as the role of transnational Jewish activism in supporting or contesting 
,VUDHO¶V =LRQLVW VHWWOHU FRORQLDO SURMHFW LQ ,VUDHO-Palestine. These questions remain 
pertinent given the fact that Israel-Palestine has been and continues to be a transnational 
project. It began as a transnational project in its inception as a settler colonial state 
established via an international resolution in 1947-8. It is also an ongoing transnational 
Jewish settler colonial project in the Occupied Territories, DQG ZLWKLQ ,VUDHO¶V 
borders, bolstered by the exclusionary Law of Return, and the accompanying denial of the 
Palestinian refugees¶ return.   
A limitation to this research thesis, and perhaps a limitation that is best addressed in 
the future by someone other than myself, has been that despite my attempt to theorise 
Israel-Palestine as a contiguous unit and to account for all those affected by the oppressive 
DSDUWKHLG VLWXDWLRQ ,VUDHO¶V SROLWLFDO GHVLJQV FRQWLQXH WR VWUXFWXUH and inhibit both 
theoretical and practical possibilities for engagement. As a researcher and a solidarity 
activist I have been unable to visit Gaza due to the ongoing blockade, and similarly the 
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critical Israeli groups which I have examined in this thesis are no longer able to provide 
on-the-ground solidarity to the people of Gaza. The geo-political isolation of Gaza, 
coupled with ,VUDHO¶V particularly extreme militarist violence against its population since 
2008-09, is undoubtedly creating a very different set of relations between Palestinians and 
Jewish Israelis. My analysis of the documentary Concrete in chapter three goes some way 
to reveal the Israeli perspective and the barriers to the possibility to break with the 
reproduction of oppressive violence. However, one can only imagine what it must be like 
to be a resident of Gaza, and that from that perspective cohabitation with your coloniser 
and oppressor might not seem like such a desirable option.    
Nevertheless, what this complex reality testifies to is that theorising from the 
perspective of the µall affected¶ is not the easy option. On the contrary, theorising in such a 
way demands that all those who are affected are accounted for, whether their interests are 
mutually exclusive or mutually dependent, and irrespective of the possibility of reaching a 
synthesis, at least in the short term. It is only by attempting to understand all the relations 
at play in a given space and/or situation that ethical nonviolent responsibility for the other 
can begin to take place. Theorising Israel-Palestine is one example of the attempt to do so. 
Nonetheless, the all affected framework lends itself to theorising relations in all situations 
of conflict, and transnational political life in general. My thesis¶V contribution to this 
principle has been to emphasise that placing the onus on those who are affected to seek 
redress can reproduce domination; rather, the onus to end violent and oppressive relations 
must be placed on the privileged. Thus, this thesis focused on the role and contributions of 
critical Israeli civil society actors in reframing Israel-Palestine, and moreover, it 
emphasised the importance of Israeli refusal to engage in the reproduction of oppressive 
racialised state violence against the Palestinians as a means to take nonviolent ethical 
responsibility for the Other.  
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However, in a world characterised by transnational mobility and interconnection, there 
is no reason why state and interstate institutions, such as the United Nations, might not 
consider moving towards a less statist mode of governance. What might international 
governance based on the µall affected¶ principle look like? What would this mean for 
conflict resolution and reconciliation? A world better equipped to consider the µall 
affected¶, a world in which the privileged choose to use their privilege to end conflict 
rather than fuel it, might be a world with fewer refugee problems, and with fewer national 
collectivities wishing to break away from oppressive ethno-majoritarian states. It might 
also be a world in which multicultural cohabitation might be seen as the norm and not a 
distant aspiration, in which self-determination is not about groupthink but simply about 
the right to exist in freedom and equality.      
Nevertheless, this thesis is not merely a utopian project; it engaged with real obstacles 
and considered tangible possibilities to overcome them. Applying this theoretical-political 
frame to a different geo-political case study will undoubtedly lead to its necessary 
modification and transformation. However, what remains at the core of this approach is 
the demand to think and theorise from the bottom up, to think from the perspective of the 
marginalised and excluded in order to examine how power operates and how it can be 
rearticulated in a more responsible and less oppressive manner for the benefit of all 
concerned.   
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